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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the divergent trajectories of ethnic and national 
politics in the Tamil speaking regions of India and Sri Lanka. Despite 
comparable historical experiences and conditions, the south Indian Tamil 
speaking areas were peaceably accommodated within a pan-Indian framework 
whilst Sri Lankan politics was marked by escalating Tamil-Sinhala ethnic 
polarisation and violent conflict. The dissertation explains these contrasting 
outcomes by setting out a novel theoretical framework that draws on the work 
of Reinhart Koselleck and his analysis of the links between concepts and 
political conflict. It argues that in the era of popular sovereignty the nation and 
ethnicity have become central and unavoidable concepts of political order, but 
concepts that can be deliberately constructed through political activity in more 
or less inclusive ways. Setting out the conceptual connections between the 
nation, ethnicity and popular sovereignty, the dissertation shows how the 
conceptual tension between a unified national identity / interest and ethnic 
pluralism becomes a central and unavoidable locus of political contestation in 
the era of popular sovereignty. Tracing the politics of ethnicity and 
nationalism in India and Sri Lanka from the late nineteenth century to the late 
1970’s, the analysis shows that the accommodation of Tamil identity within 
Indian nationalist frameworks and the escalation of Tamil – Sinhala ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka cannot be linked to differences in ethnic demography, 
political system, historical experiences or the structure of economic incentives. 
It reveals instead that these divergent outcomes are best explained as effects of 
contingent and competitive processes of political organisation and mobilisation 
through which deliberately more or less ethnically inclusive national identities 
are asserted, established and then contested.  
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1. Introduction 
The strikingly divergent political trajectories of the Tamil speaking regions of 
south India and Sri Lanka 1  present an interesting puzzle for the study of 
ethnicity, nationalism and ethnic conflict. From the early decades of the 
twentieth century, movements and ideologies stressing a distinct Tamil 
political identity and interest have dominated Tamil politics in both south 
India and Sri Lanka. However, the relationship between these movements and 
their respective states has been very different and resulted in dramatically 
different economic and political outcomes for the two Tamil speaking regions. 
Tamil Nadu is at present an economically successful and politically stable 
component of the Indian Union. It has good development indicators, a 
flourishing culture industry and has been well represented at the Union level 
since independence. In contrast, the Tamil speaking north-eastern areas of Sri 
Lanka are at present devastated by thirty years of armed conflict and the Sri 
Lankan Tamil population, both on the island and the significant West based 
Diaspora, continues to express serious disaffection with the Sri Lankan state 
(ICG 2012a, 2012b). While Tamil Nadu’s relationship with the government in 
Delhi has at times been fractious and tense, disputes have invariably been 
contained within the boundaries of the constitutional framework and never 
escalated into sustained violence. In Sri Lanka, however, relations between the 
Colombo government and Sri Lankan Tamil political actors since 
independence have been marked by confrontation, abandoned compromises 
and violence escalating into militarised conflict. The brutal end of Sri Lanka’s 
armed conflict in May 2009 has also not led to peace but intensifying ethnic 
polarisation. Three years after the war ended, the Tamil speaking areas remain 
under intense military occupation (ICG 2012a, 2012b) and the Sri Lankan 
government has steadfastly refused calls for de-militarisation, greater self 
government for the north-east and credible investigations into persistent 
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allegations that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed in 
the final stages of the war; steps widely seen as the necessary precondition of 
post-conflict political accommodation and stability (Hogg 2011; ICG 2011).  
What is peculiar about these contrasting outcomes of south Indian ethnic 
accommodation and violent ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is that they could not 
have been predicted from historical dynamics of Tamil politics in the two 
regions. In the late colonial period the south Indian Dravidian movement 
opposed Congress-led Indian nationalist mobilisation as a vital threat to Tamil 
identity and interest (Chapter Five). As independence from Britain approached, 
Dravidian leaders even advocated separation from India as a means of securing 
Tamils against the alleged threats of Indian domination. This antagonism 
continued in the immediate post-independence period. For example, the 
Indian government’s attempts to replace English with Hindi as the official 
language in 1965 led to widespread and violent protests across Tamil Nadu. 
Seven people self-immolated in protest against the act while two took poison 
and in the ensuing days up to 150 people were killed in clashes between 
protesters and police (Ross-Barnett 1976:133). Conflict did not escalate, 
however. Instead, from 1967 onwards, Dravidian parties have held power at 
the state level and have worked within the Indian constitutional framework. 
In 1976 the Anna Dravidia Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK), one of the two 
major Dravidian parties, even added the All India prefix to its name in an 
effort to explicitly signal an acceptance of the Indian constitutional framework 
(Subramanian, N 1999:301), though the AIADMK has remained an exclusively 
Tamil Nadu party. Furthermore, from the early 1990’s the Dravidian parties 
have also been important partners in the coalition governments that have 
become the norm in Delhi.  
While Tamil Nadu politics has moved from separation to integration, Sri 
Lankan Tamil politics has moved in the opposite direction. Sri Lankan Tamil 
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politicians led attempts to form pan-ethnic nationalist organisations from the 
late nineteenth century, actively collaborating with Sinhalese politicians in 
these efforts. As independence approached Tamil political leaders advocated 
power sharing within a single unified constitutional structure as a means of 
promoting and protecting Tamil interests. Conflict between the Tamils and the 
increasingly Sinhala Buddhist state emerged in the wake of the 1956 Sinhala 
Only act that established Sinhala as the sole language of administration. This 
sparked demonstrations across the Tamil speaking areas that brought the civil 
administration to a standstill by blockading government offices. Although the 
protests were widespread and sustained, they were nevertheless quite insipid 
in comparison with the intensity of the language protests in Tamil Nadu. But 
conflict steadily escalated and in 1977 a coalition of Tamil parties, citing a 
history of violence and discrimination, swept the polls in the Tamil speaking 
areas on a platform of independence. At around the same time, episodic 
confrontations emerged between the Sinhala military and a nascent Tamil 
insurgency seeking independence through armed struggle. Military repression 
and continuing anti – Tamil violence, culminating in the July 1983 pogrom,2 
tipped the simmering insurgency into a civil war (Bose 1994; Krishna 1999). 
These dramatic reversals, from separation to union in Tamil Nadu and in the 
opposite direction in Sri Lanka, are not easily explained by existing approaches 
to the study of ethnicity and nationalism. While the field of ethnicity and 
nationalism studies contains an irreducible plurality of theoretical and 
methodological approaches, two broad ways of explaining how ethnic and 
national identities are created and maintained are nevertheless discernible. 
The first set of approaches, that can be termed ‘realist’, links ethnic and 
national identities to foundational aspects of human psychology and human 
interaction or to structurally important – and relatively stable – characteristics 
of social life. A second set of approaches that can be labelled ‘constructivist’ 
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characterises ethnic and national as more or less easily created effects of 
human interaction. Constructivism can be further subdivided into 
instrumental and discursive approaches. Instrumental forms of constructivism 
explain identities as the more or less conscious and wilful creations of self 
seeking political actors pursuing other and unrelated ends. A second, 
discursive form of constructivism, draws on post-structuralist notions of power 
and agency to explain identities as effects of self-regulating discursive practices 
that create and maintain particular conceptions of social and political order, 
rather than the wilful creations of particular agents. 
Realist and constructivist frameworks have been used to analyse south Asian 
ethnic and national conflicts, including Tamil politics in India and Sri Lanka. 
These studies, discussed in Chapter Three, point to a range of factors to explain 
the production of Tamil and other identities and the consequent outcomes of 
ethnic accommodation or ethnic conflict between them. Analysis that begins 
with realist understandings of ethnic identity points to the patterns of ethnic 
demography and the more or less enlightened or moderate decisions of 
political leaders in accommodating or making ethnic demands. Instrumental 
forms of constructivism point to the self seeking interests of political actors, 
both leaders and their followers, in creating more or less accommodating 
identity projects. Finally discursive forms of constructivism point to the types 
of identities embedded in colonial rule and then incorporated by Indian and 
Sri Lankan actors in subsequent efforts to establish political order. However, 
when these factors are placed in comparative and historical perspective they 
cannot account for the important shifts over time within south Indian and Sri 
Lankan Tamil politics, as well as the important differences between them.  
This is because these divergent outcomes occurred despite the range of 
historical, social and economic similarities between the two cases that make 
them uniquely comparable (Chapter Two). India and Sri Lanka have a shared 
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history of British colonial rule followed by sustained competitive electoral 
democracy. They also have similar social and economic systems, and electoral 
politics in both states continue to rely on patronage networks that distribute 
public resources of various kinds. As a consequence, the interests that are 
mobilised and satisfied through accommodative ethnic politics in south India 
are the same as those involved in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. In other words, 
the divergent trajectories of south Indian and Sri Lankan Tamil politics cannot 
be explained as effects of the various interests satisfied in the process. Likewise 
the types of identities embedded in the discursive practices of the colonial state 
and subsequent social and political movements are also remarkably consistent 
across India and Sri Lanka. Differences in the patterns of ethnic demography 
are also more apparent than real. It could be argued that India’s ethnically 
fragmented population, where the Hindu majority is cleaved by differences of 
language and caste, is more conducive to ethnic accommodation than Sri 
Lanka’s binary division between the Sinhala Buddhist majority and the Tamil 
minority. However, the idea of a consolidated Sinhala Buddhist – Tamil 
conflict in Sri Lanka overlooks regional, religious and caste cleavages that have 
been important sites of intra Sinhala and intra Tamil conflict (Chapters Six and 
Eight). Conversely in India, from the early decades of the twentieth century, 
Hindu nationalist organisations have sought – with temporally and spatially 
varying success - to create a majoritarian Hindu political identity that 
incorporates intra–Hindu caste and linguistic cleavages (Jaffrelot 1996; Hansen 
and Jaffrelot 2001). In short, the political salience of an overwhelming ethnic 
majority in Sri Lanka and a more ethnically fragmented polity in India are 
themselves outcomes in need of explanation, and not pre-given variables that 
can underlie the divergent outcomes of ethnic pluralism in the two states. 
Finally, the more or less enlightened or moderate decisions of political leaders 
in accommodating or making ethnic demands have been important in shaping 
outcomes in the two Tamil speaking regions. However, outcomes such as 
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sustained ethnic conflict or stable accommodation are not created by single 
momentous decisions but rather a pattern of sequential decisions that are 
cumulatively, rather than singularly, consequential. For example, while 
politicians in both India and Sri Lanka decided to form pan-ethnic political 
organisations in the late nineteenth century only in India did this produce a 
sustained pan-ethnic political structure, the Indian National Congress (INC or 
Congress). The growing importance of Congress subsequently worked to both 
constrain and enable in significant ways the decisions of political actors until 
well into the twentieth century. What is required therefore is a framework of 
analysis that can situate and interpret ethnic and national decision making 
whilst also explaining why some decisions produce sustained and politically 
significant outcomes whilst others do not.  
1.1 The Argument  
This dissertation sets out an alternative framework for understanding ethnic 
and national politics in which the nation and ethnicity are treated as central 
and unavoidable concepts of political contestation in the modern system of 
nation states, rather than expressions of more or less authentic and/or stable 
identities. The centrality of the nation and ethnicity to modern politics derives 
from their close conceptual connection to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, 
the sole principle of political legitimacy within the system of nation states. 
Popular sovereignty begins by distributing the source of political authority in 
equal packets amongst the population contained within the boundaries of the 
state, but subsequently demands that political authority can only be exercised 
in accordance with the shared national identity and national interests that 
unites the population as members of a political community. As a consequence 
the concept of a shared and unifying national interest and national identity 
becomes central to political contestation. It is in this context that ethnic 
diversity becomes a conceptually unavoidable political problem. From an 
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ethnically plural population, which ethnic groups will be included within the 
national whole and, just as crucially, on what terms? Which aspects of the 
populations’ social and cultural life will be included as aspects of a shared 
national identity and which will be relegated to a lesser private, familial or 
personal realm? The nation and ethnicity are thus central concepts of modern 
political order and political actors seeking to mobilise the public power of the 
state or contest the boundaries of political community must do so in ethnic and 
national terms. 
The dissertation argues that the crucial variable able to explain the starkly 
divergent outcomes of Tamil politics in India and Sri Lanka is the dominant 
understanding of national identity that structures political contestation in the 
two states. The politically dominant conception of national identity in India 
un-problematically includes Tamil conceptions of identity and interest 
whereas that in Sri Lanka does not. The explanatory purpose of this 
dissertation is to show how from very similar starting conditions, very 
different conceptions of national identity emerged in India and Sri Lanka, with 
fatefully divergent consequences for the Tamil speaking regions. Moreover, 
the historical and empirical analyses presented here shows that the emergence 
of more or less inclusive conceptions of national identity can only be explained 
as the contingent outcome of competitive and temporally situated processes of 
political organisation and mobilisation through which the conceptually 
unavoidable tension between national unity and ethnic pluralism was resolved 
in more or less inclusive ways. In essence, central to the explanation of India’s 
ethnic accommodation and Sri Lanka’s descent into ethnic conflict are the 
contingent and temporally situated processes of conceptually framed political 
contestation through which national identities were asserted, challenged and 
more or less securely established.  
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1.2 Theoretical Framework  
The dissertation draws on the work of the German historian Reinhart 
Koselleck to explain conceptual basis of political conflict and to capture the 
specifically modern character of the nation and ethnicity. For Koselleck, 
shared concepts are a constitutive feature of social and political life such that 
without ‘common concepts there is no society, and above all, no political field 
of action’ (2004:76). A shared set of social and political concepts is the 
necessary pre-condition of mutually meaningful social and political action and 
thereby social and political conflict. This focus on the conceptual parameters 
of social and political life leads Koselleck to a depiction of the modern 
condition as marked by a distinctive set of concepts that exist alongside, but 
also independently of, the economic, social and institutional changes usually 
considered definitive of modernity (2004:79). Modern concepts such as 
‘progress’ and ‘development’ are propelled by a distinct and forward reaching 
temporality in which time expands into an open and limitless future amenable 
to human agency and control (2004:21-22). At the same time, Koselleck 
describes modern social and political interaction as increasingly mediated 
through collective and generalizable terms such as ‘nation’, ‘class’, ‘citizen’ and 
‘race’ that mark a significant departure from the place and often person specific 
labels characteristic of pre-modern social life (2004:76-89). 
The nation and ethnicity are thus forward reaching modern concepts that 
impel political action by projecting ideal visions of political community and 
the relationship between state and society. The precise meanings, and 
therefore the political consequences, of the nation and ethnicity are derived 
here from their relationship to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. While 
Koselleck does not explicitly mention the doctrine of popular sovereignty in 
his depiction of modernity’s conceptual parameters, it is nevertheless closely 
linked to the events and timing that he identifies as marking the beginnings of 
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the conceptual shift to modernity, the late eighteenth century and the 
associated French and industrial revolutions. The global expansion of the 
centralised, territorially bounded state as the overarching institution of 
political order from the late eighteenth century and the transformation of the 
world into a world of nation states have also established popular sovereignty as 
the sole doctrine of political legitimacy. As a consequence, ethnic and national 
claims and identities have become unavoidably linked to the structures of the 
modern state. 
The terms ethnicity and nation are used here therefore as publicly meaningful, 
conceptually unavoidable and politically consequential categories, and not 
treated as more or less authentic expressions of underlying subjectivities or 
preferences that can then be evaluated for their authenticity or validity. The 
terms nation and national function in politics as synonyms for the general will, 
the operative principle of popular sovereignty and in doing so convey both 
ethnic and substantive political meanings (Chapter Four). That is, the nation is 
a double sided political concept. On the one hand, the nation and national are 
terms of substantive and routine political contestation functioning as 
synonyms for issues, concerns and interests that are common or general to the 
population as citizens or members of the political association, and therefore 
appropriate areas of public or state action and concern. On the other hand, the 
nation also describes the population of the state in ethnic terms as a pre-
political community bound by ties that are outside of or prior to the political 
contract. It is this double sided nature of the national concept, along with its 
close and immediate connection to popular sovereignty that makes ethnic 
pluralism a conceptually unavoidable problem in modern politics. The nation’s 
function as a shared but contested reference for the public or common will 
that unites the population also necessarily and more or less explicitly invokes 
the nation’s ethnic character. 
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The concept of ethnicity is likewise understood here primarily as a political 
term, rather an expression of the objective existence and/or subjective 
experience of pre-political forms of community or allegiance. As a political 
term, the meanings, and therefore consequences, of ethnicity derive from the 
contractarian origins of popular sovereignty and its operative principle, the 
national or general will. In social contract thinking political communities are 
held to be established by voluntary agreement between contracting individuals 
on the basis of shared and therefore potentially universal political interests and 
values. In this way the social contract as a voluntary or political association can 
be held to form the basis for civic or political forms of national identity.3 
However, the idea of the social contract always implies both post-contractual 
unity in values and interests as well as pre-contractual or pre-political unity 
(Chapter Four). As a term of politics, therefore, ethnicity captures the 
existence of conceptually pre-contractual or pre-political differences amongst 
the population contained within the boundaries of the state. These differences 
are pre-political or pre-contractual in that their existence is normally 
understood to be outside of and / or historically prior to the political 
institutions and agreements (or contracts) that constitute the state.  
Although the nation always invokes both a political and a pre-contractual or 
ethnic community, the ethnic characterisation of the nation need not be 
ethnically exclusive and can include a diversity of religious, linguistic, regional 
and or caste groups. This diversity must nevertheless be characterised as a 
historically constituted and pre-political and pre-state unity. For example, 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s conception of Indian national unity consciously included a 
plurality of distinct ethnic groups, but depicted this plurality as historically 
bound and prior to the state (Nehru 1946:48-49). However the nation is 
conceived, in ethnically inclusive or exclusive terms, political contestation 
21 
 
within a shared national framework can only occur where protagonists share 
an understanding of the terms of ethnic inclusion.  
In India and Sri Lanka the principle ethnic cleavages have been those of 
language, religion, region and caste, along with notions of biological race. 
These ethnic cleavages were politically salient because they formed the 
backdrop against which competing actors sought to mobilise and consolidate 
national political movements. Actors seeking to consolidate a pan-Indian or 
pan-Sri Lankan national identity had to conceptually and organisationally 
accommodate these differences. Meanwhile competing actors sought to 
consolidate alternative and ethnically more exclusive national movements on 
the basis of specific linguistic, religious and regional identities. The outcome of 
this contestation ultimately determined the fate of the Tamil speaking regions. 
Treating ethnic and national politics as publicly meaningful and politically 
unavoidable features of a modern conceptual landscape departs from the extant 
literature in a number of ways. Firstly it departs from the dominant realist and 
constructivist approaches that treat ethnic and national politics as expressions 
of underlying identities, preferences or motivations that are in turn explained 
in a variety of ways. Against this view, the approach here insists that national 
and ethnic politics cannot be explained in terms of the subjectively 
experienced interests or identities of the protagonists involved. As the 
historical survey of India and Sri Lanka presented in Chapters Five through 
Eight shows, ethnic and national movements bring together actors with a 
diversity of often shifting preferences and motivations. Ethnic and national 
claims are therefore more usefully read for their public meaning rather than 
the underlying subjectivities or preferences they contain. Whereas the 
subjectivities and motivations of ethnic and national actors are likely to 
fluctuate and will always be impossible to define with certainty, the public 
meanings of ethnic and national claims are discernible and must be stable, at 
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least within defined temporal and political frameworks. Furthermore, it is the 
public meanings contained within national and ethnic claims, rather than the 
underlying subjectivities, that define the publicly meaningful, and therefore 
politically consequential, content of national and ethnic claims as political acts. 
Secondly, in abandoning the idea of motivations and preferences as 
explanatory factors, the conceptual approach pursued here also rejects the 
attempt to explain ethnic and national movements in terms of underlying 
political, economic, discursive or psychological structures. Instead ethnic and 
national politics is understood here as a publicly meaningful activity that has a 
certain autonomy from the structural conditions in which it occurs. The 
success or failure of ethnic and national movements is explained therefore in 
terms of the open-ended and competitive processes of political organisation 
and mobilisation through which political protagonists define and contest 
political objectives and seek political power. The relative success and failure of 
political movements is defined not in terms of realising stated political 
outcomes but in terms of establishing a political presence that shapes the 
conditions of possibility for other political protagonists. A successful ethnic or 
national movement is thus one that is able to establish its preferred version of 
ethnic and national community as an important organising principle of 
political life. These successful identity claims are important not just for the 
movement’s adherents but also implicitly or explicitly for others with similar, 
competing or antagonistic visions of national and or ethnic identity. 
Conversely, unsuccessful movements are those whose visions of ethnic and 
national community are of only marginal significance and easily undermined 
by countervailing mobilisation.4 The historical analysis of national and ethnic 
politics in India and Sri Lanka (Chapters Five-Eight) will show that successful 
political movements are not structurally determined outcomes. Instead, 
movements that establish a significant political presence are those that bring 
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together three types of activity over a sustained period: the articulation of 
forward reaching political objectives including the assertion of identities and 
interests; the co-ordination of existing social, economic and political interests 
behind a common political project and, finally, direct mobilisation to build 
support and acceptance of the stated objective and identity.  
Thirdly, the conceptual approach departs from the characterisation, important 
in the extant literature, of ethnic and national categories as surplus to or 
disruptive of routine political contestation. Against this view, the close and 
immediate conceptual connection drawn here between the nation and popular 
sovereignty makes the nation and its ethnic contours unavoidable components 
of routine political contestation. Political protagonists can only engage in 
mutually meaningful political contestation in terms of non-ethnic and 
universally applicable values – such as freedom or equality – where they share 
an implicit but robust conception of national identity, including the ethnic 
contours of that identity. In other words, the nation’s capacity to function as a 
vehicle for universally applicable ideologies relies on protagonists sharing an 
understanding of the nation as a pre-political and historically bound 
community defined by values and characteristics that exist outside of and prior 
to the state. The appearance of ethnically defined political conflict is not 
therefore the unnecessary or disruptive eruption of ethnic sentiments into 
otherwise non ethnic or ideally non ethnic politics. Rather, ethnically defined 
conflict is politically meaningful and profoundly consequential contestation to 
define the ethnic boundaries of national community and thereby the 
parameters of political legitimacy.  
Finally and fourthly, this understanding of national identity as necessarily 
containing both ethnic and political elements questions the notion that 
national identities can be divided into discrete ethnic and civic types. In 
general terms, the literature on the civic/ ethnic makes a distinction between 
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ethnic forms of national identity based on shared and putatively inherited 
features such as language, religion or race and civic or political forms in which 
the national community is held together by the members’ shared political 
beliefs and values. There is a developed sub field within the nationalism 
literature that discusses the validity and / or usefulness of the civic ethnic 
dichotomy. 5  While proponents of the distinction argue that it captures 
important differences between national identities that emerge from distinct 
historical processes, 6  critics find that national identities are actually much 
more dynamic, open to change and often contain both civic and ethnic 
elements.7 The participants in this debate nevertheless relate the ethnic or 
civic (political) forms or elements of national identity to the variously 
structural or fluctuating processes within which national identities and claims 
are made. As a consequence, the efforts to classify distinct forms of national 
identity overlook the nation’s conceptual connection to popular sovereignty 
through which the nation becomes a double sided political concept necessarily 
conveying both ethnic and political implications. This conceptual approach to 
the nation’s political functions suggests that it is perhaps more useful to classify 
nationalisms as more or less inclusive of the ethnic diversity contained within 
the boundaries of the state concerned rather than as more or less ethnic or 
civic. This dissertation comparatively investigates the competitive processes of 
political organisation and mobilisation that established a pan-ethnic 
nationalism in India able incorporate south Tamil conceptions of identity and 
interest, whilst in Sri Lanka producing a politically dominant Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism in which Tamils were viewed as threatening outsiders to be 
subordinated within an ethnic hierarchy.  
1.3 The Contribution 
The dissertation is situated within the broad field of comparative politics, 
focusing on the politics of ethnicity and nationalism in contemporary south 
25 
 
Asia. Whilst taking a historical approach to the puzzle of the contrasting 
political outcomes of Tamil ethnicity, it does not set out to provide a history of 
south Indian or Sri Lankan Tamil politics. Instead the dissertation seeks to 
make a contribution to the comparative study of ethnic and national politics 
by developing a novel theoretical framework. Drawing on the work of 
Koselleck, it argues that ethnic and national identities are best understood as 
meaningful and conceptually unavoidable components of modern political 
order, rather than as expressions of more or less authentic and/or 
instrumentally produced subjective states. The comparative analyses of ethnic 
and national politics in India and Sri Lanka shows that politically dominant 
conceptions of national identity are contingent, in that they could have been 
otherwise, outcomes of temporally, socially and spatially situated political 
processes, rather than effects of structural or static variables.  
The dissertation also contributes to the literature on contemporary south Asia 
by offering an original explanation for the contrasting outcomes of relatively 
stable ethnic accommodation in south India and escalating ethnic conflict in 
Sri Lanka. These outcomes are separately well established in the respective 
literatures on south India and Sri Lanka and form the basis of single case 
studies that seek to explain them. The escalation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka 
has been studied by, for example, by Bose (1994), Tambiah (1992) and Bush 
(2003) amongst many others. Meanwhile Ross-Barnet (1976) and N. 
Subramanian (1999) offer contrasting explanations of the emergence of the 
south Indian Dravidian movement and its subsequent peaceable 
accommodation within the Indian political system. These studies share, and 
seek to explain, well established narratives of key events in south Indian and 
Sri Lankan political history. 
This dissertation does not set out to challenge or disrupt these narratives. 
Rather, the contribution of the dissertation is in the insights that are yielded 
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by bringing this sequence of events into systematic comparison. Most of the 
material is therefore drawn from the extensive and well established secondary 
literature. The primary material from interviews and official documents is used 
to add context that substantiates the analytical argument. Interviews were 
conducted with Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil political actors, and journalists in 
2007/8 and the material from the interviews informs the discussion in 
Chapters Seven and Eight (the interviews are listed in Appendix Three and the 
interview material cited in the text is referenced in the bibliography). 
Temporally, the dissertation examines a period beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, when ethnic and national politics began in India and Sri 
Lanka, and ending in the late 1970’s, marked by key developments emblematic 
of the radically divergent, and now well established, trajectories of Tamil 
nationalism in the two states.8 
The explanation developed in this dissertation also departs from the accounts 
offered by the few studies that have thus far explicitly connected and / or 
compared these divergent outcomes. James Manor (1979) sets out a 
comparative analysis of Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and Indian ethnic 
accommodation. He explains the difference in terms of the relatively weakly 
institutionalised party structures in Sri Lanka which meant that Sinhala 
political leaders had little confidence in retaining their support bases. As a 
consequence they were fearful of implementing electorally unpopular policies, 
including reaching accommodation with Tamil leaders. More recently Alfred 
Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav (2011) have linked the divergent 
outcomes of the two Tamil speaking regions to the very different nation 
building policies pursued by the Indian and Sri Lankan states. They argue that 
while India’s adoption of ‘State-Nation’ policies that recognised ethnic 
pluralism facilitated ethnic peace, Sri Lanka’s adoption of ‘Nation-State’ 
policies that imposed one ethnic identity at the expense of others generated 
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conflict. Sankaran Krishna’s (1999) study of Indian intervention in Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic conflict also notes the divergent ideological contents of the Tamil 
nationalist movements in the two states. The explanatory purpose of Krishna’s 
study is to provide a constructivist account of Indian foreign policy making, 
one that challenges mainstream realist analysis (1999:3-6). However, it also 
includes an account of the divergent trajectories of Sri Lankan and south 
Indian Tamil nationalisms (1999:61-100), noting that while ‘Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalism went from moderation to secession, the Dravidian movement 
followed a trajectory that is precisely the opposite’ (1999:78). He explains this 
in terms of the different social histories and social structures of the two regions, 
along with the rising political dominance of Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism 
as the crucial factor that pushed Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism towards 
secession (1999:77). These studies are discussed in Chapter Four.  
By adopting a different framework of analysis, this dissertation provides an 
explanation for crucial factors that are overlooked in these studies. In relation 
to Manor’s argument, the dissertation explains how party competition in Sri 
Lanka, despite conditions that were comparable to those in India, failed to 
produce a strongly institutionalised pan-ethnic party comparable to the INC, 
whilst entrenching Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the politically dominant 
conception of national identity. The dissertation also explains why India and 
Sri Lanka took such divergent approaches to managing ethnic pluralism (State-
Nation versus Nation-State) despite containing a comparable range of ethnic 
categories in similar social, economic and political conditions. Finally, in 
relation to Krishna’s analysis, the framework adopted in the dissertation differs 
theoretically from his analysis of nation-building as a discursive or narrative 
process; an analysis inspired by Jacques Derrida’s account of the production of 
meaning. The material in the empirical chapters also questions Krishna’s 
analysis of south Indian Tamil or Dravidian nationalism as fundamentally at 
28 
 
odds with Indian nationalism and, similarly, his argument that the escalation 
of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is an expression of self / other logic inherent to 
all identity making projects (1999: 17, 77). Whilst Krishna’s analysis focuses on 
the meanings of nationalist narratives and the implications this has for ethnic 
pluralism, the analysis here explains why and how very different types of 
national identity emerged as politically dominant in India and Sri Lanka 
despite the existence of a similar range of narratives. 
1.4 Structure 
The dissertation is set out in the following way. Chapter Two summarises the 
history of ethnic and national politics in India and Sri Lanka. It shows that 
despite evident differences in demographic scale, the politics of national 
identity in the two cases was nevertheless shaped in comparable circumstances 
and had to content with a similar range of ethnic pluralism. Chapter Three 
reviews the extant realist and constructivist accounts of ethnic and national 
politics and shows why they fail to account for the divergence in these two 
cases. The argument that the nation and ethnicity should instead be viewed as 
core concepts of modern political order is then set out in detail in Chapter 
Four. This chapter also defines the elements of political activity that all ethnic 
and national movements must combine in a temporally sustained way if they 
are to establish their particular conception of identity and interest as a durable 
and unavoidable presence on the political field; unavoidable for both their 
adherents and opponents alike.  
Chapters Five through Eight then trace in turn the trajectories of ethnic and 
national politics India and Sri Lanka from the late nineteenth century to 1977. 
This begins in Chapter Five with an explanation of how the Congress 
movement was able to establish its pan-ethnic conception of Indian national 
identity as a dominant force in Indian political life. It also explains why 
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Congress conception of national identity could ideologically and 
organizationally incorporate Tamil but not Muslim politics. Chapter Six shows 
why despite comparable constraints and opportunities a pan-ethnic national 
movement failed to emerge in colonial Sri Lanka. This chapter also describes 
the simultaneous consolidation of Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil national 
conceptions of identity and interest that involved the more or less successful 
accommodation of intra-Sinhala and intra-Tamil cleavages. Chapter Seven 
then explains how and why the south Indian Dravidian parties were 
successfully and peaceably accommodated into the post-independence Indian 
constitutional framework. It argues that this was made possible by the 
important ideological overlaps between Indian and Dravidian conceptions of 
Tamil identity and interest. Despite their many differences, Indian and 
Dravidian frameworks overlapped on the need to cultivate and promote Tamil 
language, literature and culture and also on the need to promote Tamil 
interests in development, including addressing issues of caste inequality. It was 
this ideological overlap rather than the relative moderation of the Dravidian 
movement that produced peaceable accommodation in south India. Finally 
Chapter Eight charts the consolidation of distinct Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil 
nationalist conceptions of identity and interest in post-independence Sri Lanka 
and the subsequent escalation of conflict between them. Although the Tamil-
Sinhala axis was not an important point of conflict in the colonial era, within 
three decades of independence there was a simmering Tamil insurgency 
seeking a separate state ranged against a by then ethnically homogenous 
Sinhala military. The chapter explains this outcome as a matter of contingent 
political process; the failure of pan ethnic nationalism in the colonial period 
and the post-independence political dominance of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism that produced amongst Tamils (but not other non Sinhala 
minorities) a sustained opposition framed in national terms. Conflict emerged 
not because of the existence of distinct Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalist 
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projects per se but because of the ideological incompatibility between them: 
while there were important ideological overlaps between Indian and Dravidian 
nationalisms on the question of Tamil identity and interest, the Sinhala 
Buddhist vision of ethnic hierarchy and the Tamil nationalist insistence on 
political equality remain incompatible. The conclusion sums up the findings of 
the dissertation and also discusses the implications of these for debates on the 
management of ethnic conflict.  
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2. Ethnic politics in India and Sri Lanka: comparable 
and connected, yet divergent 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical overview of ethnic and national politics in 
India and Sri Lanka, showing that despite the differences of geographic and 
demographic scale, the problem of ethnicity and national identity in the two 
states are comparable. It traces the simultaneous emergence of conceptually 
modern politics in India and Sri Lanka during the nineteenth century. This 
occurred alongside the uneven processes of social, economic and political 
transformation associated with British colonial rule. Koselleck’s depiction of 
modern life, as underpinned by a set of social and political concepts that exist 
alongside and are yet distinct from the economic and social transformations 
associated with modernisation (2004:79), is useful in relating conceptually 
modern forms of political activity to the conditions of uneven modernisation 
found in India and Sri Lanka. The chapter shows that the question of national 
identity in the two colonial states required the accommodation of a similar 
range of ethnic identities that included differences of religion, caste, race, 
region and language. Along with a broad synchronicity in the timing of 
important landmarks in the development of ethnic and national politics in the 
two states, there were also strong ideological overlaps in many of the 
movements concerned. This overview suggests that the very different 
resolutions of the national question in India and Sri Lanka were not 
structurally determined or indeed predictable from the range of political 
movements and positions visible during the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Thus, despite the apparent differences of geographic and demographic 
scale, the divergent resolutions and consequences of the national question in 
India and Sri Lanka are the outcome of the relatively autonomous, open ended 
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and mutually meaningful competitive political processes through which 
national identities are defined and contested on a shared and distinctly modern 
conceptual landscape. 
The first part of the chapter establishes the historical trajectories through 
which modern ethnic and national politics first became conceptually 
meaningful in late nineteenth century colonial India and Sri Lanka. These 
conditions are usefully analytically separated into the following two related 
and synchronous processes: first, the establishment of the modern colonial 
state and the adoption of a conceptually modern framework of rule, including 
notions of popular sovereignty and representative government; second, the 
conceptual and social translation of the existing cultural and social diversity of 
the population into modern ethnic categories. The emergence of conceptually 
modern politics was also dependent on the social, technological and economic 
changes that produced an active and modern colonial public sphere. These 
include the introduction of mass communication technologies, beginning with 
the printing press, the shift to modern forms of education with westernised 
curricula, changes in transportation infrastructure and the integration of India 
and Sri Lanka into regional and global commodity, labour and financial flows.9 
These changes did not replicate the transformations that took place across 
western Europe and north America. Indeed the expansion of colonial rule in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century was associated with de-
urbanisation and de industrialisation across many parts of India (Bayly 1988). 
Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, modern social and 
political concepts, along with the political institutions of the colonial state, 
became crucial and established facts of social and political activity in India and 
Sri Lanka. The third and final part of the chapter provides a broad outline of 
ethnic and national politics in the two countries.  
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2.1. British colonial rule and conceptually modern politics 
The antecedents of formal British colonial rule in India and Sri Lanka can be 
traced to 1611 when the East India Company first began its trading activities 
on the Indian subcontinent. The English company was not the first to arrive in 
the region and was not for many centuries the most politically or militarily 
dominant (Bayly 1988). An early lead was taken by the Portuguese who 
established trading posts primarily on the western coast of India from the early 
1500’s (Pearson 1987) and the south western coast of Sri Lanka in 1501(De 
Silva 2005). In India European traders, including the French and the Danes, 
acted within a vibrant and competitive Indian political system in which Indian 
rulers vied for control over territory and taxable resources, including trade.10 
From the dissolution of the Mughal Empire and until the mid eighteenth 
century, European trading companies occupied subsidiary political, economic 
and militarily roles in relation to competing Indian rulers who sought to 
expand and consolidate their state building projects. The shift from trade to 
formal colonial rule on the Indian subcontinent took place in the context of 
eighteenth century French and British rivalry in which India became one of 
the theatres of globalised military conflict. From the 1740’s troops from the 
British and French state armies and navies regularly supplemented the troops 
of their respective trading companies in battles for control of Indian trading 
posts. By the late eighteenth century, the expansion of the French and British 
military presence in India and the perceived importance of Indian trade to 
French and British national interests altered the balance between the 
European companies and Indian rulers. The French and British companies 
increasingly used their military and financial resources to intervene in 
conflicts between Indian rulers and in Indian succession disputes that left their 
Indian allies heavily indebted to European company officials. The East India 
Company’s decision in 1757 to depose the Nawab of Bengal, replacing him 
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with a succession of dependents and finally in 1771 directly assuming the 
governance of Bengal, was the culmination of a series of events in which 
British ideals of absolute sovereignty, Indian political rivalries, Indian 
indebtedness, as well as the global imperatives of Anglo-French competition 
were all present. 
From the initial base in Bengal and trading posts in Madras and Bombay, 
British territorial possessions gradually expanded over the next century 
through a mixture of logics and motivations that included the need to expand 
and secure the ‘turbulent frontier’ (Galbraith 1960) against possible Indian and 
French threats and the growing indebtedness of some Indian rulers as well as 
the expanding territorial ambitions of others. British expansion was 
punctuated by a series of intense military encounters with Indian rulers, 
principally the Marathas and Mysore, who were themselves expanding their 
territories through the logic of militarised state building. A decisive victory 
over Mysore was finally achieved in 1799 while the Marathas were defeated by 
1818. Some of the annexed territory was brought under direct British rule and 
administered through the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta. 
Alongside this a large number of Indian kingdoms were incorporated as 
Princely States, ruled by hereditary monarchs who retained a veneer of 
autonomy within the overall structure of the British Empire. British colonial 
expansion continued through the nineteenth century and by 1891 covered an 
area of 1.3 million square miles with a total population of over 280 million 
people (Government of India 1892).  
For much of the eighteenth century the Tamil speaking areas of south India 
were the site of intense and violent contest between post Mughal successor 
states and European powers. The clashing territorial ambitions of Mysore 
(ruled by Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan), the Nawab of Arcot and the Maratha 
ruled kingdom of Tanjore led to frequent battles in which European companies 
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were increasingly involved as allies and often adversaries of Indian rulers. By 
the 1760’s the ruler of Arcot had become a dependent of the East India 
Company and by the 1780’s the same was true of the ruler of Tanjore. With 
the final defeat of Tipu Sultan and at the turn of the nineteenth century, the 
Tamil speaking areas were incorporated into Company rule and contained 
within the borders of the Madras Presidency. The vast majority of these areas, 
excepting the small princely state of Puddukotai and the French administered 
enclave of Pondicherry, were incorporated as directly administered territories. 
The Madras Presidency covered an area of 141,001 square miles, an area 
calculated at the time to equal to the United Kingdom and Greece combined 
and containing a polyglot population of almost 36 million, of which just over 
15 million were Tamil speakers. (Government of India 1892).  
Formal colonial rule and the rapid incorporation of India into a Britain centred 
global economy from the early decades of the nineteenth century (Goswami 
2004) wrought important changes in south Indian society as well as its 
economic patterns and linkages (Washbrook 1988). Principally the growing 
commercialisation of the south Indian economy, evident from the fifteenth 
century and the well established links of trade and culture with the Arab Gulf 
and South East Asia withered. The twin impacts of the industrial revolution 
and the intensification and consolidation of British rule produced an economic 
depression during the early decades of the nineteenth century (Bayly 1988; 
Washbrook 1988). The overseas and internal markets for south Indian textiles 
and other artisanal goods along with a nascent local iron and steel industry 
were soon taken over by British goods. Meanwhile, the defeat of Indian rulers 
also dampened demand for artisanal goods, soldiers and other forms of cultural 
specialists as the courts and their armies were dismantled. Large numbers of 
former artisans and soldiers11 were therefore forced back onto the land just as 
the Company was seeking to consolidate its rule by extracting often penal 
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levels of revenue from agricultural production. The overall effect was 
predictably to depress prices and crush economic activity such that by the time 
the ‘depression lifted, in the 1850’s, what once had been one of the early 
modern world’s great commercial economies had been turned into a 
“backward” agricultural dependency’ (Washbrook 1988:508). South India’s 
own trading and cultural links with the rest of the world were thus curtailed 
and rearticulated along the lines of Britain’s growing political and economic 
dominance. The Company’s south Indian troops, financed in large part by 
agricultural revenue, were used in Sri Lanka (1795), Java (1811-15) and Burma 
(1822-24). At the same time the growing population combined with a 
depressed local economy centred on agricultural production led to pressure on 
the land and net labour emigration from south India, including to the 
expanding plantation economy of Ceylon (Kumar 1965).  
The island of Ceylon was also incorporated into the British Empire against the 
background of global Anglo French rivalry and was prompted by the French 
invasion of Holland in 1794.12 At that point most of the island, except for the 
inland and inaccessible Kandyan kingdom, had been under European political 
and economic dominance for almost three hundred years. The Portuguese 
initially established a trading base on the south-western coast of the island in 
1501, but by the end of the century had annexed the territories associated with 
the south-western Sinhala kingdom of Kotte (later Colombo) and the northern 
Tamil kingdom of Jaffna as Portuguese dominions. Portuguese rule lasted until 
the mid seventeenth century when first Colombo (1656) and then Jaffna (1658) 
fell to the Dutch East India Company. Dutch rule in its turn was brought to an 
end when the French deposed the Stattholder of Holland and installed a 
friendly republican government prompting British fears that the Dutch 
territory on the island, particularly the natural harbour at Trincomalee, would 
be used by the French to attack India (Jeffries 1962:14-15). East India 
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Company troops laid siege and captured Trincomalee in August 1795 and by 
February the next year all of the Dutch possessions on the island had been 
surrendered to the British. The newly captured territories in Ceylon were 
initially administered by the East India Company in Madras but in 1802 were 
incorporated as the Crown Colony of Ceylon and brought under the control of 
the recently established Colonial Office.13  
In 1815 the hitherto independent kingdom of Kandy was annexed and brought 
under British rule. The Kandyan areas were linguistically Sinhalese and 
religiously Buddhist, like the low country or south western Sinhalese regions 
that had been under European rule since 1501. However, the different 
historical experience of the Kandyan areas produced an important regional 
distinction between the low country and Kandyan Sinhalese. The low country 
Sinhalese areas and people were more commercially developed and had been 
under western and Christian influence for a much longer period; this cultural 
and economic difference also became at times politically salient.14 The capture 
of the Kandyan areas furthermore triggered an important change in the 
island’s economy and demography by opening up the interior areas to 
plantation agriculture, initially coffee and then, from the 1880’s, tea. Labour 
for the plantations was sourced from south India, particularly the Tamil 
speaking areas. The increasing commercialisation of the island’s economy 
stimulated by its integration into global trade flows also brought large numbers 
of other Tamils and Indians more generally who came to take advantage of the 
opportunities in trade and commerce. By the late nineteenth century there 
were thus two distinct Tamil speaking populations on the island. The first was 
the population that migrated in the nineteenth century and settled mainly in 
the central and south-western parts of the island. The second was the 
population in the north-eastern parts of the island that had been established 
there for several centuries (Indrapala 2007). The 1891 Census of Ceylon 
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recorded the population of the island, a territory of 25, 333 square miles, at just 
over 3 million (Ceylon 1892). Of this the majority were Sinhalese (2, 041,158) 
and just under a third were Tamils (723, 853). 15  The other significant 
minorities were the Muslims, called Moormen (197, 166) and Malays (10,133) 
migrants from Malaysia. 
Although the two states were of vastly different geographical scales, they were 
governed through identical frameworks which, by the late nineteenth century, 
had established in both countries a comparable and connected politics of 
nationalism and ethnicity. The emergence of ethnic and national politics in 
India and Sri Lanka is linked to the emergence of what Thomas Metcalfe has 
called a ‘distinctive ideology of imperial governance shaped by the ideals of 
liberalism’ (1994:28). This ideology was associated with the emergent 
industrial revolution and the associated reform and evangelical movements 
that were transforming social, political and economic life in Britain and 
replaced the earlier more conservative and purely extractive mercantilist 
orientation of British rule (Stokes 1963). In Koselleck’s terms, liberal 
imperialism was characteristically modern in its future orientated 
temporality16 and British rule in both India and Sri Lanka was legitimised as a 
means of effecting social and economic progress and development. This 
sentiment is clearly expressed in Queen Victoria’s proclamation of 1857, issued 
to mark the end of the Indian mutiny or rebellion and the beginning of the 
British Crown’s direct rule over India, replacing the previously existing 
indirect rule through the East India Company. The proclamation stated that it 
was ‘our earnest duty to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote 
works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for 
the benefit of all our subjects resident therein’ (quoted in Phillips 1962:10). 
The influence of liberal imperialism is also clearly evident in Sri Lanka. The 
1833 report of the Commissioners W.M.G Colebrooke and C. H. Cameron 
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appointed to recommend reforms on the government, judiciary and economy 
of Ceylon were optimistic about the prospects for advancement on the island. 
The Commissioners stated that Ceylon was ‘the fittest spot in our Eastern 
Dominions in which to plant the seeds of European civilization whence we 
may not unreasonably hope that it will hereafter spread over the whole of 
these vast territories’ (quoted in Mendis 1956:152). 
Self government through representative institutions was a crucial component 
of the liberal imperialist notions of advancement towards European standards 
of civilization. Thomas Macaulay, English parliamentarian, historian and law 
member of the Governor General’s Council in India stated in 1833 that the day 
when India’s ‘public mind’, expanded by ‘our system’, sought self-government 
‘it will be the proudest day in English history’ (quoted in Metcalfe 1994:34). 
The contemporaneous Colobrooke Cameron report also recommended a 
legislative council with representatives – nominated rather than elected – 
chosen to represent interests in Ceylon society. The Commissioners noted that 
while the prevailing ‘ignorance and prejudice’ would prevent the government 
from adopting the Ceylonese representatives’ views, a representative 
legislature was nevertheless consistent ‘with the policy of a liberal 
government’ (quoted in Mendis 1956:54).  
By the mid to late nineteenth century, the early nineteenth century optimism 
of liberal imperialism had given way to more conservative attitudes and British 
officials were generally reluctant to grant the possibility of progress towards 
self government in both India and Sri Lanka.17 Despite official resistance and 
sometimes outright hostility to the possibility of self government, increasing 
number of Indians and Sri Lankans were nevertheless adopting the language of 
liberal representative politics to make demands of their respective states. In 
India from the 1830’s onwards (Mehrotra 1971) and in Sri Lanka from the 
1860’s (Roberts 1997b), political and social actors formed associations in an 
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effort to reform, influence and mobilise the power of the state towards their 
various projects; projects always framed in terms of the ultimate ideals of 
progress, development and legitimate government. In the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century political associations emerged in both countries that 
claimed to be national in scope and made at first extremely circumscribed but 
later more expansive demands for greater Indian and Sri Lankan participation 
in the business of government. Congress, formed in 1885, initially sought 
minor constitutional administrative changes (Seal 1968) but by the early 1920’s 
had adopted the demand for ‘swaraj’ or self rule (Sarkar 1989). A similar 
organisation called the Ceylon National Association (CNA) formed in 1888 and 
sought minor constitutional changes. However, the CNA failed to generate the 
organisational cohesiveness of the INC. In 1917 political leaders impressed by 
the imminent signs of constitutional reform in India formed a new 
organisation called the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) as a vehicle to press 
for reforms similar to those being granted in India. The CNC, like its 
predecessor, failed to develop into an established or broad based movement.18 
It was thus easily supplanted in 1946 when D S Senanayake, the leading Sri 
Lankan politician of the time, formed a new organisation called the United 
National Party (UNP). In 1948 Sri Lankan gained independence under a UNP 
led government (Wickramasinghe 1995). The problem of national identity and 
ethnic diversity was conceptually hard wired into this politics and was ever 
present, more or less explicitly, in the wrangling and manoeuvring of all 
significant actors, official and unofficial alike. 
While British officials were often hostile and dismissive of the claims of these 
organisations, they nevertheless framed their objections in the language of 
popular sovereignty. That is, while British officials might have eschewed the 
possibility of democratic self-government, they nevertheless had to rest the 
legitimacy of British rule ultimately in its ability to protect and promote the 
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interests of its Indian and Sri Lankan subjects. As Billig notes, for the modern 
state, ‘sovereignty has descended from heaven to earth, from the clouds to the 
soil of the homeland and to the collectively invoked bodies of its inhabitants’ 
(1995:29). British officials often claimed that they had a much clearer 
understanding of the needs of the Indian and Sri Lankan populations than 
Indian or Sri Lankan politicians who simply sought their own self interest. A 
clear expression of this sentiment was made by the Viceroy Lord Dufferin who 
dismissed the INC by stating that it was a ‘microscopic minority’ and that it 
was impossible to entrust to such an organisation the ‘safety and welfare’ of the 
‘majestic and multiform empire’ for which the British stood responsible ‘in the 
eyes of God and before the face of civilization’ (quoted in Gopal 1965:175). At 
the same time, British officials also invoked the ethnic pluralism of the Indian 
and Sri Lankan politicians to challenge the national claims of Indian and Sri 
Lankan politicians. In India the INC’s claim to be nationally representative was 
challenged along the cleavages of religion and caste by Muslim (Hardy 1972) 
and lower caste representatives (Zelliot 1988) with more or less explicit British 
support. Similarly, in Sri Lanka the CNC’s claims to be nationally 
representative were challenged along the cleavages of region and language by 
Kandyan Sinhalese and Tamil representatives - again with more or less explicit 
British support (Wickramasinghe 1995).  
Eventually the transition from British colonial rule to independence was 
effected through constitutional changes that saw a gradual expansion of 
elected Indian and Sri Lankan representation in the political institutions 
established during the early decades of the nineteenth century, along with 
greater executive power for elected representatives. These changes invariably 
involved contestation over the extent and balance of ethnic representation. 
During most of the nineteenth century, until the reforms of 1920, 
constitutional change was slow and incremental. In India the process of 
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constitutional reform 19  began with the 1861 Indian Councils Act which 
provided Indian representation, through nomination, in the Imperial 
Legislative Council in Calcutta and the newly established Provincial 
Legislatures, including in Madras.20 The next substantive step came with the 
1909 Indian Councils Act (also called the Morley–Minto reforms) which 
introduced for the first time the elective principle to the Imperial and 
Provincial legislative councils, with representatives elected indirectly from the 
members of local district and municipal boards. The 1909 reforms also 
introduced the principle of separate Muslim electorates; that is, Muslims voters 
were formed into a distinctive electoral college to facilitate the election of 
specifically Muslim representatives. The intention was to ensure adequate 
Muslim representation as in most electoral constituencies Muslims were a 
minority of the eligible voters. Constitutional change in Sri Lanka was also 
slow during much of the nineteenth century.21 There was little change to the 
nominated legislative council created in 1833 by the Colebrooke Cameron 
reforms save for the addition of two extra representatives in 1886; one for the 
Muslims and one for the Kandyan Sinhalese, the latter seen as requiring 
separate representation from the low country Sinhalese.  
The pace of reform in the twentieth century was comparatively more rapid 
than that in the nineteenth century. In India, just a decade after the 1909 Act, 
the Montague Chelmsford reforms of 1919 allowed for the direct elections of 
Indians (from largely territorial constituencies) to the provincial legislatures, 
and indirectly from the provincial legislature to the Imperial legislature now 
moved to the new capital in Delhi. The 1919 act also devolved a limited 
amount of executive responsibility to Indians at the provincial level. These 
reforms were rejected by the INC and other nationalists, including a 
significant number who sought to use political violence as a means of directly 
overthrowing British rule. The push for more extensive reform led to the 1935 
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Government of India Act which expanded the franchise further and granted 
responsible government, albeit under the final executive authority of the 
Viceroy, at provincial and central levels. India was governed under the 
provisions of the 1935 Act until independence and partition in 1947 following 
which, in 1952, the Indian Constituent Assembly adopted India’s post 
independence constitution and elections were held for the first time with a 
universal franchise. 
The gradual expansion of the elective principle and progress towards self 
government was marked by debates about the nature of ethnic representation, 
particularly the representation of the Indian Muslim population. By 1935 the 
INC had established an electoral dominance over the non Muslim general 
constituencies and in the 1945 elections the Muslim League swept the Muslim 
electorates. 22  The failure of Congress and Muslim League to agree on a 
mutually acceptable constitutional structure led to independence with 
partition in August 1947. Following partition, Congress consolidated its 
dominance of the Constituent Assembly and shaped the process of constitution 
making over the next five years. The INC’s vision of Indian national identity 
and national interest was decisive in shaping the form of the Indian 
constitution and its provisions on matters such as citizenship, language, 
religion and caste (Austin 1972).  
The pace of reform in Sri Lanka in the twentieth century was equally rapid, 
with important changes to the constitutional structure coinciding with major 
reforms in India. 23  The electoral principle was gingerly introduced to the 
legislative council in 1909 with the creation of an additional educated 
Ceylonese seat selected by an electorate restricted on the basis of education 
and property. The August 1917 Montague Chelmsford announcement of 
reforms in India spurred the creation of Ceylon National Congress (CNC) to 
press for an expansion of the electoral principle and territorial rather than 
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communal representation. These demands were resisted by Kandyan Sinhalese 
and Tamil politicians who insisted on special electoral provisions to offset the 
demographic majority of the low country Sinhalese translating into electoral 
dominance. A series of reforms throughout the 1920’s contained a mixture of 
territorial and communal electorates, a limited franchise and extra weighting 
to increase the representation of the minorities – principally the Tamils and 
the Kandyan Sinhalese. The next stage of reforms in Sri Lanka, as in India, was 
tasked to a Commission, the Donoughmore Commission, which remarkably 
arrived on the island in November 1927 just as the similarly-tasked Simon 
Commission arrived in India to protests and boycotts by Indian nationalist 
groups, including Congress. The Donoughmore commission, unlike its 
equivalent in India, met with a full and exhaustive range of Sri Lankan 
politicians and formulated a far reaching set of proposals. It set out a 
constitutional structure based on the London County Council system in which 
executive committees elected by the entire legislature - named the State 
Council - were tasked with responsibility for the major areas of government. 
The state councillors were to be elected primarily on the basis of territorial 
constituencies and on the basis of universal franchise.  
With the expansion of mass electoral politics, the issue of minority 
representation had become a key area of contestation between the CNC, the 
political grouping pushing for full parliamentary government with cabinet 
responsibility, and Tamil as well as other minority politicians seeking minority 
safeguards. By the late 1930’s, a number of Tamil and other minority 
politicians coalesced behind the demand for equal representation of minorities 
and the Sinhalese at the national level (or fifty-fifty). However, Tamil and 
other minority political leaders were not involved in the process of negotiating 
the political framework of independence - that was left almost exclusively to D. 
S Senanayake, the first post-independence Prime Minister. The constitution 
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that Senanayake shaped along with British officials and politics did include 
constitutional safeguards protecting minority rights, including clearly worded 
clauses entrenching the principle of equality, and was adopted by the State 
Council in May 1946. His party, the UNP, hastily formed in 1946 to contest 
elections under the new constitutional framework, also articulated a multi – 
ethnic vision of Sri Lankan identity. However, unlike India’s post-
independence constitution that was closely tied to Congress’ ideological vision 
as well as organisational coherence, the pan ethnic framework of Sri Lanka’s 
first post independence constitution was not backed by a well established 
political institution. As a consequence, in the years following independence it 
was soon pushed aside by the politically more powerful vision of a Sinhala 
Buddhist nation and national interest.  
The clear emergence of ethnic and national politics in India and Sri Lanka was 
not associated with the transformative social and economic changes that 
accompanied the expansion of representative politics and the elective principle 
in North America and Western Europe. In India, as in Sri Lanka, for the 
duration of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century the 
proportion of the population engaged in public associational politics framed 
through the concepts of nation and ethnicity was small and limited. This is 
apparent in the size of the proportion of the electorate that was eligible for the 
franchise when it was restricted through literacy and property qualifications; 
the 1919 reforms in India extended the franchise to just 2 per cent of the 
population, while in Sri Lanka the 1921 reforms extended the franchise to just 
over 1 per cent of the population. 24  The emergence of mass political 
movements in the early decades of the twentieth century also did not signal 
the creation of a uniform public culture. Shahid Amin’s study of peasant 
perceptions of Gandhi in the 1920’s shows that the official statements set out 
by Congress party workers and Gandhi himself were starkly dissonant with 
46 
 
millennial expectations and ambitions for social mobility through which 
Gandhi’s rural audience reframed his message (1984). Similarly, the prevalence 
of significant economic inequality meant that even during the periods of 
limited franchise, electoral contestation was organised through vote banks and 
the often coercive mobilisation of patron-client networks. 25  Despite these 
limitations, ethnic and national politics is nevertheless the crucial arena 
through which to explain the divergent political, social and economic 
outcomes of the Tamil speaking regions in south India and Sri Lanka. As 
Chapter Five demonstrates, the electoral incorporation of the Tamil speaking 
areas within the Congress organisation occurred through activities of 
organisation and mobilisation (often dependent on patronage networks) that 
were nevertheless framed in ethnic and national terms. Conversely, in Sri 
Lanka the failure of pan-ethnic nationalism and the associated political 
dominance of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism were also mediated through 
electoral processes in which patron client networks and vote banks were 
equally important (Chapters Six and Eight).  
2.2 Framing ethnic diversity in India and Sri Lanka 
The colonial states of India and Sri Lanka brought together populations 
containing a diversity of social and cultural groups. By the late nineteenth 
century this diversity was framed and understood through the categories of 
caste, language, religion and race; categories that were built into the structures 
of the colonial state.26 There is an ongoing debate on the relationship between 
modern ethnic categories and pre-modern cultural differences. An influential 
body of post colonial scholarship suggests that modern ethnic identities and 
therefore ethnic antagonisms are largely the products of colonial rule. 
However, these arguments are challenged by others who suggest that these 
categories were politically and socially significant in the pre-British period and 
their salience in modern politics is the result of Indian and Sri Lankan agency 
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as much as colonial systems of governance.27 Chapter Four briefly sets out a 
possible way of understanding the relationship between pre modern cultural 
diversity and modern ethnic categories in India and Sri Lanka. For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, what is important is that the social and 
cultural diversity of the Indian and Sri Lankan populations was framed, 
administered and discussed through remarkably similar ideas and categories. 
As a consequence, the problem of national identity in India and Sri Lanka had 
to contend with the same range of ethnic categories. In both states the attempt 
to create a pan ethnic national identity had to contend with ethnic differences 
framed in caste, linguistic, religious, racial and, in Sri Lanka, also regional 
terms. 
By the late nineteenth century, modern ethnic categories were an established 
part of colonial public culture. They were not only extensively used in the 
administrative practices of the state but also formed the basis of the expanding 
range of social and political activities undertaken by Indians and Sri Lankans 
themselves. The decennial census operations undertaken by the colonial 
governments of both states organised the population according to categories of 
language, religion, race and caste. These categories were also important in the 
routine administrative practices such as recruitment to state agencies – 
including the police and military, the distribution of public funds for 
education and the administration of civil law. At the same time social reform 
movements and political associations also based their activities on these very 
same ethnic categories. Religious and linguistic revival and reform movements, 
as well as caste associations, worked within the same frameworks and sets of 
assumptions as the colonial state. An important and influential set of ideas that 
influenced the use of ethnic categories – by officials and associational actors 
alike – claimed that the Indian and Sri Lankan populations could be divided 
into racially distinct Aryan, Dravidian and Muslim populations on the basis of 
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language, race, religion and caste. This racial categorisation was used by a wide 
range of actors in both countries to set out the substance of national identities 
and national histories that included some linguistic, religious and caste groups, 
but excluded others.  
The Aryan / Dravidian distinction, with Muslims as civilizational outsiders, 
evolved from the late eighteenth century study of Sanskrit by British scholars 
who were based mainly in Calcutta and were identified by themselves and 
others as Orientalists (Trautmann 2004). Noticing the structural similarities 
between Sanskrit and European languages, particularly Latin and Greek, Sir 
William Jones argued that they must have at some stage come from the same 
root language and furthermore that speakers of these languages shared 
common ancestors. The term Aryan, a Sanskrit word meaning ‘noble’ or 
‘honourable’, was introduced by the Sanskritist Max Muller in the 1840’s and it 
quickly acquired nineteenth century racial implications absent from the 
eighteenth century work of the Calcutta Orientalists.28 Thomas Trautmann has 
argued that Sir William Jones’ study of Sanskrit was situated within a larger 
biblical ethnology that emphasised the unity of mankind. In keeping with this, 
eighteenth century perspectives of Indian society generally viewed all Indian 
languages and cultures as derived from the same Sanskritic roots. The 
Orientalist characterisation nevertheless saw the Muslims as outsiders and 
invaders responsible for the destruction and degradation of Sanskritic Hindu 
civilization; a theme that became important to Hindu nationalist 
interpretations of Indian history.  
The notion that all Indian languages were derived from Sanskrit was 
challenged by scholars working on south Indian languages, in particular Tamil 
and Telugu. First Francis Ellis Whyte in 1816, and then Bishop Robert 
Caldwell in 1856, argued that the south Indian languages were independent of 
Sanskrit and had an alternative source. Caldwell used the term Dravidian, also 
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derived from Sanskrit and originally used to designate south Indian Brahmin 
groups, to label the south Indian language group, language speakers and their 
cultural and literary heritage (Trautmann 2004:145-153). The distinction 
between the Aryan and Dravidian components of Indian society gave rise to 
two competing understandings of Indian civilization and history; one in which 
the Aryans became the bearers of civilization and in the other the Dravidians. 
The Aryan/ Dravidian distinction also mapped broadly onto a north/ south 
regional divide separating the Aryan north from the Dravidian south. From the 
late nineteenth century proponents of both accounts began to draw on then 
popular biological conceptions of race in which racial types, identified through 
physical features, particularly skin colour, was used to explain intellectual and 
cultural or ‘civilizational’ attainment.  
In the Aryan narrative of Indian history, Indian civilization is created by the 
foundational act of Aryan migration. In this view, light skinned or Caucasian 
Aryans who migrated to India from the central Asian and Caucasian regions 
brought with them the Sanskrit language and Hindu religion.29 Upon entering 
India they found less civilized and darker skinned people – identified as 
Dravidian - whom they variously either exterminated, pushed into the 
mountainous regions or incorporated within their social structure as low caste 
labourers. In India the Aryan idea was taken up by Hindu nationalists and used 
to characterise Indian national culture and history as racially Aryan, 
religiously Hindu and based on Sanskrit culture and language. The golden age 
of Indian civilization was identified with the Vedic period when key Sanskrit 
texts were first thought to have been composed. In the Hindu nationalist 
conception, this Vedic-Aryan golden age was brought to an end by Muslim 
‘invasions’ that subsequently triggered the decline of Aryan social order and 
led to corruptions in Hindu thought and practices. Practices such as caste and 
gender inequality were thus blamed on the decline triggered by the Muslim 
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‘invasions’. Indian Muslims were thereby rendered outside the national core 
and, along with Muslim culture and religion, seen as an ever threatening 
cultural, religious and even demographic threat to the Hindu – Indian nation.  
This view of the non Aryan peoples as less civilized was challenged by south 
Indian scholars, particularly Tamils (Sri Lankan and Indian) who, building on 
Caldwell’s Dravidian ideas, created an alternative Dravidian view of Indian 
society and history (Ravindran 2000; Trautmann 2006). The Dravidian view 
reversed the hierarchy of the Aryan view and argued that the original 
Dravidian society had attained a high level of civilization based on egalitarian 
and humanist principles, but was destroyed by the Aryan invasions. The 
Aryans, far from civilising the subcontinent, brought with them the un-
civilized practices of caste and gender hierarchy associated with Hinduism. 
From the early decades of the twentieth century, the Dravidian category 
became politically significant in south India and was used to frame south 
Indian, particularly Tamil, language, culture, literary history and people as 
racially Dravidian. Using the Aryan association with Sanskrit and Hinduism, 
Dravidian activists argued that Hinduism, the caste structure and Sanskrit were 
all alien impositions on an otherwise egalitarian and religiously plural Tamil 
society. The Dravidian idea was also used by anti-caste movements across India 
to identify lower caste groups with the original Dravidians conquered and 
enslaved by the invading Aryans.  
As discussed further in Chapters Five and Six, while the Dravidian idea was an 
important pole of south Indian Tamil social and political life, it was less 
influential amongst the Sri Lankan Tamils. Nonetheless, the Aryan/ Dravidian 
dichotomy did have consequences in Sri Lanka. Linguistic analysis in the early 
nineteenth century established that the Sinhala language had more in common 
with Sanskrit and the north Indian languages than Tamil and the south Indian 
or Dravidian languages. The Sinhalese people were thereby classified as Aryan 
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and this led a number of British officials and scholars, along with Sinhala 
scholars and activists, to produce an Aryan narrative of the island’s history and 
national identity, one that was structurally identical to the Hindu nationalist 
vision (Rogers 1990; Dharmadasa 1992; Angall 1998). From the late nineteenth 
century, Buddhist revivalists, like their Hindu counterparts in India, used the 
Aryan idea to characterise Sri Lankan national identity and national history as 
religiously Buddhist, as well as linguistically and culturally Sinhalese. The 
foundational act of the island’s history was deemed the migration of Aryan 
Sinhalese from north India who subsequently adopted Buddhism. In this 
narrative, the flourishing Sinhala Buddhist civilization, with its developed 
system of irrigated rice farming, was destroyed by the invading south Indian 
Dravidian Tamils. As with the Muslims in India, the Tamils in Sri Lanka were 
thereby rendered outside the Sinhala Buddhist core and equally seen as a 
cultural, religious and demographic threat to the Sinhala Buddhist nation.  
Finally, the Aryan / Dravidian dichotomy was also influential in framing ideas 
about caste, particularly in south India. A complex, regionally as well as 
historically, varying phenomenon, caste practices and norms nevertheless 
contain a number of similarities across the subcontinent that extend to Tamil 
and Sinhalese society in Sri Lanka. The English term caste covers two separate 
indices of social hierarchy; jati (or birth group) and varna (or social class).30 
The varna classification of society into four recognised groups or ranks is 
derived from Hindu theology and set out in a series of Sanskrit texts. 
According to these, society is ideally divided into four distinct ranks or groups 
each with their own qualities and functions. The highest ranking groups are 
Brahmins (priests and ritual specialists), then Kashatriyas (rulers and warriors), 
followed by Vaishyas (commercial groups and other wealth creators) and 
finally the Shudras (or servile toilers). In Sanskrit theology an individual’s 
position in the varna scheme is determined by the merits of their previous life 
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while their relative status in the next life is determined by their fulfilling the 
obligations that arise from their varna status in this life. An individual’s rank is 
contained within the substance or essence of their body, such that people of 
higher caste are regarded as of purer and more auspicious substance. For those 
of high caste, the bodies of low castes are polluting, as is any food prepared or 
touched by them.  
Although substance is determined by birth (such that Brahmin bodies are 
always more auspicious and pure than those of Shudras), it can also be affected 
by daily conduct; contact with substances that Sanskrit texts deem pure impart 
a quality of auspiciousness while contact with substances deemed polluted can 
render the substance of a body polluting to others. This division of the 
universe of substances into pure and polluting has also created a fifth order, 
not formally recognised in the varna status, who deal with especially polluting 
substances – dead flesh (animal as well as human) and human waste. Caste 
groups or jatis associated with polluting activities such as removing and 
treating dead human and animal bodies, working with animal flesh (leather 
workers for example) and removing human waste are subject to a set of 
practices known by the term Untouchability. Untouchable groups were – and 
in many places continue to be – denied access to public spaces such as schools, 
temples, common wells and public roads. From the early decades of the 
twentieth century the term Dalit, meaning oppressed or broken, has also been 
used by caste groups treated as Untouchable as a term of political and cultural 
resistance (Webster 1999). 
The bodily practices of caste hierarchy – particularly taboos about food, 
engaging in work associated with untouchable groups and the prohibitions on 
untouchable groups’ access to temples and other public spaces – became the 
objects of social and political protests in India and Sri Lanka from the early 
decades of the twentieth century. It has also produced two distinct political 
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and social strategies for overcoming caste hierarchy. One approach argued that 
that caste hierarchies and the violent exclusion of un-touchable groups was 
inherent to Hinduism and therefore the only way of excising caste was to 
abandon Hindu thought and practice wholesale. 31  In the Tamil speaking 
regions this approach was closely associated with the Self Respect Movement 
and later the Dravidia Kazhagam. The Self Respect Movement and the DK, 
both working within the Dravidian framework, encouraged their followers to 
abandon Hindu life cycle rituals, caste names and Hindu worship whilst 
staging acts of iconoclasm – book burning and idol smashing – as a means of 
shattering the ritual status of Hindu objects of worship. A second approach was 
to suggest that caste hierarchy and particularly the practices of un-touchability 
were later corruptions of Hindu theology. In this approach, most closely 
associated with Gandhi and Congress, caste taboos could be overcome by 
reforming both upper caste and lower caste behaviour whilst all castes 
remained within the fold of Hindu belief and practice. Political and social 
associations that adopted this approach encouraged activities such as inter-
caste dining, public upper caste performance of lower caste work, access for 
lower castes to privileged upper caste spaces and more controversially 
encouraged lower caste groups to adopt upper caste practices – such as 
vegetarianism, tee-totalism, orthodox life cycle rituals and the worship of gods 
from the high Hindu pantheon.  
While the varna hierarchy provides the theological basis of caste hierarchy 
and was incorporated into colonial administrative structures, the actual 
experience of caste is through a second category of human community, known 
across most of south Asia by the term jati or its equivalents. The term jati 
identifies a clear social group bound generally by practices of inter-marriage 
and inter-dining. There are innumerable named jati groups, some confined to 
small locales and identifying a population of only a few thousand and others 
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ranging across vast regions and numbering in the millions.32 Only Brahmin and 
Untouchable jatis are clearly identifiable with their respective Varna. For most 
other jati identities, social position and status has rarely been a matter of fixed 
inheritance. Instead the social status of a particular jati has been determined by 
relative political and economic power and has allowed for a great deal of social 
mobility. Groups that have gained prestige and status through arms bearing, 
control of land or commercial wealth have often been able to convert this to 
social status by adopting varna norms, that is by restricting their marriage 
practices, worshipping the gods of the high Hindu pantheon and adopting 
appropriately Kshatriya like lordly lifestyles (for arms bearing groups) or the 
Vaishya like lifestyle of the pacific and settled man of worth (for commercial 
and landowning groups) (Bayly 1999). The Varna hierarchy is therefore better 
understood as an ideal index of social ranking than a description of social 
practice. The Brahmin’s ritual status was only ever a means to legitimise the 
already existing wealth and power of upwardly mobile groups and many 
Brahmins were the dependents of their wealthy landowning or commercial 
patrons (Baker 1976:29).  
From the late nineteenth century onwards caste, in both its varna and jati 
manifestations, was an established part of colonial public culture. In India the 
varna hierarchy was incorporated into colonial legal codes as part of Hindu 
personal law and also used to categorise jati groups in the census enumerations 
(Cohn 1987; Dirks 2001; Mallampalli 2004). This led to a number of caste 
associations demanding an upward revision of their varna status (Aroonan 
1980:31; Dirks 2001:223). Even in Sri Lanka where varna was not formally 
incorporated into colonial administrative practice, jati groups such as the 
Sinhala Karava and Salagamas sought official recognition for their claims to 
Kshatriya and Brahmin status respectively (Wickramasinghe 2006:140). The 
increasingly public prominence of the varna hierarchy had specific 
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implications for south Indian society, including the Tamil speaking areas. Here 
commercial and artisan groups as well as large landowners, many of whom had 
very restrictive and varna like social practices, nevertheless did not perform 
rituals, particular investiture of males with the sacred thread, that marked 
Kshatriya and Vaishya status in north India. Except for the Brahmins and the 
untouchables, the vast majority of south Indian Hindu jati groups were 
therefore classified as Shudras in the five fold varna scheme (Ross-Barnett 
1976:15-17; Bayly 1999:32). This division between Brahmins and the rest of 
south Indian society implied therefore a racial division between Aryan 
Brahmins and Dravidian non Brahmins. A number of south Indian scholars 
argued that caste was brought to south Indian society by the racially Aryan 
Brahmins as a means of enforcing social and political dominance over the 
previously egalitarian Dravidian society (Ravindran 2000; Trautmann 2006). 
The Aryan (Brahmin) / Dravidian (non Brahmin) divide also became an 
important pole of political activity during the early decades of the twentieth 
century. This Brahmin/non Brahmin duality was not, however, influential 
within Sri Lankan Tamil politics. Instead, as Chapter Six and Eight show, the 
Gandhian and Congress approach to transforming caste hierarchy has been far 
more influential in Sri Lankan Tamil society than the radical reform agenda of 
the Dravidian movement.  
The ethnic diversity of the Indian and Sri Lankan populations was therefore 
framed in comparable ways that invoked the categories of race (Aryan, 
Dravidian and Muslim), religion, caste, language and, in Sri Lanka, region (low 
country versus Kandyan Sinhalese). These categories were used by colonial 
officials as well as Indians and Sri Lankans themselves to make claims about 
the national identities and national histories of these societies. They have 
remained central to the question of national identity and ethnic diversity in 
both states. While the politics of national identity is discussed in terms of the 
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same categories of ethnic difference, it has been argued that the structure of 
ethnic demography is different. That is, India’s more fragmented ethnic 
demography, in which the Hindu majority is intersected by divisions of caste 
and language, is more conducive to ethnic accommodation than the binary 
Sinhala – Tamil cleavage that has dominated Sri Lankan politics in the post 
independence period (Horowitz 1985:37).  
However, this argument overlooks the important extent to which the axis of 
ethnic conflict within both states has shifted over time. The earliest forms of 
modern associational activity in the south Indian Tamil speaking areas 
(emerging in the early nineteenth century) were Hindu revivalist 
organisations (Hudson 1995; Pandian 2007) and this activity produced 
incidents of violent with Tamil Christians and Muslims (Suntharalingam 1974). 
However, Hindu revivalism in the south Indian Tamil areas did not develop 
into a substantial political force and by the early decades of the twentieth 
century had given way to the competing, though ideologically overlapping, 
Congress and Dravidian movements. The Dravidian movement also 
accommodated and incorporated Muslim identity, such that the Hindu – 
Muslim divide has been largely absent from south Indian Tamil politics to this 
day (More 1997, 2004). The Hindu-Muslim cleavage has not however 
disappeared, and in post independence India the Hindu nationalist movement 
has sought to consolidate a Hindu national identity by overcoming intra Hindu 
caste and linguistic divides (Hansen and Jaffrelot 2001). Furthermore, the 
absence of Hindu nationalist mobilisation in the Tamil speaking areas is not 
guaranteed and there is a debate as to whether contemporary Hindu 
nationalist mobilisation is eroding the largely secular political culture 
established by the Dravidian parties in Tamil south India.33 
Similarly, in Sri Lanka, while the majority population could be identified as 
linguistically Sinhalese and religiously Buddhist, the Sinhala Buddhist category 
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is internally divided by caste as well as the distinction between high country 
Kandyan and low country Sinhalese. Importantly, for much of the colonial 
period, intra Sinhala and intra Tamil distinctions were far more significant as 
axes of social and political conflict than the distinction between Tamils and 
Sinhalese. In the late nineteenth century, politics amongst Sinhala elites 
involved caste based conflict between the landowning Goyigama caste, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the non landowning but commercially successful 
caste complex known by the acronym KSD – standing for Karava (fishing), 
Salagama (cinnamon peelers) and Durava (toddy tappers). 34  In the 1911 
elections the Goyigama Sinhalese preferred to vote for a Tamil from the 
landowning Vellala caste than for a Sinhalese candidate from the Karava caste 
(Wicramasinghe 1995:31). Meanwhile amongst the Tamils there was acute 
political and social conflict between Hindus from the landowning Vellala caste 
and Christians from non landowning castes (Saveri 1993). The analysis in 
Chapters Six and Eight show how the consolidation of competing Sinhala 
Buddhist and Tamil nationalist projects in post independence Sri Lanka was 
effected by processes of political mobilisation and contestation that actively 
worked to overcome intra-Sinhala and intra-Tamil cleavages.  
The structure of ethnic demography is not therefore an independent variable. 
Instead patterns of ethnic politics – whether organised around single or 
multiple cleavages – are the outcome of competitive political processes in 
which actors seek to consolidate more or less inclusive conceptions of national 
identity. The following section sets out a broad trajectory of the ethnic and 
national politics of the two states. Not only were there broad synchronicities 
in the political history of ethnicity in the two states, but also important 
connections. Furthermore, the divergent outcomes of Tamil politics between 
the two states cannot be easily discerned from the range of ethnic and national 
movements that were visible in the early decades of the twentieth century. As 
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the analysis in the later empirical chapters shows, this divergence in outcome 
can only be explained through specific and contingent processes of political 
contestation.  
2.3 National and ethnic politics: an outline 
In both India and Sri Lanka, the earliest significant forms of modern social and 
political activity were religious revival and reform movements. Hindu and 
Muslim revival and reform activity was apparent in Bengal from the late 
eighteenth century (Kopf 1969; Hardy 1972). A similar Hindu – or Saivite – 
revival movement was also apparent in the Tamil speaking regions of south 
India from the 1830’s (Suntharalingham 1974; Pandian 2007) and in Sri Lanka 
from the 1840’s (Hudson 1992, 1995; Gunasingam 1999), while the Buddhist 
revival was also beginning at this point (Dharmadasa 1992; de Silva 2005). 
These movements took similar forms. They all sought to reshape their 
audiences’ practices and beliefs to fit the modern understanding of religion; a 
system of beliefs set out in core texts and a set of ritual and social practices that 
could only be legitimised or justified in relation to those texts. In place of the 
often syncretic and localised nature of belief and practice, religious reformers 
across south Asia sought to impose discipline by setting out standard versions 
of Hinduism, Buddhism and Tamil Saivism 35  that would fit the modern 
category of religion. These movements initially emerged as responses to 
Christian missionary proselytising, but soon adopted the Christian 
missionaries’ methods – establishing printing presses, hospitals, schools and 
hostels – to counter proselytise (Van der Veer 2001).  
There were strong similarities and connections between these movements, but 
also important differences in their outcomes. Hindu revivalism in India and 
Buddhist revivalism in Sri Lanka were comparable and also importantly 
connected. They both made comparable national claims (invoking the Aryan 
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idea) – asserting that Indian and Sri Lankan national history, territory and 
identity had to be understood in Hindu and Buddhist terms respectively. At 
the same time the Buddhist revival in Sri Lanka was also strongly influenced 
by the Theosophical Society, an organisation which played a role in Indian 
Hindu revivalism and also to an extent in Congress politics (Seal 1968; Van der 
Veer 2001). The two movements were also associated with linguistic revival – 
Hindi in the Hindu case (Kumar 1990) and Sinhala in the Buddhist case 
(Dharmadasa 1992). Finally, both movements were associated with ethnic 
violence. In the late nineteenth century, the Hindu revivalist inspired cow 
protection movement led to ethnic violence against Muslims (Freitag 1980) 
and in the same period in Sri Lanka Buddhist revivalism was associated with 
ethnic violence between Sinhalese Buddhists and Sinhalese Catholics and, later 
(in 1915), against Muslims (Tambiah 1997). However, the political impact of 
the two movements was very different. In India, Hindu nationalism existed 
alongside Congress’ pan-ethnic conception of national identity and interest, 
whilst in Sri Lanka, the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist conception had by 1956 
established a political dominance that led to important transformations in the 
constitution, the ethnic distribution of economic activity and the ethnic 
composition of the state bureaucracy as well as access to higher education 
(Chapter Eight). Similarly, the Tamil Saivite movement (that explicitly linked 
the Tamil speaking areas of Sri Lanka and south India) was very similar in form 
and substance to the Hindu and Buddhist revivalisms but failed to establish a 
similar political presence. In south India, the Tamil-Saivite revival had given 
way by the early twentieth century to competing Indian nationalist and 
Dravidian conceptions of Tamil identity and interest. Meanwhile, in the Tamil 
speaking areas of Sri Lanka, it gave way to a form of Tamil revivalism that was 
closer to Congress’ conception of Tamil identity than that of the Dravidian 
movement.  
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Indian and Sri Lankan political mobilisation to demand constitutional reform 
also took comparable forms, although leading to very different political 
outcomes. The INC and the CNA were similarly elite organisations that 
conducted their activities in English and confined their activities to meetings 
and statements.36 From 1920 onwards, however, the INC in India adopted mass 
form and sought to directly mobilise the Indian population in mass protests 
intended to secure its objective; broadly Indian self government. In doing so, 
its style of politics became vernacular; Congress leaders spoke in the 
vernacular languages, adopted ‘national’ dress, used popular means of 
communication (including theatre, film and even cinema) and engaged in the 
revival of Indian cultural forms, such as the south Indian forms of Carnatic 
music and Bharathanatyam dance.37 These activities also overlapped with those 
of Hindu revivalists in that Congress often adopted Hindu religious idioms and 
images to mobilise popular support (Goswami 2004; Gould 2004). Congress’ 
activities had a strong influence on politicians in Sri Lanka. In the Tamil 
speaking areas it directly influenced the Jaffna Youth Congress (JYC) which 
had established links with Congress leaders, even organising Gandhi’s only 
visit to the island in 1927 (Perinbanayagam 1980). The JYC adopted INC forms 
and strategies – such as the vernacular languages and a ‘national dress’ similar 
to the attire of south Indian politicians - to promote a pan ethnic form of 
Ceylonese nationalism (1980). Congress was also influential amongst Sinhalese 
politicians; many Sinhala political leaders attended Congress sessions in India, 
wore ‘national dress’, spoke in the vernacular, promoted Buddhism, adopted 
Gandhian terms such as ‘soul force’ and ‘passive resistance’, endorsed Gandhi’s 
campaign of homespun cotton and even advocated a federation of India and 
Ceylon (Russell 1982; Roberts 1997b). Despite these strong connections, Sri 
Lankan politics lacked a pan island organisation comparable to the Indian 
Congress and as a consequence Tamil and Sinhala political activity produced 
two separate and incompatible conceptions of national identity and national 
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interest. As the discussion in the empirical chapters demonstrates, this 
difference can only be explained as the outcome of contingent (in that they 
could have been otherwise) competitive processes through which political 
actors and associations seek to establish more or less inclusive conceptions of 
national identity and national interest in a more or less temporally continuous 
way. 
There were also striking synchronicities in the ethnic and national politics of 
post independence India and Sri Lanka, though an absence of politically 
significant connections. In September 1949 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(DMK) was founded in Madras City (Ross-Barnett 1976:79) and a few months 
later in December the Federal Party (FP) was founded in Colombo (Wilson 
1994:32). While the Federal Party sought territorial autonomy for the Tamil 
speaking regions, the DMK sought initially outright independence for an area 
it labelled Dravida Nadu, covering the Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu and 
Kannadam, or the Dravidian language speaking areas. By 1956 the FP was the 
dominant actor in Sri Lankan Tamil politics. In 1967 Congress lost power, for 
the first time since 1935, in the Tamil speaking Madras state and politics has 
since been dominated by Dravidian parties. In 1956 language became a vital 
issue of contestation in India and Sri Lanka; in India leading to the linguistic 
re-organisation of provinces (King, R.D, 1999) and in Sri Lanka to the adoption 
of Sinhala as the only official language (De Votta 2004). Language and the 
question of the official language remained issues of conflict until the late 1960s. 
Moves to impose Sinhala as the official language in Sri Lanka sparked Tamil 
protest which in turn produced a backlash of anti Tamil violence in 1958 and 
again mass Tamil protest in 1961. Similarly moves to impose Hindi as the 
official language provoked violent protests in the Tamil speaking areas in 1967. 
In India, however, the language issue was resolved through an uneasy but 
stable compromise that granted Hindi official recognition, but permitted the 
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continued use of English at the national or union level and the other ‘national’ 
languages, including Tamil at the state level (Ross-Barnett 1976:241). In 
contrast, in Sri Lanka conflict over language morphed into a wider set of 
contradictions over land policy, employment and access to higher education 
that were associated with escalating demands for political autonomy.  
The divergent outcomes of post independence Tamil politics were also 
associated with an absence of strong political connections between Tamil Nadu 
and Sri Lankan Tamil political actors. The FP’s conception of Tamil identity 
and interest was strongly political, centred on need to secure territorial 
autonomy as a means of securing Tamil interests, particularly through 
economic development. In contrast, the DMK and Congress together 
cultivated an understanding of Tamil identity and interest organised around 
the promotion of Tamil language and literature, the promotion of social and 
economic development and the provision of welfare policies. The strong 
connections that existed between the Tamil – Saivite revivals of the nineteenth 
century and between the cultural revivalisms of the 1920’s were absent. 
Instead, as discussed later, Tamil politics in India and Sri Lanka was decisively 
shaped by the extent to which the organising principles of Tamil politics 
overlapped with the dominant framings of national identity and national 
interest in the respective states.  
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3. Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The study of nationalism, ethnicity and ethnic conflict is a theoretically and 
methodologically plural field that also contains a number of ongoing debates.38 
There are approaches that explain ethnic and national politics as the outcomes 
of rational individual decision making, testing their predictions with 
quantitative analysis,39 others that use qualitative and interpretive methods and 
focus on a smaller set of cases40 and some that use a mixture of the two.41 A 
common concern that runs through this literature is an effort to identify the 
conditions and forces driving the production of ethnic and nationalist 
sentiment and identities, and thereby explain why ethnic and national politics 
might appear plausible, attractive or indeed inevitable. National and ethnic 
politics have been variously explained as effects of long run structural 
transformations in economic, social and political life, 42  as expressions of 
historically established forms of cultural community, 43  as linked to 
fundamental aspects of human psychology, as outcomes of rational individual 
choice, as ideological tools that conceal other material interests and as effects 
of discursive (or linguistic) practices, and so on.  
Crosscutting the diversity of theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approaches are a number of unresolved debates. The first and most important 
of these concerns the historical origins and sociological characteristics of 
nationalism and, principally, its relations to the transformations of modernity. 
Modernist approaches, such as those put forward by Ernst Gellner (1983), 
Benedict Anderson (1991) and John Breuilly (1993) explain nationalism as a 
product of the social, cultural, economic and political transformations of 
modernity. In contrast, ethnosymbolist arguments, as set out by Anthony 
Smith (1986) and John Hutchinson (2005) amongst others, argue that the 
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symbolic resources of modern national communities have links to pre-modern 
forms of social and political community. A second debate revolves around the 
question of whether nations can be categorised into distinct civic or ethnic 
types. Hans Kohn (1945), Leah Greenfeld (1992) and others have argued that 
civic forms of national belonging, defined by voluntary allegiance to 
institutions and political values can be differentiated from ethnic forms of 
nationalism defined by notions of blood and belonging. This distinction has 
been challenged on the grounds that forms of nationalism that appear civic, 
also always implicitly involve ethnic or cultural content (Yack 1996; Brubaker 
2004). A third, and more recent, debate focuses on the constitutional and 
political means of resolving ethnic and national conflicts; whether 
constitutional design should either eschew ethnic recognition and thereby 
facilitate ethnic integration or constitutionally recognise ethnic identities as a 
means of accommodating ethnic cleavages (Choudhry 2008). 
This chapter will review key studies that have sought to explain ethnic and 
national politics in India and Sri Lanka, focusing in particular on the literature 
that deals specifically with the Tamil speaking regions or that has a bearing on 
explaining the divergent outcomes of Tamil politics in the two states. The 
studies reviewed contain a diverse array of theoretical and methodological 
approaches that defy easy or conclusive categorisation but can usefully be 
divided into two groups on the basis of how ethnicity and nationalism are 
characterised. The first group, labelled ‘realist’ here, treats ethnic and national 
politics as expressing a form of subjectivity that is either linked to foundational 
aspects of human psychology or to structurally important – and relatively 
stable - characteristics of social life. A second group, labelled ‘constructivist’, 
characterises ethnic and national politics as effects, more or less transient and 
easily created, of other factors: namely, discursive or ideological projects, 
political or economic incentives and opportunities or a combination of the 
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above. The ‘realist’ and ‘constructivist’ labels are far from precise. Many of the 
approaches included in the ‘realist’ category explain ethnic and national 
sentiment as a historically produced – but relatively stable and therefore 
significant - effect; likewise approaches in the ‘constructivist’ category 
characterise ethnic or national identity, once created, as very real in its 
emotive affect. The categorisation does however point to an important 
difference of emphasis in understanding the drivers of ethnic and national 
politics: for realists in significant and enduring aspects of human subjectivity 
or the structures of social and political life, and for constructivists in 
contingent conditions and/or the wilful and more or less self seeking activities 
of social and political actors. 
The review is therefore focussed on studies that have the variable outcomes of 
ethnic pluralism as a focus. It does not provide a general review of the general 
historical and political science literature on the Tamil speaking areas. Many of 
the key general historical and political science studies of Tamil politics for the 
period covered by the dissertation are anyway concerned with explaining 
ethnic and national politics. This is because the emergence of the Dravidian 
movement in south India and the escalation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka 
have been crucial and definitive political processes of the two regions. For 
example Washbrook (1976) and Baker (1976) in their respective historical 
studies of politics in Madras explain ethnic and national identities 
instrumentally as more or less convenient vehicles for an assortment of other 
interests. Similarly, in the political science literature, Ross-Barnett (1976) and 
N. Subramanian (1999) provide contrasting explanations of the Dravidian 
movement in realist and instrumentalist terms respectively. These studies are 
discussed further below as their arguments have a bearing on the conceptual 
approach to national and ethnic politics set out in this dissertation. Many of 
the other key historical surveys of Indian and Sri Lankan politics, including 
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surveys of Tamil politics, implicitly rely on the theoretical approaches 
surveyed below. For example while Seal (1968), Russell (1982) and Tambiah 
(1992) rely on instrumentalist accounts of ethnic identities, Gunasingham 
(1999), De Silva (2005) and Goswami (2004) adopt realist approaches. However, 
the explanatory intent of these studies is to situate key political developments, 
including the development of ethnic and national identities, in relation to 
wider social and economic processes. Their explanatory purpose therefore does 
not directly bear on the central question of this dissertation, namely why 
under comparable conditions, ethnic pluralism in south India led to peaceable 
accommodation whereas in Sri Lanka it led to escalating conflict. For this 
reason the review below focuses on studies that have as a central object the 
problem of accounting for the variable political outcomes of ethnic pluralism.  
3.2 Realist approaches 
Horowitz (1985) and Chandra (2004) provide explanations of ethnic politics 
and conflict based on the micro-dynamics of human psychology and behaviour 
that give rise to different explanations of the divergent outcomes studied here. 
For Horowitz, ethnic conflict has its foundation in the elemental forces of 
group behaviour; individuals identify with ethnic labels – as these constitute a 
visible and viable marker of group segregation- and then seek to secure the 
status and position of their (ethnic) group, relative to the status and position of 
other ethnic groups44. Crucially, in Horowitz’s explanation it is relative rather 
than absolute position that is vital to explaining group conflict in much of 
developing Asia and Africa and he highlights in particular competition for 
public sector employment and official recognition for ethnic markers such as 
religion and culture that mark groups as relatively ‘advanced’ and ‘progressive’ 
or ‘backward’ and ‘traditional’45. He argues that India avoided ethnic conflict 
and Sri Lanka did not because of the character of ethnic demography; namely 
the Indian political system is characterised by a large number of scattered 
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ethnic groups that prevents the emergence of binary conflict whereas in Sri 
Lanka the primacy of the Tamil – Sinhala cleavage provides a basis for 
polarised conflict (1985: 37, 39). As a consequence, in India ethnic demands 
were regionally dispersed, non-zero sum and also non contradictory – i.e. the 
demands of Tamil speakers and Marathi speakers could be accommodated by 
the centre through regional level recognition for their languages. In contrast, 
in Sri Lanka ethnic conflict led to contradictory demands of Tamil and Sinhala 
speakers on the centre that were mutually irreconcilable.  
Also starting from the micro-foundations of human behaviour, Chandra (2004) 
seeks to explain a particular aspect of ethnic behaviour: the importance of 
ethnic identity in voter behaviour and the propensity of voters to prefer co-
ethnic candidates. She suggests that in situations where democratic politics 
revolves centrally around political candidates’ ability to access and dispense 
public goods (patronage), voters uncertain about candidates’ intentions will use 
ethnicity as a marker, believing that they are more likely to receive patronage 
from co-ethnic candidates than from others (2004: 49-51, 58-9). Chandra 
assigns the stable co-existence of Indian democracy and competitive ethnic 
parties to the multiple cross –cutting cleavages that the Indian political system 
has encouraged; as Indians can organise and demand goods on the basis of 
language, caste and religion no single ethnic identity becomes overwhelming 
and no cleavage becomes the focus of a binary conflict (2005). In contrast – 
and by implication – in situations like Sri Lanka, ethnic parties have congealed 
along the most visible and numerically largest categories (namely Sinhala and 
Tamil). Whereas for Horowitz ethnic politics expresses a psychic need for 
relative group worth, Chandra derives ethnic behaviour from a rational 
calculation of expected benefits that are reinforced by the psychic benefits of 
group standing. Furthermore, for Chandra the relative ethnic stability of 
Indian politics is to be explained by the types of incentives created by the 
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Indian constitution, rather than by the existing ethnic demography of the 
Indian population. The Indian constitution provides for the distribution of 
goods based on multiple cleavages - including caste and language - and as a 
consequence encourages the formation of cross cutting allegiances that prevent 
the consolidation of polarised groups; linguistic groups are intersected by caste 
identities and vice versa such that caste and language based patronage 
networks are always at risk of being intersected by competing mobilisation.  
Both these approaches effectively begin from observed patterns of ethnic 
behaviour and then infer motivations or rationalities that might explain this 
behaviour. They then go on to suggest how these ethnic rationalities or 
motivations might help explain and predict observed patterns of ethnic politics 
and conflict. The struggle for relative group worth and esteem as well as the 
rational pursuit of patronage have undoubtedly contributed to the growth of 
key nationalist and ethnic parties that have shaped south Indian and Sri 
Lankan Tamil politics. The empirical chapters that follow show however that 
the divergence of political outcomes in the Tamil speaking areas cannot be 
explained in terms of unchanging and temporally static variables such as 
human psychology or motivation. Instead, the presence or absence of ethnic 
conflict along the Tamil axis in these two states is an outcome of the 
trajectories of key political movements and organisations; primarily the INC, 
Sinhala Buddhism, the FP and the Dravidian movement. The growth of these 
movements relied on a wide, complex range of motivations and activities that 
established not just their political dominance but also their ideological 
frameworks – including the substantive content of their ethnic and national 
claims.  
To begin with, the Indian government’s willingness and ability to recognise 
multiple ethnic claims and institute multiple cleavages (Chandra 2005) within 
the Indian population is not simply an act of enlightened policy but rather the 
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outcome of process. For example, the Indian constitution’s recognition of 
ethnic pluralism derives from official Congress policy, a product of Congress’ 
temporally continuous activities of oppositional politics during the Colonial 
period. 46  In attempting to establish a unified national platform, Congress 
politicians, from the late nineteenth century, had to confront the problem of 
India’s ethnic pluralism. In the process, they adopted measures such as 
secularism, recognition of linguistic diversity and positive discrimination for 
low caste groups. Crucially, what was important in the adoption of these 
measures was the need to present a unified ‘national’ platform that could 
potentially overcome the opposition of ethnic groups that charged Congress of 
representing only elite, upper caste, Hindu and Hindi speaking interests.47 The 
measures that evolved through these struggles were later incorporated into the 
Indian constitution because Congress was established as the dominant party 
with the Constituent assembly. 48  
Congress’ political growth was importantly dependent upon patronage seeking 
politicians and voters across India, but these actors switched their allegiance to 
Congress during the 1930’s – as an attractive vehicle for their ambitions – 
because it had already established a presence through its temporally 
continuous activities of oppositional organisation and mobilisation within an 
Indian nationalist framework.49 The comparable absence of multiple cleavages 
in Sri Lankan politics is likewise the result of a different historical process, in 
which sustained attempts to forge a pan ethnic oppositional platform were 
absent. 50  Even if the activities of all the political actors who over a long 
historical period played crucial roles in establishing the INC’s political 
presence were to be reduced to the struggle for relative group worth or 
patronage (rent seeking) activity, the temporally continuous co-ordination of 
such activity within a pan ethnic platform is still important. Patronage politics 
was equally visible in Sri Lanka during the colonial (Russell 1982:68-103) and 
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post colonial periods (Kearney 1973:52-3, 159; Moore 1985:224) and yet the 
absence of a pan ethnic platform led to very different constitutional outcomes 
and trajectories of ethnic politics.  
Likewise, the absence of sustained and binary ethnic conflict in India cannot 
be explained simply in terms of a fragmented ethnic demography. The Hindu / 
Muslim cleavage has an established and temporally sustained presence in 
Indian ethnic and national politics and Hindu revivalist activity predated and 
then coexisted (sometimes in conflict and at other times in cooperation) with 
Congress’ pan ethnic nationalist mobilisation.51 While the political and social 
salience of Hindu nationalist rhetoric has been temporally and geographically 
varied, Hindu nationalist associations have been able to accommodate caste as 
well as linguistic cleavages within the Hindu category.52 Furthermore, even 
after partition, Indian Muslims constitute twelve per cent of the Indian 
population (Hasan 1988a:818). Hindu nationalist mobilisation with a distinct 
anti-Muslim ethos continued in the post-independence period and has 
sustained temporally and regionally varying but persistent incidents of Hindu 
– Muslim violence (1998a:820). The Hindu nationalist Bharathia Janata Party 
(BJP) has also had electoral success, leading national governments (1996-8 and 
1999-2004) and various state governments (Jaffrelot 1996; Hansen and Jaffrelot 
2001). However, the Hindu nationalist project has not been able to overturn 
India’s relative inclusive constitutional order and even BJP led coalition 
governments have also had to honour the tradition of extending state subsidies 
to Indian Muslims making the Hajj to Mecca (Stepan et al 2011:69). The 
absence of sustained binary conflict along the Hindu – Muslim cleavage is not 
therefore because such a cleavage is politically unviable but because the 
political trajectory of Hindu nationalism has been shaped conclusively by 
countervailing Congress mobilisation and the political dominance of Congress 
pan-ethnic conception of the Indian nation.  
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In Sri Lanka, meanwhile, the electoral and political dominance of Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism must also be seen as the result of process and politics, 
rather than an unmediated expression of ethnic demography. For most of the 
colonial period, the most important ethnic cleavages were along religious and 
caste lines within both the Tamil and Sinhala categories and along a regional 
(Kandyan versus Low Country) axis within the Sinhala category. 53  Caste 
cleavages were so strong that in 1911 upper caste Sinhalese voters preferred an 
upper caste Tamil candidate over a lower caste Sinhalese candidate in elections, 
albeit from a very limited franchise, to choose a Ceylonese representative for 
the legislative council (Wickramasignhe 1995:31-4). The establishment of a 
unified Sinhala Buddhist framework took place through processes that 
accommodated (more or less equally) religious, regional and caste cleavages 
within the Sinhala category.54 This consolidation, furthermore, took place in 
the absence of a coherent and stable pan-ethnic political organisation.  
Another set of what are here termed realist approaches explain the different 
outcomes in India and Sri Lanka in terms of the decisions and policies adopted 
by political leaders. Bose (1994), for example, relates Sri Lanka’s escalating 
ethnic conflict to the series of discriminatory measures adopted by successive 
Sri Lankan governments,55 as do Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2009). Meanwhile, 
De Votta (2004) suggests that the escalation of conflict was a consequence of 
Sinhala leaders’ decisions to pursue strategies of ethnic outbidding in an effort 
to secure the majority of the Sinhala vote, thereby eschewing the possibility of 
compromise with the Tamils. In a similar vein, O’Duffy (2007) argues that 
Sinhalese perceptions of discrimination during colonial rule along with the 
adoption of majoritarian institutions led to post-independence Sinhala ethnic 
outbidding that polarised Sinahala-Tamil relations and led eventually to a 
sustained Tamil insurgency. These approaches assume that ethnic diversity can 
be peaceably accommodated where leaders, and their constituents, show 
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moderation and agree to appropriate institutional reforms. Stepan, Linz and 
Yadav (2011) also make an explicit comparison between Tamil speaking areas 
in India and Sri Lanka, linking their divergent trajectories to the Indian 
adoption of a set of what they term ‘state-nation’ policies that explicitly 
recognize cultural plurality, in contrast to the ‘nation-state’ policies followed 
in Sri Lanka that sought to forcibly create cultural homogeneity out of deeply 
entrenched cultural heterogeneity. Finally, Ross-Barnett’s study of south 
Indian Tamil nationalism suggests that the peaceable accommodation of the 
Dravidian movement within the Indian constitutional framework occurred in 
large part because of the moderation of the leaders of the DMK who in 
November 1960 dropped the demand for secession (1976:109).  
The argument presented here does not necessarily contradict this analysis. 
Instead, crucially, it places often momentous political decisions within a 
broader historical process, suggesting that these decisions are informed by 
wider and politically entrenched understandings of national identity and 
national interest, rather than momentary instances of extreme or moderate 
calculation. For example, when Congress leaders adopted accommodative 
policies, described by Stepan, Linz and Yadav as ‘state-nation’ policies, they did 
so as a necessary means of consolidating a pan-ethnic platform. From the 
inaugural meeting of Congress in December 1885, Indian nationalists 
associated with Congress were anxious to demonstrate that their organisation 
had pan-ethnic and pan-Indian support.56 To this end they rotated the annual 
sessions through cities across India, including cities that were important 
Muslim centres, such as Lucknow and Allahabad. They did this not merely 
because they were necessarily convinced of the normative value of a pan-
ethnic platform, but because demonstrating pan-ethnic support was crucial to 
legitimise their claim that the INC was a truly ‘national’ body. In other words, 
to be national meant to be demonstrably pan-Indian and therefore pan-ethnic 
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in scope. During much of the nineteenth century, Congress’ principal 
adversaries were British officials in India,57 while the party’s politicians sought 
to influence the British parliament and wider British public.58 These claims 
were challenged by the anti Congress views of prominent Muslim politicians59, 
whilst British officials also claimed that Congress did not represent the vast 
mass of the Indian population. The steady and inexorable consolidation by 
Congress of principles, such as secularism and the recognition of linguistic 
pluralism as core components of its activities, was therefore an outcome of 
temporally continuous activities of oppositional politics, towards the end of 
presenting a truly national (in the sense of pan-ethnic) platform of opposition 
to British rule.  
The equally inexorable consolidation of Sinhala Buddhist ‘nation-state’ policies 
in Sri Lanka is similarly the result of a process including oppositional politics, 
competition to gain control of the state and finally through the activities of the 
state itself. The escalation of conflict was not the inevitable result of Sinhala 
Buddhist dominance. The trajectory of conflict in Sri Lanka also required that 
Tamil politicians responded to discrimination by consolidating an alternative 
conception of national identity and interest, one premised on Tamil – Sinhala 
collective equality rather than Sinhala first hierarchy.60 This was by no means 
inevitable and required the conscious and continuous in time activities of the 
FP, formed in 1949. The FP’s eventual electoral dominance was facilitated, but 
not guaranteed, by the escalation of discrimination. This becomes evident if 
the behaviour of FP politicians is contrasted with Sri Lankan Muslim 
politicians: while the FP developed along a path of oppositional politics, 
Muslim leaders worked within the Sinhala Buddhist framework without 
challenging its hierarchical implications.61The subsequent escalation of conflict 
between the FP and successive Sri Lankan governments was largely inevitable 
given that their conceptions of national identity and interest were mutually 
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incompatible. All of the agreements negotiated by Tamil political leaders with 
their Sinhala counterparts during this period, and then again in 1981, fell well 
short of the demand for federal autonomy, let alone the later demands for 
secession, but none were implemented and all were attacked by opposition 
Sinhala leaders as an existential threat to (Sinhala) national identity and 
interest.62  
The importance of political overlap, rather than positions of extremism or 
moderation, is also evident in the Dravidian movement’s peaceable 
accommodation within the Indian constitutional framework. As discussed 
further in Chapter Eight, the DMK’s decision to abandon secession in the early 
1960’s is best understood as part of a broader shift away from (electorally 
unappealing) radical social reform and towards a more resonant Tamil cultural 
nationalism (Ross-Barnett 1976:89). EVR Ramaswamy, the Dravidian leader 
who most clearly articulated the demand for secession, sought it as a means of 
achieving radical social reform and was himself ambivalent about the aesthetic 
and cultural value of Tamil language and literature (Pandian 1999). In adopting 
Tamil cultural nationalism, however, the DMK was moving onto ground 
already occupied by the Congress movement, which had long been engaged in 
Tamil literary and cultural revival (Chapter 5). Furthermore, the promotion 
and cultivation of regional languages and cultures – as a core aspect of Indian 
nationalist mobilisation – was incorporated into the constitutional framework 
that recognised India as a multilingual state. In short, the areas of overlap 
between Congress and the DMK, particularly on the areas of Tamil cultural 
revivalism, set the context for political decision making and laid the basis for 
ethnic accommodation.  
The events surrounding the hosting of the World Tamil Conference provide a 
clear example of the existence of political overlap in south India and its 
absence in Sri Lanka. The Conference was initiated in 1966 by a renowned 
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Tamil scholar from Jaffna, Xavier Thanninayagam (then working at the 
University of Malaysia), as an occasional global forum to discuss Tamil studies. 
The first conference was held in Kaula Lumpur and opened by Tunku Abdul 
Rahma, the Malaysian Prime Minister. At the first conference, the Congress 
Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, M. Bakhtavatsalam, offered to host the second 
conference in Madras City. Before the conference could be held, however, the 
Congress government was defeated at the 1967 election by the DMK. The 
DMK government was therefore able to take credit for ‘officially’ hosting the 
event, which had been organised in large part by the previous Congress 
government. However, the conference was by no means a purely DMK event, 
and the opening address was given by the then President of the Indian Union, 
Dr. Zakir Husain. 63  The fourth 1974 Conference was held in Jaffna (an 
intervening 1970 conference was held in Paris), despite the opposition of the 
Sri Lankan government, but it ended in disaster when police opened fire on 
the final session of the conference killing nine civilians (Ponnambalam 
1983:181). Whereas Congress and the DMK could agonistically compete to 
promote Tamil language and literature along with other issues, namely 
economic development and social welfare in the Tamil speaking areas, the FP 
and the Sinhala dominated ‘national’ parties had mutually contradictory 
positions on these issues.  
Finally, James Manor has argued that Sri Lanka’s escalating ethnic conflict, in 
particular Sinhala leaders’ inability to honour agreements with Tamil leaders, 
is a consequence of the organisational weakness of the major Sinhala parties 
(1979). This weakness is a symptom of the wider failure of ‘political 
integration’ on the island; a failure that is reflected in the absence of strong 
institutions linking politics at the local level with national politics in Colombo. 
The two main Sinhala parties, the UNP and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP), have failed to evolve into robust ‘broadly based organisations’ with 
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active and vital local party units. As a consequence, neither party has 
developed a stable support base, bolstered by strong linkages between the 
leadership and ordinary members, capable of assuring re-election. In 
comparison, the Congress party in India, which was comfortably re-elected in 
competitive elections from 1952 to 1977, was characterised by a coherent 
organisation and active local party politics. Without a comparable party 
structure, Sinhala party leaders and Prime Ministers, unsure of their prospects 
for re-election were unwilling to honour agreements reached with Tamil 
leaders, fearful that they might lose votes at the following election (1979: 22, 
39-40). The argument is ‘realist’ in so far as it accepts the reality of ethnic 
sentiment and points to the need for a political settlement to ‘ease ethnic 
tensions.’ It also potentially links the divergent outcomes of ethnic politics in 
India and Sri Lanka to an important difference in their institutions and 
political processes; namely India’s more cohesively integrated political system 
that sustained – and was in turn sustained by - strong linkages between the 
local and the national via political parties (in the period of study Congress) and 
a vibrant system of local government connected to provincial and national 
levels.  
However, Manor’s analysis overlooks the interlinked processes through which 
political parties develop cohesive organisations whilst simultaneously adopting 
a clear ideological framework. For example, both the pan Indian nationalism of 
the Indian Congress, as well as the largely cultural and social reform Tamil 
nationalism of the Dravidian parties, developed in tandem with organisational 
structures. Furthermore, the crucial factor in determining the political 
accommodation of the Dravidian movement within the overall Indian 
nationalist framework was the overlap in their respective understandings of 
Tamil identity and interest. Had the major Sinhala parties evolved an 
organisational structure in which Tamils and Sinhalese were viewed as equal 
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collectives, conflict would have been avoided. However, if the Sinhala parties 
had evolved cohesive organisations on a Sinhala Buddhist platform, the 
problem of mutual incompatibility would have remained but with the added 
feature of organisational stability. The relative organisational weakness of the 
Sinhala parties is therefore less consequential than the electoral dominance of 
Sinhala Buddhism in the post independence period and the absence of a 
sustained political movement that expressed any pan-ethnic alternative. The 
emergence of Tamil – Sinhala ethnic conflict was therefore a matter of 
ideological contradiction, rather than organisational weakness alone. That is, 
the overt political and later military conflict between Tamil nationalist actors 
and the Sri Lankan state was thus an expression of the ideological 
incompatibility between the Tamil nationalist conception of Tamil – Sinhala 
collective equality and the Sinhala nationalist conception of Sinhala first 
hierarchy.  
3.3 Constructivsm  
The approaches labelled here constructivist share an approach that seeks to 
explain ethnic and nationalist sentiment as an effect of other processes. In 
particular, they focus on ideologies or discourses as key to shaping 
subjectivities and interest towards ethnic affiliation. In some approaches, 
ideologies or discourses are seen as world views used by existing interests, 
more or less consciously and instrumentally, to mobilise political action and 
realise common ends.64 Other approaches, influenced by post-structuralism, 
use terms such as discourse and ideology to capture an amalgam of linguistic, 
administrative and bodily practices that shape and produce ethnic and national 
identities in place of previously existing subjectivities and orientations to the 
world. 65  There is therefore an important theoretical divide between post 
structuralist and other forms of constructivst accounts that revolves on their 
different understandings of human agency. This difference is nevertheless 
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bound by a common assumption that ethnic and national politics are effects of 
social, political and or discursive dynamics, rather than an expression of 
unchanging aspects of human psychology or group behaviour. Constructivist 
studies of ethnic and national politics in India and Sri Lanka have pointed to 
the often contingent, rather than structurally necessary, nature of ethnic and 
nationalist mobilisation highlighting in particular the inaccurate content of 
claims such movements make.66 However, as Chapter Two argued and as the 
historical chapters will detail, the array of interests, ideologies and discursive 
practices available for ethnic and nationalist mobilisation were broadly 
comparable and cannot in and of themselves account for the divergent 
outcomes of the south Indian and Sri Lankan Tamil speaking areas.  
The instrumentalist (or non post-structuralist) constructivist accounts relate 
ethnic and nationalist mobilisation to existing social, economic and political 
interests. There are however, differences between them on how far ethnic and 
nationalist appeals have subjective resonance with their constituents. In some 
accounts, while political leaders and elites use ethnic and nationalist slogans 
instrumentally, such slogans have instinctive resonance amongst their 
constituents.67 Other accounts, however, suggest that both political leaders and 
their constituents use ethnic and national slogans to achieve other and 
unrelated social and economic ends.68  
Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict has been explained in terms of elite instrumentalism 
by Kenneth Bush (2003) and Kristian Stokke (1998). Bush links the escalation 
of ethnic appeals to intra-ethnic power struggles, suggesting politicians’ 
attempts to ethnically outbid their co-ethnic competitors in the pursuit of 
power has thwarted attempts at ethnic moderation. In a slightly different vein, 
Stokke uses a Marxist approach to argue that nationalist appeals were used by 
Sinhala and Tamil political leaders from the dominant class as a means of 
mobilising co-ethnic cross class support and consolidating a system of 
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patronage politics that diverted and displaced appeals for more substantive 
forms of economic redistribution. Both of these accounts point to significant 
moments of inter-ethnic co-operation to undermine the claims of a 
structurally significant Sinhala Tamil conflict; for example, Bush notes as 
significant instances of military co-operation between Tamil militants and the 
Sri Lankan military, particularly during the Indian intervention, while Stokke 
draws attention to the similar class backgrounds of ethnic elites in the post 
independence period and their fitful attempts at negotiating political 
compromises. The two accounts also assume that ethnic appeals are naturally 
resonant amongst the target populations.  
Set against a comparative framework, these elite instrumentalist accounts pose 
a number of problems. Firstly, while elite interests in political power and 
securing a highly unequal economic order might have been secured through 
Tamil and Sinhala nationalist projects, this cannot explain why they had to be 
secured through these specific projects and not others. During the period that 
saw the consolidation of the Tamil and Sinhala nationalist projects, Sri Lankan 
Muslim, Indian and south Indian Tamil elite interests in power and patronage 
politics were secured through other types of political project. The political 
consolidation of Congress, the Dravidian parties and the careers of Sri Lankan 
Muslim politicians could equally be explained in terms of the satisfaction of 
political and economic interests without the attendant ethnic conflict. In other 
words, while Tamil and Sinhala elite interests were no different from the 
interests of other political elites in India and Sri Lanka, the escalation of Tamil 
– Sinhala conflict was quite specific and unique. The consolidation of Sinhala 
and Tamil nationalisms, as well as the escalation of conflict between them, 
may well have satisfied elite interests but cannot be said to have been caused 
or driven by these interests in and of themselves. Secondly, the escalation of 
Sinhala – Tamil conflict had material and political consequences that were 
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quite apart from the interests of elites who may have instrumentally used these 
projects in a more or less conscious way. As Chapter Eight demonstrates the 
consolidation of Sinhala Buddhism transformed economic and social life on the 
island in significant ways that were largely in keeping with the Sinhala 
Buddhist ethos. At the same time, the consolidation of Tamil nationalism, as a 
form of oppositional politics that insisted on Tamil–Sinhala collective equality, 
constrained the options of Tamil politicians who arguably would have had 
greater access to patronage resources if they had sought collaboration with 
Sinhala Buddhist parties, than opposition to them, following the example of 
Muslim and Sinhala Christian politicians.69 Furthermore, the presumption that 
ethno-nationalist appeals would be naturally resonant and appealing, above for 
example-pan ethnic forms of mobilisation, overlooks the temporally 
continuous activities and processes that led to the consolidation of Sinhala 
Buddhist and Tamil nationalism. In other words, Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil 
nationalisms only became resonant as a result sustained political mobilisation 
and the consequences this mobilisation entailed. Finally, Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism is in its ideological claims almost symmetrical with Hindu 
nationalism in India, yet Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has attained a position 
of overwhelming dominance in Sri Lankan politics that Hindu nationalism has 
not realised in Indian politics.  
Instrumentalist logics have also been invoked by Washbrook (1976), Baker 
(1976) and N Subramanian (1999) to explain ethnic and nationalist politics in 
south India. In these accounts, political leaders as well as their followers 
pursue other and unrelated ends through national and ethnic mobilisation. In 
their respective studies of politics in colonial south India, Washbrook and 
Baker explain ideological labels – namely Indian nationalism and the 
Dravidian movement – as a means of linking and co-ordinating political and 
economic interests across local, provincial and national arenas. The key figures 
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in their explanations are rural bosses and urban magnates (Baker 1976:23; 
Washbrook 1976:77, 105), actors with significant political or economic 
resources able to command the allegiance of a multi-ethnic and inter-caste 
(contra Chandra) constituency of followers and dependents (Baker 1976:27-31; 
Washbrook 1976:143-5). They point to the frequent shifts in the allegiance of 
magnate politicians, regularly shifting from Congress to the Dravidian camp 
and back again, to suggest that party labels had little relationship to the 
substance of politics, which was primarily concerned with the control and 
distribution of economic resources.   
This magnate centred analysis also challenges the realist accounts of Ross-
Barnet and Stepan, Linz and Yadav who argue that the Brahmin – non 
Brahmin cleavage, central to colonial Tamil politics in India, expressed a real 
and socially significant cultural divide. Against this view Baker and 
Washbrook each point to the inter-caste character of magnate networks and 
the inter-caste co-operation evident in much of the cultural, religious and 
educational philanthropic activity that characterised magnate life. 
Furthermore, these accounts also discount the possibility that mass political 
activity, whether electoral behaviour or mass protest, can be explained as an 
expression of Dravidian or Indian nationalist affiliation. Rather, they argue 
that by voting or engaging in protests, south Indians were more likely 
motivated by a range of other factors such as magnate allegiance, opposition to 
specific government policies, expressing economic discontent or seeking social 
mobility.  
The flaws in these accounts mirror those in the elite instrumentalism of Bush 
and Stokke. That is, an analysis of the interests that are arguably satisfied 
through ethnic and nationalist politics cannot explain why ethnic and 
nationalist politics takes one particular pattern rather than another, and also 
ignores the important political and material consequences of these specific 
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patterns. Comparable magnate interests were served in colonial Sri Lanka, 
although in the absence of a developed pan ethnic political movement, with 
very different consequences.  However, Baker and Washbrook are, in common 
with the elite instrumentalists, dismissive of the ideological and cultural 
content of political movements. Washbrook for example uses the term 
‘publicist’ to identify political actors engaged in activities such as journalism, 
literary production and political agitation, arguing that publicists are 
invariably just cogs in larger magnate machines (1976:119, 232). However, as 
the analysis of colonial Indian politics in Chapter Five shows, the patterns and 
content of publicist activity was just as important in determining the trajectory 
of Congress’ growth. Congress’ success in mobilising electoral support in the 
Tamil speaking areas and its failure to do so amongst the Muslim electorate is 
linked to the cultural and ideological content of its activities in these different 
regions. Through its activities in the Tamil speaking areas, Congress was able 
to present itself as a vehicle for Tamil identity and interests and thereby 
convinced Tamil magnates of its viability as a vehicle for their political 
ambitions. Congress failed to have the same effect in the Muslim majority 
areas and consequently did not win the support of Muslim magnates. Congress’ 
political trajectory and its ability to incorporate Tamil but not Muslim identity 
cannot be reduced to the coalitions of interest Congress mobilised and satisfied.  
N. Subramanian’s study of the electoral growth of the Dravidian movement is 
located in the post independence decades, a period that saw the political clout 
of the magnate undermined by the growing political assertiveness of groups 
labelled ‘backward castes’ (BCs) or other backward castes (OBCs). These groups 
consisted of middling peasants, small shopkeepers and casual labour situated in 
between large landowners as well as urban professional and commercial groups. 
In caste terms they fall between Brahmin and upper caste non Brahmins at one 
end of the spectrum and Dalit or untouchable groups at the other, and 
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constitute up to 67 per cent of the Tamil Nadu population (1999:45, 138-9). 
Subramanian links the peaceable accommodation of the Dravidian movement 
with the core interests of these groups through an argument centred on the 
organisational structure of the Dravidian parties. He characterises the two 
Dravidian parties, the DMK and the AIADMK, as having a pluralist, rather 
than authoritarian, relationship with the multiple caste, religious and 
economic groups they mobilised. This pluralist relationship contained and 
muted the potential for conflict and ethnic antagonism contained within the 
Dravidian movement. Subramanian suggests, in constructivist and 
instrumentalist mode, that the Dravidian label was adopted by a diversity of 
emergent OBC groups for their own ends – namely social and political 
advancement. In doing so, such groups forced the party leaderships to blunt 
their more extreme ideological demands, namely for secession, and instead 
encouraged party leaders to seek political power through the Indian 
constitutional framework (1999:27-46).  
In contrast to Ross Barnett who points to the strategic moderation of DMK 
leaders to explain the peaceable accommodation of the Dravidian movement, 
Subramanian’s argument rests on the moderation of Dravidian party supporters. 
He also suggests that the Dravidian parties’ pluralist ethos can explain the 
divergent ethnic outcomes in south India and Sri Lanka. The internal pluralism 
of the two Dravidian parties meant that party leaders abandoned their earlier 
concerns with ‘policing ethnic boundaries’ and focussed instead on their 
constituents’ demands to cultivate and ‘revalue plebian’ cultural norms and 
practices (1999:10). The Sinhala Buddhist movement in Sri Lanka, less plural in 
its internal structure, retained its focus on an exclusivist ideology and the 
‘policing of ethnic boundaries’ that prompted escalating conflict. 
Subramanian’s argument implies that ethnic antagonism stems largely from the 
leadership of political movements, while ordinary followers tend to have 
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localised and group specific interests that are less likely to produce ethnic 
conflict. De-centralised and internally plural ethnic movements, such as the 
Dravidian movement, are therefore less likely to produce ethnic antagonism 
than centralised and authoritarian movements.  
Subramanian’s analysis of Dravidian ideology, and its evaluation of the impact 
of party structure on the divergent ethnic outcomes in south India and Sri 
Lanka, is however open to question. Firstly, he characterises the initial phase 
of Dravidian politics, led by Erode Venkata Ramaswamy and the Self Respect 
Movement and, later, the Dravida Kazhagam (DK), as conveying an ethno-
nationalist ideology, one that privileged the interests and identities of Hindu 
non-Brahmin castes over those of Dalits and non-Hindus (1999:107-119). This 
ideological orientation combined with Ramaswamy’s centralised, doctrinaire 
and authoritarian leadership style gave the Dravidian movement the potential 
for ethnic antagonism. Ramaswamy’s potential to invoke ethnic conflict was 
blunted, Subramanian argues, by the more accommodating leadership styles of 
later Dravidian party political leaders - C. N Annadurai, M. Karunanidhi and 
M. G Ramachandran – and the plural organisational structures of the 
Dravidian parties – the DMK and AIADMK. Subramanian’s reading of early 
Dravidian politics as carrying an ethno-nationalist orientation is challenged by 
other analyses which points to the centrality of social reform in the ethos and 
activities of Ramaswamy and the organisations he led. Pandian (1999, 2007) 
and Geetha and Rajadurai (1998) in their respective studies point to 
Ramaswamy’s explicit inclusion of Tamil speaking Muslims, Christians and 
Tamil Dalits in the Dravidian category along with his ambivalence towards, 
and sometimes outright derision of, Tamil literary and cultural revival 
activities. They also point to Ramaswamy’s almost exclusive focus on purging 
Tamil society of customs he regarded as alien, Hindu and irrational – primarily 
Hindu ritual, the everyday observance of caste boundaries and gender 
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inequality – in contrast to the DMK and AIADMK’s downgrading of social 
reform in favour of Tamil cultural revival. Their analysis is in keeping with 
Ross Barnett’s view that the later Dravidian political parties (DMK and 
AIADMK) abandoned Ramaswamy’s often iconoclastic and uncompromising 
social reform of the DK in favour of an electorally more attractive Tamil 
cultural nationalism. It is not clear therefore that Subramanian’s depiction of a 
shift in Dravidian ideology from Ramaswamy’s conflict prone ethno-
nationalism to the more accommodating varieties of the DMK and AIADMK is 
entirely tenable. A more likely reading is of a shift from Ramaswamy’s 
stringent reform agenda that was largely indifferent to promoting Tamil 
culture’s alleged social and aesthetic value to the DMK and AIADMK’s cultural 
revivalism that evaded socially controversial questions of caste hierarchy and 
gender relations.  
Along with his atypical reading of the Dravidian movement and its shifts in 
ideological emphasis, Subramanian’s analysis of the role of organisational 
structure is also open to challenge when applied to Sri Lanka. The Sinhala 
political parties along with the Tamil FP were not, as Subramanian presumes, 
centralised and authoritarian. All of them relied on recruiting locally 
influential individuals and winning the support of locally important caste 
groups. Although decision making in the Sinhala parties and the FP was 
characterised by centralisation, this did not imply authoritarian control over 
party followers. Manor’s argument, for example, relies precisely on the weak 
control Sinhala leaders exercised over their potential voters (1979). Meanwhile, 
the Tamil political parties repeatedly compromised on their core political 
demands yet were unable to prevent escalating conflict: for example, the FP 
agreed to de-centralisation rather than federal autonomy, while the TULF, 
having stood on a platform of secession in 1977, agreed to settle on political 
autonomy through district development councils. The relative looseness and 
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pluralism of party organisations cannot therefore be seen as decisive in shaping 
ethnic outcomes; rather, the crucial difference between south India and Sri 
Lanka is to be found in the ideological content of competing conceptions of 
national identity and national interest through which politics was and is 
pursued.  
3.3.1 Constructivism: post colonial subjectivities 
A second stream of constructivism influenced by post-structuralism and post 
colonialism has emphasised the role of colonial power in constituting ethnic 
and national identities. In these analyses, post colonial ethnic dynamics are 
traced to the colonial experience, whilst colonial power itself is understood as 
not merely constraining or dominating the life of its subjects but also as 
working through language and other administrative mechanisms to actively 
produce agents and their identities. Ethnic and national identities are thus 
understood as effects of power, understood here in Foucauldian terms as a 
productive rather than merely repressive force: power that produces subjects 
through the disciplinary activities of administrative organisations, language, 
legal mechanisms, revivalist organisations and religious bodies (Foucault 1977). 
This form of analysis has been used for example by Dirks (2001) to study the 
emergence of caste identities in India, by Wickramasinghe (2006) to study 
ethnic identities in Sri Lanka and by Ramaswamy (1997) to study Tamil 
linguistic nationalism in south India. Krisnha’s (1999) study of India’s 
intervention in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict similarly draws on Jacques Derrida’s 
analysis of language and meaning to examine the production of identities in 
Indian foreign policy as well as in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. 
Like the conceptual approach adopted in this dissertation (developed in 
Chapter Four), constitutive forms of constructivism stress the role of language 
and symbolic practices more generally in understanding human agency and 
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power. However, there are important differences. The post-structuralist 
frameworks adopted by constitutive forms of constructivism understand 
language and related discursive practices as creating subjectivities and 
therefore shaping agency. In contrast, the conceptual approach adopted here, 
understands concepts as framing the semantic field within which political 
actors can engage in mutually meaningful contestation. The conceptual 
approach is not therefore a means to investigate the contingent and 
constructed nature of subjectivities but a tool to interpret the semantic 
foundations, and therefore the rationale, of political action and the competing 
visions of political order that animate meaningful political contestation.  
Constitutive forms of constructivism also differ fundamentally from 
instrumentalist constructivism and realist accounts in its understanding of 
human agency, the nature of power and the role of language and symbolic 
practices more generally. Whereas constitutive constructivists regard language 
as crucial to the formation of subjects or agents, realist and instrumentalist 
constructivism understands language primarily as a vehicle for already formed 
interests and identities. Despite these important and theoretically irresolvable 
differences, constitutive constructivism suffers from the same shortfalls in 
accounting for the divergent and historically changing patterns of south Indian 
and Sri Lankan ethnic and national politics. To begin with, the administrative 
categories, scholarly frameworks and revivalist narratives through which 
ethnic identities were constituted across India and Sri Lanka during the 
colonial period were broadly the same and influenced by cross cutting 
intellectual trends, as in, for example, the Aryan / Dravidian dichotomy. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to draw a linear connection between the 
constitutive practices of identity construction and divergent (between cases), 
as well as historically varying (within each case) patterns of ethnic 
mobilisation.  
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Dirks (2001) and Wickramasinghe (2006) focus on the administrative 
categories and practices of British colonial rule. However, Dirks’ analysis of the 
importance of British practices and ideas in constituting caste as a central 
principle of colonial Indian society, and therefore post colonial Indian 
dynamics, could equally be applied to British and earlier Dutch colonial 
practices in Sri Lanka (Roberts 1982; de Silva 2005). In India, however, caste 
became an important vector of mobilisation, allied to but independent of 
language and ideas of race, whereas in Sri Lanka, although caste divisions 
remained important, they were largely incorporated within Sinhala Buddhist 
and Tamil nationalist mobilisation. 70  Similarly Wickramasignhe’s focus on 
colonial attitudes and policies in constituting Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and 
Kandyan ethnic identities in Sri Lanka cannot account for the very different 
political trajectories of these similarly constituted categories. Twentieth 
century Tamil politics has been dominated by the demand for collective 
Tamil-Sinhala political equality and an associated rejection of a subordinate 
position for Tamils within the Sinhala Buddhist framework. In contrast 
Muslim political leaders have largely accepted and worked within the Sinhala 
Buddhist framework. Both arguments also ignore variations in British official 
perceptions, attitudes and polices over time, and also differences between 
British officials. British officials in south India and Punjab, for example, 
rejected the view that caste was a religious phenomenon and fundamental to 
Indian society (Balyly 1999:138-40; Washbrook 1981, 2004) whilst in Sri 
Lanka British officials from 1929 onwards actively sought to augment the 
creation of a pan-ethnic national identity and largely ignored Tamil politicians’ 
fears of Sinhala domination (Colonial Office:1928, 1945).  
Ramaswamy’s study of south Indian Tamil linguistic nationalism can be subject 
to similar criticism (1997). Her aim is to explain the passionate and often 
violent expressions of south Indian Tamil linguistic nationalism, including acts 
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of self immolation, which occurred during the 1960’s in opposition to the 
central government’s moves to enforce the status of Hindi as the official 
language in India; moves that were swiftly abandoned following the protests. 
She locates the source of Tamil linguistic sentiment in Tamil revivalist 
narratives, and examines the rhetorical tropes, images and metonyms of this 
literature to recreate the constitution of Tamil speaking subjects moved by a 
passionate identification with the Tamil language. This resort to subjectivity is, 
however, comparatively and historically problematic. In terms of post-colonial 
protest, the south Indian Tamil language protests were hardly exceptionally or 
singularly violent. Fatal self-immolation is also not unique in recent Indian 
political history; there was, for example, a wave of upper-caste self 
immolations in the early 1990’s against positive discrimination measures to 
benefit lower-caste groups (Dirks 2001:275). The upper-caste protests were, 
moreover, not associated with a previous history of thick and emotively 
affective literary expression. What is perhaps most intriguing about the Tamil 
language protests is not their passionate intensity but the fact that the language 
issue in India was politically resolved and by the mid 1970’s ceased to be, in 
the Tamil speaking areas, an issue of emotive contestation. Meanwhile, Sri 
Lankan Tamil language protests in 1956 and 1958 were quite insipid, involving 
in the main limited acts of civil disobedience (Wilson 1994; Navaratnam 1991). 
These protests nevertheless provoked lethal bouts of anti Tamil violence. The 
language issue in Sri Lanka, though initially less passionately contested, was 
part of an escalating Sinhala-Tamil conflict that finally led to civil war in 1983.  
Krishna’s analysis of post-colonial nation building and ethnic conflict in south 
Asia similarly fails to capture important and consequential differences between 
India and Sri Lanka, as well as important variations within each case. He 
argues that the ‘fixation with producing a pulverized and uniform sense of 
national identity (usually along majoritarian lines) has leashed a spiral of 
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regional, state and societal violence that appears endless’ (1999: xvii). For 
Krishna, Indian nationhood has been an attempt to impose the ideal of ‘Unity 
and Diversity’ in which ‘diversity was appreciated only insofar as it 
embellished Indian unity’. Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka the construction of post 
colonial nationhood has been the establishment of an ethnic hierarchy in 
which the majority Sinhala community is assured of its ‘rightful’ place and the 
minorities accept their ‘proper’ subordinate place. Krishna’s analysis of 
national identity formation and the subsequent ethnic violence this creates 
adopts Derrida’s formulation of the meaning as a process requiring continuous 
difference and also deferment. The attempt to create a unified national self 
both creates and requires different ethnic others, while the moment of 
national unity is deferred endlessly into the future and facilitates violent 
processes of suppression and assimilation in the present (1999:16, 54, 17-21).  
Krishna’s adoption of the Derridean framework would suggest that the link 
between nation building and ethnic conflict is inherent in the deep links 
between the creation of meaning and the formation of subjects. However, as 
Krishna himself notes, ‘whether or not a particular segment of society 
commences on an ethnonationalist path is an open – ended, political question’ 
(1999:xxxv). His study, focused as it is on challenging dominant realist 
accounts of foreign policy making by setting out an alternative constructivist 
reading of Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, does not set out to explain why Sri 
Lankan nation building produced a Tamil secessionist movement but Indian 
nation building did not. Indeed, and arguably a Derridean analysis of nation-
building could not explain this important divergence. By treating nation 
building as a process of identity creation that invariably creates an ethnic other, 
Derridean analysis cannot capture important and substantive differences in the 
historically situated processes of nation building in India and Sri Lanka. As 
Chapter Five demonstrates the peaceable accommodation of the Dravidian 
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movement within the Indian ‘Unity in Diversity’ conception and the 
simultaneous exclusion of Muslim identity was a matter of contingent political 
process rather than an outcome of any binary self-other logic inherent in the 
production of identity. Similarly, as Chapters Six and Eight argue, the 
escalation of Tamil Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka required both the dominance 
of Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism and the successful mobilisation of a Tamil 
nationalist identity that insisted on Tamil–Sinhala collective equality. Muslims’ 
acceptance of the former exemplifies an alternative outcome that Tamil 
politics could have taken but did not. Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict is thus a 
conflict of countervailing political projects, rather than countervailing 
identities. Important differences in the Indian and Sri Lankan nation building 
projects, including their divergent impacts on the their respective Tamil 
speaking regions and populations, cannot therefore be captured by a 
framework in which ethnic conflict is a binary matter of the national self 
provoking its own ethnic other.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The approaches surveyed here ask a variant of the question ‘what causes 
nationally or ethnically framed politics and conflict?’ Realist approaches 
suggest that ethnic and national subjectivities are relatively stable aspects of 
social and political life and explain ethnic and political outcomes in terms of 
the patterns of ethnic demography and the more or less enlightened policies 
adopted by political leaders. In contrast, constructivist approaches characterise 
ethnic and national categories as contingent outcomes. For instrumentalist 
constructivists, ethnic and national categories are simply convenient labels 
through which instrumental actors pursue unrelated ends: namely social 
advancement, economic gain or political power. Constitutive constructivists 
meanwhile focus on the discursive practices that produce ethnic and national 
subjectivities. While instrumentalist constructivists focus on interests to 
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explain ethnic and national outcomes, constitutive constructivists turn to the 
content of discursive practices. However, as the discussion above shows, the 
various causal factors that are identified through these process are inadequate 
to explain the divergent outcomes of ethnic and national politics in India and 
Sri Lanka as well the historically shifting patterns of ethnic conflict within 
each state.  
Chapter Four sets out an alternative approach through which the patterns of 
ethnic and national politics in India and Sri Lanka could be explained. Instead 
of asking why ethnic and national conflict occurs and searching for causal 
explanations, it begins with alternative questions. Firstly it asks, what makes 
ethnic and national claims and categories meaningful, and therefore politically 
consequential? From this follows a second question: why are some projects of 
ethnic and national identity formation more successful than others? It then 
sets out an alternative framework based on answers to these two distinctive 
questions. The empirical chapters then deploy this framework to explain the 
trajectories of ethnic and national politics in India and Sri Lanka from the late 
nineteenth century to 1977.  
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4. Ethnic and national as working concepts 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter argues that the study of ethnic and national movements must 
begin with an analysis of the nation and ethnicity, along with their synonyms, 
as key concepts of political order in the modern system of nation states. It 
shows that the nation and ethnicity are conceptually unavoidable terms of 
political contestation in the nation state system. Political actors seeking to 
establish or contest the boundaries of political community, as well as the 
legitimate basis of state action, must do so in ethnic and national terms. The 
specifically modern character of the nation and ethnicity are derived here 
from the work of the German historian Reinhart Koselleck and his analysis of 
the forward reaching temporality that propels modern concepts and the 
actions they entail. The precise meanings of the nation and ethnicity are 
derived from their close conceptual connection to the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, the sole principle of political legitimacy within the system of 
nation states. The nation functions in political contestation as a synonym for 
the post contractual general or public will that alone sanctions legitimate state 
action. At the same time, the term national also describes the political 
community as a pre-contractual political unity. The contractarian origin of 
popular sovereignty thus creates a conceptually unavoidable tension between 
the need for national unity and the existence of ethnic or cultural differences 
that are conceptually outside of, beyond or before the political contract. How 
are the ethnic groups contained within the boundaries of the state to be 
reconciled into a national whole, and on what terms? Which groups will be 
included in the nation-state and which excluded?  
This dissertation is concerned with explaining why the dominant conception 
of national identity in India came to include Tamils whilst that in Sri Lanka 
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sought to subordinate them within a Sinhala Buddhist hierarchy. As discussed 
in Chapter Three, this difference cannot be explained in terms of static 
variables such as ethnic demography, political system, differences of official 
policy or economic incentives. Instead, the emergence of an inclusive (of 
Tamils) conception of national identity in India and the simultaneous 
emergence of an ethnically hierarchical Sinhala Buddhist conception in Sri 
Lanka is an outcome of political process. National identities, the ideal 
orderings of ethnicity they project and the forms of public action they 
legitimate, become dominant when they are associated with successful 
political movements. This chapter also sets out an alternative understanding of 
the elements of political success. It suggests that successful political 
movements are those that bring together in a spatially and socially extensive, 
as well as temporally sustained, way three types of activities. The first is to 
articulate a coherent ideology, a vision of national identity, national interest 
and the ethnic boundaries of national community. This includes a more or less 
stable political programme setting out the concrete proposals through which 
this future vision is to be realised. Secondly, successful political movements 
also co-opt existing and powerful interest groups situated within their target 
audience. Thirdly, all successful political movements engage in direct political 
mobilisation to build a mass support base. To be successful political movements 
have to bring together these activities in a socially and spatially extensive way; 
that is they have to cover, or seek to cover, extensive sections of their relevant 
target audience and territory. Finally, political processes occur in time as well 
as space and successful movements are those that bring together these 
activities in a temporally sustained way. While movements that bring together 
all of these elements will be successful in establishing their preferred identities 
as unavoidable principles of political contestation, they will not necessarily 
realise their stated objectives of autonomy or independence. As discussed 
further below, the re-ordering of nation states is invariably a conjunction of 
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international as well as domestic politics. Strong and sustained nationalist 
movements are often thwarted by the international system while weak and 
anaemic ones often get what they – intermittently – demand. Nevertheless, the 
relative weakness and strength of competing national movements, and the 
ethnic ordering they entail, is decisive in explaining the outcomes of ethnic 
accommodation and ethnic conflict.  
The chapter is organised in the following way. The first section discusses a 
possible interpretation of the relationship between modern ethnic categories 
and pre-modern forms of cultural diversity. The following section then sets out 
Koselleck’s depiction of the forward reaching temporality characteristic of 
modern concepts and suggests how this helps explain the meanings and 
implications of national and ethnic claims. The third section describes the 
close conceptual connection between the nation, ethnicity and the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty through a close analysis of Rousseau’s Social Contract. The 
fourth section describes the elements of successful political mobilisation that 
can account for the relative successes and failures of the national and ethnic 
movements discussed in the following historical chapters.  
4.2 The sources of modern ethnicity 
The historical origins, as well as the social and political function, of modern 
ethnic categories are a matter of intense debate. Realists characterise such 
categories as rooted in enduring aspects of human psychology and/or relatively 
stable components of social and political life. For constructivists on the other 
hand, these categories are products of discursive practices or simply 
convenient vehicles that are more or less consciously invoked for a host of 
unrelated ends. The relationship between ethnic categories and colonial rule is 
particularly at issue in post colonial scholarship which has argued that ethnic 
or communal categories in south Asia are artefacts of colonial rule and 
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radically discontinuous with social and political meanings associated with 
differences of religious practice, language and caste in the pre-colonial period. 
This is contested by others who point to continuities whilst also emphasising 
the agency of the colonial subjects themselves in effecting transformations in 
caste, religious and linguistic practices.71  
The approach adopted here sidesteps questions of colonial power, historical 
continuity and the agency of colonial subjects at the centre of debates on the 
meanings and subjective experience of cultural difference. Rather, it suggests 
that by the late nineteenth century, many of the cultural practices touched by 
the social, political and economic transformations associated with the colonial 
state would inevitably have been translated into the modern categories of 
religion, caste and language. The long established institutions, philosophical 
traditions and ritual practices that were incorporated into the Buddhist, Hindu, 
Muslim and Saivite religious revivalisms of the late nineteenth century could 
not have simply disappeared or avoided contact with modern conceptions of 
religion as a confessional system and potentially ‘national’ institution. Similarly, 
the established Sanskrit, Tamil, Sinhala and Urdu literary traditions and 
practices would also not have disappeared or avoided translation into modern 
languages, reproduced through print and studied through modern conventions 
of literary analysis. In Ernst Gellner’s terminology, this process involved the 
translation of pre-modern high cultures into modern, academy produced, 
culture rather than the translation of pre-modern wild culture into modern 
high culture (Gellner 1983). In other words, the transformation of pre-modern 
cultural difference into modern categories of religion, language and caste is 
understood here as a matter of inevitable conceptual translation, leaving aside 
questions of agency and continuity.  
There was, of course, a great unevenness in the extent to which modern 
notions of religion or language were understood or important in shaping 
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everyday social and cultural life. However, the use of modern ethnic categories 
was conceptually unavoidable in modern representative politics and the 
processes through which these modern differences were included or excluded 
from national conceptions of identity and interest are central to explaining the 
difference between ethnic conflict and ethnic accommodation. Popular self 
government is invariably national self government, with the nation 
understood as both a body of citizens and as a pre political entity. Almost all 
states have some degree of ethnic pluralism, and the principle of national self 
government requires therefore a solution to a central problem: how is the 
ethnic pluralism of the population to be reconciled with the need for a unified 
nation capable of self government. Ethnic categories are therefore important, 
not because they necessarily provide insight into the subjective experience of 
culture difference, but because in the era of national self government they are 
publicly meaningful categories of social and political life that must inevitably 
be reconciled with the need for a national whole.  
4.3 The nation and the conceptual basis of modern political life 
In treating the nation and ethnicity as first and foremost meaningful terms of 
political contestation, the argument here is that language is a crucial force in 
shaping and constraining the clash of competing identities and interests in 
social and political life. That is, concepts cannot be understood as either simply 
expressions of pre-existing identities and interests or as more or less 
convenient vehicles through which groups and forces realise their pre-
linguistic ends. Instead, as Connolly argues, language is an ‘institutionalised 
structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain 
directions’ such that to ‘understand the political life of a community one must 
understand the conceptual system within which that life moves; and therefore 
those concepts that help shape the fabric of our political experiences 
necessarily enter into any rational account of them’ (1993:1, 39). The meanings 
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of national and ethnic claims and the often fateful political consequences of 
national and ethnic mobilisation are closely linked to the conceptual shifts 
associated with the processes of modernisation.  
Koselleck’s work and the wider project of conceptual history with which he is 
closely associated is centrally concerned to trace the processes of 
modernisation through shifts in social and political concepts. Conceptual shifts 
reflect and direct social and economic transformations; ‘it is through concepts 
that a horizon is constituted, against which structural changes are perceived, 
evaluated and acted upon’ (Richter 1995:36). Koselleck characterises modern 
social and political concepts as imbued with a peculiar temporality, one 
impelled by movement towards the future, conceived as open ended, amenable 
to human control and the projected site of competing ideological visions. He 
locates the transition to modern social and political concepts in the period 
between 1750 and 1850 when previous eschatological expectations of an end to 
the world were displaced by new anticipations of a radically improved future 
and encapsulated in the concept of progress that also signalled a new 
understanding of the term history. The modern attitude to the future can be 
captured in the difference between Luther and Robespierre. As Koselleck notes, 
for Luther, the future heralded only the prophesied end of the world with 
some uncertainty as to the timing of the end, but for Robespierre, calling for 
action to hasten the pace of the Revolution, the ‘acceleration of time is a 
human task, presaging an epoch of freedom and happiness, the golden future’ 
(2004:13). The opening up of the future was associated with the novel doctrine 
of progress that also set out altered understandings of human history, society 
and the imperatives of political action. The term progress had previously been 
used in the sense of perfection, the attainment of a defined goal, and referred 
to discrete areas of activity, such as art, literature, mastery of nature or 
technical achievement. From the middle of the eighteenth century, however, 
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progress became what Koselleck terms a ‘collective singular’ that tied together 
‘numerous experiences into a single term’ and instead of indicating a specific 
goal became ‘a processual category of movement.’ Progress thus came to be a 
universal category of movement towards the future such that ‘progress itself 
becomes the historical agent and affects the constant amelioration of the 
human condition in all its dimensions’ (2002:230). As Koselleck notes, since 
the transition to modernity it has become ‘a widespread belief that progress is 
general and constant while every regression, decline, or decay occurs only 
partially and temporarily’ (2002:227).  
This notion of progress was also closely related to a new conception of history. 
Koselleck describes a shift from history as a term to describe written historical 
accounts, which could serve as a guide to future action, to history as a 
collective singular, ‘history in itself’ without related subject or object. The 
singular concept of history now also contained an internal process, namely 
that of progress, such that human history in its entirety, or world history, 
could be seen as unfolding according to an inherent logic. As a consequence, 
past events could no longer guide future action, and Koselleck notes that 
Enlightenment writers ‘tolerated no allusion to the past’, seeking instead to 
dispose of the past ‘as quickly as possible so that a new future could be set free’ 
(2004:39). In other words, the ‘ruse of reason forbade man to learn directly 
from history and indirectly forced him towards happiness’ (2004:37). The 
combined frameworks of progress and history produced an imperative for 
future orientated action that marked modern social and political concepts. 
That is, ‘since the nineteenth century, it has become difficult to gain political 
legitimacy without being progressive at the same time’ (Koselleck 2002:230). 
In this way, modern political concepts and ideologies (the variety of isms) 
reach into the future and seek to shape, as well as describe, possible states of 
social and political existence. Terms such as freedom, republic and democracy 
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that previously had limited legal and constitutional reference gained a general 
and imprecise meaning that could be appropriated by a variety of groups. 
Political concepts thus function as ‘catchwords’ and political struggle involves 
struggles ‘over the proper interpretation and usage of concepts’ as political 
protagonists seek to exclude their opponents ‘from using the same words to say 
and wish for that which might differ from one’s own conception’ (Koselleck 
2004:253). This struggle is nevertheless bound by a shared temporality:  
‘The concepts are orientated in terms of an irreversible 
temporal process, loading its agents with responsibility while 
simultaneously relieving them of it, for the process of self-
creation is included within the properties of the prospective 
future. It is from this that such concepts take their diachronic 
force, a force which sustains both speaker and addressee’ 
(Koselleck 2004:251). 
In the methodology of conceptual history, concepts are separated from words 
only on the basis of textual analysis; that is ‘socio-political terminology in the 
source language possesses a series of expressions that, on the basis of critical 
exegesis, stand out definitely as concepts’ (2004:84) That is, certain terms 
cannot be identified as concepts a priori but the use of terms within a specific 
modern context can be identified as conceptual by its ideological – that is 
future orientated - implications. Although words, as well as concepts, can have 
ambiguous meanings, words generally have stable references whereas ‘a 
concept must remain ambiguous in order to be a concept’ (2004:85). Collective 
singulars, such as freedom, history and progress along with terms of collective 
identity such as class, nation, and party that Koselleck identifies as 
characteristically modern, are marked by a future orientated temporality and 
have a general, rather than specific, reference. Freedom comes to mean 
freedom in general rather than specific and legally defined preferences and 
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also defines – when expressed as emancipation – the ideal end of most modern 
political ideologies. Koselleck’s use of the term ambiguous can therefore be 
compared to W. B Gallie’s description of moral and political concepts as 
‘essentially contested’ (Connolly 1993:10-22). Concepts are ambiguous in the 
sense that political contestation involves endless disagreement about what 
counts as true freedom, and whether or not progress has been realised by a 
particular course of action. Similarly, competing political projects invariably 
invoke different accounts of the past and, while claiming for their own 
account the status of true history, attack their opponents as relying on or 
propagating false history. Similarly, the nation is not just a discrete body of 
legally defined citizens but also a pre- political entity, the agent of historical 
process and an ideal – yet to be realised - form of political community.  
This study does not set out to provide a conceptual history of the nation and 
ethnicity or related concepts such as ethnic / communal – an effort that would 
require diachronic as well as synchronic analysis of the shifting meanings 
associated with these terms, as well as the shifting terms through which 
political community and cultural difference are denoted in a specific area. It is 
worth noting, however, that both the nation and ethnicity have had a variety 
of shifting references. In colonial south Asia in the late eighteenth and early 
part of the nineteenth century the term nation was used rather loosely to 
define human collectives, and could be used synonymously with terms such as 
race and caste. 72 It was only in the last quarter of the twentieth century that 
nation acquired its definite links with the demand for self government.73 The 
term ethnic, on the other hand, was not used until well into the twentieth 
century; instead the term communal was often used, as in for example 
discussions of Hindu – Muslim politics in colonial India as ‘communal politics’. 
The term ethnic only replaced the term communal in south Asia from the 
early 1980’s and has gained ground particularly since the end of the Cold War 
102 
 
and the associated political, as well as scholarly, focus on conflict, defined as 
‘ethnic’, in the post-Soviet states.74 Despite these variations, the terms nation 
and ethnicity have also come to have a close connection with the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, creating a set of recognizable and consistent meanings 
and implications that are central to understanding the divergent outcomes of 
the Tamil speaking regions in south India and Sri Lanka.  
In terms of this connection then the predominant meaning of the nation is as 
the unit of self government; the national unit refers to the political community 
as a body of legally and constitutionally defined citizens and as a pre-political 
entity held together by pre-contractual or cultural ties. The nation always 
conveys both these meanings; national sovereignty is both defined by the state, 
as well as constituting the state. In relation to the principle of national self-
government the term ethnicity, or its synonyms, invariably refers to sub-state 
groups defined by what are held to be pre-political or pre-contractual ties. 
Ethnic or communal ties are pre-political or pre-contractual in that their 
existence is normally understood to be outside of and / or historically prior to 
the political institutions and agreements (or contracts) that constitute the state. 
In India and Sri Lanka the principle ethnic cleavages have been those of 
language, religion, region and caste along with notions of biological race. The 
national and the ethnic / communal have therefore linked but not completely 
overlapping meanings. National claims are taken here to imply a form of 
political community defined in ethnic / communal terms as well as in political 
terms as a body of citizens and the legitimate unit of self government. Whereas 
national claims always invoke the demand for self government, ethnic / 
communal demands can invoke a pre-political or cultural group identity 
without making the same political demand. As the discussion below shows, 
national claims are not ever exclusively ethnic or civil but simply more or less 
inclusive of the ethnic pluralism contained within the boundaries of all states.  
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Koselleck’s analysis of the relationship between concepts and action, as well as 
his characterisation of the forward reaching temporality of modern social 
concepts, are key to interpreting the meanings and implications of national 
and ethnic claims. In particular, the notion of the ‘semantic field’ – a tool of 
analysis in the wider conceptual history project (Richter, 1995:48-50) – can be 
used to link the nation and ethnic / communal to the concepts of self 
government, popular sovereignty, freedom and progress. The semantic field 
describes a ‘relatively unified part of a language’s vocabulary’ at a given 
historical time, such that ‘its elements are so organised that each of them 
delimits and is delimited by the other’ (1995 48). Examples of linguistic fields 
such as ‘kinship, morality, colors, military organization’ bring together words, 
principles and concepts (1995). As discussed further below the meanings of 
nation/ ethnic / communal/ self government and progress are set in relation to 
each other and define the frame within which national and ethnic contestation 
occurs.  
Koselleck describes the relationship between concepts and the material reality 
of life as one of unresolved tension. Social and political concepts are not 
merely reflections of reality, but also elements of that reality in so far as they 
establish a framework for registering reality and thereby set the ‘horizon’ of 
social and political action (2004:86). Conversely, concepts are grounded in 
complex socio-political systems that cannot simply be treated as ‘linguistic 
communities organised around specific key concepts’ (2004:76). That is, ‘there 
exists between concept and materiality a tension now transcended, now 
breaking out afresh, now seemingly insoluble’ (2004:86), or, more succinctly, 
‘language and history depend on each other but never coincide’ (2004:222). 
The conceptual range of the nation and ethnic / communal do not exhaust the 
range of factors that make ethnic and national politics possible or indeed 
decide their outcomes. However, this conceptual range does set the framework 
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within which ethnic and national claims become meaningful and therefore 
politically and socially consequential. The ‘polemical intent’ of nation and 
ethnic / communal as key terms of political struggle is situated within a 
semantic field of social and political concepts in which notions of self 
government and popular sovereignty become, along with ideas of progress and 
temporal movement, key markers of political legitimacy.  
As Koselleck notes, one of the key principles underlying Enlightenment 
conceptions of freedom is that ‘rule could henceforth only be self – rule by 
mature human beings (first men, then later, women too) over themselves’ and 
further that ‘inner freedom can only exist if it is also realised outwardly’ 
(2002:250). In line with broader trends in liberal thought, English Utilitarians 
understood progress towards self government as a necessary end of 
enlightened British rule in south Asia. In this process, the unit of self 
government was increasingly conceived in national terms. The link between 
the nation and self government is also evident in the wider global system of 
ordering; the term inter-national was first coined by Jeremy Bentham in the 
late eighteenth century and has come to imply since then a system of 
interaction between nation-state units (Billig 1995:84). Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the link between the nation, the state and self government 
was further entrenched and also became a standard rhetoric of politics in 
colonial India and Sri Lanka (see below). The League of Nations and then the 
United Nations, the twentieth century’s two successive attempts to 
institutionalise co-operative political decision making at the supra state level 
defined –in terms of nomenclature and practice - their component units as 
national entities. 
Movement towards national self government also became an important 
component of ranking different groups on a linear scale of progress and 
development. Koselleck describes how the ‘opening up of the globe brought to 
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light various cultural levels which were, through processes of synchronic 
comparison then ordered diachronically’. The observation that ‘individual 
peoples or states ... were found to be in advance of others’ produced a ‘constant 
impulse of progressive comparison’. By the seventeenth century a common 
motif was to order this comparison along a ‘hierarchy produced through a 
consideration of the best existing constitution or the state of scientific, 
technical or economic development’ (2004:238). Furthermore political action 
was increasingly framed in terms of the imperative of comparative 
development and progress; ‘of promoting or superseding other positions, 
groups, Stände, classes, nations, sciences and knowledges’ (2004:246-7). 
Working within a clear framework of linear development, John Stuart Mill 
characterised national self government through representative institutions as 
an ideal form of constitution suitable only for those peoples who had reached 
an adequate stage of development. For Mill it was the task of despotic 
government to move those ‘backward’ peoples along the linear trajectory 
towards a point when they would be fit to govern themselves.75  
This comparative scale of linear progression was evident in south Asia. The 
term ‘backward’ was used by colonial officials, as well as subjects themselves, 
to characterise groups who had lower levels of formal education, as well as 
lower levels of participation in public sector employment and non agricultural 
sectors of the economy. For example, the Viceroy, Dufferin (served 1884-1888), 
explained his concern for Indian Muslims in the following terms: ‘naturally my 
liveliest sympathies will be for those who through any circumstances over 
which they have no control have fallen behind in the race of progress and 
advancement’ (quoted in Hardy 1972:133). Similarly, from the late nineteenth 
century, colonial officials in south India used the term ‘backward’ to describe 
socially and economically exploited caste groups that were in need of special 
government assistance (Radhakrishnan 1990). At the same time, signs of 
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movement towards the expression of nationhood and nationality were linked 
to ideas of progress and self government. A number of Indian and British 
officials took the formation of INC as a sign of evolutionary ‘awakening’ that 
included the acquisition of a unified ‘national’ purpose (Bayly 1999:129). In 
December 1885, as the ‘National Congress’ met in Bombay and the ‘National 
Conference’ met in Calcutta, the Bengali politician S. N Banerjea remarked: ‘all 
India seemed at present to have met in solemn conclave to think out the great 
problem of national advancement’ (quoted in Mehrotra 1971:586). Speaking in 
1952, the Sri Lankan Tamil politician S. J. V Chelvanayagam also linked 
national status to development, telling his audience in Jaffna: ‘We in North 
and East Ceylon should also develop into the most advanced stage of human 
society, that is, we should achieve national status’ (quoted in Wilson 1994:44).  
The modernity of the nation is apparent in this forward reaching temporal 
movement; that is, the nation and its related terms are ‘instruments for the 
direction of historical movement’ – movement towards political independence 
and self government – however defined (Koselleck 2004:251). The nation’s 
close association with self government, as well as the link between the nation 
and ethnic / communal, are rooted in the doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
Although the historical and conceptual links between nationalism and popular 
sovereignty have been noted, the emergence of the nation as the vehicle of self 
government has generally been understood as conceptually inadvertent (Yack 
2001). Against this view, the argument here is that the meanings conveyed by 
the nation in political contestation have a close and deep conceptual 
connection to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, as set out in Rousseau’s 
Social Contract.  
The Social Contract is a key text in understanding modern conceptions of self 
government as it sets out the connection between the individual’s inner 
freedom and moral progress, on the one hand, and collective self government, 
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on the other, that Koselleck identifies as central to modern understandings of 
freedom, progress and self government. It also crucially presents the unit of 
self government as the pre political people; that is the people as a unit that 
exists prior to the state. The core nationalist demand that the nation should be 
self governing, ideally with a state of its own, implicitly relies on the Social 
Contract’s vision of the sovereign people as a pre political entity held together 
by cohesive ties that exist prior to the state. The discussion in the following 
section sets out the conceptual connections between the nation, popular 
sovereignty and ethnic pluralism. It argues that in the context of self 
government, the nation functions as a synonym for the general will - the 
operative principle of popular sovereignty. It is as a consequence of the 
connection between the nation and general will, that ethnic pluralism 
becomes a conceptually important problem for national politics – a problem 
that can be resolved in more or less inclusive ways. 
4.4 The nation, the general will and the problem of ethnic 
pluralism 
The Social Contract explicitly invokes two distinct images of the political 
community in its account of the legitimate political order; as a contractually 
formed body of citizens on the one hand, and as a historically constituted 
ethnic community, on the other. Both these visions of the political community 
enter into the characteristics and functions of the general will, the active 
principle of popular sovereignty as defined in the Social Contract The general 
will expresses the interests shared by the population as members of the 
political association, and creates two axes of political contestation; first, to 
reconcile mutually competing interests within society into a singular interest, 
and second, to define an ideal ordering of the polity within which a singular 
general or national will becomes possible. While Rousseau derives the 
existence and characteristics of the general will from a depiction of the 
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political community as a contractual entity, as the following discussion shows, 
he turns to ethnic conceptions of political community to substantiate the 
general will and translate it into concrete systems of legislation and forms of 
government. The nation enters the Social Contract as a synonym for the 
general will, and, in doing so, becomes the object of contestation to reconcile 
competing interests into a singular will and define an ideal ordering of the 
polity. However, it is argued here this contestation can only occur where the 
protagonists have a broad but shared understanding of the nation’s ethnic 
boundaries. 
Rousseau initially describes the political community and the general will as 
emerging from a hypothetical state of nature. The state or political association 
emerges when individuals living largely isolated and independent lives enter 
into a mutually binding and mutually beneficial social contract. In doing so, 
they establish a new sovereign power and gain two distinct sets of identities 
and interests. As citizens and members of the sovereign, they have a common 
or general will that expresses their shared interest in preserving and fostering 
their political union. As private individuals, however, they continue to have 
private wills directed towards individual ends that can be in conflict with the 
general will i.e. ‘each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary to 
or different from the general will he has as a citizen’ (Rousseau 1987:150). 
Although individuals enter into the social contract as a means of preserving 
and fostering their own lives and goods, once they have entered into the 
contract, only their shared general will can direct the forces of the state they 
have established through their union. The general will is therefore the active 
principle of popular sovereignty and mediates the relationship between the 
state and its subjects by ensuring that the capacities of the state are exercised 
only in accordance with the common interests that individuals have in 
preserving and fostering their political union. As such, 
109 
 
‘The first and most important consequence of the principles 
established above is that only the general will can direct the 
forces of the state according to the purpose for which it was 
instituted, which is the common good. For if the opposition of 
private interests made necessary the establishment of societies, 
it is the accord of these same interests that made it possible. It is 
what these different interests have in common that forms the 
social bond, and, were there no point of agreement among 
these interests, no society could exist. For it is utterly on the 
basis of this common interest that society ought to be governed’ 
(1987:153).  
As the operative principle of popular sovereignty, the notion of a singular 
general will is also central to Rousseau’s definition of legislation and 
government, the concrete mechanisms through which state power is exercised. 
Rousseau defines the law as a statute enacted in accordance with the common 
interests that individuals share as members of the state; that is, a statute in 
accordance with the general will. Meanwhile, the government is understood as 
an intermediate body with executive power established by the sovereign 
through an act of law and charged with the ‘the execution of the laws and the 
preservation of liberty, both civil and political’ (1987:173) While the 
characteristics of the general will and its relationship to the state, legislation 
and government are derived from the universally applicable principles of the 
social contract, Rousseau turns to ethnic conceptions of political community to 
substantiate the general will and discuss concrete systems of legislation.  In 
discussing the origins of legislative systems and the ends that legislation ought 
ideally to realise, Rousseau qualifies the universally applicable and a priori 
principles derived from the social contract with the compulsions that arise 
from specific and historically constituted national characteristics. The demands 
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of national character do not invalidate the universal imperatives of the social 
contract. Instead, historically constituted national communities can be 
interpreted as the constraining medium within which the principles of the 
social contract have to operate. 
As a hypothetical device, the social contract assumes that individuals can 
together arrive at the universally valid principles of the social contract through 
a rational consideration of the compulsions driving them towards a mutually 
binding association. However, in discussing substantive legislative systems, 
Rousseau also depicts the human character and capacity to reason as socially 
and historically shaped. Although the principles of the social contract may 
stipulate that the ‘populace that is subject to the laws ought to be their author’ 
(1987:162), actual existing states and legislative systems could not have 
emerged from a hypothetical social contract. The associating individuals could 
only acquire the social capacities demanded by the social contract from a 
previously existing social state. As Rousseau puts it, 
‘For an emerging people to have to be capable of appreciating the 
sound maxims of politics and to follow the fundamental rules of 
statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause. The social 
spirit which ought to be the work of that institution, would have 
to preside over the institution itself’ (1987:164). 
In order to explain the historical origins of legislative systems, Rousseau turns 
to the idea of superhuman legislators, the ‘fathers of nations’, men of ‘superior 
intelligence that beheld all the passions of men without feeling any of them’ 
(1987:162). While the idea of a superhuman legislator is possibly no more 
historically accurate as an account of political community than the social 
contract, it is important in suggesting that nations, states and legislative 
systems emerge through historical processes rather than through a contractual 
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act of association.76 The understanding of peoples or nations as historically and 
geographically formed and bounded entities enters substantively into the 
definition of the general will, and is therefore inseparable from attempts to 
reconcile competing interests and define an ideal ordering of the polity. 
Although the principles derived from the social contract demand that the 
‘purpose of every legislative system’ is to secure ‘two principal objects, liberty 
and equality’ (1987:170) good legislation must also secure the specific objects 
prescribed by national characteristics. Rousseau cites a number of examples to 
demonstrate the diverse types of national character that have organised states 
and systems of legislation throughout history:  
‘In a word, aside from the maxims common to all, each people 
has within itself some cause that organises them in a particular 
way and renders its legislation proper for it alone. Thus it was 
long ago the Hebrews and recently the Arabs have had religion 
as their main object: the Athenians had letters; Carthage and 
Tyre, commerce; Rhodes seafaring; Sparta, war; and Rome, 
virtue’ (1987:171).  
The nation comes therefore to occupy a structurally integral position in the 
Social Contract as a means of substantiating the general will, and in doing so it 
does more than add a cultural or ethnic flavour to the substantive political 
meanings conveyed by the general will. Instead, the concept of the nation 
becomes active in determining the legitimacy of legislation and government 
action. In other words, the nation becomes a synonym for the general will and 
the national comes to define the interests, values and identity that the 
population have as members of the political association. Defining the nation’s 
interests, and what is appropriately national, is a means of separating what is 
public and political from what is personal, familial or social. Contesting the 
national interest and national character are therefore not just means of 
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expressing patriotic sentiment, but also key to making political claims about 
the appropriate exercise of public power. It is in this way that the nation 
becomes a central and indispensable political device; political power can only 
legitimately be exercised in accordance with the national will and national 
identity.  
The meanings and implications of terms such as ethnicity or communalism 
emerge from this relationship between the nation and self government. While 
nationhood, nationality and nationalism were associated with progress and self 
government, terms such as ethnicity, communal and communalism have come 
to be defined as divisive and reactionary, an impediment to progress. That is, 
terms such as ethnic, ethno-national or communal convey the moral 
illegitimacy associated with the notion of the partial, factional or sectional 
interest in the Social Contract. While the term national imbues a demand or 
platform with the moral legitimacy of the general will, terms such as 
communal and ethno national are invariably used as terms of abuse and invoke 
the approbation associated with the notion of the faction or partial interest. 
This opposition between nationality as a principle of progress and unification, 
and communualism as a principle of reaction and division, was clearly 
articulated in the early decades of the twentieth century, as both India and Sri 
Lanka moved towards self government. S. Satyamurti, the Tamil Nadu 
Congressman, giving a speech at the Youth Congress meeting in Jaffna titled 
‘Communalism our great danger’, stated that ‘communalism, narrow and 
utterly selfish and circumscribed in its very nature, was the very contradiction 
of nationalism’ (quoted in Kadirgamar 1980:45). A 1928 report on 
constitutional reform in Sri Lanka likewise noted that the ‘evils of communal 
representation have accentuated rather than diminished racial differences’ and 
went onto argue that the ‘formation of parties on racial or caste lines would be 
fatal to the best interests of the country’ (Colonial Office 1928:42).  
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During the 1980’s, as the term ethnicity gradually replaced communal or 
communalism, it retained this same sense of opposition to the ideals of 
progress, freedom and self government: generally bad and divisive ethno-
nationalism was increasingly contrasted with good and unifying civic 
nationalism.77 This is apparent in the studies of ethnic and national politics in 
Sri Lanka. For example, two books written after the 1983 anti-Tamil riots that 
study in some depth the politics and process of the violence, use different 
terminology, reflecting different approaches. S. J Tambiah’s study is titled 
‘Ethnic fratricide and the dismantling of democracy’ (1986), and explains 
ethnic violence in terms of groups, interests and the construction of ideologies 
that have disrupted the calm of an otherwise peaceful people and island. A. J 
Wilson’s study has a similar, but perhaps less dramatic title, the ‘Break Up of 
Sri Lanka’, but in this work the focus is on clashing political values and goods – 
namely the escalating conflict between the Tamils and the unitary Sinhala 
Buddhist state. As a consequence, for Wilson, the ‘Break Up’ of Sri Lanka is 
understood in national terms, namely the emergence of two national identities 
and two sovereign states (1988).  
Although the opposition between ‘good’ unifying civic nationalism and ‘bad’ 
ethnic or communal allegiance is clear in much scholarly analysis and political 
rhetoric, the significant nationalist movements that emerged during this 
period cannot be classified as purely civic or ethnic, as all contained civic and 
ethnic elements. They were civic insofar as they identified the nation as a self 
governing body of citizens unified by shared political or economic interests, 
and were ethnic in that the nation was also understood as bound by pre 
political and historically constituted cultural ties. Furthermore, all of the 
nationalist movements studied here - whether they are generally regarded as 
civic (Indian nationalism) or ethnic (Sinhala Buddhist nationalism) - 
recognised and sought to incorporate (more or less successfully) a diversity of 
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ethnic categories within their respective national conceptions. Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalists consciously sought to integrate low country and Kandyan 
Sinhalese as well as unifying caste cleavages while Tamil nationalists in Sri 
Lanka recognised and sought to overcome caste as well as regional differences 
(between Jaffna and the eastern areas of Trincomalee and Batticaloa). 
Meanwhile, Congress did not articulate a form of civic identity that erased 
ethnic difference, but instead sought to integrate ethnic cleavages within its 
organisational structure. The Congress movement recognised, and more or less 
successfully accommodated, differences of language, caste and religion. 
Similarly, the Muslim League in its national conception recognised and sought 
(largely unsuccessfully) to integrate and manage the regional distinctions 
(Bengal, Punjab, northern India etc) amongst Indian Muslims. The problem of 
ethnic pluralism is not therefore that of avoiding bad ethno-nationalism/ 
communalism while establishing good civic nationalism, but rather that of 
establishing a national framework for the competitive politics of self 
government that is capable of including, in a more or less equitable way, the 
ethnic pluralism contained within the boundaries of almost all states.  
This conceptually modern semantic field in which concepts such as nation, 
communal and ethnic gained their meaning and import set the boundaries 
within which, through processes of competitive mobilisation, actors defined, 
contested and thereby more or less successfully established conceptions of 
Indian, Tamil and Sinhala national identity. Understanding the semantic field 
of ethnic and national politics is crucial to explaining the behaviour of the 
protagonists of this politics, not necessarily by ‘privileging the definitions the 
participants explicitly give’, but by making clear the ‘rules they actually follow 
in their actions and appraisals of action’ (Connolly 1993:37). That is, while 
political actors may not be able to give a precise account of the theory of 
popular sovereignty, they nevertheless invoke the binary opposition between 
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the general will and partial wills when they affirm values as (civic) national or 
deride them as ethno-national/ communal. 78  The publicly accepted and 
political consequential meanings of ethnic and national claims, rather than the 
subjectively experienced meanings, are framed therefore by these implicit 
rules that sustain the opposition between the national/ general and the ethnic 
(communal)/ particular. Deciphering the political meaning or ‘polemical 
intent’ of ethnic and national claims is crucial as it is the publicly accepted 
meaning – rather than the subjectively experienced understanding – that links 
ethnic and national claims to the material outcomes of ethnic and national 
mobilisation and contestation.  
Congress’ pan ethnic conception of Indian national identity and national 
interest incorporated the central claims of Tamil cultural nationalism and 
allowed for the peaceable accommodation of the once separatist Dravidian 
movement within the Indian constitutional framework. Although the 
Congress movement was closely associated with Hindu nationalist actors in a 
number of regions, and many political actors supported Congress for purely 
self interested and opportunistic reasons, namely to get themselves elected, the 
Indian constitutional framework was nevertheless shaped by Congress’ 
publicly stated ideology of pan ethnic nationalism. Similarly the political 
dominance of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism produced ethnically hierarchical 
and materially significant social, economic and political consequences despite 
the fact Sinhala Buddhist rhetoric was often mobilised for clearly tactical or 
parochial reasons. In short, the publicly stated intentions of successful 
nationalist movements are crucial and linked to the social and political 
transformations they effect. Furthermore, the public meanings of ethnic and 
national claims, as well as the transformations they effect, exist apart from the 
diversity of interests and motivations they are able to mobilise. While the 
historic authenticity and normative integrity of Indian or Sinhala Buddhist 
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conceptions of national identity and interest are open to evaluation, this is less 
important than the public meanings they implicitly mobilise and the actual 
transformations they effect. The transformations they effect are always 
legitimized by invoking the principle of the general will, but in ways that can 
be more or less accommodative of the plurality of interests and identities 
existing within the boundaries of the state.  
Similarly, the terminology of oppositional politics is also clearly linked to the 
types of power they seek. For example, before the 1952 general elections in Sri 
Lanka the FP released a manifesto describing that Sri Lankan Tamils as a 
distinct nation possessed of their own homeland and the right to self-
determination. On the basis of this claim, the FP demanded a set of rights for 
Tamil speakers on the island, including recognition of the Tamil language and 
political autonomy for the Tamil speaking areas (Navaratnam 1991). This 
statement has been analysed for its empirical accuracy (Hobsbawm 1992) and 
also explained as an instrumental ploy used by self-seeking politicians to whip 
up Tamil ethnic sentiment and thereby secure political power (Stokke 1998). 
However, in claiming that the Tamils were a nation the FP’s ‘polemical intent’ 
was to set out an ideal political order, rather than to describe reality. As 
Koselleck notes, modern concepts ‘no longer serve merely to define given 
states of affairs, but reach into the future’ (2004:80). Similarly, the argument 
that FP politicians’ real intentions were simply to secure power fails to capture 
the particular form of power that they sought. By framing their demands in 
national terms, they sought specific positions of power, a form of territorial 
autonomy that would be outside the purview of the ‘nationalising’ policies of 
the Sinhala Buddhist state. That is, language and terminological struggle, for 
example on whether the Tamils actually constituted a ‘nation’, is inseparable 
from the struggle for power; ‘positions that were to be secured had first to be 
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formulated linguistically before it was possible to enter or permanently occupy 
them’ (2004:80).  
4.5 Accounting for success and failure  
The divergent outcomes of ethnic and national politics in India and Sri Lanka 
came about despite comparable and connected historical and social conditions. 
From the late nineteenth century, there was a similar range of ethnic and 
national movements in the two states. There were attempts at pan ethnic 
nationalism in Sri Lanka, whilst Indian Hindu nationalist organisations set out 
positions and claims that corresponded almost exactly to those of Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism. The discussion in Chapter Three argued that the 
divergence could not be explained through structurally given differences of 
demography or the incentives and opportunities facing political actors in the 
two countries. In other words, processes of political contestation – within a 
framework of shared concepts – are crucial in explaining the outcome. As 
Connolly argues, politics cannot be reduced to ‘psychological factors or 
economic forces’ (1993:6) and should instead be seen as a form of conflict 
conducted through mutually shared and mutually contested concepts.  
‘Politics involves the clash that emerges when appraisive 
concepts are shared widely but imperfectly, when mutual 
understanding and interpretation is possible but in a partial 
and limited way, when reasoned argument and coercive 
pressure commingle precariously in the endless process of 
defining and resolving issues.’ (1993:40) 
The outcomes of ethnic and national politics cannot therefore be reduced to 
the structural conditions – economic or political – in which they occur and 
must instead be located in the interactive processes through which actors 
define and contest competing conceptions of national identity and national 
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interest. Processes occur in time as well as space, and temporal patterns of 
activity are therefore crucial in explaining the divergent outcomes of national 
and ethnic politics in India and Sri Lanka. The argument, elaborated in the 
empirical chapters, is twofold. The first part of the argument is that politically 
dominant and significant conceptions of national or ethnic identity are those 
that are advanced by successful ethnic and national movements. The second 
part is that all politically successful ethnic and national movements bring 
together three activities in a temporally sustained way: articulating an 
ideological framework, incorporating significant existing cleavages and interest 
groups and, finally, mobilising support through activities of direct political 
mobilisation. Temporally situated patterns of activity, rather than temporally 
static variables, are central to the explanation of the difference between ethnic 
conflict and ethnic accommodation offered here.  
The first part of the argument links ethnic and national identities to 
temporally situated activities of political organisation and mobilisation. The 
political dominance of a pan-ethnic conception of Indian national identity in 
the period from 1920 to 1967 is linked closely to the dominance of the INC, 
while the political dominance of a territorial conception of Tamil national 
identity and interest in Sri Lanka is linked to the electoral and political 
dominance of the FP. While ethnic and national claims are hardwired into 
conceptual framework of modern politics and are therefore unavoidable, the 
actual forms that national identity takes is contingent i.e. dependent on 
processes that were political and that could easily have been otherwise. 
Political dominance is taken here simply to mean a capacity to mobilise 
majority support across the relevant target audience - the non Muslim Indian 
population and the Sri Lankan Tamil population in the examples given above – 
and to become, as a consequence, an unavoidable presence for allies and 
antagonists alike. The relative success or failure of a political movement is thus 
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measured here by its ability to establish its conception of identity and interest 
as dominant, not by its capacity to realise its stated outcomes. Sri Lanka’s 
constitutional progress to self government from 1920 onwards was dictated 
primarily by the decisions of British officials and was unrelated to the fairly 
anaemic forces of anti-colonial protest. Similarly, the FP in Sri Lanka was an 
abject failure in terms of securing its stated objectives, namely self government 
in the Tamil speaking regions, but was successful in establishing its conception 
of territorial nationhood as the dominant pole of Tamil politics on the island, 
one that has remained unavoidable for nationalist and non nationalist Tamils 
as well as for non Tamil antagonists of the Tamil nationalist movement.  
The second part of the argument sets out the patterns of activities that all 
successful movements bring together in a temporally continuous way. The 
three processes of ideological articulation, co-option and direct political 
mobilisation are derived from the three functions of ideology - co-ordination, 
mobilisation and legitimation - identified by John Breuilly (1993:93). However, 
it departs from this typology in focusing on the processes necessary for 
successful political action rather than the functions of ideology. As Breuilly 
notes, ideological claims can either be invoked to rationalise already planned 
action or work to motivate action (1993:93). At the same time, and following 
Koselleck, modern political action must be framed in temporally forward 
reaching concepts (and therefore be ideological) if it is to be understood by 
other political actors as a political act. Therefore, while ideology can have 
functions, it is also constitutive of political acts as meaningful acts. The three 
processes of mobilisation here also do not include the function of legitimation, 
which Breuilly identifies as legitimation in the eyes of powerful international 
actors. The international context is certainly important in the events analysed 
in this dissertation. For much of the colonial period, the decisions and 
preferences of British officials were crucial in shaping the timing and direction 
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of constitutional change. The decline of British power and the emergence of 
two new global powers - the USA and USSR –were factors in the dynamics 
leading to Indian independence soon after the end of the war in Europe. 
Similarly, British officials were decisive in determining the constitutional form 
of Sri Lankan independence and, later, international and regional dynamics 
fuelled the escalation of ethnic conflict into civil war. However, in the 
framework adopted here, from the late nineteenth century, international, 
British and south Asian political actors and movements are understood as 
working within the same conceptual framework that included the concepts of 
nation, ethnicity and self-government. Furthermore, this dissertation uses a 
different measure of success to the one adopted by Breuilly. Successful political 
movements are not those that realise their objectives, but those that establish 
their conception of national identity and interest as unavoidable objects of the 
political landscape. The three processes are essential components of political 
movements that are successful in establishing their preferred characterisations 
of identity and interest.  
In setting out an ideological framework, national movements have to make 
claims about the pre-political ties that bind the nation together, the boundaries 
of the national community and the terms through which politically significant 
ethnic categories will be integrated into the national whole. The ethnic 
categories that are consciously integrated into the national whole will depend 
on the national identity that is sought. So, for example, late nineteenth century 
attempts to establish a pan-Indian national platform had to address and 
accommodate existing religious and regional cleavages that were already 
established in Indian political life. Indian nationalists therefore explicitly 
sought to include Muslims and all significant regional centres. Early twentieth 
century attempts to forge a pan-Sinhalese platform had to address cleavages 
between low country and Kandyan Sinhalese, whilst the FP’s attempts to forge 
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a territorial conception of Tamil identity from 1949 onwards had to address 
the divisions of caste and the distinctions between northern and eastern areas.  
Along with setting out a clear ideological framework, successful political 
movements also have to mobilise support; this involves co-opting already 
powerful social and political actors and directly mobilising amongst the target 
population. The types of groups and interests that a movement seeks to co-opt 
and accommodate will be framed by its ideological and tactical objectives. In 
its early years, for example, Congress sought to co-opt the support of 
established Muslim politicians and important Muslim religious institutions. 
Later, when it became an electoral party, it sought to co-opt the support of 
powerful individuals capable of mobilising vote banks. Groups and individuals 
who are co-opted in such a way might support the movement for reasons that 
are quite apart from the movement’s ideological objectives – for example, 
because they want to win political power. However, all ideological movements 
that have become significant social and political forces must include, alongside 
the ideologically motivated cadres, others who use the movement to more or 
less consciously to pursue other unrelated objectives. Conversely, it can be 
seen as a sign of an ideological movement’s success that individuals who are 
motivated to pursue social recognition or power come to see the movement in 
question as a reliable or even unavoidable way of securing these ends. 
Finally, all successful movements use methods such as mass protests and the 
channels of mass communication to directly reach their target audience. The 
Congress movements’ anti colonial protests, the Sinhala Buddhist temperance 
campaigns and the Federal Party’s civil disobedience all sought in various ways 
to shape individual behaviour, and therefore subjective allegiance, in line with 
national objectives. This direct mobilisation is often conducted in the 
vernacular and through popular and resonant symbols and metonyms. The 
scope and medium of direct mobilisation has therefore an impact on the ethnic 
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boundaries of national community. A movement can only build support 
amongst a target ethnic category if it is able to directly and effectively 
communicate its message in the relevant language and symbols. The Indian 
Congress’ electoral dominance in the Tamil speaking areas was associated with 
its extensive activities of mobilisation that used the Tamil language and culture 
as both vehicles and expressions of Indian nationalism. In contrast, it did not 
use Muslim cultural symbols or the Urdu language in the same way. As 
discussed in the following chapter, this difference explains why Congress was 
able to incorporate Tamil identity within its conception of the Indian nation 
but failed to incorporate Muslim identity. Finally, there is a symbiotic 
relationship between a movement’s proven capacity to directly mobilise 
support and its ability to co-opt the support of powerful actors. Politically 
ambitious actors are more likely to support an ideological movement, for 
whatever reason, if it has a proven capacity at directly mobilising the support 
of their target audience. While powerful magnates – able to command vote 
banks - in the south Indian Tamil speaking areas switched their support to 
Congress during the 1930’s, Muslim magnates did not. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out an alternative framework for explaining ethnic and 
national politics. Instead of attempting to identify dynamics ‘causally’ linked to 
ethnic and national politics, it suggested first asking what makes ethnic and 
national claims meaningful, and then why some ethnic and national 
movements were more successful than others. In response to the first question, 
it argued that the terms ethnic and national, along with their cognates, 
functioned as key terms of political contestation that gained their meaning 
from a close link to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The term nation 
functions as a synonym for the ‘general will’ and in doing so, denotes the 
people as both a legally defined body but also as a pre-political and historically 
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constituted entity. It is as a consequence of the twin meanings of the term 
nation that ethnic or pre-political differences – of language, religion, region 
and ‘race’ – become politically consequential. That is, questions of which 
ethnic categories would be included in the national whole  - and on what 
terms – as well as which ethnic categories would be excluded became both 
politically meaningful and unavoidable. Ethnic pluralism became a conceptual 
challenge – unavoidable but not irresolvable – to the idea of a unified ‘national’ 
general will. As such, in the era of popular sovereignty ethnic pluralism has to 
be reconciled with the need for a conception of the national whole as 
politically and historically unified. As the nation is always both political and 
pre-political, conceptions of national identity are better understood as more or 
less inclusive of the ethnic pluralism contained within the boundaries of the 
state than as either ethnic or civic.  
Ethnic and national claims should thus be interpreted, not as accurate 
statements of reality more or less consciously used to pursue other interests, 
but as publicly meaningful forward reaching attempts to describe and 
therefore create possible social and political worlds. Ethnic and national 
contestation must therefore be situated in the realm of meaningful politics and 
while arguably linked – in specific cases - to psychological drives and/or 
economic interests, they cannot be reduced to either. While the political 
consequences of ethnic and national movements are linked to their publicly 
meaningful claims, the relative success and failure of such movements is an 
outcome of temporally situated processes of political organisation and 
mobilisation. Movements ought to be considered successful in so far as they 
establish their claims to identity as unavoidable – for allies and antagonists – 
aspects of social and political life. The chapter also argued that successful 
movements are those that bring together in a temporally sustained way the 
124 
 
activities of ideological articulation, interest co-option and direct political 
mobilization.  
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5. Tamils, Muslims and Congress’ pan ethnic 
nationalism in colonial India 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter Four argued that national identities cannot be considered exclusively 
civic or ethnic, but must rather be seen as more or less inclusive of the ethnic 
pluralism contained within almost all states. Moreover it argued that while the 
ethnic categories that became important from the late nineteenth century – 
such as Muslim, Hindu, Tamil and Dravidian – invariably concealed a great 
diversity of social practices, they nevertheless realised a political, social and 
cultural resonance in public associational culture that became politically 
unavoidable, even for those unconvinced of their validity. 79  This chapter 
explains why the pan-ethnic conception of Indian national identity and 
national interest associated with the INC was able to mobilise support in the 
Tamil speaking areas, and therefore symbolically include Tamil identity, but 
could not do the same with Muslim politics. The key moments at which to 
judge Congress’ ability to incorporate these distinct identities are the elections 
that took place between 1934 and 1937 and again in 1945. Before and during 
these elections there were significant social and political movements in the 
Tamil speaking areas and amongst Muslims across India denouncing Congress 
and Indian nationalism as respectively antithetical to Tamil and Muslim 
interests. In the Tamil speaking areas, first the Justice Party (founded in 1916), 
and later the Self Respect Movement (founded in 1925), both describing the 
Tamils as Dravidian, denounced Congress as a vehicle of north Indian, Aryan 
and Brahmanical domination. Amongst the Muslim electorate, Muslim 
associations, most prominently the Muslim League, characterised Congress as a 
Hindu body and a threat to Muslim political interests. Despite this symmetrical 
- in rhetoric at least - opposition, Congress’ ability to mobilise support amongst 
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the two electorates was very different. In the 1937 elections it scored one of its 
most impressive victories in the Tamil speaking areas securing 159 out of a 
total of 215 seats (Baker 1976:211). In contrast, in the same elections Congress 
failed to demonstrate Muslim electoral support and secured only 26 of the 482 
provincial legislature seats elected from Muslim constituencies across India 
(Sarkar 1989:349). 
This failure cannot be explained by the different strengths of the Tamil and 
Muslim movements; both the Muslim League and the Justice party had weak 
party structures and very little ability to mobilise direct political support. 
Similarly, it cannot be explained by a fundamental difference in the salient 
economic and social structures of the Tamil and Muslim electorates; in both 
the key to electoral success was winning over important rural and urban 
notables or magnates able to mobilise significant vote banks through patron 
client networks.80 Importantly, the political behaviour of Tamil and Muslim 
patrons was equally motivated by considerations of personal advantage, rather 
than sustained allegiance to ethnic identity or political party. Instead of 
looking to structural forces, the argument presented here is that the difference 
lies in the extent to which Congress activists incorporated Muslim and Tamil 
identities in their activities of direct mobilisation and communication. In the 
Tamil speaking areas, from the late nineteenth century, regional Congress 
politicians used the Tamil language as both the medium and expression of 
Indian nationalism and thereby symbolically and organisationally incorporated 
Tamil public culture into a wider Indian nationalist project. The explanation 
for the absence of similar sustained efforts to present Congress and Indian 
nationalism in Muslim religious and cultural terms is located at the regional 
levels of the Congress organisation. In Punjab, Bengal and the United 
Provinces (UP) – the three areas that contained the majority of Indian 
Muslims81 – the regional Congress was dominated by groups that were also 
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closely associated with Hindu nationalism and therefore propagated and 
understood the Indian nation in largely Hindu terms.82  
Despite the importance of patronage networks, rather than political affiliation, 
in deciding electoral outcomes, direct mobilisation using ethnic categories are 
a crucial factor in explaining this difference. Congress’ sustained efforts at 
direct mobilisation through Tamil linguistic and cultural categories, 
heightened during the mass protests of Non-Cooperation (1920-1922) and Civil 
Disobedience (1930–34), established the movement as an important and visible 
presence in Tamil political life. This presence did not necessarily translate 
directly into voter motivation and behaviour. Rather, when Congress entered 
electoral competition, many magnates, who previously had other affiliations, 
switched their allegiance, sensing that Congress was an attractive vehicle for 
electoral victory and therefore one that could be utilised against their 
interests.83 Congress simply did not have this effect on Muslim magnates – and, 
nor importantly, did the Muslim League until 1945.84  
Congress’ contrasting ability to mobilise amongst the Tamil and Muslim 
populations in India is not simply a matter of explaining electoral outcomes. 
Rather, the inclusion of publicly asserted and politically significant ethnic 
identities is realised through these processes of political organisation and 
mobilisation. The inclusion of Tamil political and associational activity within 
a pan-Indian framework occurred because of activities that actively sought to 
mobilise popular support for Indian nationalism in the Tamil speaking areas. In 
adopting the Tamil language and Tamil cultural forms as vehicles of Indian 
nationalism, Congress activists also adopted them as interests of Indian 
nationalism; the organisational and substantive content of Indian nationalism 
in the Tamil speaking areas took on distinctly Tamil concerns and interests. In 
other words, Indian national identity is today un-problematically inclusive of 
Tamils (and linguistic diversity more generally) but problematically so of 
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Muslim identity because of the contingent historical processes of political 
organisation and mobilisation. The antagonism between Hindu and Muslim 
associations and interests at the regional levels, while important, was not the 
only or even dominant vector of social and political conflict in Punjab, Bengal 
and UP. What was decisive for the relationship between Congress and Muslim 
groups, however, was the dominance of Hindu nationalist sentiment and 
associations at the regional level of the Congress organisation. 
The first section of this chapter describes the ideological content and 
associational structures of pan-ethnic Indian nationalism, the competing 
Dravidian and Indian nationalisms in the Tamil speaking areas as well as 
Hindu and Muslim nationalism. The following section then describes the 
Congress development from 1885 to become by 1947 arguably the central 
institution of Indian politics in terms of three key activities of modern 
associational politics; that is ideological articulation; co-option of existing 
sources of power and influence and finally the direct mobilisation of support. 
It discusses in turn the Congress movement’s relationship to Tamil/ Dravidian, 
Hindu and Muslim nationalisms to reveal the differential ways in which the 
identities espoused by the movements were incorporated within the larger 
vision of a pan-ethnic Indian national identity and national interest. The 
section ends by explaining why ethnic demography and rational calculation 
alone cannot account for the different patterns of Congress mobilisation 
amongst Muslim and Tamil voters.  
5.2 Context 
5.2.1 Congress and pan-ethnic Indian nationalism  
Addressing the first session of the INC, held in Bombay in December 1885, G. 
S. Iyer, a delegate from Madras, expressed his sense of the momentous nature 
of the occasion. He stated that the assemblage of ‘my chosen countrymen from 
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Calcutta and Lahore, from Madras and Sind, from places wide apart and 
difficult of intercommunication’ indicated ‘the beginning of national political 
life.’ For Iyer, Congress was national because it was pan-Indian and the fact 
that such a meeting could be held meant that Indians could ‘with greater 
propriety than heretofore speak of an Indian nation, of national opinion and 
national aspirations’ (quoted in Mehrotra1971:600). The attempt to create a 
pan-Indian ‘national’ political body had been a feature of Indian public life 
from the early decades of the nineteenth century.85 These attempts gained 
momentum in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s because of a series of 
government decisions that were crystallised in Indian public culture – through 
the activity of regional associations and the press – as revealing of the 
contradiction between Indian and British interests, with the latter seen as 
unduly driving official policy. Under the Conservative Viceroy Lord Lytton 
(served 1876-1880) government decisions on civil service recruitment, famine 
response, cotton tariffs and the rising expenditure on military campaigns in 
Afghanistan, along with the extravagant 1876 Delhi Durbar to celebrate Queen 
Victoria’s golden jubilee at a time of devastating famine, were widely 
condemned as inimical to Indian interests. Subsequently, the Liberal Viceroy 
Lord Ripon’s (served 1880-1884) attempts to introduce the elective principle at 
local government elections and equalise racial anomalies in the status of 
European and Indian judges produced a clear divide between Indian and 
European opinion and led to India-wide demonstrations of support for Ripon 
when he made a last tour of the country near the end of his tenure.86  
The move towards holding a pan-Indian meeting was led by associational 
activity in Calcutta, Madras, Poona and Bombay – all areas with a growing 
western educated population (Seal 1968: chapter six). The Indian Association 
in Calcutta took an initial step and, making use of the Government’s decision 
to hold an International Exhibition in Calcutta in December 1883, invited 
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delegates from across the country to attend a National Conference in the city 
(1968:261). From late 1884, a separate effort co-ordinated by the retired 
English civil servant Allen O. Hume - working with associations in Bombay 
and Poona - got underway to hold a pan-Indian conference in Poona the 
following year (Mehrotra 1971:557). Eventually the meeting was held in 
Bombay because of cholera in Poona and was announced in the press as the 
INC (1971:589, 584). At the same time, the second National Conference was 
held in Calcutta and S. N Banerjea remarked on the perceptible level of 
political activity that ‘all India seemed at the present moment to have met in 
solemn conclave to think out the great problem of national advancement’ 
(quoted in 1971:586). The second session of the INC was held in Calcutta, 
where it was nominally merged with the National Conference and 
subsequently became as Anil Seal describes, ‘the matrix of the later nationalist 
movement.’ (Seal 1968:267) 
Over the following years, the activities of the INC expressed and established an 
understanding of Indian national identity and national interest that was 
organised around a core set of principles. The most important of these 
principles was that the diverse ethnic and regional identities found within the 
Indian population were nevertheless united by shared interests. The INC 
claimed to be the body that expressed these shared interests because it 
contained within its organisational structure the ethnic and regional pluralism 
of the Indian population; the official report of the first session noted the 
regional, professional and ethnic diversity of its delegates as a mark of the 
representative character of the proceedings (Mehrotra 1971:592). The notion 
that India’s ethnic and regional pluralism existed alongside a unity of purpose 
and interest remained a constant theme of Congress’ claims and activities. The 
unified Indian national interest and identity, shared by India’s plural 
population, was defined by Congress activities over the following years as 
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consisting of three broad objectives: the first was to secure Indian economic 
progress and development, the second was greater equality and the third was 
demands for greater self government, leading eventually to calls for political 
independence.  
Although the idea that British rule was economically detrimental to India was 
apparent from the early years of the nineteenth century,87 in the later part of 
the century these arguments were, importantly, expressed in terms of the 
national developmental paradigm, first developed by Friedrich List as a 
challenge to the neo classical model associated with Britain’s global economic 
dominance (Goswami 2004:215-224) The ideal of the national developmental 
state, contained within List’s conception of national economic development, 
was explicitly taken up by Indian intellectuals and political activists. For 
example, Govind Mahadev Ranade, an Indian judge and member of Congress 
‘inner circle’ for the first two decades of its existence (McLane 1988:53), 
described the ideal state as the ‘national organ taking care of national needs.’ 
(quoted in Goswami 2004:222) Importantly, the ideal of the national 
developmental state also framed criticisms of British policy. Most famously, 
Dadabhai Naroji, another member of the inner circle and who produced early 
estimates of India’s national and per capita income, argued that British rule 
was facilitating a net drain of wealth from India to Britain (quoted in 
2004:224). Naroji’s arguments led to an ongoing debate with British officials, 
who countered by publishing their own ‘official’ estimates of per capita 
income, and, from 1890 onwards, for the ‘next several decades, the accurate 
determination of per capita income became a sub – industry of its own’ 
(2004:225). Importantly, the economic arguments between Indian nationalists 
and British officials reified the ideal of the state as the agent of national 
economic progress and established economic growth as a key element of a 
unified national interest. This was evident in Congress and wider nationalist 
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politics from the late nineteenth century. Resolutions and speeches on 
economic issues were a regular feature of the annual Congress sessions (Zaidi 
and INC 1985) and from 1901 there were also exhibitions and fairs on 
industrial development held along with Congress sessions (Mclane 1977:144). 
The national development paradigm and the ‘territorial isomorphism of 
economy and nation’ (Goswami 2004:212) it implied also provided the basis of 
mass political participation. The boycotting of foreign goods and the use of 
alternative indigenous or Swadeshi products became key features of mass 
nationalist mobilisation in the twentieth century. (Sarkar 1989:111–137) 
The demand for equality between Indians and Europeans was also an 
important element in forming the idea of a unified Indian national interest and 
identity in the public culture of the late nineteenth century. By the late 
nineteenth century, assumptions of racial superiority were a crucial feature of 
the way many Europeans in India, government officials as well as non-official, 
interacted with Indians.88 The attitude of racial superiority was also expressed 
in support of policies that discriminated against Indians. Issues that were 
important in late nineteenth century Indian political life – and subsequently 
taken up by Congress – include: the demand that the recruitment 
examinations for the civil service be held in India as well as in England, the 
ability of Indian judges to hear cases involving European subjects (Seal 1968: 
137-143, 163-5), the admittance of Indians to the Indian Volunteer Reserve 
Force and restrictions on Indians carrying firearms (Sinha 1995: 162, Chapter 
Two). While Congress sought equality between Europeans and Indians, the 
principle of equality also became a means of regulating the internal pluralism 
and diversity of the Indian population. A broad notion of equality was 
expressed in a number of ways. Firstly, Congress adopted an approach of non-
discrimination and sought to include all major ethnic groups within its 
platform – this eventually translated into an inclusive and territorial framing 
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of citizenship in the Indian constitution. 89  Secondly, Congress also slowly 
adopted measures to address the various social, political and economic 
inequalities amongst the Indian population. The Nehru report of 1928 adopted 
universal franchise as Congress policy (Sarkar 2001:29) and from 1932 Gandhi 
explicitly adopted measures to ameliorate the social and economic conditions 
of caste groups subject to the practices of untouchability (Sarkar1989:329). The 
post independence Constitution (adopted in 1950), framed by a Congress 
controlled Constituent Assembly, explicitly prohibited the exclusionary and 
violent practices through which individuals were treated as untouchable and 
committed the Indian state to measures addressing economic and social 
inequality.90 
The link between progress, self government and national identity was apparent 
in the founding of the INC. The circular note sent to regional associations 
inviting them to attend the first session of the INC stated: ‘Indirectly this 
Conference will form the germ of a Native Parliament and, if properly 
conducted, will constitute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the 
assertion that India is still wholly unfit for representative institutions’ (quoted 
in Mehrotra 1971:576) The demand for self government became an 
increasingly important part of the Congress platform. Beginning in the late 
nineteenth century with calls for modest reforms of the existing constitutional 
structure, by the late 1920’s Congress was demanding independence for an 
Indian government elected on the basis of universal franchise from territorial 
constituencies (Sarkar 2001). Congress’ constitutional demands were initially 
made on the public platform, at the annual December sessions, through 
petitions and proposals for constitutional reform. From 1920 onwards, 
however, as Congress switched to become a mass party, the imperative of 
constitutional reform became the nominal trigger for mass agitation, the key 
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issue of contestation between Congress and the Indian government and - as 
discussed below – a source of conflict within Congress itself. 
At the time of the Congress founding, however, this pan-ethnic understanding 
of Indian national identity and interest was not the only, or even the most 
important, political project in Indian public culture. Alongside and often in 
direct collision with Congress were other forms of public associational activity 
that asserted very different understandings of national identity and national 
interest. Three that are in themselves politically significant and also significant 
for understanding the political trajectory of modern national and ethnic 
politics in the Tamil speaking areas are Hindu, Muslim and finally Tamil / 
Dravidian nationalisms. These are discussed in the following sub-sections 
whilst the next section will discuss the public organisational and ideological 
presence of these three movements in the late nineteenth century.  
5.2.2 India as a Hindu / Aryan nation 
By the time of the first Congress session in Bombay, the understanding of India 
as an exclusively Hindu nation was already a well established trope in Indian 
public culture. Key to the Hindu nationalist conception of India was the Aryan 
idea, which had its intellectual roots in the Orientalist scholarship that began 
to study the sources of Indian cultural and religious life in the late eighteenth 
century. 91  According to this idea, Indian civilization was founded by the 
migration of racially Aryan peoples who established a flourishing religious and 
cultural life set out in the ancient Sanskrit texts that was subsequently 
corrupted and degraded by centuries of intolerant and alien Muslim rule.92 By 
the late nineteenth century, the term Arya or Aryan was central to Hindu 
nationalist thought and activities (Van der Veer 1999) and came to represent ‘a 
renascent Hinduism, a reformed Hinduism excised of corrupting external 
currents, and the traumatic imprimatur of what were seen as successive 
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colonial intrusions’ (Goswami 2004:183). The increasing use and wide 
circulation of the Sanskrit term Bharat to describe India, along with the more 
evocative image of the nation as mother goddess or Bharatmata, also 
established a clear and unmediated equation between Aryan (Hindus) and the 
Indian national past and therefore future interest (2004: Chapter 6). Non-
Hindus, and Muslims in particular, became therefore non-nationals, and a 
potential cultural as well as demographic threat who could only be brought 
into the national core through cultural assimilation (Jaffrelot 1993; Van der 
Veer 1999:429; Goswami 2004:267).  
The relationship between Hindu nationalism and the Congress movement can 
be understood through two associations: the Arya Samaj and the Theosophical 
Society. The Arya Samaj was founded in 1875 in Gujarat by Dayananda 
Saraswati (1824 – 1833) but had most support in Punjab and the United 
Provinces (Jones 1968:43; Van der Veer 2001:49-52). The movement set out to 
reform Hindu practice to be in line with an idealised, pristine and reformed 
religion – labelled Arya Dharm – that did away with idol worship, practices of 
caste hierarchy and caste exclusion, Brahmin priests and priestly ritual, whilst 
also introducing a novel ritual of purification (or Shuddi) - used to ‘re-convert’ 
Muslims and Christians to their ‘original’ Aryan religion (Jones, 1968; Van der 
Veer 1999). By 1921 the Samaj had a significant social and cultural presence, 
with an estimated half a million members (Sarkar 1989:74) and a network of 
schools, colleges and hospitals across the country that were also used by non-
Arya Samaj Hindus (Van der Veer 2001:52). The Arya Samaj was closely 
associated with Congress in Punjab (Barrier 1967) and the United Provinces 
(Gould 2004: Chapter 4) where its activities contributed to social and political 
antagonism along Hindu – Muslim lines. The Samaj vigorously promoted 
efforts to protect cows, including prohibitions of slaughter that not only 
characterised Muslims as sacrilegious but also sought to outlaw the customary 
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sacrifice of cows at Muslim religious festivals (Jones 1968). The Samaj also 
championed the use of Hindi (written in the Sanskrit or Devanagri script) over 
Urdu (written in the Persian script) identifying the former as authentically 
‘national’ and the latter as a foreign imposition (Kumar 1990; King, R.D 
1999:74-91).  
The promotion of an Aryan and Hindu conception of Indian national identity 
in south India was prominently associated with the Theosophical Society. The 
Theosophical brand of Hinduism was socially far more conservative than the 
Samaj’s Arya Dharm, defending, for example, caste hierarchy and the notion 
that whereas upper caste bodies were composed of an pure substance, lower 
caste bodies were inherently polluting, and polluted upper cast groups by their 
mere presence (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998:96). Despite these differences, 
the Theosophists treated the revival and cultivation of an idealised Vedic or 
Aryan Hinduism as a national mission (Suntharalingam 1974:290-311). Colonel 
H. S Olcott, the co-founder of the Society, speaking in Madras described the 
Aryan religion as the ‘national religion’ (1974:303), stating that Indian national 
regeneration demanded the revival of Aryan science and religion (1974:295). 
The Society soon established an important presence with branches and 
Sanskrit schools in many districts and small towns across the Tamil speaking 
areas (1974:298 303). Furthermore, from the late nineteenth century, the 
Society also built up a presence in the print media (Washbrook 1976:290; 
Pandian 2007:36). These assets proved useful in the Society’s close association 
with pan-ethnic Indian nationalist politics. The Madras Mahajana Sabha, the 
association that sent delegates to the first Congress in Bombay, timed its first 
provincial conference in December 1884 to coincide with the Society’s annual 
meeting (Mehrotra 1971:561). The Society continued to have close associations 
with the Madras politicians, known as the Mylapore group (Washbrook 
1976:238, 239), who effectively controlled the provincial Congress 
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organisation until 1920 (1976:245-248, 289). Annie Besant, 93  the society’s 
President after the death of Olcott in 1907, played an important role in 
Congress led efforts for Indian self rule during the 1910’s and 1920’s (see 
below). 
5.2.3 Muslim nationalism 
Along with the idea of a pan-ethnic Indian national identity and a Hindu 
national identity, the notion that Indian Muslims also constituted a distinct 
social and political group, and potentially a national group, was also well 
established in late nineteenth century Indian public culture. The Muslims of 
India, who constituted almost twenty per cent of the total Indian population at 
the 1892 census, were unevenly distributed across the provinces. The majority 
of Indian Muslims lived in Bengal, whilst in Punjab Muslims formed a majority 
of the population and in United Provinces Muslims constituted a socially and 
culturally significant minority. Along with this regional variation, there were 
also other important cleavages amongst the Muslim population; ‘Language, 
caste and economic standing worked together to divide Muslim from Muslim 
no less than Hindu from Hindu’ (Seal 1968:300). The idea of a distinct Muslim 
identity uniting these disparate groups and carrying conceptual and 
institutional implications for modern political activity can be understood as the 
outcome of three distinct sets of activities that took place during the 
nineteenth century. The first were the Muslim revival and reform movements 
of the early nineteenth century that worked amongst ordinary Muslims; the 
second were the collective pronouncements of British officials and the third 
were the efforts of Muslim public figures and intellectuals who used 
associational forms along with modern social and political concepts to organise 
Muslim activity in colonial public culture.  
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Peter Hardy describes the activities of Saiyid Ahmed (1786–1831) and his 
followers across northern India, and those of Hajji Shariat – Allah (1781–1840), 
as well as his son Dudu Miyan (1819–62) in Bengal, as directing a message of 
Islamic revival and reform that sought to consolidate a sharply differentiated 
religious identity (1972:50-60). Preaching against customs that many Muslims 
shared with Hindus such as ‘intercession at the tombs of saints, consultation of 
Brahmins, even vegetarianism and aversion to the remarriage of widows’, these 
movements were ‘essentially rejections of medieval Indian Islam in favour of 
early Islam in Arabia’ (1972:59). Unlike the Hindu reform movements, these 
reformists directed their message at non elite groups. In the case of Saiyid 
Ahmed, there were small landowners, teachers, small shopkeepers and minor 
officials, and in Bengal ‘depressed Muslim cultivators sinking into the sea of 
landless labourers’ (1972:56, 58). These activities sought to consolidate a 
distinct identity by making Muslims aware of ‘what they did not share with 
their non Muslim neighbours’ (1972:59). 
While Islamic reformers were attempting to consolidate an Islamic social and 
religious community, British officials from the mid nineteenth century also 
began to adopt the category of an all-India Muslim religious community and 
all-India Muslim political interest in administrative practice and official 
communications. At the all-India level, this first became visible in a 1871 
Government of India regulation calling for the official encouragement and 
support of Muslim education – classical, vernacular and in the English 
language. The resolution, prompted by incidents of what appeared to be 
Islamist inspired violent opposition to the colonial state, was intended to foster 
Muslim loyalty to British rule (1972:81-5). A report published in the same year, 
and prompted by the same anxiety about widespread Muslim disloyalty, 
categorised Muslims in total as ‘in all respects .... a race ruined under British 
rule’ (1972:31). Although this judgement was probably only applicable to 
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certain groups of Muslims, it was nevertheless adopted as a blanket assessment 
that Muslims had not progressed under British rule and were relatively 
‘backward’ when compared to Hindus. This assessment of relative 
‘backwardness’ was important and, following the resolution of 1871, there 
were two further Government resolutions in 1873 and 1885 sanctioning 
official support for Muslim education (Mehrotra 1971:368-9). The introduction 
of elections for local governments from 1882 also led to the adoption of 
separate electorates for Muslim voters, thus recognising Muslims as a separate 
political constituency. (Hardy 1972:125) 
Finally, modern associational activity was also important in establishing public 
life the concept of a Muslim identity. Important in this regard were the 
activities of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1893), a judge and Muslim reformer, 
who sought to reconcile Islam and western education and thereby establish a 
modern and progressive Muslim identity. Through his writings Sayed sought 
to demonstrate that Islam was ‘compatible with progress, as a Victorian liberal 
understood it’, and also that ‘Islam was modern progress and modern progress 
was Islam properly understood’ (1972:96). One of his most significant 
achievements was the founding of the Muhammadan Anglo – Oriental College 
at Aligarh in 1878. The college, founded with Government backing, educated 
elite Muslims along western lines whilst also providing a Muslim religious 
education (Seal 1968:318-9). Similarly, in 1863 in Calcutta, Abdul Latif, a civil 
servant, established the Muhammaden Literary and Scientific Society to 
‘impart useful information to the higher and educated classes of the 
Mahomedan Literary Community’. By 1877 the Society had over 500 members 
(1968:309, 310). There were also attempts to establish pan-Indian Muslim 
associational linkages. In 1878 Amir Ali, a Calcutta barrister, established the 
National Mohammedan Association and by 1888 it had fifty branches across 
India, including five in Madras (1968:312-3) As a consequence of these three 
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types of activities, by the time the INC held its first session in Bombay, the 
understanding that Muslims constituted a distinct interest and identity was 
well established in colonial public culture. The Muslim category was a reality 
that Congress politicians, both Muslim and Hindu, had to negotiate in their 
attempts to establish a pan-ethnic Indian national platform from which to 
negotiate with the British state. 
5.2.4 Tamil as Dravidian and Tamil as Indian  
By the late nineteenth century there was also a well established Tamil public 
culture established through the circulation of printed journals, 94  texts and 
related associational activity, in which the study of the Tamil language, its 
history and the religious traditions of the Tamils were key issues of debate and 
contestation through which a modern Tamil identity was formed (Baker 198; 
Pandian 2007:22). These activities were organised around two distinct poles 
and while both asserted the existence of a Tamil linguistic identity, they 
sought to transform Tamil social, religious, linguistic and later political 
practices in different and mutually incompatible ways. One set of activities 
was hugely influenced by the Dravidian idea, which emerged from the 
scholarly study of south Indian languages starting in the early nineteenth 
century. This second ‘Madras School of Orientalism’ (Trautmann 2006; xiii) 
challenged the Calcutta Orientalists’ claim that all Indian languages were 
derived from Sanskrit, arguing that Tamil and the other south Indian 
languages were not only related to each other, forming a single Dravidian 
family, but were also distinct from Sanskrit and the Aryan family of languages 
(Trautmann 2006). Like the Aryan idea, the Dravidian idea expanded from its 
initial linguistic association and became by the second half of the nineteenth 
century a theory of south Indian society, religion, language and history. 
Analogous to the Vedic golden age of the Aryan theory destroyed by Muslim 
rule, the Dravidian theory posited a lost Dravidian golden age destroyed by the 
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Aryan invasion (Baker 1981; Van der Veer 2001:140-1). In the multiple uses of 
the Dravidian idea by religious and social reformers, the Aryan invasion is 
blamed for corrupting an initially pristine Dravidian religion (Saivism) and for 
introducing unsavoury social practices such as the subjugation of women and 
caste hierarchy.95 Alongside, and often in competition with, the notion of a 
Dravidian Tamil identity were activities that promoted Tamil language, culture 
and religion as components and expressions of a wider Indian tradition (Baker 
1981; Ramaswamy 1997:46-62). While the Indian orientated Tamil revivalist 
activities sometimes characterised Tamil as having ultimately Aryan origins 
(Pandian 2007:52-55) the Tamil language was also presented as the equivalent 
of Sanskrit in its literary and linguistic merit (Nambi Aroonan 1980:61).  
During the nineteenth century the Tamil-as-Dravidian idea was associated 
mainly with Tamils from upper non-Brahmin castes, usually educated in 
English and often employed as government officials or as educationalists 
(Ravindran 2000). These activists produced printed editions of Tamil texts 
from the palm leaf manuscripts and sought to cultivate the production of 
literary knowledge about these texts by founding journals and literary 
associations (2000). The notion of Tamil-as-Dravidian prompted efforts to 
purge Tamil speech and writing of Sanskrit inflections and Tamil religious 
practice of alien accretions to what was considered to be authentic Saivite 
theology (Pandian 2007:121-141). 
Linguistic and religious reappraisal also implied a reappraisal of racial origins 
and, thereby, caste hierarchy in Tamil society. The Tamil-as-Dravidian project 
challenged the lowly position assigned to non-Brahmin Tamils in the five fold 
Varna hierarchy outlined in the Sanskrit text, the Laws of Manu, and 
reiterated in the Aryan theory of Indian civilization. The latter, adopted in 
colonial law codes and census operations, and also widely prevalent in colonial 
public culture, categorised Tamil society into three distinct groups 
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(Ramaswamy 1997:25-29). At one end of the caste and racial hierarchy were 
Tamil Brahmins, identified as descendents of the early Aryan colonists who 
carried Vedic civilization to the south (Trautmann 1997:176; Dirks 2001:134-
144). At the other end of the hierarchy were the Untouchable groups – 
identified as racially Dravidian and in daily practice treated as ritually 
polluting (Irschick 1969:9). In the middle, all the other non-Brahmin Tamil 
groups were identified as Shudras; the last of the four Varna categories and 
ascribed to perform menial labour (Nambi Aroonan 1980:29-31). The Shudra 
category, as it was used in the Tamil speaking areas, included many high status 
and often wealthy mercantile, landowning or soldiering groups 
From the late nineteenth century, Tamil revivalists used the Dravidian idea to 
challenge this classification and instead presented Tamils as outside of caste 
and descendents of a worthy Dravidian civilization (Ravindran 2000). Tamil 
Brahmins, in contrast, were seen not as civilising colonisers but as deceptive 
outsiders who had corrupted a once flourishing and egalitarian society with 
their ritualism and caste hierarchies (2000) (Pandian 2007:121-141). In the 
twentieth century the Dravidian idea was used by the Self Respect Movement, 
later DK, to challenge the Congress movement on the grounds that the latter 
was associated with Brahmins, Sanskrit and Hinduism (see below).96 
While the Indian and Dravidian Tamil revival and reform projects were 
organisationally distinct and based on mutually contradictory assumptions, 
there were nevertheless two important areas of overlap. Firstly, they both 
shared an interest in the cultivation and promotion of the Tamil language and 
literature, albeit for different ends. The promotion of a Tamil-as-Indian 
identity was closely associated with pan-Indian nationalism and as a project 
that sought eventually to create a political movement was crucially concerned 
with the creation and dissemination of a more demotic and accessible Tamil 
that could be used for purposes of mass communication (Baker 1981:15; 
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Ramaswamy 1997:46-56). This was in sharp contrast to the Tamil-as-Dravidian 
project which was generally concerned with scholarly activities and religious, 
as well as well as linguistic, forms that were accessible in the main to elite non-
Brahmin groups (Ravindran 2000). Furthermore, the Tamil-as-Dravidian 
project presumed the existence of a sharp racial, cultural and caste divide 
between Tamils, on the one hand, and north Indians, Hindus and Brahmins, 
on the other. Despite these differences, the competing Tamil-as-Indian and 
Tamil-as-Dravidian projects nevertheless together produced a varied and 
complex Tamil public culture in which Tamil literary and cultural forms were 
presumed to be aesthetically valuable and adopted as political interests.  
The two projects also overlapped on the need to reform social practices and 
address social inequalities – such as caste hierarchy and the position of women 
- that were increasingly understood as out of keeping with the wider humanist 
assumptions of progress and improvement. Again, the problem of social reform 
was framed through mutually contradictory frameworks. While the Tamil-as-
Dravidian project blamed unpalatable social practices on Aryan Hinduism and 
Brahmin dominance, reformists97 within the Tamil-as-Indian project presented 
social reform as a means of returning to a more authentic and socially 
enlightened Hindu order.98 Like the promotion of Tamil literature and culture, 
the different assumptions were less important for the political relationship 
between Dravidian and Indian nationalist politics in the Tamil speaking 
regions than the objectives they shared. These shared objectives allowed these 
projects to politically and socially compete in a way that was agonistic rather 
than antagonistic, and meant that this competition could be accommodated 
within Congress evolving framework of pan-ethnic Indian national identity 
and national interest.  
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5.3 Process 
5.3.1 Political History of the Congress movement 
Congress’ political development from its foundation to independence in 1947 
can usefully be considered in two phases; the first up to 1920 and the second 
from 1920 to 1947. In the first phase, its activities were limited to articulating a 
set of political claims and co-opting the support of established interests and 
associations. It was only after 1920, and the adoption of the strategy of mass 
protest through non-cooperation, that the Congress organisation formally 
adopted the third prong of public associational activity; direct political 
mobilisation in an effort to build popular support. For forty years, therefore, 
Congress was mostly an annual gathering, held in different towns and cities 
across British India. Despite the limited nature of its activities, the fact that 
they were continuous was sufficient to establish Congress as a significant 
association asserting the existence of a pan-Indian national identity and 
national interest. The success of Congress during this period was not in its 
ability to realise any of its stated objectives – for example the introduction of 
simultaneous examinations,99 the expansion of the elective principle,100 or the 
adoption of economic policies that could stimulate Indian industrial expansion 
and growth.101 On all of these counts, Congress can be regarded as a failure. 
Rather the success of Congress was that it slowly became an unavoidable 
political presence, for both its detractors and supporters alike. 
Congress’ ability to establish itself as an unavoidable, whether problematic or 
potentially useful, presence in Indian political life, was not the result of any a 
priori structural givens; those factors such as the growing levels of education, 
political and administrative centralisation, or advances in communications and 
transportations technologies that facilitated pan-Indian integration as well as 
Indian integration into global economic flows, were also all present in Sri 
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Lanka during the same period.102 Rather, the gradual institutionalisation of 
Congress as an accepted fact of political life was realised through co-ordinated 
and temporally continuous activities within a shared conceptual framework in 
which the claim to be a pan-ethnic Indian nationalist entity was both 
meaningful and carried political legitimacy. The crucial elements of this 
activity were the predictability and regularity of the annual Congress in 
December, the fact that the annual event was held at a different location every 
year103, and the reasonable level of commitment by nationalist politicians to 
maintaining the unity of the Congress organisation.  
In this first phase of the Congress’ political history, there were significant 
Hindu and Muslim challenges to the project of establishing the annual sessions 
as authoritative statements of pan-ethnic Indian national opinion and interest. 
Muslim associations argued that Congress demands for an expansion of 
competitive examinations would lead to Hindu domination and charged that 
Congress was therefore inimical to Muslim interests (Seal 1968:315, 324). 
Congress leaders sought to meet this challenge by attempting to demonstrate 
Muslim support and by adopting a rule at the 1888 session stipulating that it 
would not discuss issues or adopt resolutions that were opposed by a majority 
of either Hindu or Muslim delegates (1968:333). The attempt to create unity by 
excluding issues that caused disagreement was also evident in the conflict 
between social reformers and their opponents. For many Congress figures, 
Indian progress demanded not just self government, but also the reformation 
of Indian, particularly Hindu, social practices that contravened the principles 
and standards of enlightenment humanism (Suntharalingam 1974:289, 315). 
Efforts to reform Hindu practices – particularly those of child marriage and 
enforced widowhood – were vociferously opposed by associations that sought 
to protect Hindu orthodoxy from alien (i.e. western) intervention (Sarkar 
1989:71). By 1895 orthodox opinion had prevailed and social reformers – who 
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from 1887 had met as the National Social Conference after the normal sessions 
- were prohibited from holding their meetings in association with the annual 
Congress sessions (Goswami 2004:232). 
The 1888 rule and the 1895 expulsion of social reform issues did not 
conclusively resolve the relationship between Congress and Muslim political 
associations, or indeed between Congress and the issue of Hindu social reform. 
These efforts nevertheless reveal a key dynamic of Congress’ attempts to 
maintain unity. Importantly, the effort to create a national – in the sense of 
pan-ethnic – platform involved an explicit recognition of distinct ethnic 
groups combined with an attempt to incorporate these groups within the 
organization. For example, the 1888 rule explicitly recognised Hindus and 
Muslims as distinct entities. Similarly, the 1895 expulsions confirmed the 
argument made by prominent Congress leaders (Suntharalingam 1974:288; 
Goswami 2004:232) that Congress should confine itself to political issues, 
leaving social questions to the relevant social (ethnic) groups, an implicit 
characterisation of the Indian population as containing a multiplicity of 
socially self-regulating groups. The pan-ethnic national identity sought by 
Congress involved, therefore, first the explicit recognition of ethnic pluralism 
and, second, an attempt to create a political space acceptable to all the groups 
concerned. In other words, the creation of a pan-ethnic national identity 
involved the incorporation, rather than negation or transcendence, of publicly 
established ethnic pluralism. Accommodation was also sought at the 
organisational level; Congress encouraged Muslim participation at the annual 
sessions,104 invited the prominent Bombay Muslim politician Badruddin Tyabji 
(Seal 1968:331) to be President at the 1887 session and held its sessions in cities 
with substantial Muslim populations – such as Allahabad, Lucknow and 
Lahore.105 Similarly, the expulsion of social reform issues did not entail the 
expulsion of reform minded Congress politicians – many of whom remained in 
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the Congress ‘inner circle’ (McLane, 1988:53), and in 1905 one of their number, 
G. K Gokhale, was elected Congress president, at that point the youngest 
person to have held that post (Khan 1992:161).  
The persistence of the Congress’ yearly activities, and its efforts to maintain 
unity, established it as an important and unavoidable presence in Indian 
political life. The annual sessions attracted a growing number of delegates as 
well as non-delegates. Delegates arriving by train from other provinces were 
met by large, enthusiastic crowds and then taken in procession to the pandal 
(tent) in which the sessions were held (McLane 1977:98, 99). The sessions 
were also well reported in the press and, by the 1920’s, the coverage was so 
exhaustive that the Government called off its covert surveillance of the 
sessions (Israel 1994:163). Conversely, the annual sessions also became a 
tangible object through which government officials could attack the notion of 
a pan-Indian national identity. In 1888, the Viceroy Dufferin (served 1884-
1888) formally warned princes and chiefs of the native states not to contribute 
to Congress (Seal 1968:279) and there were repeated claims that Government 
officials worked to prevent large wealthy landowners from contributing to 
Congress funds (McLane 1977:140, 146). Lord Curzon (served 1899-1905) set 
out to pointedly ignore Congress and thereby reduce it to irrelevance during 
his tenure (Gopal 1965:267). The antipathy towards Congress during this 
initial phase signalled its growing importance in Indian political life and 
presaged its eventual status as a, perhaps the, key interlocutor in the 
negotiations that brought British rule to an end.  
Eventually, the most important split in Congress during this period was not 
based on ethnic or regional cleavages, but rather on the approach that should 
be adopted in challenging British policy. The section labelled ‘moderate’ by 
British officials wanted to retain Congress as primarily a body co-ordinating 
and expressing educated Indian opinion whilst engaging in measured 
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constitutional negotiation with the state. In contrast, those deemed ‘extremists’ 
sought to directly mobilise the Indian population, using language and symbols 
that would be readily understood by the largely rural and illiterate population, 
for the purposes of gaining greater Indian self rule, or Swaraj (Sarkar 1989:89-
100) The split between the extremist and moderate factions came in the wake 
of the 1905 Bengal partition that triggered mass protests and isolated terrorist 
attacks against British targets, particularly in Bengal, but across India, 
including the Tamil speaking areas (1989:111-137; Arnold 1977:26). Following 
a violent and fractious session in Ahmedabad in 1907, where the two groups 
came into open conflict, key extremist leaders were arrested and then 
sentenced to imprisonment for inciting violence against the state (McLane 
1977:366-8). At the 1908 session the moderates locked in their control of 
Congress by adopting a constitution that created provincial units through 
which the selection of delegates for annual Congress sessions would be 
organised (Sarkar 1989:137). This was not, however, a permanent rupture, and 
the eventual return of the extremists to the Congress fold in 1915 (Arnold 
1977:27) confirmed its centrality in Indian political life.  
The transformation of Congress into a mass movement that engaged in direct 
political mobilisation took place in the context of changes associated with the 
First World War. The Indian contribution to the First World War led to a 
growing sense, amongst Indians and British officials alike, that there would 
have to be constitutional concessions in exchange (Arnold 2001:106). British 
officials were also working to the logic that the economic hardship association 
with the war – including spiralling prices and the increased taxes imposed to 
pay for war time debt – could translate into serious political discontent unless 
checked by political concessions (Baker 1976:20-21). This sense of imminent 
political change also prompted a spurt of nationalist activity. Congress and 
Muslim League convened simultaneously in Bombay in December 1915 and 
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worked to produce a common agreement on constitutional reform (Sarkar 
1989:150). Meanwhile, Bal Gangadghar Tilak, the extremist leader recently 
released from prison, formed a mass agitation Home Rule League in 
Maharashtra, while Annie Besant did the same in Madras (1989:151). The 
anticipated reforms were finally enshrined in the 1919 Government of India 
Act (1989:194). Under a system termed ‘dyarchy’, the act provided for a level 
of self government at the provincial level by transferring control of some 
government departments to elected representatives, whilst retaining official 
control over key areas such as defence, revenues and foreign affairs (Irschick 
1969:89–96; Baker 1976:22). The reforms were welcomed by Congress (Sarkar 
1989:194) and satisfied the ambitions of many Congress politicians who were 
eager to contest the 1920 elections for the newly empowered legislatures 
(Baker 1976:32; Arnold 1977:29–32). However, crucial events of 1919 – 20106 
that sharply polarised Indian and British opinion led to Congress adopting 
Gandhi’s strategy of mass protest through non – co-operation in a special 
Calcutta session of the Congress in September 1920 (Sarkar 1989:197).  
Gandhi introduced a series of organisational reforms that provided the 
infrastructure for Congress’ transformation from an annual convention into a 
mass movement (Krishna 1966). The provincial Congress committees, that 
previously followed the polyglot administrative structures of the colonial state, 
were divided into linguistic units, thereby creating for the first time a modern 
Tamil political unit – the Tamil Nad Provincial Congress Committee (Arnold 
1977:47). At the same, an executive – the Working Committee – was also 
established which met regularly and provided for a less sporadic organisational 
presence (Krishna 1966:415). Finally, Gandhi’s reforms introduced a small and 
nominal membership fee (1966:419) symbolic of Congress’ stated ambition of 
expanding beyond the educated middle classes and wealthy patrons to directly 
reach the vast mass of the Indian population.  
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In the eventful years between 1920 and 1947 Congress’ engaged in three 
phases of mass India-wide anti-colonial protest: the Non Co-operation 
movement (1920–2), the Civil Disobedience movement (1930-4) and, finally, 
the Quit India movement (1942-5). These movements saw an expansion of 
Congress’ nominal membership, but invariably drew on resentments, conflicts 
and aspirations that were independent of Congress’ formal programme.107 In 
Madras, for example, the popularity of picketing liquor shops as a tactic of 
protest during the Non Cooperation Movement probably owed as much to the 
social ambitions of upwardly mobile caste groups, as it did to the publicly 
stated objective of targeting the liquor excise tax; a crucial element of the 
government’s finances (Arnold 1977:65). Similarly, participation in the 1930–
34 Civil Disobedience movement across the Tamil speaking areas was driven in 
part by the economic distress caused by the Depression (Baker 1976:169-200). 
Despite the gap between Congress rhetoric and the multifaceted reality of mass 
protest in an uneven and complex society108, the protests were nevertheless 
important. By demonstrating its ability to co-ordinate and mobilise political 
activity across India, Congress established itself – in the eyes of many ordinary 
and politically ambitious Indians109, as well as the British establishment in 
India and London - as a powerful actor in Indian political life.110 Crucially, 
Congress also gained publicity, not just within India but also internationally; 
Gandhi’s salt march gained widespread coverage and consequently became an 
iconic moment in Indian political history (Arnold 2001:146-147). 
Through the work of organising and conducting protests – marches, picketing 
of cloth and liquor shops, sathyagraha (openly violating official policy to entice 
arrest and sometimes violent repression) – Congress built a network that was 
to become useful during subsequent electioneering. A section of the Congress 
party – labelled the Swarajists – contested elections during the 1920’s for 
provincial and national legislatures. During the 1920’s the principle of magnate 
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power and patron client power remained paramount and successful candidates 
were only nominally grouped under party labels.111 By 1935, however, whilst 
magnate power remained important, many candidates actively sought out 
Congress nominations, and in some areas the negotiations between vote-bank 
brokers that preceded electoral contests now took place within the Congress 
party structures (Baker 1976:261). This trend was accentuated during the 1945 
elections as it became clear that serious negotiations for the transfer of power 
was imminent and many vote bank brokers sought out parties that were likely 
to wield power. (Jalal 1994:146) 
5.3.2 Congress in the Tamil speaking areas 
Congress’ electoral victories in the Tamil speaking areas between 1934 -7, and 
again in 1947, was built on decades of Indian nationalist orientated political 
activity, beginning with the twenty one Madras delegates who attended the 
first Congress session in Bombay (Mehrotra 1971:591). Congress’ activities in 
the Tamil speaking areas from the late nineteenth century took place alongside 
countervailing activities that sought to promote an alternative Dravidian 
understanding of Tamil identity and interest (Nambi Aroonan 1980; 
Ramaswamy 1997; Pandian 2007). There were, however, two important 
differences between Congress and Dravidian projects that explain the former’s 
electoral triumph over the latter, evident in 1926 (Baker 162, 163), but more so 
from 1934 (312). Firstly, in realising its electoral victories, Congress brought 
together all three activities of successful political mobilisation – namely 
ideological articulation, co-option of existing interests and direct political 
mobilisation. In contrast, social and political movements espousing a Dravidian 
identity did not, during this period, effectively co-ordinate these three types of 
activity. Secondly, whereas Congress’ efforts to directly mobilise support were 
designed to reach a mass audience and used widely familiar cultural forms 
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(Bhaskaran 1981:29-42; Ramaswamy 1997:46–62), the Dravidian movement 
was less inclined to adopt popular culture as a vehicle of mass mobilisation.  
During the nineteenth century, the Dravidian idea was used to frame Tamil 
identity and interests by individuals and associations who were preoccupied 
with scholarly activities (Ravindran 2000) and tended to promote elite cultural 
and religious forms (Pandian 2007:125–136). The Self Respect Movement that 
became the most visible vehicle of the Dravidian idea in the early decades of 
the twentieth century repudiated many of the religious and literary concerns 
of the early Dravidian activists (Ramaswamy 1997:238; Pandian 1999:297 – 
299). The Self Respecters did engage in direct mobilisation, often staging 
dramatic acts of iconoclasm (Nambi Aroonan 1980:160 – 169), but these were 
focused on social on social transformation and the eradication of Hindu 
practices rather than the capture of political power (see below).  
As discussed above, as a consequence of their shared objectives (the promotion 
of Tamil literature and culture as well as social reform) the competition 
between Congress and the Dravidian movement was more agonistic than 
antagonistic. Crucially, these two objectives could also be accommodated 
within the broader and evolving framework of the Congress movement. Indian 
nationalists associated with the ‘extremist’ approach within the Congress 
movement promoted Tamil culture and language in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as expressions of an indigenous Indian tradition, and 
a means of mobilising mass support (Washbrook 1976:245, 246; Arnold 
1977:27; Nambi Aroonan 1980:64). With Gandhi’s linguistic reorganisation of 
Congress units, the use and promotion of the Indian languages was formally 
tied to the objective of greater self government (King, R.D 1999:63). Congress 
policy remained ambiguous on the question of a single national language – 
Hindi or English – as well as the redrawing of provincial boundaries. However, 
the adoption of linguistic units within Congress meant that India’s linguistic 
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diversity was firmly established as a reality, and value, within Congress’ vision 
of pan-ethnic Indian nationalism. Similarly, the 1895 expulsion of the Social 
Reform conference did not permanently exclude social reform issues from the 
Congress agenda. In the Tamil speaking areas, the poet and Indian nationalist, 
Subramania Bharathi (1882-1921), attacked the practice of untouchability and 
engaged in activities to undermine caste hierarchy (Nambi Aroonan 1980:59-
62) In 1933 Gandhi initiated a campaign to eradicate untouchability (Arnold 
2001:179) and the practice of untouchability was legally prohibited in the 
Indian constitution (Bayly 1999:269). Eventually a conflict over caste 
segregation within the Tamil Nadu Congress led to the formation in 1925 of 
the Self Respect movement, which set out a programme of radical social 
reform based on the Dravidian idea. These conflicts continued in the post 
independence era (Chapter Seven) but could be ideologically accommodated 
within the pan Indian Congress framework – eventually crystallized in the 
post-independence constitution that set progressive social reform based on 
humanist principles as a national objective.  
The widespread expectations of constitutional reform associated with the First 
World War provoked intense political activity in the Tamil speaking regions. 
In September 1916 Annie Besant (president of the Theosophical Society), along 
with Congress affiliated politicians, launched the Home Rule League in Madras 
city (Irschick 1969:35). The League engaged in a campaign of direct 
mobilisation and used the press, pamphlets and speaking tours to reach the 
population in both English and Tamil (1969:37). The League’s vociferous 
campaigns provoked the Madras Government into an issuing an order 
excluding Besant and two of her associates to rural areas outside of Madras city 
between June and September 1917 (1969:37, 63). The punishment of Besant 
furthered the League’s appeal; its membership increased from 7, 000 to 27, 000 
between March and December 1917 (Arnold 1977:23) and on her release Mrs. 
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Besant was elected as President of the forthcoming Calcutta Congress. Soon 
after the founding of the League in November 1916, a counter political 
organisation, the South Indian Political Association, was formed, also in 
Madras City (Irschick 1969:47). SIPA set out its opposition to the League’s 
demand for Indian self rule in the ‘Non-Brahmin Manifesto’ that was 
published by the leading English language nationalist newspapers in the 
province (1969:48). Invoking ideas associated with the Dravidian theory, the 
Manifesto claimed that south Indian society was characterised by the social, 
ritual and political dominance of Brahmins over non-Brahmins and called for a 
continuation of British rule to hold the scales between the antagonistic 
interests of Indian society (1969:358 – 367). To propagate its message, SIPA 
launched two newspapers - the English language Justice (which led to SIPA 
being referred to as the Justice Party) and the Tamil language Dravidian - as 
well as acquiring an already established Telugu paper, the Andhra Prakasika 
(1969:51). Like the League, it held conferences and conducted speaking tours, 
and encouraged the formation of local Dravidian associations to engage in 
activities – such as running night schools, reading rooms and libraries – to 
promote education amongst non-Brahmins (Nambi Aroonan 1980:49, 50).  
Although the non-Brahmin manifesto pointed to the disproportionate 
proportion of Brahmins employed in the public sector to substantiate its thesis 
of Brahmin domination, the actual political economy of caste across Madras, 
including the Tamil speaking areas, prevented any simple division into 
Brahmin and non-Brahmin blocks. Social, economic and political power 
during this period was organised around landowning or commercial magnates 
who controlled productive wealth (Washbrook 1976: Chapter 3). The vast 
majority of magnates were from non-Brahmin castes, as revealed by income 
tax figures (Baker 1970:90, 95), and their networks of dependents were cross-
caste and often multi-religious (Washbrook 1976:145, 198). The low 
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representation of non-Brahmins in the public sector was more easily explained 
by elite non-Brahmin reluctance to enter public service employment, despite 
official encouragement, than Brahmin exclusivity (Baker 1976:48–51; 
Washbrook 1976:276). Despite the economic implausibility of the non-
Brahmin manifesto, it nevertheless drew on familiar themes in south Indian 
public culture, namely the cultural and racial divide between Brahmins and 
non-Brahmins asserted by the Dravidian theory of south Indian civilization 
(Irschick 1969:275 – 285).  
Congress responded to the Justice party by establishing the Madras Presidency 
Association (MPA) in September 1917, an organisation representing non-
Brahmins within the party (1969:61). The MPA acquired its own newspapers – 
the English language Indian Patriot and the Tamil language Desabhaktan 
(patriot) and claimed a membership of 2000 (1969). While the MPA was more 
of a political gesture than a serious organisation, 112  it was nevertheless 
significant in symbolising Congress’ attempts to incorporate differences of 
caste within the organisational structure. The formation of the MPA 
acknowledged the existence of an ethnic cleavage but also brought this 
cleavage within the organisational structure of the Congress organisation. As 
with the 1888 rule and the 1895 expulsions of the social reformers, the 
decision to form the MPA stemmed from a pan-ethnic national project in 
which ethnic differences were conceptually and organisationally incorporated 
and accommodated, rather than ignored or excluded.  
Throughout the 1920’s Congress – at the all India level – decided either to 
boycott the newly empowered legislatures created by the 1919 Montague 
Chelmsford reforms or sought to obstruct their work from within (Baker 
1976:155–166). As a consequence, in Madras, until the 1935 elections, the 
legislature was nominally at least dominated by the Justice party. This was not, 
however, a position built on a cohesive party machine (1976:64-71). Rather, 
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successful elections throughout this period were dependent on the votes 
controlled by magnate networks and successful candidates more often than not 
chose party allegiances only after securing their election (1976:37, 48) and 
often switched allegiances once elected (1976:76, 77). As such the Justice’s 
activities can be seen as restricted to a thin form of co-opting interests: it co-
opted the interests of a number of magnates to oppose Congress and Home 
Rule League and did this (by distributing patronage) primarily to retain a 
nominal majority in the legislature. Although it held annual Conferences, the 
Justice’s efforts to directly mobilise political support were not sustained or 
particularly successful; its two newspapers struggled to compete, in terms of 
circulation, with Congress-allied nationalist papers (Washbrook 1976:277) and 
were continuously in financial difficulties, finally closing in 1932 (Baker 
1976:241). 
Meanwhile, outside of the legislature, Congress was engaged in ongoing 
campaigns of direct political mobilisation. The spurts of activity during the all 
India Non – Co-operation113 and Civil Disobedience114 movements saw marches, 
picketing of cloth and liquor shops as well as other acts of defiance against 
official restrictions; many of which were beyond the official Congress 
programme. Alongside these protests, and ongoing throughout this period, 
Congress politicians and allied groups worked to promote the Congress 
message through cultural channels. The work of the Indian nationalist Tamil 
poet Sumbramania Bharathi became popular during the 1920’s following his 
death (Irschick 1969:285–289). Bharathi’s songs and poems on Indian 
nationalist themes and symbols – calling for independence, denigrating caste, 
glorifying Gandhi – were written in clear and demotic Tamil and were easily 
accessible to a mass audience (1969; Baker 1981:15) and contrasted sharply 
with the arcane style and inaccessible vocabulary that often characterised 
Tamil literary production (Baker 1981:14). Tamil Congress politicians built 
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links with the touring companies which performed plays, invariably musicals, 
to audiences across the Tamil speaking areas (Bhaskaran 1981:29–42). From the 
1920’s onwards plays were stages that that extolled nationalist figures, for 
example Tilak and Bhagat Singh, or used familiar religious or historical stories 
and figures as thinly veiled metaphors of the struggles between foreign (British) 
oppression and indigenous resistance. The plays were always accompanied by 
songs, which were printed and sold in affordable song books, extolling a 
similar nationalist litany of themes (1981). These activities established the 
symbols of Indian nationalism as unavoidable badges of political legitimacy. By 
1926, even the Justice Party, that had formerly denounced Gandhi and his 
campaign of khaddr or home spun cloth (Irschick 1969:182-3), was decorating 
its meetings with placards reading ‘Love Live Mahatma Gandhi’ and 
encouraging the use of Khaddr. (1969:315) 
The Tamil Nadu Congress was also associated with the revival and reform of 
south Indian forms of dance and music that have since become characterised as 
emblematic of Indian ‘classical’ traditions. An alliance between Congress 
politicians and nationalist performers transformed dance styles and 
instrumental as well as vocal music previously performed in the temples and 
courts by specialist caste groups into standardised forms, performed in modern 
concert halls. The Madras Music Academy, founded alongside the 1927 Madras 
Congress, was crucial in supervising the formation of modern south Indian 
Bharathanatyam, from the previously plural traditions known as Sadir, and 
creating a standardised style of classical Carnatic Music. Through these 
activities, forms of music and dance that were practiced in south India, 
particularly the Tamil speaking areas, were made emblems of Indian ‘national’ 
culture and civilization (Allen 1997; Natarajan 1997; Subramanian, L 1999)  
While the Justice party did not venture onto the streets to contest Congress 
mobilisation, the Indian nationalist framing of Tamil identity and interest was 
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challenged during this period by the Self Respect Movement that sought to 
radically reform south Indian, particularly Tamil, social and religious 
practices. 115  The movement was founded by EVR Ramaswami Naicker, a 
Congressman and active campaigner during the Non Cooperation campaigns. 
Ramaswami resigned from the Tamil Nad Congress Committee in 1926 after 
falling out with the Committee members and Gandhi over separate dining 
arrangements for Brahmin and non-Brahmin students at a Sanskrit school 
funded by Congress; on learning of the separate eating arrangement 
Ramaswami insisted that all caste based distinctions should be abolished and 
resigned after senior Congress leaders refused to enforce common dining.116 
Working from within the Dravidian framework, Ramaswami sought to 
transform Tamil society by arguing that social practices such as caste and the 
denigration of women were brought into south Indian society by north Indian, 
Aryan Hinduism. The message of the movement was unequivocal: south 
Indian and Tamil society would only be truly liberated and reformed once it 
had shed all alien Hindu practices including the use of caste names, caste 
marks, Hindu life cycle rituals, Brahmin priests and idol worship (Nambi 
Aroonan 1980:160-169). Ramaswami toured extensively and wrote 
voluminously and sought to transform individual behaviour (Visswanathan 
1983). The movement achieved a significant presence in the Tamil speaking 
areas (1983). Ramaswami’s activity, however, was solely focused on direct 
mobilisation to realise social transformation and was not aimed at capturing 
political power; Narendra Subramanian argues that Ramaswami ‘lacked a clear 
conception of state power and a strategy to acquire and exercise it’ 
(1999:120).117  
While the Justice Party and the Self Respect Movement were engaged in elite 
co-option and direct social evangelization respectively, Congress, when it 
abandoned Civil Disobedience in 1934 and decided to enter electoral politics, 
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brought together all three types of political activity that constitute successful 
political mobilisation (Chapter Four). This organisational capacity had been 
created by the years of direct mobilisation that began from 1920. The 1935 
reforms granted full responsibility for all heads of government to elected 
provincial legislatures, although retaining a great deal of official control at the 
national legislature in Delhi (Sarkar 1989:336-338). In the Tamil speaking areas, 
Congress’ successful electoral campaign brought together the three sets of 
activities and cemented Tamil Nadu’s integration into a pan-Indian and pan 
ethnic conception of politics. In terms of ideological articulation, Congress’ 
direction at the all India level was set out in the election manifesto ‘A call to 
the nation’. It detailed a programme that was framed by the core principles of 
unity amidst diversity, equality, progress (primarily through economic 
development) and Indian independence that had been the core of Congress’ 
activities from the late nineteenth century. Importantly, this framework 
contained objectives that overlapped significantly with Dravidian politics i.e. 
broadly the need to address social inequality, particularly caste hierarchy, and 
the recognition and cultivation of (India’s) plural linguistic identities. 
Meanwhile, the work of co-opting interests and mobilising support was 
conducted at the provincial levels, and here Congress’ activity over the 
previous decade wrought important changes in the dynamics of electoral 
campaigns. S. Satyamurti, a senior Tamil Nadu Congress politician, observed in 
January 1937 that the forthcoming provincial elections would be a test ‘not 
only of patriotism but also of our business capacity’ (quoted in Arnold 
1977:172). The INC campaign was a synergy of mass mobilisation and magnate 
interests. On the one hand, Congress used its organisational networks to 
register newly enfranchised voters, held public meetings and used devices such 
as processions and songs to set out its programme and even offered transport to 
polling stations. Well known Congress politicians - including national figures 
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like Nehru and Vallabhai Patel – also toured south Indian districts.118 On the 
other hand, it also sought out as candidates individuals able to command local 
votes, in other words magnates or patrons, whatever their previous 
affiliation.119  
However, Congress activity over the previous years, along with the activities 
of mass mobilisation it initiated for the campaign, changed magnate behaviour 
if not magnate interests. Local power-holders, who previously waited till after 
the elections to choose a party allegiance, began to associate with Congress in 
preparation for the elections because it appeared as a viable and attractive 
vehicle in the competition between rival magnate factions for political power 
(Baker 1976:282-293). In other words, Congress had built up a presence and a 
perceived capacity for electoral mobilisation that was to an extent autonomous 
of local interests. For example, in some districts local power-holders with 
competing networks and vote-banks competed for the party’s nomination and 
unsuccessful candidates withdrew from the electoral contest (1976:301, 303), 
unwilling to match the organisational resources at the official Congress 
candidate’s disposal. The career of Kamraj Nadar, a Congress activist from a 
humble background who joined the movement during the Non Cooperation 
movement, exemplifies the extent to which the Congress structure itself 
became a source of power (Arnold 1977:143). In the 1937 elections a successful 
business man stood aside to let Kamraj compete as the official candidate from a 
southern Tamil Nadu constituency even though Kamraj himself did not possess 
a factional network tied to the control of economic resources (Baker 1976:303). 
Kamraj subsequently rose through the party’s ranks, serving as both Chief 
Minister (1954–63) of the province and later All India Congress President 
(1963-7) (Kumaradoss 2004).  
While the new type of organisational infrastructure mobilised by Congress 
meant that the Justice Party disintegrated, Dravidian politics and the assertion 
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of an anti-Indian Dravidian Tamil political identity and interest did not 
disappear. The Tamil-as-Dravidian identity was invoked to challenge the INC 
project on two separate issues. On the first occasion, the Self Respect League 
allied with other Tamil revivalists and Muslim associations to oppose Congress’ 
legislation, introduced in July 1937, making Hindi a compulsory subject in the 
Madras school curriculum. Indian nationalists from the late nineteenth 
century had sought to replace English with the indigenous Hindi as the link 
language between the different provinces and in 1918 Gandhi had founded an 
institute for the propagation of Hindi in south India (Nambi Aroonan 
1980:195-215). While Congress advocated Hindi as an indigenous Indian 
language, the anti-Congress alliance invoked the Dravidian theory to 
characterise Hindi as a north Indian, Aryan and Hindu imposition. The 
agitation drew significant support and led to 683 arrests, more than the 504 
arrests that took place during the Congress led Quit India (1942-45) movement 
(Ross Barnett 1976:49, 52).  
Again in June 1940 Ramaswami and the Self Respect League invoked the 
Dravidian idea to challenge Congress’ claim to represent Indian demands for 
independence by organising a Dravidanad Separation Conference. At the 
conference Ramaswami unveiled a map showing the whole of south India as 
Dravidanad whilst north India was divided into Muslim India and Aryavarta 
(Nambi Aroonan 1980:243-245). The Dravidian idea was not, however, used to 
mount an effective electoral challenge to Congress until the post independence 
period. The remnants of the Justice merged with the Self Respect League in 
1944 to form a new organisation, the DK (1980:227-228). Ramaswami took 
leadership of the new organisation and retained his policy of staying out of 
electoral politics. The DK’s activities consisted therefore of articulating a clear 
and unequivocal social world view along with direct mobilisation to realise 
that world view. This left the field open for Congress; its organisational base 
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was further strengthened by the 1942 Quit India movement and in the 1946 
elections won its second convincing electoral victory in Madras (Ross-Barnett 
1976:77).  
Congress’ electoral victory should not, however, be interpreted as a 
repudiation of Dravidian politics. Instead – and as a consequence of their 
overlapping objectives - the competition between Congress and the Dravidian 
movement was more agonistic than antagonistic and crucially contained 
within Congress framework of pan-ethnic Indian national identity and 
national interest. Furthermore, the Tamil Nad Congress developed these 
objectives – the cultivation of Tamil culture and issues of social reform, 
particularly the question of caste hierarchy – through its efforts to directly 
mobilise the Tamil speaking population. As is argued in Chapter Seven, it was 
the overlapping objectives of the Dravidian and Congress movement – rather 
than the relative extremism or moderation of the parties concerned – that 
explains the post independence accommodation of Dravidian parties within 
the Indian constitutional framework. The next section of this chapter briefly 
discusses the relationship between Congress and Muslim politics. It argues that 
the absence of Congress efforts to directly mobilise the Muslim population 
explains Congress’ failure to mobilise Muslim electoral support, despite the 
importance of patronage networks in determining electoral behaviour.  
5.3.3 Congress, Muslims and Hindu nationalism 
By the First World War, the idea of a distinct all India Muslim Political 
identity was well established in colonial public culture. A clear expression of 
this was the provision for separate Muslim electorates for the provincial and all 
India legislatures in the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms (Hasan 1991:66-67). 
Congress sought to reconcile this political reality with the need to present a 
unified – and therefore national – demand for constitutional reform by 
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engaging in negotiations with the All India Muslim League, an association 
formed from the 1906 Dacca meeting of the Mohhammedan Educational 
Conference (Hardy 1972:164). The principal issue of negotiation was the 
means of securing adequate Muslim representation at the central and 
provincial legislature. Between 1915 and 1924 Congress and the League met 
simultaneously as they first jointly pursued constitutional reform and then, 
with the adoption of Non–Cooperation, mass protest (Sarkar 1989:150, 235). 
With the end of the Non–Cooperation movement, Congress and League again 
began to meet separately. Negotiations were again attempted in 1928, 1934, 
1938, and 1944 but always failed to produce an agreement on the measures 
that would allay Muslim fears of being overwhelmed by an elected Hindu 
majority (Jalal 1994:10, 13, 44, 121). The final round of negotiations after the 
elections of 1946 also failed to find agreement and led eventually to an 
acceptance of partition.  
This outcome was not inevitable and cannot be seen as an unmediated 
expression of the growth of Hindu and Muslim nationalist sentiments or 
Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Rather, the political trajectory that led to partition 
has to be understood partly in terms of Congress failure to directly mobilise 
support amongst the Muslim electorate. As a consequence Congress did not 
establish itself as a viable and attractive for political mobilisation amongst the 
Muslim electorate. This meant that the changes that took place in Tamil 
magnate behaviour were absent amongst provincial Muslim magnates and 
politicians. Muslim political behaviour in the 1935-7 elections continued to be 
conditioned by magnate competition and factional networks, unencumbered 
by the constraints and possibilities of extensive party mobilisation (1994:19-34). 
This behaviour only changed with the 1945/6 elections when Muslim political 
leaders and magnates switched their allegiance to the Muslim League; in the 
1935-7 elections the League had secured only 4.4 per cent of the Muslim votes 
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cast in provincial elections but in the 1945/6 elections it won nearly 75 per 
cent (1994:171-2). 
The League’s victory in the 1945/6 elections was not built however on a robust 
party structure that brought together the three core components of successful 
political mobilisation. The decision to switch to the League was prompted by 
local considerations and conflicts along with the growing sense that 
momentous constitutional changes were about to take place and Muslims 
needed representation at the centre.120 The League’s slogan of Pakistan had 
different meanings in different provinces – in Punjab it was tied to the idea of 
a general threat to Islam and an ideal of Muslim community (Giltmartin 1998), 
whilst in Bengal it was linked to agricultural grievances and specifically an 
undivided Bengal province (Jalal 1994:151). Ayesha Jalal notes that 
Muhammed Ali Jinnah himself left the notion of Pakistan unspecified and 
argues that he intended to use the idea of Pakistan as a bargaining chip to 
secure representation for Muslims at the centre of a strongly centralised Indian 
state (1994:57-60). 121  She suggests that Jinnah was finally forced to accept 
partition because of Congress’ determination to secure its own control at the 
centre, at the expense of partition, and the British determination to transfer 
power as quickly as possible; neither of which had been part of Jinnah’s 
calculations (1994:175, 188). Ironically, the vague resolution calling for 
Pakistan passed by the League in March 1940 led to the creation of new state 
boundaries whilst the June 1940 Dravidanad demand, spelt out as a definite 
territory with map included, has become a historical curiosity. The crucial 
factor in explaining the different outcomes of the two demands is the 
Congress’ contrasting history of political mobilisation amongst the Muslim and 
Tamil electorates.  
In the Tamil speaking areas, regional Congress politicians familiar and 
conversant with Tamil cultural forms were crucial to the activities of direct 
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mobilisation that established Indian nationalism’s cultural as well as political 
presence in the Tamil speaking areas. However in areas such as Bengal, Punjab 
and UP with substantial Muslim populations, regional Congress politicians 
often had strong ties to Hindu nationalist movements and were therefore 
ideologically opposed to incorporating the Muslim identity with the Congress 
movement. In the Punjab, Congress was closely allied to the Arya Samaj 
(Barrier 1967), in Bengal it was dominated by Hindu Bengalis’ who 
increasingly defined themselves in Hindu nationalist terms (Chatterji 1994: 
Chapter 2,3), whilst in the United Provinces the Congress structure was closely 
associated with the Hindu Mahasabha (Gordon 1975) and the Arya Samaj 
(Gould 2004). As a consequence, in the three provinces that constituted the 
majority of the Muslim electorate - Bengal, Punjab and UP - Congress pushed 
Hindu nationalist issues such as banning cow slaughter and the promotion of 
Hindi in the Sanskrit script over Urdu that symbolically excluded Muslims 
from the core Indian national community.  
The joint Hindu-Muslim mobilisation that took place during the Non-
Cooperation was presented by Congress and the Muslim leaders as a symbolic 
partnership between the cow and khilafat; Hindus agreed to protest in support 
of the Ottoman khalif and in return Muslims agreed to stop slaughtering cows 
(Hasan 1991:127-132, 220). When this participation ended Muslim 
participation in anti colonial mass protest declined and Congress’ subsequent 
campaign – Civil Disobedience – had a very Hindu character in areas such as 
UP. Mass meetings were held in temples and at Hindu festivals, the 
propaganda invoked Hindu symbols and activities such as picketing often 
specifically targeted Muslim shops - leaving their Hindu competitors 
undisturbed (Gould 2004: Chapter 2,3). As a consequence of these activities, 
even Muslim politicians who wanted to switch to Congress in 1937 found they 
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could not because of the antipathy it generated within the Muslim electorate 
(Jalal 1994:30). 
The Hindu nationalist character of the regional Congress does not, however, 
indicate a clear or enduring Hindu-Muslim antagonism in politics. While there 
were bouts of Hindu-Muslim violence, these were episodic and separated by 
periods of calm and co-operation (Hasan 1991:46-52). Similarly, there were 
also instances of Hindu-Muslim political cooperation, as in Subash Chandra 
Bose’s ill fated Indian National Army (Sarkar 1983:411, 421).There were also 
ongoing intra-Hindu and intra-Muslim tensions. For example, amongst Hindus 
there were important differences between the reformist Arya Samaj and more 
orthodox movements such as the Sanatan Dharma (Gordon 1975:151; McLane 
1977:283). There were also significant differences of interest between Muslims, 
including between the Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces and those in 
UP where Muslims formed a small but significant minority (Jalal 1994); 
between Shias and Sunnis (Hasan 1991:42) and sometimes between the 
political and religious leaderships (McLane 1977:113). Alongside these 
differences were the important differences of class and economic interest that 
separated Muslim and Hindu landowners from their tenants.122  
While all these differences became politically or culturally contentious at 
different historical moments, the crucial factor that determined Congress’ 
failure to build support amongst the Muslim electorate was the Hindu 
nationalist character of its regional structures. This became evident during the 
Muslim Mass Contacts Campaign led by Nehru in 1937 to directly reach the 
Muslim electorate. The campaign had some success in UP, Bengal and Punjab 
and was able to recruit new Muslim members (Hasan 1988:209) – enough to 
alarm Muslim politicians (Jalal 1994:43). It was, however, severely 
handicapped by regional and district level Congress politicians who refused to 
grant funds and lend manpower to the efforts to reach Muslims directly (Hasan 
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1998:213-215). Within months the campaign was called off and the Congress 
leadership switched back to the tactic of direct negotiation, with Subash 
Chandra Bose opening talks with Jinnah (Jalal 1994:44).  
The importance of Hindu nationalists at the provincial level does not thereby 
mean that Congress can simply be equated with Hindu nationalism. There are 
significant ideological and organisational differences between Congress’ pan 
ethnic Indian nationalism and the varied currents of Hindu nationalism. As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, this became evident in the Constituent Assembly 
debates that framed India’s post independence constitution. It is also 
significant that the incidence of Hindu-Muslim communal violence, extremely 
high in the months leading up to and following partition (Sarkar 1989:432-
439), reduced significantly in the decades following partition (Wilkinson 
2004:12). The rising incidence of Hindu-Muslim violence (primarily collective 
violence by Hindus against Muslims) from the early 1980’s coincides with the 
decline of Congress as a cohesive political structure and the simultaneous 
growth of Hindu nationalist political, social and cultural forces (Jaffrelot 1996).  
5.3.4 Ethnic Demography, Ideology and Political Process 
It could be argued that the bare facts of ethnic demography offer a simpler 
explanation of the difference between Congress’ electoral success in the Tamil 
speaking areas and its simultaneous failure in the Muslim constituencies. 
While Tamil speakers constituted an overwhelming majority in many districts 
of Madras, Muslims were in a minority in UP and a slim majority in Bengal 
and Punjab. As a consequence, it was could be argued that Hindu nationalist 
politicians would dominate in the provincial structures of Congress in UP, 
Punjab and Bengal. Conversely, given the demographic dominance of Tamil 
speakers, Congress politicians wanting to build a genuine pan-ethnic 
movement could not have plausibly excluded Tamils. This line of reasoning 
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would suggest that Congress’ decisions to exclude and include different ethnic 
groups can in part be reduced to electoral and demographic calculations. 
However, as the argument presented in this chapter shows, the differential 
patterns of ethnic inclusion and exclusion from Congress’ pan-ethnic platform 
cannot be explained as outcomes of an objective ideal of rational decision 
making based on electoral and demographic calculation. Instead, the 
differential patterns can only be explained in terms of competing ideological 
frameworks of national identity and interests and the more or less successful 
processes of organisation and mobilisation through which these were pursued.  
Provincial Congress politicians in UP, Bengal and Punjab failed to mobilise 
support amongst the Muslim electorate because their Hindu nationalist 
conception of Indian national identity and interest excluded Muslims. 
Instrumental calculation alone fails to explain the behaviour of Congress 
politicians in these three crucial provinces. Indeed, an argument could be 
made in instrumental terms to suggest that provincial Congress politicians 
should have supported efforts to mobilise Muslim support. The majority of 
Muslims, after all, voted in separate Muslim constituencies and mobilising 
support amongst them could have been in addition to, rather than at the 
expense of, Hindu support. However, to successfully mobilise support amongst 
Muslim constituencies, Congress politicians in these areas would have had to 
ideologically incorporate Muslims into Indian nationalism – in the same way 
that Tamils were incorporated. This would have involved the incorporation 
and cultivation of Muslim symbols (such as Urdu) as exemplars of Indian 
national identity and the adoption of core aspects of the Muslim political 
platform – for example the argument that Muslims required special provisions 
to overcome their relative backwardness in relation to Hindus. These positions 
are not inherently contradictory with the pan-ethnic framework of Indian 
nationalism set out by Congress leaders at the national level. However, these 
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symbolic and political measures were antithetical to the Hindu nationalist 
frameworks of the provincial Congress leaders who were central figures in 
directing the patterns and rhetoric of popular mobilisation. Within the Hindu 
nationalist frameworks, Muslim symbols (such as Urdu) and a flourishing 
Muslim population existed as existential threats to the Indian nation. In other 
words, Congress politicians in UP, Bengal and Punjab failed to mobilise 
support amongst the Muslims because they ideologically could not, rather than 
because they electorally or demographically need not. Hindu nationalist 
allegiances also explain why Congress leaders in these three provinces 
intentionally and successfully undermined the 1937 attempt by the Congress 
national leadership to directly reach the Muslim electorate (Hasan 1988).  
Likewise, ideological compulsion, rather than electoral calculation, explains 
Congress’ ability to mobilise support in the Tamil speaking regions. 
Demographically, Tamil speakers actually constituted a smaller proportion of 
the Indian population than Muslims123 and therefore could have been more 
plausibly ignored in attempts to forge a pan-ethnic Indian nation. However, 
the ideological framework of Congress politicians in Tamil Nadu made the 
symbolic and electoral incorporation of Tamil speakers appear as a crucial 
component of the Indian nationalist project. As a consequence, Tamil Nadu 
Congress politicians promoted and cultivated Tamil language, literature and 
Tamil cultural forms as a means of advancing Indian nationalism. Many 
important aspects of contemporary Tamil culture – such as Tamil language 
journalism, the beginnings of Tamil cinema, the revival and reform of 
Bharathanatyam and Carnatic music as well as the influential contributions of 
the composer and poet Subramania Bharathi – have their roots in Congress led 
Indian nationalist mobilisation.  
Finally, Congress’ failure amongst the Muslim electorate and success amongst 
the Tamils is also not a matter of the different forms of ethnic difference. That 
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is, the fact that the Tamils were predominantly Hindu (89 per cent)124 did not 
necessarily make it easier for Congress to mobilise Tamil support. To begin 
with, language was a crucial factor in Congress mobilisation in the Tamil 
speaking areas. This emphasis on Tamil was out of step with Hindu 
nationalists’ insistence on Hindi and Sanskrit. Indeed, and as discussed in 
Chapter Seven, language became a central issue of contestation in post-
independence India. Hindu nationalist insistence on making Hindi the 
national language led to widespread and violent protests across the Tamil 
speaking areas. Furthermore, and partly as a consequence of its agonistic 
competition with the Dravidian movement, the Tamil Nadu Congress early on 
adopted positive discrimination for disadvantaged caste groups; a measure that 
was an anathema to Hindu nationalists in other parts of India.  
The escalation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka along the Tamil – Sinhala axis 
also demonstrates that religion is not more or less difficult a marker to 
accommodate than language. While the Tamils are predominantly Hindu, and 
the Sinhalese predominantly Buddhists, the Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil 
national identities incorporated Sinhala and Tamil speaking Christians 
respectively. Interestingly, in Sri Lanka while religiously framed conflict 
between Buddhists and Muslims was an important part of politics in the 
colonial era, this largely disappeared in the post-independence period.125 In 
other words the translation of ethnic cleavage into conflict depends crucially 
on political processes through which national identities are framed in more or 
less inclusive ways.  
Congress’ contrasting record of success and failure amongst the Tamils and the 
Muslims reveals the importance of ideology and contingent political processes 
in explaining the patterns of ethnic inclusion and exclusion in the formation of 
national communities. The ideological framing sets out the ethnic boundaries 
of national community; which groups are to be included in the national whole 
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and which excluded. While the pan-ethnic framework of the national level 
Congress could include Tamils and Muslims alike, the Hindu nationalist 
allegiances of provincial Congress politicians in UP, Bengal and Punjab 
specifically excluded Muslims. At the same time, while the incorporation of 
Tamils was theoretically permissible in Congress pan-ethnic framework it was 
actually realised by the activities of Tamil Nadu Congress politicians who used 
Tamil cultural forms as both objects and vehicles of Indian nationalism. These 
outcomes were also a matter of political process in that the emergence of 
Congress’ pan-ethnic framework and its successful incorporation of the Tamils 
required the spatially co-ordinated and temporally continuous activities of 
political actors whose actions were motivated by a diverse array of ends, but 
were nevertheless meaningful and consequential within a shared conceptual 
framework. Finally, these outcomes were contingent in that they were 
outcomes of agency or political action, rather than effects of structures such 
that had these activities not taken place there would have been different 
outcomes.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the emergence of Congress as a cohesive, pan-
ethnic national movement was the result of temporally continuous effort, one 
that brought together the three key activities of ideological articulation, 
interest co-option and direct political mobilisation, rather than simply the 
structurally determined coincidence of interests. It showed that the 
relationship between Tamil politics and the Congress movement was shaped 
by two related factors. The first was the development of Congress’ explicitly 
multi-ethnic and multi-lingual ideological and organisational framework that 
could accommodate the principal issues of anti-Congress Dravidian Tamil 
politics: the cultivation of Tamil culture and social reform. Importantly, this 
pan-ethnic ideological and organisational framework emerged when Congress 
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led efforts to create a pan-ethnic platform were confronted with ethnic 
associations opposing Congress efforts. The second factor was Congress’ efforts 
at direct political mobilisation in the Tamil speaking areas that established 
Congress and pan-ethnic Indian nationalism as key brands in Tamil public 
culture. In short, the key factor in creating a politically significant pan ethnic 
national identity that incorporated Tamils was the outcome not of structural 
factors, but of competitive and agonistic, rather than merely antagonistic, 
processes of organisation and mobilisation. Furthermore, these processes did 
not so much transcend ethnic cleavages as incorporate them within a wider 
pan-ethnic politics. Finally, the chapter discussed the relationship between 
Congress and Muslim politics and argued that the absence of Congress efforts 
to mobilise support directly amongst the Muslim population meant that 
Muslims were not ideologically and organisationally incorporated into the 
Congress national project in a way comparable to the Tamils. The following 
chapter analyses ethnic and national politics in colonial Sri Lanka and suggests 
that by the moment of independence, an ethnically exclusive Sinhala Buddhist 
understanding of national identity and interest had become electorally 
dominant and, while not organised through a single political structure, was 
nevertheless to become the organising principle of Sri Lanka’s post-
independence politics, a development that had important consequences for Sri 
Lankan Tamil politics in the post independence-period.  
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6. Ethnic and National Politics in Colonial Sri Lanka 
6.1 Introduction 
Unlike in India, at the moment of Sri Lanka’s independence, the question of 
the political status of the Tamil speaking people and Tamil speaking areas 
within a wider conception of national identity remained unresolved. There 
was no organisation comparable to the INC with a developed political 
programme capable of mobilising electoral support across the island. The UNP, 
which came to power at independence, was formally multi-ethnic. However, 
as discussed below, it was a loose alliance formed in the last months of colonial 
rule, and its driving force was the authority and stature of its founder leader, D 
S Senanayake.126 During the Second World War Senanayake had established a 
reputation amongst British officials as reliable leader to whom power could be 
transferred, despite his close and visible relationship to Sinhala Buddhist 
revivalism.127 Although the UNP had a multiethnic list of candidates, it did not 
have a developed political framework that reconciled the island’s ethnic 
pluralism within a unified conception of national identity and national interest. 
The party’s organising principle was instead a tacit understanding and 
acceptance of Senanayake’s leadership, and of majority rule.128  
In the absence of a developed and institutionalised conception of pan ethnic 
national identity and interest, it was the Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil 
conceptions of national identity and national interest that together shaped the 
dynamics of politics in the Tamil speaking regions. These two had mutually 
contradictory understandings of the history of the island’s ethnic plurality, the 
relative historical and cultural claims of the various ethnic groups and, 
therefore, of the ideal means through which ethic pluralism ought to be 
reconciled with the need for a unified conception of national identity and 
national interest. Although these two conceptions had their intellectual, and 
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even organisational, roots in the nineteenth century religious and linguistic 
revivalist movements, there was very little overt conflict or antagonism 
between the Tamil and Sinhala revival movements during most of the colonial 
period, and their relationship was mostly one of mutual indifference, with 
instances of collaboration, support and encouragement. It was only the advent 
of tangible political power tied to the conceptual framework of popular 
sovereignty and the nation that brought the contradictory assumptions of 
these two frameworks into conflict. From 1920 onwards, as self government 
became a distinct and plausible prospect, there was often pointed and 
sometimes acrimonious political conflict between Tamil and Sinhala political 
leaders. Conflict took place on issues such as the citizenship rights of Indian 
origin plantation labours, constitutional reform and the distribution of public 
resources (Russell 1982; Wickramasinghe 1995) - all of which raised divisive 
but conceptually unavoidable questions about the ethnic characteristics of 
national identity and the substance of national interest. As independence 
approached, these questions remained unresolved and the key political actors – 
Tamil, Sinhalese and British – all shared the view that a crucial factor in 
deciding the island’s political future would be the relations between the 
Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority.  
The appearance of two incompatible Tamil and Sinhala conceptions of national 
identity and national interest was not, however, an outcome made inevitable 
by ethnic demography or indeed the passions of ethnic revivalisms. Neither 
the growth of Tamil nor Sinhala Buddhist nationalisms as political platforms 
can be understood as the simple expressions of a pre-existing ethnic sentiment. 
Instead, both could only present a unified political platform – and even then 
not reliably so - by more or less successfully negotiating differences of religion, 
caste and region that remained points of conflict within the constituencies of 
the Tamil and Sinhala Buddhist nationalist movements. The gradual political 
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and electoral ascendance of these movements is not therefore a simple 
translation of interests, incentives or structures, but rather a matter of process. 
Likewise, the absence of a pan-ethnic nationalist movement capable of 
mobilising pan-island political support is also a matter of process, rather than a 
structurally given outcome. In other words, the development of the island’s 
ethnic politics into one of competing Sinhala majority and Tamil minority 
interests can only be understood by examining the processes of associational 
activity through which modern ethnic and national identities were established 
and thereafter contested.  
The chapter is organised in the following way. The first section examines in 
turn the emergence of Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil conceptions of national 
identity and national interest from the religious and revival movements of the 
late nineteenth century. The next section then sets out the trajectory of ethnic 
and national politics in two parts, the first from the late nineteenth century to 
1920, and the second from 1920 to independence. It also examines the pivotal 
role played by British officials in shaping the reforms leading to independence, 
but also explains why differences in British policy cannot account for the 
relative successes and failures of pan-ethnic anti colonial politics in India and 
Sri Lanka. In the discussion of colonial Indian politics in Chapter Five, 1920 
was a useful marker that separated Congress’ pre-1920 phase of primarily elite 
centred development from the post-1920 phase of mass mobilisation. Whilst in 
Sri Lanka 1920 does not mark a clear divide between phases of elite centred 
and mass mobilisation politics, the date nevertheless signals an important shift 
in the island’s ethnic and national politics. From 1920 onwards, constitutional 
reforms consistently adopted the principle of territorial as opposed to 
communal or group based representation as the basis for self government. 
From then on the political consequences of the Sinhala demographic majority 
and the Tamil demographic minority became crucial factors in the island’s 
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politics. The relationship of mutual indifference alongside moments of 
collaboration was from 1920 replaced by ongoing contestation between Tamil 
and Sinhala politicians over issues that vitally touched the ethnic framework of 
national politics. The argument presented below is that the failure to find a 
robust and clear resolution to these issues was a matter of process - an outcome 
of the dynamics of political contestation, organisation and mobilisation - 
rather than the product of pre given structures or incentives, whether 
demographic, economic or indeed the categories created by colonial policies 
themselves. 
6.2.Context 
6.2.1 Sinhala Buddhist nationalism 
The social and political ascendance of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism can be 
traced to the Buddhist revivalist and reform movements which, amongst the 
revivalist trends of the nineteenth century, Stanley Tambiah describes as the 
‘most complex, weighty, powerful and fateful for the history of the country’ 
(1997:39).The Buddhist movement, like its Hindu counterparts in India and Sri 
Lanka, was a response to the intellectual and social challenges posed by 
Christian missionary activity. Buddhist revivalists, like their Hindu and 
Muslim equivalents on the island and in India, responded to missionary 
charges of the inferiority, irrationality and superstitious nature of their 
theology and ritual by adopting the very standards and definitions against 
which Buddhism was often held to be wanting. Buddhist revivalist activities 
established in public culture a separation between ‘true’ Buddhism – a pristine 
and rational confessional religion, compatible with modern science and 
progress that was separate from the ‘false’ Buddhism of popular practice, 
debased primarily by the corrupting influence of south Indian (Tamil) 
invasions and British colonial rule.129  
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To propagate and defend this ‘true’ religion, Buddhist activists engaged in 
public associational activities, used print technology and engaged in debates 
with Christian missionaries that were staged in front of an audience 
understood by all as a public to be compelled by reason. Peter van der Veer has 
described the public associational propagation of religion in nineteenth 
century Britain and its colonial possessions as an ‘interactional’ (2001:3,4) 
process through which religion in both imperial centre and colonial periphery 
‘creates the public sphere and, in so doing, is transformed and moulded in a 
national form’ (22). The transformation of Buddhism was thus associated with 
the emergence of a powerful Sinhala Buddhist national identity that fused 
language, race and religion with a powerful claim to the entire territory of the 
island. Dharmadasa describes the Sinhala Buddhist ideological tradition as 
having an ‘explicitly stated identification of the island with one ethnic group 
and one religious identity – Sinhalese and Buddhist’ (1992:19). The import and 
consequence of Buddhist revival and reform activities was therefore ‘not so 
much the implementation of social reform as the forging of an ideology and 
consciousness of nationalist identity, destiny, and majoritarian privilege.’ 
(Tambiah 1997:43) 
In the expanding public culture of the late nineteenth century, Sinhala 
Buddhist associations, newspapers and magazines set out a clear vision of the 
ethnic boundaries of national community and the relative claims of different 
ethnic groups. This vision was derived from a narrative of the island’s history 
that, as in India, was closely linked to the concerns and categories of 
Orientalist scholarship (Rogers 1990; Angell 1998). From the early nineteenth 
century, a set of Pali texts, known as vamsas or chronicles that were written 
from the sixth century onwards (Dharmadasa 1992:3), were translated into 
English and came to be viewed as authoritative sources by British officials, 
scholars and Sinhala Buddhist activists (Rogers 1990). Nineteenth century 
178 
 
interpretations of these texts set out a narrative of the island’s history that 
were remarkably similar to the Hindu nationalist conceptions of Indian history 
of Aryan migration and Aryan civilization followed by invasion and 
destruction. In the Sri Lankan version of the Aryan theory, an initial act of 
migration by north Indian Aryan Sinhalese founds a thriving classical 
civilization based on Buddhist piety (1990) and an advanced practice of 
irrigated agricultural production able to support a substantial population, 
speculated to be greater than the nineteenth century population levels on the 
island (Farmer 1957:15) Whereas in the Hindu nationalist conception, the 
classical Vedic civilization was destroyed by Muslim invasions, the Sinhala 
Buddhist narrative had the south Indians Tamils (or Malabars as they were 
sometimes called) as the ‘principal alien and antagonist’ of the Sinhala people 
responsible for destroying and degrading the classical glory of Sinhala 
civilization. (Dharmadasa 1992:47, 79, 139).  
The officially sponsored archaeological study of the ruins at Anuradhapura and 
Polonnaruva (sites related in the Mahavamsa and other chronicles) that began 
in the 1870’s (1992:112), lent material weight to the Aryan theory of the 
island’s history, for both Sinhala Buddhist revivalists and British officials 
alike.130 With the opening of the railways, Anuradhapura in particular became 
a modern site of pilgrimage (Wickramasinghe 2006:87), and by the early 
twentieth century the notion that the Sinhalese had a great and unbroken 
history on the island had become commonplace (2006:88, see also Rogers 
1990:87). The chronicles were thus transformed by a modern interpretation 
through categories of nation, civilization, progress and race, into the basis for a 
national conception of history and collective agency that provided a clear 
matrix for social and political action, but crucially excluded non Sinhala 
Buddhists, particularly the Tamils.  
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In response to Christian missionary proselytising, Buddhist monks engaged in 
a series of public debates with Christian preachers (Seneviratne 1999:89), and 
set out to produce printed material to defend their own doctrine and attack 
Christian theology, often using the arguments of western secularists and 
rationalists (Dharmadasa 1992:79). The debates caught the attention of Colonel 
Olcott, one of the founders of the Theosophical Society, and, following the 
Society’s move to India in 1879, Olcott visited the island in 1880 (1992: 106). 
The Theosophists efforts gave ‘organizational muscle and propagandistic 
efficacy’ (Tambiah 1997:39) to revivalist activities 131  that were further 
developed by Anangarika Dharmapala (1864-1933), a revivalist who ‘first 
found his vocation and acquired his propagandist skills in association with the 
Theosophists’ (Tambiah 1992:6). Olcott explicitly encouraged his Buddhist 
audiences to adopt the organisational models of the Christian missionaries and 
following their visit Buddhist societies, newspapers, schools and Young Men’s 
Buddhist Associations (YMBA) were established across the Sinhala districts 
(Dharmadasa 1992:107-8). The myriad and expanding Buddhist associational 
activities were the sites at which a new and reformed ‘national’ Buddhist 
religion was expressed. Through his speeches and writings, Dharmapala was a 
key influence in shaping the contours and content of this new religion 
(Seneviratne 1999:28). Tambiah describes the core features of Dharmapala’s 
reformed religion in the following way:  
‘.. a selective retrieval of norms from canonical Buddhism; a 
denigration of alleged non Buddhist ritual practices and magical 
manipulations ... ; enunciation of a code for lay conduct, suited 
to the emergent Sinhalese urban middle class and business 
interests, which emphasized a puritanical sexual morality and 
etiquette in family life; and most important of all, an appeal to 
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the past glories of Buddhism and Sinhalese civilization 
celebrated in the Mahavamsa and other chronicles..’ (1992:7-8) 
In this way, by the early twentieth century, Buddhism had become established 
as the national religion within an emergent Sinhala Buddhist identity in which 
language, race, religion and territory were closely intertwined. The 
nationalisation of Buddhism was thus coeval with the simultaneous 
nationalisation of Hinduism and Christianity in India and Britain respectively 
(Van der Veer 2001). The social and economic context of Buddhist revivalism 
– and thereby emergent Sinhala nationalism – was the rapid growth and 
commercialisation of the economy associated with the opening up of the 
Kandyan132 areas to plantation agriculture and the incorporation of the island 
into Britain centred global flows of finance and trade (Roberts 1997a; De Silva 
2005:421-5). This produced a new commercial elite formed by low country 
Sinhala caste groups – the Karavas, Salagamas and Duravas (KSD) – who had 
formerly been associated with the relatively low status occupations of fishing, 
cinnamon peeling and toddy tapping respectively (1997a). During the course of 
the nineteenth century these groups acquired new wealth and status through a 
variety of activities such as contracting labour to clear forests, supplying food 
and alcohol for the new plantations, graphite and gem mining, supplying 
furniture, small scale retail and investing in urban property. (Roberts 
1997a:160-165 
The three low country caste groups – labelled the KSD – formed the initial 
core of the Buddhist revivalism (De Silva 2005:432). During the twentieth 
century, however, Sinhala Buddhism became the dominant framework 
through which, Kandyans, upper caste landowners or Goyigamas and even 
Sinhala Christians organised their political activities. In this way, Sinhala 
Buddhism followed the trajectory of Hindu nationalism, which emerged first 
amongst urban upper caste groups but subsequently expanded to include a 
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wide array of non – elite groups across northern India (Jaffrelot 1996). An 
important difference between India and Sri Lanka was, however, that in India 
the force of Hindu nationalist mobilisation was contained by Congress’ pan-
ethnic conception of national identity and interest.  
6.2.2 Tamil Revivalism 
Nineteenth century revival and reform activities in the Tamil speaking areas 
established a clear public culture in the Tamil language through which Tamil 
cultural, as well as political, interests were contested and debated. Unlike 
nineteenth century Buddhist revivalism, however, Tamil associational 
activities did not produce a clear sense of Tamil identity that brought together 
claims about language, religion, people and territory. Tamil revivalist activities 
were instead organised into multiple strands – connected to the strands of 
Hindu and Tamil revivalist activities in India. A key figure in shaping the 
religious movement was Arumugam Navalar (1822-1879) who sought to 
counter Christian proselytising by reasserting the value of the Tamil Saiva 
Siddhanta tradition. While Navalar’s activities placed the Saiva Siddhanta 
system of beliefs and rituals at the core of Tamil interests, associational 
activities were later focussed on the cultivation and promotion of Tamil 
language, literature and culture. Assertions of Tamil political identity and 
Tamil political interests by associations and politicians were not consistently 
linked during the colonial period to clear historical narratives or territorial 
claims. However, there was a clear consensus by the early decades of the 
twentieth century amongst Tamil associations that the Tamils constituted a 
distinct ethnic group and were, like the Sinhalese, indigenous to the island 
(Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990). The sense of a distinct Tamil cultural presence 
inspired two mutually antagonistic political movements; one in pursuit of a 
pan-ethnic Ceylonese nationalism and the other seeking political safeguards 
for Tamils and other minorities against the threat of Sinhalese domination. 133  
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Sri Lankan Tamil public culture in the colonial period bore the traces of Hindu 
revivalism and was closely associated with the Congress brand of Tamil 
revivalism. However, the Tamil-as-Dravidian idea, while sometimes asserted, 
did not become a pole of sustained social reform or political activity, as it did 
in south India.134 In short, while the Dravidian idea was often asserted, unlike 
in south India, there was no sustained organisational structure committed to 
cultivating the Tamil-as-Dravidian idea. This relative absence, which is 
particularly striking given the importance of the Aryan idea to Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism, makes clear that mutually incompatible ethnic and 
national claims are not necessarily mirror images of each other or indeed 
diametrically opposed. For example, while the Tamils figured prominently in 
Sinhala Buddhist nationalist narratives, the Sinhalese were largely absent from 
Tamil revivalist conceptions for most of the nineteenth century, and Navalar 
himself rarely mentioned the Sinhalese at all (Hellman – Rajanayagam 
1989:250). The different configurations of race, territory, language and religion 
in Tamil and Sinhala nationalism demonstrate that the content of the ethnic 
and national claims that become politically or socially dominant cannot be 
seen as merely the oppositional and reactive pairings of self and other. Instead, 
Sinhala Buddhsit and Tamil revivalists were not so much responding to each 
other as responding to the emergence of a new set of categories (religion and 
language) and concepts (nation, history, progress) through which they had to 
reconfigure existing ideas and practices. As discussed in Chapter Four, while 
the translation of pre-modern Tamil and Sinhala religious and literary systems 
into modern categories was inevitable, the subsequent conflict between 
Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalist frameworks was not.  
The career of Arumugam Navalar has a number of evident similarities with 
that of Anangarika Dharmapala and Indian Hindu nationalists like Dayananda 
Saraswati. The son of a Jaffna poet, Navalar was taught Tamil by his father 
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before entering a mission school at the age of twelve to study English. He was 
a talented student, and after completing his studies, was asked by the principal, 
Peter Percival, to help with translating the Bible and prayer book into Tamil. 
Navalar’s education and later work at the mission school took place in the 
midst of the tensions and debates associated with missionary proselytising. 
Although initially attracted to Christianity (Hudson 1992:35), he was 
eventually moved by the desire to promote Saiva Siddhanta or the Tamil 
Saivite tradition and protect it against missionary attacks and criticism 
(Gunasingam 1999:126). His efforts to defend and cultivate Saivism were 
comparable to those adopted by Dharmapala, Saraswati and other revivalists. 
He preached sermons, published tracts, edited and produced reliable printed 
editions of key religious texts and established schools that provided a modern 
curriculum within a Saivite religious atmosphere.135 While Navalar’s efforts 
sought to reproduce Saivism as a modern confessional faith, in the image of 
Protestant Christianity, the outcome of this work did not establish a sustained 
public equation of Saivism as the ‘national’ religion of the Tamil people.  
The competition between Christian missionaries and their Saivite opponents 
was crucial to the early development of modern public culture in the Tamil 
speaking areas of south India and Sri Lanka.136 However, by the early decades 
of the twentieth century, Saivism had become less prominent as a means of 
identifying Tamil cultural and political interests – in contrast to the growing 
importance of Buddhism and Hinduism in Sri Lankan and (north) Indian 
politics respectively. There are three reasons for this. The first was that 
Navalar and his followers promoted Saivism primarily as a form of salvation 
and did not clearly elaborate a set of claims linking Saivism with Tamil 
political and social interests more broadly, in a manner comparable to 
Buddhist and Hindu revivalists. 137  Secondly, in the later decades of the 
nineteenth century, efforts to cultivate Saivism were increasingly undertaken 
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under the broader label of Hinduism, abandoning Navalar’s explicit focus on 
the Saiva Siddhanta tradition (Gunasingham 1999:150-1). Finally, and most 
importantly, the relative decline of Saivism and religion more broadly as a 
basis for social and political community is a consequence of the growing 
importance - from the early decades of the twentieth century - of language, 
literature, Bharathanatyam and Carnatic music as means of identifying Tamil 
cultural, social and even political interests. This is not to say that religion 
disappeared as a locus of associational activity, quite the reverse. Temple 
committees, churches, religiously affiliated schools, newspapers and welfare 
associations continued to play a central role in the public culture of the Tamil 
speaking areas.138 However, as discussed below, the promotion of Tamil culture, 
broadly defined, was a concern shared by Hindu, as well as Christian, public 
associations.  
The expansion of associational activity in the Tamil speaking regions began in 
the Jaffna peninsula and was closely associated with the dominant landowning 
caste, the Vellalas. At the onset of British rule the social dominance of the 
Vellalas had already been consolidated by their position within the previous 
Dutch administrative structures and participation in south Indian and south-
east Asian trade networks (Arasaratnam 1981). During the nineteenth century, 
agricultural production in Jaffna increasingly turned to cash crops and the 
wealth accruing from this was invested in education (Gunasingham 1999:40-
113). Employment in the British administration, on the island but also in south 
India and in British Malaya, became further sources of income for the 
peninsula. Associational activity followed the linkages of employment and 
administration created by colonial rule. Christian and Hindu schools were 
established in the Tamil speaking districts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa whilst 
the Jaffna based press began to routinely report events from these areas, as well 
as from Colombo (1999:132, 140-1). There were also efforts to encourage 
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investment and migration from the overpopulated and capital rich Jaffna 
peninsula to the relatively under populated areas of Vanni and the eastern 
province (1999:171).  
Associational activity amongst the Tamil speaking population did not, however, 
establish a clear narrative of national identity that integrated claims about 
language, religion and territory. There was no single association that could 
mobilise mass activity and support across the Tamil speaking population. 
Indeed, for much of this period, religious competition and theological conflict 
between Hindus and Christians dominated public life. Religious controversy 
was also closely related to the issue of caste. Christian missionary proselytising 
challenged Vellala dominance of low caste groups who were often dependent 
labourers of Vellala landlords. While Christians and Hindus engaged in 
theological debates through the print media, at a more corporeal level, upper 
caste Hindus sought violently to maintain the practices of caste hierarchy 
against efforts by low caste groups to establish their cultural autonomy and 
assert social equality (Saveri 1993:257-313). However, at the moment of 
independence, the principal political cleavage was not over the issue of caste or 
religion. Instead, this was centred on whether the Tamils should seek minority 
safeguards that would protect against the possibility of Sinhala political 
domination or, instead, work with Sinhala leaders to set out a common 
demand for political independence.  
6.3 Process 
6.3.1 Ethnic and national politics up to 1920 
Chapter Five traced the emergence of a pan-Indian form of nationalism able to 
accommodate the clear sense of a distinct Tamil cultural identity and interest 
formed through nineteenth century revival and reform activities. The 
discussion centred on Congress’ ability to mobilise electoral support in the 
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Tamil speaking regions during the 1935 elections despite the existence of 
countervailing Dravidian ideas and associational activity. The chapter argued 
that crucial to this outcome was Congress’ temporally continuous activity in 
the period between its foundation in 1885 and 1920 which established it as an 
unavoidable – for its detractors and supporters – presence in Indian political 
life. Congress’ brand of pan-ethnic Indian nationalism was established through 
the continuous in time activities of setting out a clear political framework, co-
option of interests and direct political mobilisation. In effect, the production of 
a form of pan ethnic nationalism – capable of incorporating the claims and 
concerns of established Tamil public culture – was the outcome of sustained 
and continuous activities towards this end, rather than a vehicle or expression 
of pre-existing interests, identities or subjectivities.  
The analysis presented below shows that a comparable pan-ethnic Ceylonese 
national organisation failed to appear primarily because of the absence of 
temporally sustained activities that brought together the elements of 
ideological articulation, co-option of interests and direct mobilisation. There 
were recurrent and fitful attempts to establish a pan-ethnic Ceylonese national 
organisation from the late nineteenth century that were supported by 
Sinhalese and Tamil political actors. Some associations, like the Ceylon 
National Association (CNA) formed in 1888, the Ceylon National Congress 
(CNC) formed in 1918 and the Liberal League formed in 1932 resembled the 
‘moderate’ section of the pre 1920 Congress in confining their activities to 
formal meetings and petitions, eschewing direct or mass political mobilisation 
(Russell 1982:37-8; De Silva 1997:161-2). On the other hand, there were also 
organisations like the Ceylon Reform Society formed in 1905-6, and the Jaffna 
Youth Congress formed in 1924, which like the extremist section of Congress, 
emphasised social reform and the revival of indigenous cultural forms as 
crucial to political independence (Kadirgamar 1980; Roberts 1997b 279-80). 
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The Youth Congress also engaged in direct political mobilisation (see below). 
While all the elements of a pan ethnic national movement were present, what 
was absent was an organisational structure that brought together in a 
continuous in time way activities of ideological articulation, co-option of 
interests and direct political mobilisation within a pan island political 
framework.  
Associational activity during this period (late nineteenth century to 1920) was 
– as in India – the preserve of a small elite defined by education, property and 
income concentrated around Colombo, along with a significant presence in 
Jaffna. The existence of substantial social and economic disparities is evident in 
the smallness of the electorate, which was, until the introduction of universal 
franchise in 1931, based on property and income qualifications. In 1912, for 
example, an electorate restricted to adult males literate in English contained 
just 2934 voters from a population of just over 4 million.139 In 1924, when the 
electorate was expanded to include adult males with literacy in Sinhala, Tamil 
or English along with a minimum level of property or income, the number of 
voters expanded to 204, 997, or 4 percent of the total population of 4 million.140 
Education and economic prosperity were also unevenly distributed. The 
Ceylon Tamils were disproportionately represented amongst the English 
educated; although only 11 per cent of the population141, in 1918, for example, 
made up almost half of the constituency for the electorate based on English 
language literacy (Russell 1982:23). Meanwhile, wealth created by the 
plantation economy was concentrated primarily in the hands of the low 
country Sinhalese – those of the KSD castes, while the Kandyans were under-
represented amongst groups that could be said to have elite status at the pan 
island level (Roberts 1997a:231). 
The uneven expansion of education and commercialised prosperity meant that 
associational activity also relied heavily on wealthy patrons. P. Ramanathan 
188 
 
(1851-1930), 142  descendent of a wealthy Jaffna Vellala family and Tamil 
representative in the legislative council from 1879 to 1893, financed – largely 
from his own funds - the construction and, for a number of years, the 
maintenance of the Ponnampala-Vanesvarar temple in Colombo and the 
Ramanathan College for women in Jaffna (Vythilingam 1971:544-552; Saveri 
1993:52-3, 247). Similarly the Hapitigam complex of temperance societies, that 
often held meetings with crowds of over 20,000, was largely funded by Don 
Spater Senanayake 143  (De Silva 2005:464), whose fortune was built on the 
proceeds of an early enterprise in the distillation and selling of alcohol 
(Roberts 1997a:207). This concentration of wealth also played out in electoral 
politics where – as in India – magnate power and patron client networks 
played an important role in deciding electoral outcomes (Russell 1982:72-6, 
90-103). Successful political organisation – especially in the context of 
universal franchise – relied, therefore, on the co-option of magnate interest, 
along with articulating a political framework and direct political mobilisation.  
It was in this context that the Ceylon National Association was formed in 1888 
with a stated goal ‘to help in the formation of a healthy public opinion on all 
questions of public importance and to promote by every legitimate means the 
political, intellectual and material advancement of the people’ (Vythilingam 
1971:394). These objectives worked within the framework of a pan island 
political identity and political interest, and the organisation brought together 
political actors from two of the most politically active groups on the island, the 
low country Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils. The organisation’s first 
President was P. Ramanathan (1971), the Tamil representative in the 
legislative council, while the CNA had much of its organisational roots in the 
Ceylon Agricultural Association, an organisation that was set up to promote 
the interests of low country (primarily Karava) planters (De Silva 1997:161). 
The CNA continued to exist until December 1919 when it was merged with 
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the Ceylon Reform League (formed in 1917) to form the Ceylon National 
Congress (CNC) (Gunasingham 1999:211-3). While the CNA’s founders were 
certainly aware of the INC in India (De Silva 1997:161), they did not emulate 
that pattern of activity by holding an annual meeting in different parts of the 
island. As discussed in Chapter Five, it was as a result of the problems 
encountered in this activity that Congress was compelled to formulate a 
framework for pan-Indian politics that could accommodate ethnic pluralism. It 
was forced to confront the difference between social reformers and 
conservatives, as well as the problems of co-opting Muslim support in the 
context of countervailing anti Congress mobilisation by Muslim political actors. 
The CNA did not engage in this process and therefore did not have to resolve 
the problem of reconciling the claims of Sinhala Buddhist associations in the 
south with those of Tamil associations in Jaffna. Instead, the CNA continued 
primarily as a label, invoked to host speakers or lobby the government on 
specific issues. 144  As a consequence, by 1920, when constitutional reforms 
precipitated a shift towards mass electoral politics, associational activity on the 
island had not generated a stable and institutionalised framework through 
which the ethnic pluralism could be accommodated with the need for a 
unified national identity and national interest.  
The absence of a pan-ethnic framework on the island’s politics can only be 
explained through the absence of a process; primarily that of temporally 
continuous political organisation and mobilisation that seeks actively to 
incorporate a plurality of ethnic groups in an effort to present a pan-ethnic 
political platform. This absence cannot be explained as the outcome of a 
fundamental difference from India in the structure of the island’s politics. The 
factors that were associated with Congress’ political trajectory up to 1920 were 
also present in Sri Lanka. By the early decades of the twentieth century, ideas 
such as self government, discrimination, progress, the need for patriotism and 
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economic nationalism were circulating in the island’s public culture, and being 
used to criticise the British government (Kadirgamar 1980:11, 71-5; Roberts 
1997b:273-84; Gunasingham1999:199-203). There was also a variety of local 
interests that sought to influence the government in Colombo. While the 
Ceylon Agricultural Association sought to lobby the government in Colombo 
on behalf of planters, the Chilaw Association protested against the policy on 
waste lands, whilst also seeking to influence the direction of government 
investments in railways (De Silva 1997:162). In 1859 a group of Kandyan 
Chiefs lobbied the government for a change in the marriage ordinances 
(1997:156) Meanwhile, in Jaffna, Arumugam Navalar campaigned against the 
perceived maladministration of W. C Twynam, the government agent for the 
province, and provided information in this regard to the Tamil representative 
in the Colombo legislature (Gunasingam 1999:192). Finally, from 1890, Jaffna 
associations, including associations of Jaffna Tamils who had emigrated to 
work as civil servants in Malaysia, petitioned the Colombo government to 
demand an extension of the railway to Jaffna; the decision to construct the line 
was finally taken in 1898 and it was completed in 1905 (1999:165-8).  
Sri Lankan political actors eventually addressed the problem of establishing a 
pan-ethnic national demand for self government in the context of the rising 
expectations of constitutional reform in India generated by the First World 
War. The Ceylon Reform League was founded in Colombo by P. Arunachalem 
(1853-1924),145 with the explicit objective of securing constitutional reform 
towards self government, at the same time as Congress and the Muslim League 
were holding simultaneous sessions in Bombay in an effort to find agreement 
on constitutional reform. The League set about attempting to formulate a 
common set of proposals that included the CNA and the Jaffna Association 
(formed in 1905) (Gunasingham 1999:205, 212-3). The inclusion of the Jaffna 
association was an explicit attempt to present a platform that was 
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representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese – and was explicitly 
endorsed as such by the Hindu Organ (1999; 214), an English and Tamil 
language publication that was also the largest circulating paper on the 
peninsula (Russell 1982:109). When an agreement was eventually reached, a 
new umbrella organisation, the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was launched 
in December 1919 with a clear set of proposals for constitutional reform. A 
CNC delegation travelled to London in 1920 to make the case for 
constitutional reform. The delegation was led by P. Arunachalem, also elected 
as the first president of the CNC. (Wickramasinghe 1995:43; Gunasingham 
1999:212-3).  
The agreement with the Jaffna association turned, crucially, on the means of 
ensuring adequate representation for the Tamils, given that the Sinhalese were 
in a demographic majority and the Tamils a demographic minority. The 
question gained particular urgency as reformists, led by Arunachalem, sought 
to transform the existing system in which individuals were nominated by the 
Governor to represent specific ethnic groups into one of elected 
representatives chosen by territorial rather than communal (or ethnic) 
constituencies. Such a move would necessarily transform the existing system of 
balanced representation into one where a majority of delegates elected from 
Sinhala constituencies could potentially control the legislature. Sinhala and 
Tamil political leaders eventually agreed that in return for the Jaffna 
Association assenting to territorial, rather than communal constituencies, and 
joining the CNC, a seat in the western province, with a substantial Tamil 
minority, 146  would be allocated to a Ceylon Tamil candidate (Gunasingham 
1999:214-5). The agreement was broken in the 1921 elections that returned 3 
Tamils and 13 Sinhalese to the newly constituted legislative council, without a 
Tamil representative from the Western Province (De Silva 2005:486). Soon 
afterwards, the Jaffna Association and Arunachalem resigned from the CNC, 
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and the latter formed a new organisation called the Tamil Mahajana Sabhai 
(Gunasingham 1999:212). There were no subsequent formal agreements in the 
colonial period between Tamil and Sinhala associations.  
The brevity of the agreement between the Jaffna Association and the CNC, as 
well as the abruptness of its termination, does not however indicate a 
pervasive or intractable Sinhala Buddhist – Tamil political divide. Although 
ethnic categories were a key part of political life in the period up to 1920, the 
crucial divides and conflicts were within the Sinhala and Tamil categories. The 
Sinhala Buddhist revival led to violent confrontations between Sinhalese 
Buddhists and Sinhalese Christians in 1883 near Colombo (Tambiah 1997:48-
56). In 1903 there were violent clashes between Sinhalese Buddhists and the 
Catholic church in Anuradhapura (Wickramasinghe 2006:117-8) 147 . The 
Sinhalese category was also regionally divided between the low country 
Sinhalese of the southern and western regions and the Kandyan Sinhalese. In 
1889 the Kandyan Sinhalese were given separate representation in the 
legislative council – plausibly as a counter to the emergent forms of 
associational activity associated primarily with low country Sinhalese (De Silva 
1997:155-163). Finally there was caste competition within the low-country 
Sinhalese category between the KSD groups and the landowning Goyigama 
caste (De Silva 2005:453-457).  
There were similar divides within the Tamil category. Conflict, often violent, 
occurred between Hindu Vellalas and low caste groups as the latter attempted 
to leave the hierarchical social order through conversion to Christianity 
(Saveri 1993: Chapter 5). In common with the Sinhalese, there was also 
political competition between Tamil Hindus and Tamil Christians to be 
selected as the Tamil representative in the legislative council (Gunasingham 
1999:193). The 1889 reforms also granted separate representation to the 
Muslims, undermining the claim of P. Ramanathan, the existing Tamil 
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representative in the legislative council, that the Muslims ought to be 
considered part of the Tamil category (Samaraweera 1997:308-9).  
Finally, the most significant episode of ethnic violence took place in 1915 and 
was primarily one of Sinhalese gangs attacking Muslim traders in the central 
and low country areas of the island (Tambiah 1997:56-81). The violence - 
triggered by a confrontation over the routing of a Buddhist procession near a 
newly expanded mosque – was closely associated with the Buddhist revival 
movement, particularly the temperance movement. Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalist magazines and periodicals – particularly those associated with 
Anangarika Dharmapala – portrayed the Muslims as foreigners increasingly 
usurping the rightful place of the Sinhalese (1997:70). Although Dharampala 
and his associate Walinsinha Harishchandra excoriated the Tamils (in terms 
similar to those used against Muslims) (Dharmadasa 1992:138; 
Wickramasinghe 2006:90), the violence was directed almost exclusively at 
Muslims, leaving Tamils resident in the areas, unaffected (Tambiah 1997:62-68, 
72). This disconnect between violent narratives of national identity and 
national interest and the violence that actually occurs demonstrates the 
importance of context – along with the presence of violent narratives and the 
subjectivities they may or may not inculcate – in producing violent conflict.  
While violent ethnic conflict was present, albeit not along a Tamil – Sinhala 
axis, there were also, during this period, notable instances of Tamil-Sinhala co-
operation. P. Ramanathan and P. Arunachalem, as well as cooperating with 
Sinhalese politicians in attempts to form political associations, also encouraged 
Sinhala Buddhist revivalist activities. Ramanathan addressed Buddhist 
associations encouraging his audience to speak Sinhalese in place of English 
(Vythilingam 1971:482), supported moves to get the observance of Vesak (the 
birthday of the Buddha) recognised as a national holiday (1971:476) and sought 
to establish a Buddhist – Hindu school in Colombo (Saveri 1993:53). 
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Ramanathan also travelled to the Colonial Office in London following the 1915 
violence to protest against the harsh measures taken by the government 
against prominent Sinhala Buddhist leaders and associations thought to be 
responsible for the rioting (De Silva 2005:475-9). Similarly, Arunachalem also 
spoke publicly on the virtues and wonders of Sinhala Buddhist civilization and 
in 1919 addressed the Lanka Mahajana Sabha, a Sinhala Buddhist revivalist 
association, in Sinhalese (De Silva 2005:497). Finally, in 1911 Ramanathan was 
elected to represent the educated Ceylonese from an island wide constituency 
of ‘native’ Ceylonese literate in English. His opponent was Sinhalese, but from 
the Karava caste, and many of the Goyigama Sinhalese preferred to vote for a 
high caste Vellala Tamil over a Karava Sinhalese (Wickramasinghe 1995:33; 
Wilson 2000:48). 
Despite the apparent lack of Sinhala-Tamil conflict and the instances of clear 
collaboration, the problem of reconciling the publicly established Tamil and 
Sinhala ethnic identities with the need for a unified conception of national 
identity and national identity remained conceptually unavoidable. It also 
became politically unavoidable because of the strength of associational activity 
that established distinct and incompatible conceptions of national identity and 
national interest in the Tamil and Sinhala speaking areas. Increasingly, Tamil 
and Sinhala associational activity sought to accommodate – though not 
necessarily successfully – differences of caste and religion within larger 
conceptions of Tamil and Sinhala identity and interest respectively. That is, 
Sinhala and Tamil associational activity was coming to identify the Sinhala and 
Tamil category respectively as platforms that unified internal diversities of 
caste, religion and region.  
Anangarika Dharmapala emphasised the unity of the Aryan Sinhalese identity 
that overcame the divisions of caste, stating that the ‘Aryan nationals 
belonging to the Govi caste, Karuva caste, Dura cate, Vahumpura caste, Uli 
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caste, Berava caste and Rada caste should take heart to maintain Aryan codes 
of conduct’ (quoted in Dharmadasa 1992:149). Meanwhile, attempts were also 
made to overcome the Buddhist-Christian divide as when prominent Buddhist 
and Christian Sinhalese organised a ‘national’ day on April 15 1914. One of the 
organisers, E. T de Silva (also a Christian) described the day as one of 
‘introspection by the Sinhalese of themselves as Sinhalese ... for the celebration 
of our past glory and to breathe our hopes for the future’ (1992:224). The 
following year another ‘national day’ was organised on the 2nd of March to 
mark the centenary of the Kandyan convention – as a result of which the 
formerly independent Kandyan kingdom came under British rule. The events 
of the day, including the hoisting of the Kandyan lion flag as the national flag, 
were attempts to symbolically bridge the gaps between the low country and 
Kandyan Sinhalese areas. In the process the Kandy kingdom and the Kandyan 
identity more generally were increasingly viewed as authentic representatives 
of a glorious Sinhala and thereby Sri Lankan past, by both Sinhalese and many 
British officials alike (Wickramasinghe 2006:103-111).  
These attempts to forge an overarching Sinhalese conception of national 
identity and national interest of course necessarily excluded the Tamils. In 
Sinhala Buddhist revivalist activity, the Tamils were depicted as the ‘barbaric 
races of south India’ (Dharmadasa 1992:139) responsible for destroying the 
once glorious Sinhala civilization whilst Anagarika Dharmapala noted that the 
Sinhalese were a ‘unique race, in as much as they have no slave blood in them, 
and never were conquered by either the pagan Tamils or European vandals’ 
(quoted in 1992:140). Dharmapala’s vision of the island as a Sinhala Buddhist 
territory expressed a hierarchical ordering of ethnic groups in which the 
Tamils, and other groups, could only have a secondary claim.  
‘The island of Lanka belongs to the Buddhist Sinhalese. For 
2455 years this was the land of birth for the Sinhalese. Other 
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races have come here to pursue their commercial activities.... 
for the Tamils there is South India; for the moors Egypt... But 
for the Sinhalese there is only this island.’ (1992:136) 
Alongside the Sinhala nationalist conception of a hierarchical ordering of 
ethnic groups on the island, Tamil associational activity was also increasingly 
coalescing around a conception of Tamils and Sinhalese as equally indigenous 
to the island. There was a general presumption in Tamil public culture – also 
adopted by P. Ramanathan and P. Arunachalem - that the Tamils were one of 
the two ‘founding races’ of the island (Wilson 2000:48,54, 56) The Hindu 
Organ, the largest circulating and most influential of the peninsula’s 
newspapers, welcomed the pact between the CNC and the Jaffna Association, 
characterising it as an agreement between the ‘Sinhalese and the Tamils, the 
people (inhabitants) of this country’ (Gunasingham 1999:214).When the pact 
broke down, many of the Tamil politicians associated with the negotiations 
asserted that Tamil political interests required a focus on securing Tamil rights, 
rather than the attempt to bury differences in an attempt to secure self 
governance. To this end, a number of political associations were formed with a 
focus on securing and promoting Tamil interests. Arunachalem, speaking at 
the inauguration of the Ceylon Tamil League in 1923, noted that while the 
Tamils would not ‘abandon the proud duty and privilege of service to all our 
brothers of very race and creed’, they did nevertheless ‘object to being bullied 
or terrorised’ and intended ‘to defend ourselves and make ourselves strong’ 
(1999:217). Furthermore, Tamil political interests were also projected as 
incorporating differences of caste and religion. At the inaugural meeting of the 
Jaffna Association, the Hindu Organ expressed the hope that the organisation 
would function ‘with full unity and all earnestness, without involving caste 
and religious prejudices’ (quoted in Gunasingham 1999:205). Later political 
associations such as the Jaffna Youth Congress and the All Ceylon Tamil 
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Conference had prominent Hindu and Christian participants (Kadirgamar 
1980:15, 39; Russell 1982:69, 83, 200). 
In contrast to the situation in India, Sri Lankan politics in 1920 lacked a 
developed pan-island organisational structure with a worked out conception of 
pan-ethnic national identity and national interest. Instead, Tamil and Sinhala 
associational activity from the late nineteenth century had produced two 
conceptions of national identity and interest that were mutually incompatible, 
while not diametrically opposed. The Sinhala conception – akin to the Hindu 
nationalist conception in India – was one of ethnic hierarchy in which the 
Sinhala Buddhists had a privileged historical, social and political position on 
the island. In contrast, the Tamil position was increasingly one of ethnic 
equality between the Tamils and Sinhalese, the two ‘founding races’ of the 
island. As discussed below, the dominant conception of Tamil identity and 
interest apparent in Tamil associational activity was closer to the Indianist pole 
of south Indian Tamil revivalism than the Dravidianist pole. Although the 
distinct Tamil and Sinhala conceptions were not each associated with robust 
organisational structures – many of the organisations established during this 
period were short-lived148 – they were nevertheless influential and came to 
inform efforts to mobilise mass political participation and electoral support in 
the decades leading to independence. These two distinct and mutually 
incompatible conceptions of national identity and national interest thus 
became established parts of the island’s political landscape.  
6.3.2 1920-1947: Towards independence 
A crucial component of the process of constitutional reform during this period 
was the question of ethnic representation. In 1945 a Commission, headed by 
Lord Soulbury and appointed by the Secretary of State, made public its 
recommendations for constitutional reform on the island (Colonial Office 
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1945). The Commission described the ‘problem of the Ceylon Constitution’ as 
essentially one of ‘reconciling the demands of the minorities for an adequate 
voice in the conduct of affairs’ with the obvious fact that the constitution must 
‘preserve for the majority that proportionate share in all spheres of 
Government activity to which their numbers and influence entitle them’ 
(1945:53). This characterisation contained the recognition that ethnic 
identities remained important to electoral politics. 149  From 1833 to 1920 
representation in the legislative council had been communal (ethnic): 
individuals were nominated by the Governor to represent the interests of 
ethnic groups. Initially individuals were chosen to represent the Sinhalese, the 
Tamils and the Burghers. In 1889 additional representation for the Kandyans 
and Muslims was also granted. The elective principle was introduced on a 
limited basis in 1911 for the educated Ceylonese seat but from 1920 onwards 
there was a rapid shift away from communal representation towards territorial 
representation. 150  The political consequences of the Sinhala demographic 
majority and the Tamil demographic minority became therefore key issues of 
debate, discussion and mobilisation for Tamil and Sinhala political leaders as 
well as for British officials.  
Two dynamics were at play in shaping ethnic and national politics during the 
final decades of colonial rule and in determining the constitutional structure 
through which the island became independent. The first was the ongoing 
consolidation – though not erasure - of the religious, regional and, to some 
extent, caste cleavages within the Tamil and Sinhala Buddhist conceptions of 
national identity that was coeval with a shift towards mass mobilization 
associated with the rapidly expanding franchise. As direct political 
mobilisation became a more important feature of political contestation, ethnic 
and national identities were increasingly communicated in the Tamil and 
Sinhala languages and through popular cultural forms. This was comparable 
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and even connected to events in India, but in the absence of a pan-ethnic 
framework produced very different outcomes.151 The second crucial dynamic 
in determining the final shape of constitutional outcomes were the perceptions 
and decisions of British officials. The views of British officials, rather than the 
force of political mobilisation on the island, were crucial in the decisions to 
abandon communal representation in favour of territorial constituencies, to 
adopt universal franchise 152  and to appoint D. S Senanayake as the key 
interlocutor in the negotiations for the transfer of power.153 These decisions 
were justified by two slightly contradictory strands of reasoning. The first was 
that the island had a Sinhala Buddhist character and that inevitably the 
Sinhalese would be politically dominant. The second strand of reasoning was 
that the development of a pan-ethnic national framework to politics was 
desirable and would eventually develop on the island.154  
The shift towards territorial representation that began with reforms 
implemented in 1921 produced initially a conflict between the political 
interests of the Kandyans and those of the low country Sinhalese politicians, 
largely represented by the CNC. Kandyan politicians took the position that 
further self government would simply mean domination by the low country 
Sinhalese, many of whom worked in the Kandyan areas as traders and 
suppliers servicing the plantation economy (Wickramasinghe 1995:42). As a 
consequence, the Kandyans remained aloof from the CNC and lobbied to 
retain communal representation, which they were granted in the first set of 
reforms in 1921. However, in the following set of reforms, implemented in 
1923, the Kandyans lost the communal safeguards and found that many of the 
Kandyan electorates were won by low country Sinhalese politicians. In 
response, a Kandyan National Assembly was formed that demanded a federal 
autonomy for the Kandyan areas - the KNA’s scheme envisaged a threefold 
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division of the island into Tamil, low Country and Kandyan federal states 
(1995:67-9).  
This political division between the Kandyans and the low country Sinhalese 
was, however, bridged during the 1930’s through a shared interest in excluding 
Indians – plantation labourers and traders – from the economic and political 
life of the island. The shift was precipitated by the decision in 1931 to adopt 
the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commission report on 
constitutional reform that advocated universal adult franchise – including 
women – and territorial constituencies. The reforms enfranchised the south 
Indian, mainly Tamil, plantation labourers, arousing the hostility of both 
Kandyan and low Country Sinhalese politicians and associations, all of whom 
complained the Indians would demographically ‘swamp’ the Sinhalese 
(Colonial Office 1945:56).155 In 1921 the Indian Tamil population (that lived 
and worked mainly in the tea plantations in the Kandyan districts) was almost 
two thirds the size (just over 600,000) of the Kandyan Sinhalese population 
(just over 1,000,000). The Kandyans complained that if the Indians were given 
the right to vote, Kandyan candidates would not be elected. Kandyan hostility 
to the Indian Tamil plantation labourers was therefore political and not 
economic: plantation owners had sought out labour from south India because 
the Kandyans, relatively prosperous and with abundant land, did not want to 
work on the plantations that were opening up from the mid nineteenth 
century (De Silva 2005:349). At the same time, by the late nineteenth century, 
economic stagnation and landlessness in south India was leading to labour 
emigration (Chapter Two). 
In contrast, the Sri Lankan Tamils, who had been resident in the northeast of 
the island for several centuries, supported the Indian Tamils right to the 
franchise. Sri Lankan Tamils were not competing for work on the plantations; 
there was a relatively prosperous agricultural economy in the north-east (De 
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Silva 2005:385-7) which supported a growing demand for education, 
particularly English education. As noted earlier, this led to an over-
representation of Sri Lankan Tamils in the public services (Roberts 1997a:229-
230) and also led many Sri Lankan Tamils to emigrate to Singapore and 
Malaysia in search of similar white collar work (Russell 1982:23). Sri Lankan 
Tamil support for the Indian Tamils was interpreted by Sinhala political 
leaders as a means of ‘defeating the majority community’ (Wickramasinghe 
1985:84).  
The Donoughmore Commissioners recommended adult franchise as a means of 
alleviating the social and economic conditions of workers and other 
impoverished sections of the population, specifically mentioning the 
plantation labourers (Colonial Office 1928:83, 86). However, from 1929 
onwards, the franchise conditions were repeatedly revised to specifically 
exclude Indian labourers by the Colonial Office and the Governor General at 
the insistence of Kandyan as well as low country Sinhalese politicians 
(Colonial Office 1945:13; Wickramasinghe 1995:85)  
The alliance of Kandyan and low country Country Sinhalese was facilitated by 
the widening use of Sinhala Buddhist rhetoric and metonyms in the 
techniques of mass political mobilisation that was increasingly becoming a part 
of associational activity. Sinhala Buddhist conceptions of national identity and 
national history were circulating through an expanding vernacular print 
culture and also through forms such as the popular theatre (Wickramasinghe 
2006:77-9, 89). The nationalist message exhorted the Sinhalese to change their 
names, forms of dress and other cultural habits to be more authentically Aryan 
Sinhalese (2006:81, 93) and at the same time focussed attention on the threat 
posed by Indian labourers and traders (Wicramasinghe 1995:134). Sinhalese 
labour leaders also mobilised against the Indian threat, organising boycotts of 
Indian owned business, calling for landlords to evict Indian tenants, 
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encouraging businesses not to employ Indians and even exhorting the 
Sinhalese not to engage in mixed marriages as it would diminish the purity of 
the Sinhalese (Russell 1982:249-50; Wickramasinghe 2006:130-135).  
The increasing political viability of a pan-Sinhalese identity is evident in the 
behaviour of S. W.R. D Bandaranaike, a low country politician and future 
Prime Minister of independent Sri Lanka. Bandaranaike initially supported the 
Kandyan demand for federation in the hope of securing Kandyan backing 
(Russell 1982:191; Wickramasinghe 1995:69). By 1936, however, he 
abandoned this and adopted a Sinhala Buddhist platform forming the Sinhala 
Maha Sabha as a means of bridging the gap between the low country and 
Kandyan Sinhalese (Russell 1982:142, 236; Wickramasinghe 1995:170-1). 
Through the SMS Bandaranaike adopted a very shrill note on defending 
Sinhalese interests, stating for example that ‘I am prepared to sacrifice my life 
for the sake of my community, the Sinhalese. If anybody were to try to hinder 
our progress, I should see that he should never forget’ (quoted in Russell 
1982:157). The conscious attempt to consolidate a regionally unified Sinhala 
identity was also exemplified at the 1940 annual session of the CNC where t 
adopted independence as its eventual goal and unfurled the Kandyan lion flag 
as the national flag (Wickramasinghe 1995:175).  
The shift from communal to territorial electorates also precipitated a divide in 
Tamil politics, albeit one that was based on differences of political approach, 
rather than differences of region, caste or religion. There two distinct 
approaches to promoting Tamil political interests – although they shared an 
understanding of the content of these interests. The first was associated with 
Tamil politicians, most prominently P. Ramanathan and from 1934 G. G. 
Ponnambalam 156  (1910-1977), who sought to retain a balance of ethnic 
representation in the legislative council. The second was associated with a new 
organisation formed called the Jaffna Youth Congress was formed in 1924 
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(Kadirgamar 1980). The JYC attacked its Tamil opponents as ‘communalists’ 
and sought instead to build a pan-ethnic form of Ceylonese nationalism that 
explicitly used techniques of mass political mobilization. Despite the bitter, 
and often violent, conflicts between the two groups157 they nevertheless shared 
an understanding of the Tamils as indigenous to the island and sought a multi 
ethnic political future for the island in which the Tamils and Sinhalese could 
coexist as equal collectives. Their tactics to realise this end differed – the JYC 
sought to build political alliances with Sinhalese politicians 158 , while P. 
Ramanathan and later G. G. Ponnambalam sought to build alliances with other 
minority representatives (Russell 1982:66-67)159 but were orientated towards a 
similar political vision.  
The JYC, for example, at its first session in 1924 promulgated a political 
framework of national identity that was very much like that of the early 
Indian Congress. Asserting that it was possible for ‘people of all religions to 
work of the welfare of the mother land’, the JYC resolved that ‘no distinction 
be made between or preference shown to any one of the various religious 
bodies in the country and that no sectarian issue be ever raised’ at JYC 
meetings or in JYC propaganda (Kadirgamar 1980:13). In a similar vein, G. G. 
Ponnambalam, in a 1939 speech setting out the case for balanced 
representation, argued that ‘we are a composite of different races and 
nationalities who have to live and move and have our being in this country.’ 
He went onto state that the ‘rights of every component part must be accepted 
and the claims recognised if this country is to march on for the highest good of 
the greatest number if not of the people as a whole’ (2001:5).  
The JYC was strongly influenced by the Indian Congress – particularly the 
adoption of mass mobilisation and questions of social reform, poverty and the 
promotion of indigenous cultural forms that occurred under Gandhi’s 
leadership. During the height of its political presence between 1924 and 1931, 
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the JYC held sessions addressed by well known Indian figures including 
Gandhi and Nehru as well as the Tamil Nadu Congress figures Satyamurti and 
V. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar. The JYC also promoted Gandhi’s campaign of 
using homespun cotton or Khaddr over imported cloth, encouraged the use of 
the Tamil language in public life, led campaigns to end caste discrimination in 
Jaffna’s educational institutions and raised issues of imperialism and economic 
underdevelopment in its annual sessions (Kadirgamar 1980). 160  The JYC’s 
cultivation of Tamil language and culture – an explicit part of its programme 
since its founding - was part of a broader movement of Tamil cultural 
promotion that was shaped by the Indianist pole of south Indian Tamil 
revivalism. In the course of the 1930’s, for example, Bharathanatyam and 
Carnatic music - the south Indian traditions of dance and music adopted and 
reformed by the Indian Congress as ‘national forms’ – replaced western 
classical music and dance in the curricula of Jaffna schools and colleges 
(Russell 1982:122). 
Over a period of six years, the JYC established a presence in the island’s 
political life – concentrated in Jaffna161 – by setting out a clear framework of 
national identity and national interest and directly mobilising political support. 
As a consequence, it was also briefly able to influence ambitious politicians 
seeking election in a manner in ways comparable to the Indian Congress in the 
elections. In 1931 the JYC called for a boycott of the elections to the State 
Council created by the Donoughmore Commission reforms. The decision was 
taken on the basis that the reforms did not go far enough towards 
independence and echoed the Indian Congress’ campaign of Civil 
Disobedience taking place at the same time (Kadirgamar 1980:58-60, 72-82). 
Within days of the JYC announcing its decision and holding public meetings 
to dissuade people from voting, a large number of the more notable candidates 
withdrew their nominations (1980:78). The fact that candidates, who operated 
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within an electoral landscape in which patronage networks were crucial, 
withdrew suggests that the JYC brand had nevertheless become an 
independent source of electoral legitimacy within northern electoral 
constituencies. 162  The boycott was also, however, the cause of the JYC’s 
eventual demise. Its optimistic hopes of a reciprocal boycott in the Sinhalese 
areas were entirely unfounded (Russell 1982:31, 33) and indeed its activities 
were even misrepresented by many, though not all, Sinhalese politicians and 
later by British officials as a demand for communal electorates.163 
By 1934 Tamil politicians who sought to negotiate balanced ethnic 
representation, most prominently G. G. Ponnambalam, had persuaded the then 
Governor R. E. Stubbs, to hold elections in the areas affected by boycott and 
entered the state council. From that point on, the demand for balanced 
representation between the majority Sinhalese and non Sinhalese in any future 
constitutional reforms became an important – though not dominant - platform 
in Tamil politics. The demand, commonly known as 50-50,164 was promoted as 
a means of protecting the non-Sinhala minorities against discriminatory acts 
by ensuring a balance of political power between the majority and the 
minorities. Although the JYC and its members remained politically active, 
they lost their former influence. When two key JYC members stood for 
election in 1947 they fared dismally and lost their deposits. In the meantime, 
the notion that Tamil political interests were threatened by Sinhala 
domination gained momentum. At the 1947 elections Ponnambalam’s All 
Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) won six seats (out of nine) in the northern 
province and one seat (out of seven) from the eastern province 
(Wickramasinghe 1995:242) on a platform of seeking ‘responsive co-operation’ 
(Russell 1982:324) with Sinhala leaders. In the elections Ponnambalam 
abandoned his home constituency of Point Pedro and directly challenged A. 
Mahadeva, standing as a candidate for D. S Senanayake’s UNP in the Jaffna 
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town constituency. In what he described as an ‘ordeal by election’ (1982), 
Ponnambalam beat Mahadeva165 demonstrating that his argument of the threat 
posed by Sinhala majority rule to Tamil interests had gained traction in Jaffna 
town, an important locus of Tamil politics.  
6.3.3 British perceptions and the transfer of power 
The Donoughmore commission’s recommendations were intended to 
overcome the ethnic cleavages that were apparent in the island’s politics. 
However, in the period between 1931 and 1947, when the Donoughmore 
constitution functioned, ethnic cleavages continued, and more importantly, 
mutually incompatible Tamil and Sinhala conceptions of national identity and 
interest became established in public culture and political life. From 1931 the 
Sinhala Buddhist framework also became the basis for economic policy. D. S 
Senanayake, as the minister for Agriculture and Lands,166 implemented a policy 
of state support for peasant colonization of the largely under-populated areas 
in the north central, northern and north-western areas of the island.167 The 
colonization schemes resonated with the Mahavamsa vision of the island’s 
history in which the glorious Buddhist, hydraulic civilizations centred on the 
cities of Anuradhapura and Polunnaruwa were destroyed by Tamil invaders. 
The schemes were widely presented as the re–conquest of Buddhist land and 
Senanayake himself presented himself as a direct descendent of an old Rajarata 
(or King’s country) family (Farmer 1957:144).Tamil politicians criticised these 
policies as discriminating against Tamil interests. The emphasis on (Sinhala) 
peasant colonisation led to a radical reduction in public funds spent on 
irrigation works in the North-east, where previous investments had to rapid 
increases in productivity. 168: At the same time they also noted that rates of 
landlessness in the Jaffna peninsula were comparable to those in the 
overcrowded south-western parts of the island. 169   Meanwhile, the public 
services also became hugely politicized as Sinhala politicians criticized Tamil 
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over-representation in the public services, while Tamil politicians complained 
of administrative measures that discriminated against Tamil candidates (Russell 
1982:25, 169; Wickramasinghe 1995:150-1). A 1943 debate in the State Council 
on the issue of replacing English with a national language also revealed deep 
differences between Sinhalese and Tamil representatives. (Russell 1982:286-7).  
The Soulbury Commission, appointed in 1944 to recommend further 
constitutional reforms, recognised that ethnic categories continued to 
dominate the island’s politics (Colonial Office 1945:33, 71). The commission 
noted Tamil and other minority complaints of discrimination but suggested 
that these were simply the effects of the Sinhalese majority correcting for 
previous deficiencies. The Commission was however optimistic that a more 
ethnically inclusive form of politics would naturally develop in the post 
independence period and encouraged Sinhalese leaders to take minority 
concerns into account (1945:47-50). From 1943 onwards D. S Senanayake 
emerged as the leader to whom power would be transferred, and from that 
point onwards Tamil politicians were largely excluded from discussions on 
constitutional reform. 170  The Soulbury Commission’s recommendations – 
approved in early 1946 – set out a parliamentary system with cabinet 
government and territorial, rather than communal, constituencies. 
Senanayake’s demand for dominion status and finally independence were 
eventually granted, largely as a consequence of the pace of events in India and 
as means of shoring up Senanayake’s political credibility on the island in the 
face of growing labour unrest (Jeffries 1962:112,-3). The problem of 
reconciling the island’s ethnic pluralism into a singular national framework 
was left to the future – strikingly it was agreed that if the minorities no longer 
had a third party to whom appeals could be made, compromise was more 
likely (1962:115-6).  
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6.3.4 British policy and pan-ethnic politics 
There are, of course, some important differences in British attitudes to ethnic 
pluralism in India and Sri Lanka, particularly in the years leading up to 
independence. However, this cannot be easily correlated with the relative 
success or failure of pan-ethnic politics in the two states. There were 
substantial moves towards self-government in India and Sri Lanka during the 
1930’s. The Donoughmore reforms in Sri Lanka led to effective self 
government with universal franchise, but without ethnically defined 
constituencies. Likewise, in India, the 1935 Act led to provincial self 
government and greater Indian participation at the national level in Delhi. 
However, in India the franchise was highly restricted and separate Muslim 
constituencies remained. In Sri Lanka, however, Sinhalese political actors’ 
ability to exercise political power, and indeed their demands for further self 
government, were not undermined by their inability to mobilise pan-ethnic 
support. In fact, British officials accommodated Sinhalese leaders’ insistence 
that Indian Tamils be excluded from the franchise in an effort to get the 
Donoughmore proposals accepted. Furthermore, British officials did not 
protest or oppose when Sinhalese ministers used the powers granted to them 
by the Donoughmore reforms to pass legislation that directly discriminated 
against Indian Tamils. In Sri Lanka therefore the absence of a pan-ethnic 
consensus was not a key factor in British official decision making; quite the 
reverse, British officials arguably condoned the ethnic exclusion of Indian 
Tamils in their efforts to maintain a working relationship with Sinhalese 
political leaders. In that sense, from the 1930’s onwards, Sinhalese leaders were 
not under any pressure from colonial to form a unified national front.  
In contrast, in India, British officials insisted on including representations from 
a wide range of actors in formulating the provisions of the 1935 Act. Muslim 
and Dalit representatives were, for example, invited to the 1931-2 London 
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Round Table Conferences that Congress leaders boycotted. In October 1939 
the then Viceroy, the Marquis of Linlithgow (served 1936-43), explicitly stated 
that there would be no further progress towards self government without 
Muslim agreement (Sarkar 1989:377). This in part formed the conditions in 
which the Muslim League adopted the Pakistan resolution of March 1940 
(1989:378). However, as Ayesha Jalal (1994) has argued, by early 1947, British 
priorities had switched to transferring power as early as possible, even at the 
cost of finding agreement between Congress and the League. As in Sri Lanka, 
therefore, in the final months before independence British officials were 
focussed on transferring power rather than maintaining their rule through the 
use of ethnic categories. In the last stages of British rule what mattered was not 
British policy as much as the League’s ability to win the overwhelming 
majority of Muslim electorates in the 1945/6 elections and, conversely, 
Congress’ failure to do the same. If the League had not won this overwhelming 
mandate, it would not have been a key player in the final months that led to 
the transfer of power. However, as Chapter Five argued, Congress’ failure to 
win Muslim support was not so much a matter of British policy but the Hindu 
nationalist orientation of Congress politicians in the three key provinces of 
Punjab, Bengal and UP. Furthermore, Congress’ contrasting ability to win 
Tamil electoral support was an outcome of its long run ideological and 
institutional development, beginning in the late nineteenth century. In other 
words, the divergent trajectories of ethnic and national politics in the two 
states are outcomes of political process, rather than the contrasting policies of 
British officials.  
There are also substantial problems with the argument that greater British 
resistance to self rule in India led to a more developed form of nationalist 
movement there compared to in Sri Lanka. From the late nineteenth century 
until 1920, Congress politicians, like their Sri Lankan counterparts, were not 
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seeking independence but rather limited constitutional reform. Furthermore, 
the first two of Congress’ three India wide protests (Non Cooperation and Civil 
Disobedience respectively) had very little effect on the direction of British 
reforms. The Non-Cooperation movement, which followed the 1919 
Government of India Act that granted limited self government, insisted on 
independence but failed to effect any change in the legislation. Furthermore, 
once Gandhi had called off the Non Cooperation movement in 1924, many 
leading Congress politicians joined to form the Swaraj party and contested 
elections for institutions created by the 1919 reforms. Similarly, the Civil 
Disobedience movement (1931-4) – launched with the objective of securing 
Dominion status - failed to make any substantial change to the content of the 
1935 Government of India act. Congress nevertheless participated in the 
institutions created by the very Act it had spent four years resisting.  
To reiterate, despite the failure of Congress-led mass mobilisation in realising 
its stated goals, these processes were nevertheless crucial in developing a pan-
Indian ideological and organisational structure. While relations between 
British officials and the Congress movement were arguably more fractious than 
similar relations in Sri Lanka, this is better understood as the result, rather 
than the cause, of Congress mobilisation. The organisational strength of 
Congress led anti-colonial nationalism, demonstrated during the Quit India 
movement (1942) and continuing through strikes and demonstrations till 
independence, was nevertheless decisive in pushing for a rapid pace of 
decolonisation at the end of the war in Europe in 1945 (Sarkar 1989: Chapter 
Eight). The rapid momentum towards independence in India also pushed 
British officials towards granting Sri Lanka independence, rather than simply 
further self-government (Jeffries 1962:113). As such, Sri Lanka gained 
independence within months of India despite the absence of a sustained anti-
colonial movement. The presence or absence of sustained pan-ethnic anti 
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colonial politics was therefore not clearly correlated with the direction and 
speed of self government until the 1940’s and the impact of the war on 
Britain’s relative power and ability to hold the Empire together against Indian 
and international resistance. However, the presence or absence of sustained 
pan-ethnic, anti-colonial politics is the crucial factor in explaining the very 
divergent political, social and economic outcomes of Tamil identity in India 
and Sri Lanka. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the Indian Congress movement in Chapter Five demonstrates 
that the emergence of a pan-ethnic framework of national politics is not an act 
of compromise or statesmanship. Rather, in India it emerged through 
continuous in time efforts of political mobilisation and organisation that 
sought to present a pan ethnic platform that could demonstrate credible 
support across India. As a consequence, Congress’ political framework 
developed institutional depth and went onto structure the post-independence 
Indian constitution. In Sri Lanka, a pan ethnic political platform failed to 
develop because of the absence of this process. Organisations such as the CNA 
and the CNC did not engage in continuous processes of organisation and 
mobilisation in an attempt to establish a pan ethnic platform that could 
demonstrate support across the island. As a consequence, they could be easily 
ignored and quickly supplanted by new organisations. In April, in preparation 
for the first elections to be held under the auspices of the Soulbury 
constitution, Senanayake bypassed the CNC and formed the UNP 
(Wickramasinghe 1995:223). Most of CNC’s parliamentary candidates simply 
switched allegiances to the UNP which won 42 out of a total of 95 seats in the 
1947 elections (1995:242). The UNP did not have a developed framework of 
national identity and national interest and functioned primarily as a label that 
co-ordinated the interests of ambitious politicians of local standing; its chief 
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asset was Senanayake’s status as the most likely future Prime Minister 
(1995:224).  
This chapter has argued that the absence of a pan-ethnic Ceylonese 
nationalism was a matter of process rather than structure. That is the absence 
of a pan-ethnic platform cannot be explained in terms of the island’s ethnic 
demography or indeed the structure of incentives facing political actors. The 
dominant trends in Tamil and Sinhala associational activity were comparable 
to those in India; Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka is the equivalent of 
Hindu nationalism in India, whilst Tamil politics was closely linked to the 
Indianist pole of south Indian Tamil revivalism. Similarly, the types of social 
groups that were associated with Congress’ growth and expansion were also 
present in the island. There was, for example, from the late nineteenth century 
a small and unevenly distributed group of actors engaged in funding and 
organising associational activity that sought in various ways to shape 
government policy. Electoral competition on the island, as in India, was also 
hugely dependent on local magnates able to command votes through networks 
of patronage. The conditions and possibilities of ethnic and national political 
contestation were therefore comparable and the differences of outcome can 
only be explained through the processes of organisation and mobilisation 
through which identities were asserted and then contested.  
Indeed, the pattern of ethnic politics on the island was in some ways more 
favourably disposed towards a pan-ethnic form of politics than those in India. 
Unlike the relations between leading Congress and Muslim political leaders, 
important Tamil politicians and Tamil associations were central to efforts to 
create a pan-ethnic form of politics. The brothers P. Ramanathan and P. 
Arunachalem played important roles in the founding of the CNA and the CNC 
respectively, both of which sort to advance a pan-ethnic politics. Later, Jaffna 
politics was for a period dominated by the Youth Congress which also sought 
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to create a popular movement in support of a pan-ethnic form of anti-colonial 
nationalism; its 1931 boycott was the only instance of anti-colonial mass 
protest in the island’s history comparable to the pan-Indian agitations through 
which Congress built its support and organisational structure (Russell 1982:42). 
However, in the absence of continuous in time activities to establish a pan-
ethnic and pan-island organisational structure, associational activities amongst 
the Tamils and Sinhalese came instead to be organised around two 
incompatible – though not diametrically opposed – conceptions of national 
identity and national interest.  
The Muslim and Tamil politicians who endorsed Senanayake’s leadership and 
the UNP explained their decision in terms of the legitimacy of accepting 
majority Sinhala rule – not as a means of evolving a pan ethnic national 
identity. However, the understanding of the island’s national character as 
essentially Sinhala Buddhist failed to gain traction in Tamil politics. Instead, as 
discussed in Chapter Eight, in the post independence period, Tamil politics was 
dominated by the Federal Party which continued to insist on the notion of 
Tamils and Sinhalese as equally indigenous to the island. The escalating 
conflict between this momentum in Tamil politics and the Sinhala Buddhist 
framework that was systematically being incorporated into state structures was 
a crucial component of the island’s politics in the post independence decade.  
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7. Tamil identity and the Indian nation in the post-
independence era 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the relationship between political dynamics in the 
Tamil speaking areas and Indian national identity in the post independence 
era. It will first outline the understanding of Indian national identity contained 
in the Indian constitution. The constitution was an expression of Congress 
doctrine and set the dominant framework through which ethnic pluralism was 
reconciled into a unified national whole. The chapter will argue that the 
electoral competition between the Dravidian movement and Congress in the 
Tamil speaking areas took place in terms of shared notions of Tamil identity 
and interest that were compatible with constitutional understandings of Indian 
national identity. The chapter explains Congress’ electoral decline in the Tamil 
speaking areas as the outcome of the DMK’s effective mobilisation 
compounded by an economic crisis and contingent political factors that 
worked against a Congress revival. It will suggest that the political 
accommodation of Tamil identity within Indian nationalism was due to the 
ideological contours of the political dominance of an ethnically plural 
understanding of Indian national identity rather than the federal provisions of 
the constitution or the political moderation of the Dravidian parties.  
In the post Independence era, the Indian state was redefined in national terms. 
A key act in this formal redefinition was the drafting of a new Indian 
constitution. The constitution expressed and enshrined an understanding of 
Indian national identity that recognised the internal ethnic pluralism of the 
Indian population, but reconciled this within a shared and unifying national 
interest in economic and social development. 171 This understanding of Indian 
national identity and national interest captured in the phrase ‘unity in 
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diversity’ was the outcome of Congress’ ideological and political development 
from its inception in the late nineteenth century (Sarkar 2001). In the decades 
following independence, Congress’ electoral and political dominance 
established the twin principles of ethnic pluralism along with a unifying 
national constitutional framework and commitment to economic development 
as central facts of Indian political life.172 Whilst Congress eventually lost power 
at the national level in 1977, the constitution has remained in force to become 
the most durable of the constitutions that succeeded British colonial rule in 
south Asia. The Constitution’s understanding of Indian national identity has 
likewise remained a critical force in Indian political dynamics, acting as both a 
restraint and a resource for social and political movements that have sought to 
capture or exercise state power in line with their preferred understandings of 
national identity and national interest. 
In the Tamil speaking areas, the Congress party and its articulation of Indian 
national identity was challenged by the political growth of the DMK, a party 
that had its ideological roots in the once separatist and outspokenly anti-Indian 
DK.173 However, the growth of the DMK and its replacement of Congress as 
the governing party in the Tamil speaking areas by 1967 took place without a 
fundamental redefinition of Indian national identity in the Tamil speaking 
regions or indeed a complete reorientation of Dravidian ideology. This 
accommodation was possible because there was sufficient ideological overlap 
between Dravidian and Indian notions of Tamil identity; an ideological 
overlap that was developed through the Congress movement’s mobilisation in 
the Tamil speaking areas. Although not infinitely elastic, the Constitution’s 
characterisation of the Indian nation has been capacious enough to withstand 
the ascendance to political power of the once separatist Dravidian movement 
in the Tamil speaking areas.  
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7.2 Congress party dominance and framing Indian national 
identity  
The framing of the Indian constitution and its relative stability are inseparable 
from Congress’ organisational, ideological and electoral dominance of Indian 
political life from the late colonial period until 1977. While the political values 
that eventually defined the constitution reflected the party’s political doctrine, 
its ability to dominate discussions in the constituent assembly reflected its 
electoral strength.174 The values of democracy, socialism, pluralism and unity 
that guided the framing of the Indian constitution were outcomes of Congress 
ideological development and its struggle to present itself as the legitimate 
representative of Indian national identity and interests (Sarkar 1999). 
Although there was a diversity of views within the constituent assembly, the 
drafting of the Constitution was closely controlled by a few key individuals 
whose authority rested on their status in the Congress party. Corbridge and 
Harris suggest that the Constitution was effectively written by Nehru and 
Bhimrao Ambedkar (2000:269), while Austin argues that the drafting process 
was managed by an oligarchy consisting of Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Maulana 
Abul Kalam Azad and Patel175 (1972:18). Whatever the precise role of these 
figures, and despite important differences on issues such land reform, 
economic policy176 and the problem of caste hierarchy, their political careers 
had all been at a pan-Indian rather than provincial level, and they all agreed 
on the need for a strong centralised state capable of securing national unity 
and directing the processes of economic development and social 
transformation (1972:21, 187-207). 
The Indian constitution, and the process of constitution making, established an 
authoritative framework for reconciling the ethnic pluralism of the Indian 
population with the need for a unified national identity. The constitutional 
process was legitimised through the principle of popular sovereignty and 
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invoked the pre-political authority of the Indian people; the objectives 
resolution stated that the constituent assembly ‘derived from the people .... all 
power and authority’ (1972:2) while the preamble to the constitution declared 
‘We the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India, into 
sovereign democratic republic’ (cited in Corbridge and Harriss 2000:20). In 
invoking the authority of the pre-political people in this way, the 
constitutional process inevitably raised the population’s ethnic pluralism as a 
conceptually unavoidable problem. As a consequence, the political 
accommodation and representation of India’s ethnic pluralism became a 
central part of the constitution making process. The Congress leadership 
directed provincial units to ensure that candidates representing minority 
religious and Untouchable caste groups were nominated to the Constituent 
assembly to ensure that it would be ‘the mirror of the nation’ (Austin 1972:11). 
The constitution making process was thus marked by a series of debates on the 
appropriate means through which to represent and recognise caste, religious 
and linguistic differences within an overarching ‘national’ framework. The 
constitutional resolution of these issues has proved remarkably stable and 
relatively capacious, enabling a stable political accommodation between Tamil 
politics and the national framework of Indian politics.  
The constitutional accommodation of ethnic pluralism was framed by the 
overarching objectives of preserving Indian unity and securing Indian national 
interests in social and economic progress and development. The two were 
linked in so far as unity was seen as a pre-requisite for progress. The 
imperative of securing the social and economic transformation of India was 
forcefully expressed by Nehru at the opening of the Assembly in December 
1946; the ‘first task of this assembly’ he stated ‘is to free India through a new 
constitution, to feed the starving people, to clothe the naked masses, and to 
give every Indian the fullest opportunity to develop himself according to his 
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capacity’ (quoted in Corbridge and Harriss 2000:20) There was a broad 
consensus amongst assembly members that the state would play a central role 
in effecting economic and social transformation (Austin 1972:41-3), a view 
that was rooted in the nationalist critique of the colonial state as an agent 
perpetuating India’s social and economic backwardness (Chatterjee 1986). In 
the words of K. Santhanam, a south Indian assembly member, India needed a 
social revolution to get out ‘of the medievalism based on birth, religion, 
custom and community’ and towards a society based on ‘law, individual merit, 
and secular education’ along with an economic revolution to move from a 
‘primitive rural economy’ towards a ‘scientific and planned agriculture and 
industry’ (quoted in Austin 1972:20).  
Indian unity was understood as crucial to realising these far reaching 
objectives but the precise means of realising that unity was contested. During 
the constituent assembly debates, as during the anti-colonial struggle, the need 
for unity was often juxtaposed to the fissiparous tendencies of ethnic / 
communal pluralism and demands.177 There were, however, two antagonistic 
views on how ethnic pluralism ought to be reconciled within a unified Indian 
national whole. The first was the Hindu nationalist conception that was most 
forcefully expressed during the debates on the question of national language. 
Hindu nationalists sought to establish a Hindu conception of India by 
cementing the dominance of a Sanskritised version of Hindi that would lead to 
the linguistic, and therefore cultural, assimilation of Muslim Urdu speakers 
and the speakers of south Indian Dravidian languages.178 During the assembly 
debates, Hindu nationalists insisted on a Sanskritised version of Hindi, purged 
of Urdu references and the Arabic script (Singh 2005), whilst demanding that 
south Indians learn Hindi (Austin 1972:275). In contrast to this ethnically 
assimilationist project, the Congress leadership, along with most south Indian, 
Muslim and other ethnic minority members, advocated the idea of ‘unity in 
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diversity’ in which political relations between plural ethnic groups could be 
managed in a non – antagonistic manner.  
The ‘unity in diversity’ conception of the Indian nation as a pre political and 
organic whole that was nevertheless marked by great pluralism is best 
captured in Nehru’s autobiographical impressions of India. He noted that the 
‘diversity of India is tremendous’ and ‘obvious’ and pointed to the differences 
between the ‘Pathan of the North-West and the Tamil in the far south’; their 
‘racial stocks are not the same’ and the two differ in ‘figure, food and clothing 
and of course language.’ Despite these differences which had persisted for 
‘hundreds of years,’ Nehru argued that there had also been a unifying tendency, 
something ‘distinctively Indian, with the same national heritage and the same 
set of moral and mental qualities.’ He characterises this timeless unity as a 
striving for internal harmony rather than a homogenization of external 
manners and habits:  
‘Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of 
India since the dawn of civilization. That unity was not 
conceived as something imposed from outside, a 
standardization of externals or even of beliefs. It was 
something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance 
of belief and custom was practised and every variety 
acknowledged and even encouraged’ (1947:49). 
This ‘unity in diversity’ conception of Indian unity was the one that was 
eventually dominant in framing the Indian constitution. Although the 
constitution did contain some Hindu nationalist inflections, notably the 
inclusion of the Sanskrit term Bharat to describe India and an injunction on 
the state to work towards the prohibition of cow slaughter (Goswami 2004: 
Chapter 6; Singh; 2005), it also contained a large number of provisions that 
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formally recognised and entrenched the existence of religious, caste and 
linguistic diversity (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011: Chapter 2). It is these latter 
provisions that are invoked by Stepan, Linz and Yadav in describing the Indian 
polity as ‘robustly multinational’ in its institutional framework. Furthermore, 
these provisions have also resisted later Hindu nationalist attempts to overturn 
them. The measures through which the categories of caste, religion and 
language were recognised varied – and included a number of positive and 
negative rights – but all the measures were legitimised and mediated by the 
need to secure Indian unity and Indian interests in progress and development.  
One of the most contentious issues was the political representation of caste and 
religious groups. Soon after partition, the Constituent Assembly (CA) 
abandoned the colonial policy of separate electorates for religious groups on 
the basis that this undermined a unified national identity (Austin 1972:144-
155). It did, however, retain a form of special representation Dalits and tribal 
groups - known as Scheduled Castes and Tribes as they were listed in a 
schedule of the constitution. A number of constituencies were marked as 
reserved and in these only SC and ST candidates could be elected. Furthermore, 
SC and ST groups were also granted a reserved quota of spaces in public sector 
employment and higher education. Both these measures were initially adopted 
for a limited period of time as a means of ameliorating the ‘backward’ 
condition of these groups (Bayly 1999:Chapter Seven). While the political 
representation of religious groups was rejected as incompatible with national 
unity, the constitution nevertheless sought to protect and encourage the 
religious pluralism of Indian society. Not only was freedom of religion 
guaranteed as a fundamental right, public subsidies were also granted to 
religious activities, such as education and pilgrimage – including subsidies for 
the Muslim pilgrimage of Haj (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011:69). Religious 
freedom was not, however, sacrosanct and was instead circumscribed by the 
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imperative of social reform; Hindu religious freedom was circumscribed by 
laws explicitly prohibiting the practice of untouchability (2011:69) whilst 
Muslim religious freedom was circumscribed the state’s obligation to work 
towards the creation of a uniform code of civil law, one that would override 
separate Hindu and Muslim personal laws (Austin 1972:80). In making these 
incursions, the CA accepted that the ‘right freely to practice religion should 
not prevent the state from making laws providing for social welfare and 
reform’ (1972:64).  
The problem of reconciling linguistic diversity and national unity was also 
acutely contested within the CA and involved two separate issues. The first 
was the need to define a national or official language and the consequent 
problem of the political status afforded to the non-national and non-official 
languages. The second issue was that of the linguistic re-organisation of the 
India’s provincial boundaries. Both raised the possibility that India’s linguistic 
pluralism undermining the search for national unity. Questions of language 
again polarised debate between Hindu nationalists, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, those advocating a ‘unity in diversity’ conception of Indian 
identity.179 Hindu nationalists (within Congress) demanded official / national 
status for Sanskritised Hindi over and above the claims of English and the 
other Indian languages. Those advocating a ‘unity in diversity’ approach, 
including Nehru and most of the actors identified as crucial in the constitution 
making process, favoured a long term switch from English to Hindustani, 
understood very much as a composite of its Persian and Sanskrit roots. Nehru 
and most south Indian delegates also favoured the continued use of English as 
the state language and were unwilling to insist that south Indians learn 
Hindustani / Hindi to participate in the public life of the state. The eventual 
agreement on language was in keeping with the broad Congress doctrine of 
‘unity in diversity’; Hindi was ascribed the prosaic title of ‘official’ language in 
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place of the more emotively resonant ‘national’ status while English was also 
retained as a recognised official language, initially for a period of fifteen years 
until 1965 when the switch from English to Hindi for all official purposes was 
to be effected. The constitution also went on to list thirteen regional languages, 
including Tamil, which could be adopted by the state or provincial legislatures. 
According to Durgabi Deshmukh, who helped draft the language provisions, 
this was done for ‘psychological reasons and to give these languages status’; 
Nehru suggested that formally listing the languages in the constitution would 
ensure ‘their due place’ in the new India (quoted in Austin 1972:298). As 1965 
approached, conflict continued between Hindi advocates insisting on an 
immediate switch to Hindi and non Hindi speakers demanding the continued 
use of English. The conflict was eventually resolved, under Nehru’s leadership, 
by the passage of legislation in 1963 that mandated the continued use of 
English alongside Hindi for official purposes after 1965 (King, R.D 1999:131).  
The assembly also had to decide whether to undertake the linguistic 
reorganisation of provincial units along with the promulgation of the new 
constitution. Linguistic reorganisation had been a consistent part of the 
Congress platform since 1920 and Congress itself was organised on linguistic 
lines from that time. At independence there were also growing and insistent 
calls, especially from the Telugu speaking areas, for immediate 
reorganisation. 180  The linguistic reorganisation of provinces was initially 
promoted as a necessary element of democratic self governance and progress. 
The 1928 Nehru Report envisioned a system of linguistic provinces on the 
basis that language ‘corresponds with a special variety of culture, of traditions 
and literature’ and argued that in linguistic provinces ‘all these factors will 
help in the general progress of the province’ (King, R.D 1999:64) As 
independence approached, however, the Congress leadership increasingly 
began to see demands for immediate linguistic reorganisation as divisive; in a 
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December 1948 note Azad deplored ‘the demand for linguistic provinces and 
other particularistic tendencies’ (quoted in Austin 1972:239). In response to 
the insistence of assembly members demanding immediate linguistic 
reorganisation, two commissions were formed during the term of the 
Assembly to report on the issue and both, influenced by Nehru, advised against 
immediate linguistic reorganisation as inimical to the national interest (King, 
R.D 1999; Chapter Four). The first report submitted in December 1948, 
allegedly drafted by Nehru, found that linguistic reorganisation was ‘not in the 
larger interests of the Indian nation’ (quoted in Austin 1972:242), while the 
second commission, of which Nehru was a member, reported in April 1949 
that any reorganisation of provincial boundaries must be ‘subject to certain 
limitations in regard to the good of India as a whole’ (1972:242). The new 
constitution was adopted in January 1950 with the provincial boundaries of 
the colonial era largely in place and the process of linguistic reorganisation was 
only reluctantly initiated by Nehru in 1953 following mass protests in the 
Telugu speaking areas demanding the immediate creation of the Telugu 
speaking state of Andhra Pradesh with the city of Madras as its capital 
(Mitchell 2009). This movement triggered a more widespread process of 
linguistic reorganisation and the creation of new states across India (King, R.D 
1999:12) including the Tamil speaking state of Madras renamed Tamil Nadu in 
1967 (Ramaswamy 1997:157).  
Although linguistic reorganisation transformed the India into a union of 
largely linguistically defined states, federalism was not envisaged or indeed 
created as a mechanism for accommodating linguistic identities per se. The 
new constitution did organise Indian government along federal lines with 
power distributed between the central, union or national government in Delhi 
and provincial or state governments located in the various capitals of the 
component states of the union. However, this distribution of power was more 
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an outcome of the institutional history of the colonial state than an expression 
of federalism as a component of Indian national identity. While concepts such 
as democracy, progress, unity and socialism had been core components of 
Congress’ ideological development, federalism had not. In terms of national 
identity, the principle of unity was far more important in organising the 
constitution than the principle of federalism. In keeping with colonial 
administrative practices, power was centralised in the union government so 
that the federal autonomy of the state governments could easily be over-ridden; 
Ambedkar, chair of the drafting committee, described the constitution as 
avoiding the ‘tight mould of federalism’ and could be ‘both unitary as well as 
federal according to the requirements of the time and circumstances’ (quoted 
in Austin 1972:188). As such, control over the boundaries of the states rests 
entirely with the central government which acting through the President can 
redraw existing boundaries to create new states or merge existing states 
regardless of the linguistic principle. The constitution requires only that the 
President ascertain the views of the states concerned, rather than secure 
formal consent through majority votes in state legislatures. The federal 
provisions of the Constitution have therefore been less important in 
accommodating linguistic identities within a national whole than the notion of 
India’s linguistic diversity firmly embedded in Congress doctrine and 
expressed through the official and national language provisions of the 
Constitution.  
The overarching objective driving the framers of the Indian constitution was 
to create a strong and centralised unitary state that would secure Indian 
political unity and the drive for economic development.181 A central part of 
this process was the constitutional recognition of the Indian population as 
ethnically plural. This constitutional recognition was not, however, an act of 
shrewd statesmanship, wise moderation or enlightened policy making, but, 
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rather, an outcome of process; the long and temporally continuous process of 
anti-colonial nationalism that had established the Congress party as the 
dominant political force in India, the only institution capable of mobilising 
pan Indian un-coerced and co-ordinated political activity. This process created 
and established an ideology of Indian national identity and national interest in 
which the Indian population was conceived as a plural but ancient and 
historically unified people with a shared interest in realising a future of 
development and progress. The progress of the Indian people was moreover 
understood, as Koselleck would argue in world historic terms; Nehru, for 
example stated that Congress sought freedom as a ‘means to an end ... that end 
being the raising of the people ... to higher levels and hence the general 
advancement of humanity’ (quoted in Austin 1972:26). The political 
recognition of ethnic pluralism was in line with this vision of progressive 
development; religious groups were granted social and cultural rights, but not 
political recognition; SC and ST groups were granted political representation 
and positive discrimination quotas as a means of alleviating their 
‘backwardness’. Linguistic pluralism was acceptable in so far as it expressed 
India’s ‘composite culture’, but resisted if it expressed ‘divisive’ tendencies. 
Finally, this plural conception of Indian identity cannot easily be categorised 
as a civic form of national identity, one defined by allegiance to the state or a 
set of abstract political values. Instead, the metonyms and rhetoric of Indian 
nationhood invariably invoked the sense of an organic and ancient people-
hood. Indian nationalism was not therefore civic, in the sense of transcending 
ethnic pluralism, but rather inclusive of a range of ethnic identities that 
included a language based Tamil identity.  
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7.3 Tamil cultural nationalism and Tamil Nadu electoral 
politics 
Post-independence political developments in the Tamil speaking regions of 
south India are often characterised as the electoral defeat of Congress’ vision of 
pan Indian nationalism and its replacement with a specific form of regional or 
cultural national identity. In the two decades following independence, the 
Congress party gradually lost its electoral dominance in the Tamil speaking 
regions to the DMK, an ideological and organisational offshoot of the DK – an 
organisation that had open secessionist objectives and in the post 
independence period staged public burnings of the Indian flag and constitution 
as acts of iconoclastic protest. Although Congress won comfortable majorities 
in the three sets of elections following independence, in the 1967 elections it 
was defeated by a coalition of parties headed by the DMK. The DMK led 
coalition won the majority of seats in national elections and in the state 
assembly elections, pushing the Congress party into opposition in the Tamil 
speaking areas for the first time since 1935. After the 1967 elections the 
Congress’ electoral fortunes in the Tamil speaking areas went into permanent 
decline; it has subsequently never won a majority of seats in either the 
national or state assembly elections. Congress’ political position in the Tamil 
areas was further marginalised in 1972 when M. G. Ramachandran (or MGR as 
he is commonly known), a popular actor, left the DMK to form the ADMK. In 
1976 MGR added the prefix All India, to the ADMK as a gesture of explicitly 
accepting the pan Indian framework and identity, although the party remained 
a Tamil Nadu entity (Subramanian, N 1999:40). The DMK and AIADMK have 
subsequently become the two largest parties in the Tamil areas, acting as the 
major partners in the electoral coalitions contending in the state and national 
assembly elections. Congress, along with the Communists and other minor 
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regional parties, has been reduced to the position of minor alliance partner to 
either the DMK or the AIADMK.  
Explanations of the Dravidian movement’s ascendance have suggested that the 
DMK offered a more culturally resonant understanding of Tamil identity and 
interest than Congress’ vision of Tamils as a component of a pan Indian nation 
struggling for progress and development. In his study of Dravidian Politics, N. 
Subramanian characterises Nehruvian nation building as attempting to build a 
shared national identity on the basis of the strategy of economic development 
and industrialisation at the expense of a more cultural understanding of 
nationhood. When Nehruvian national building did attempt to characterise 
the state bearing nation in cultural terms it ‘drew on the syncretic Mughlai 
culture of the North Indian elite, with which few Tamils felt an affinity’ 
(1999:134). In contrast, Tamil or Dravidian ‘mytho – history’ was central to the 
DMK’s vision of Tamil identity as it presented itself as the vehicle of a Tamil 
plebeian class left out by Congress’ vision of economic development (1999:145). 
In an earlier study of south Indian Tamil politics, Margueritte Ross Barnett 
makes a similar argument equating Tamil cultural nationalism with the DMK:  
‘The founding of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam .. in 1949 
was a turning point in the political history of Tamil Nadu, 
south India, because it ushered in the era of Tamil cultural 
nationalism. Nationalism existed before 1949, but in nascent 
form, encompassed and overshadowed by other political 
themes. In the hands of the DMK, Tamil nationalism became an 
ideology of mass mobilisation, and has shaped the articulation 
of political demands for a generation’ (1976:3). 
David Washbrook adopts a similar explanation, suggesting that there existed a 
‘cultural gap, centuries wide, between Indian nationalism and the Dravidian 
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ideology.’ As a consequence, the Dravidian movement simply had ‘no means of 
comprehending policies and arguments geared to the development of a 
modern bourgeois nation state’ (1989:249). The timing of the DMK’s victory, 
just two years after an intense and widespread wave of protests across the 
Tamil speaking areas against the adoption of Hindi as India’s official language, 
adds to the impression of the DMK as representing a growing Tamil nationalist 
sentiment at odds with Congress’ pan-Indian vision of national identity. The 
DMK declared the 26th of January 1965, the date on which the Constitution 
sanctioned the switch from English to Hindi, as a day of mourning, and called 
on its supporters to raise black flags and engage in protest. The protests 
demonstrated widespread and intense hostility to the introduction of Hindi. 
Between the 26th of January and early February, five people self immolated in 
protest and two more poisoned themselves. Although the DMK leaders were 
placed in preventive detention to avoid unrest, the anti-Hindi agitations 
triggered violence and rioting that was comparable in scale and intensity to the 
1942 Quit India agitations. There were widespread attacks against public 
buildings, leading to confrontations between the police and protestors and 
police firing; according to the government, seventy people were killed while 
the DMK put the figure at one hundred and fifty (Ross-Barnett 1976:133). 
The apparent ideological divide between the DMK and Congress on the 
language issue was compounded by the fact that the latter was in government 
(in Tamil Nadu and in Delhi) at the time of the anti-Hindi protests while the 
DMK was the largest opposition party in Tamil Nadu. Although Congress 
leaders from Madras frequently expressed their preference for retaining 
English as the official language, along with Hindi, they were nevertheless 
associated with the national government’s language policy. The Congress Chief 
Minister at the time, M. Bhaktavatsalan, who refused to meet protestors and 
discuss their demands, was also prominently associated with the Dakshin 
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Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, the organisation founded by Gandhi to promote 
the learning of Hindi in the non-Hindi speaking areas (Subramanian, N 
1999:193). However, the appearance of an intense and passionate 
confrontation between the Congress led state government and the DMK on 
the language issue did not signal an irrevocable ideological gap. Rather than 
representing disparate and incompatible visions of Tamil identity and interest, 
the DMK and Congress can be interpreted as working within a shared set of 
ideological norms that could be accommodated within the constitutional 
framework of Indian national identity. The Congress and DMK ideologies, 
while distinct, overlapped in two important areas: the promotion of Tamil 
speakers’ interest in progress and development, and the encouragement of 
Tamil language and culture. 
The notion of progress and development shared by the DMK and Congress was 
broadly defined and included the need to promote economic growth and 
industrialisation of the Tamil speaking areas, abolish poverty and improve 
living conditions whilst also encouraging social change in line with egalitarian 
and liberal norms focussing in particular on the eradication of caste oppression 
and exclusion.182 For Congress, these commitments were encompassed in the 
term Socialism, which united a variety of groups and interests whose specific 
economic policies and priorities were often quite divergent (Austin 1972:41-3). 
Whilst the DMK never articulated an explicit position on industrialisation or 
economic growth that was comparable to its emphasis on protecting and 
promoting Tamil cultural interests, notions of progress and development were 
nevertheless implicit in its vision of Tamil identity and interests and 
particularly its criticisms of Congress rule. The DMK regularly asserted that 
the Congress party prioritised the economic development of north India whilst 
neglecting the south, and argued that the common Tamil man was excluded 
from the benefits of Congress’ developmental strategy (Subramanian, N 
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1999:143). Meanwhile, both parties committed themselves to abolishing the 
exclusions and hierarchies of caste and presented themselves as championing 
the interests of socially and economically marginalised lower caste groups.  
The two parties’ were also comparable in their approach to the promotion of 
Tamil language and culture in the public / political sphere. Following 
independence, the relationship between Tamil and Indian national identity 
was at stake in two language related issues: the linguistic reorganisation of 
India’s federal boundaries and the question of the official language. As 
discussed later, the Tamil Nadu Congress and Congress affiliated organisations 
were far more important than the Dravidian movement in the efforts to create 
a Tamil speaking state out of the polyglot Madras presidency. Congress leaders 
were crucial in efforts to ensure that Madras city remained within the Tamil 
speaking Madras state, rather than the Telugu speaking Andhra Pradesh, and 
were also important in other border disputes over areas claimed by more than 
one of the soon-to-be formed linguistic states. The Dravidian movement, at 
that stage committed to the idea of a pan-south Indian Dravidistan, remained 
aloof from these essentially intra-Dravidian disputes. While the DMK played 
an important role in the anti-Hindi agitations, Congress’ commitment to Hindi 
as the official language was not incompatible with the Tamil Nadu section 
promoting Tamil language and culture as appropriate emblems of India’s 
‘composite culture.’ The DMK’s efforts to promote the Tamil language as an 
emblem of a Dravidian heritage when it finally took power were not radical 
departures from Congress’ previous policies (Ramaswamy 1997:161-178).  
The electoral ascendance of parties associated with the Dravidian movement 
cannot therefore be interpreted as the displacement of the Congress vision of 
Tamil identity with a notion of Tamils as Dravidian. Rather the growth of the 
DMK has to be interpreted in the light of pan-Indian social and political 
factors that produced electoral defeats in 1967 for the Congress party across 
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India, including Tamil Nadu. The short term factor that produced these defeats 
was the acute food crisis that affected India from 1964 as a result of droughts 
and poor harvests. The food crisis led to acute shortages, spiralling prices and 
also compulsory requisitioning of grain from all farmers (Swamy 1998:115; 
Corbridge and Harriss 2000:67-73; Subramanian, N 1999:191-198). The DMK 
made the food crisis an important part of its electoral strategy; party activists 
regularly held protests outside ration shops and reducing the price of rice was a 
prominent part of the election manifesto (Subramanian, N 1999:193; Swamy 
1998:116). Congress’ electoral demise was a contingent outcome rather than an 
expression of a structural shift away from pan-Indian politics to Tamil cultural 
nationalism. In the 1967 elections the party’s share of the vote (41.4 percent) 
was slightly higher than that of the DMK (40.6 percent) and the DMK’s 
electoral victory was an outcome of the first past the post electoral system that 
translated the DMK’s lower vote share into a higher share of seats; the DMK 
won 59 percent of the seats while Congress was reduced to just 21 percent 
(Ross-Barnett 1976:149). The DMK’s electoral victory was therefore also 
crucially linked to shrewd electoral alliances that allowed for an efficient 
translation of votes into seats.  
The DMK’s success is also closely related to expanding political participation 
amongst the Indian population and particularly amongst groups variously 
labelled the intermediate or Backward Classes / Castes. Margueritte Ross 
Barnett identifies the DMK support base in class / caste terms as ‘the rising 
urban lower middle class, the educated unemployed youth, and the middling 
(film – going) farmer in the backward castes’ (1976:99-100). Narendra 
Subramanian characterises the groups who formed the DMK’s early support 
base as small shop keepers, small peasants, artisans and the new white collar 
worker all of ‘intermediate caste origin’. This newly important electoral 
demographic comprised a substantial component of the Tamil Nadu population; 
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in caste terms the BC’s account for 51 – 67 per cent of the state’s 
population ,whilst in class terms small property holders and white collar 
workers comprise 50 – 60 per cent of the population (Subramanian, N 
1999:139). In the decades since independence these groups have been granted 
affirmative action quotas similar to those granted to SC’s and ST’s; first at state 
level and then from the early 1990’s at the union level (Bayly 1999: Chapter 7). 
The caste groups eligible for these benefits are identified in official documents 
as in much political discussion as Other Backward Classes (OBC’s) (1999). The 
mobilisation of Backward Classes / Castes across south India from the 1940’s 
onwards prefigured their mobilisation across northern India during the 1980’s 
(Yadav 1997). 
The relative electoral successes and failures of Congress and the Dravidian 
parties within these changed political conditions can be analysed in terms of 
the three facets of successful political mobilisation: ideological articulation; co-
option and direct political evangelisation and conversion. In terms of the first 
two facets, the performance of Congress and the Dravidian parties were 
broadly comparable; Dravidian and Congress notions of Tamil identity and 
interest could be contained within the Indian constitutional frameworks while 
the DMK, AIDMK and Congress attempted to co-opt the support of actors, 
groups and institutions with established sources of power. The relative success 
of the Dravidian parties can be attributed to their more effective techniques of 
direct evangelization that included the use of the growing Tamil print media, 
cinema, street theatre and popular oratory. As a consequence, the Dravidian 
parties were more effective at presenting themselves to voters, particularly 
from OBC groups, as custodians of Tamil economic and cultural interests, even 
though Dravidian policies were not vastly different from those pursued by 
Congress. 
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7.4 Tamil identity and interests in Congress and Dravidian 
ideology 
The Dravidian ideology, as articulated by the DK, considers Tamil society to be 
linguistically, culturally and racially Dravidian, and therefore distinct from 
Hindu and Sanskrit speaking Aryan north India. Hinduism and the caste 
structure are deemed to have been forcibly imposed on an initially caste free 
Dravidian Tamil society by the invading north Indian Aryans who used the 
systems of caste to perpetuate their economic and cultural dominance over 
Tamils and other Dravidians. In this conception, Tamil society’s interests 
demanded the rejection of Hindu theology and ritual and the adoption of 
modern, rational and secular practices and norms, as well as improvements in 
the material wellbeing of economically oppressed Dravidians. Like the 
Congress party, the Dravidian movement also conceived of the state as an 
important agent of social and economic transformation. This was, however, 
deemed impossible in a Congress dominated India. The DK, particularly its 
chief ideologue EVR Ramaswamy, characterised Congress as a vehicle of north 
Indian, Brahmin interests and sought a separate independent state of 
Dravidistan in which a full programme of social reform could be pursued, 
unencumbered by the Hindu dominated Congress.  This radical social reform 
agenda was less interested in the promotion of Tamil culture and literature, 
than in removing the signs and symbols of Hindu and Brahmin domination. As 
such, the state and political realm was envisaged by the DK ideally as a space of 
rational, secular, progressive and scientific symbols and values.  
Despite the DK’s opposition to Congress rule, its conceptions of the state were 
not diametrically opposed to Congress doctrine and the constitutional 
understanding of Indian national identity. In both Congress and DK doctrines, 
the state was an agent of social transformation and the political realm ideally 
an arena of secular, rational, modern values (Chatterjee 1986: Chapter 5; 
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Pandian 1999). Where the DK and Congress differed was on the relationship 
between Hinduism and social reform; while the DK sought to eradicate Hindu 
symbols and practices from Tamil society, Congress commitments to social 
reform, including the reform of Hinduism, was balanced by the state’s 
responsibility to recognise and protect the plurality of existing norms and 
practices in Indian society. As a consequence of these overlaps, and despite the 
DK’s avowedly secessionist demands, it was not subjected to the same levels of 
repression as parties such as the National Conference in Kashmir or the Akali 
Dal in Punjab which were deemed secessionist by the Congress government.183  
The formation of the DMK produced a new conception of Tamil society, 
interest and identity that was less orientated towards social reform and more 
concerned with promoting Tamil culture as well as the interests of the OBC 
category. C. N Annadurai, one of Ramaswamy’s principal lieutenants, split 
with his former leader over ideological and organisational differences; the bulk 
of the DK membership left with him and joined the newly formed DMK. The 
DMK retained a conception of Tamil society as Dravidian, rather than Indian, 
but welcomed Indian independence as a step towards realising Tamil interests, 
and also saw electoral contest as a viable means of capturing political power. In 
contrast, EVR Ramaswamy observed Indian independence as a day of 
mourning and condemned electoral politics as a distraction from the more 
important work of social reform. The new party insisted on its ideological 
loyalty to the DK, and the Presidency of the Party was left symbolically vacant, 
to be occupied when he was chosen by Ramaswamy.184  
In its early years, the DMK’s activities complemented the DK’s emphasis on 
social transformation and the eradication of Hindu ritual and symbolism. 
During the 1950’s, for example, the DMK participated in DK protests over 
visible symbols of caste hierarchy, attacked polytheism and superstition and 
the party’ first election manifesto, produced for the 1957 polls, emphasised 
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social reform themes. However, during the 1960’s the emphasis of the party’s 
electoral campaigns shifted and it focussed on issues such as the supposed (see 
below) economic neglect of the south, measures to improve the welfare of the 
Tamil Nadu ‘common man’ and expanding reservations for the BC’s. The 
Dravidian political parties have since been associated with an expanding 
sphere of welfare provision. Successive DMK and ADMK governments have 
expanded the scope of reservations for OBC and SC/ST groups such that they 
now account for 50 per cent of all public sector employment and publicly 
controlled higher education institutions in the state (Subramanian, N 1999; 
291). Meanwhile, the AIADMK’s electoral success during the 1980s was 
closely associated with a series of high profile welfare measures, such as free 
midday meals for children, targeted at low income groups (Swamy 1998).  
Social reform issues were not completely abandoned; the DMK government 
did, for example, enact legislation to provide legal recognition for Self Respect 
marriages (Ross-Barnett 1976:269) and sought, unsuccessfully, to open up the 
Hindu priesthood to all castes (Dirks 2001:264). However, DMK leaders have 
distanced themselves from the DK’s trademark shrill iconoclasm; in 1971 
Muthuvel Karunanidhi, the then DMK chief minister, openly censured a DK 
campaign of publicly mocking and attacking Hindu deities and scriptures, 
saying the DMK government would not tolerate ‘anti God activities’ (Ross-
Barnett 1976:291). AIADMK leaders have gone even further and explicitly 
associated themselves with Hindu rites and rituals. In 1968 MG Ramachandran, 
whilst still in the DMK, organised special poojas (or ritual offerings) in Hindu 
temples across Tamil Nadu for the speedy recovery of C.N Annadurai when 
the latter fell ill (1976:273). When MG Ramachanran fell ill in 1984, 
Jayalalitha, the AIADMK second in command, organised similar poojas. 
Although Jayalalitha is a Brahmin and regularly engages in public acts of 
Hindu piety, this has not precluded her from assuming the role of a Dravidian 
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leader, revealing the shifting meanings and associations of the term Dravidian 
from its early twentieth century links to the non-Brahmin movement 
(Subramanian, N 1999:232).  
In abandoning social reform, the DMK and subsequently the ADMK have 
adopted and promoted Tamil culture, language and literature as emblems of 
Tamil identity and Tamil interest. This is a notable departure from the DK, and 
particularly Ramaswamy, who often denounced the Tamil language as 
‘barbaric’ and sought to modernise and liberate Tamil society, rather than 
return it to a more authentic cultural past (Pandian 1999). During the 1960’s 
the DMK prominently associated itself with the movement against Hindi as a 
means of burnishing its Tamil credentials; although as Margueritte Ross 
Barnett notes, the anti Hindi movement was a much wider coalition that the 
DMK actually struggled to control (1976:242-248). Once in power, the party 
sought to promote the Tamil language; it changed the official name of Madras 
to Tamil Nadu, adopted a new flag and also instituted a song in praise of the 
Tamil language to open state assembly sessions - rather than the customary 
prayer (Ramaswamy 1997:157, 161-178; Subramanian, N 1999:222). In 
February 1968 it hosted the international Tamil studies conference in Chennai 
attended by scholars from around the world and used the event to present 
itself as custodian and advocate of the Tamil cultural and literary heritage 
(Subramanian, N 1999:222). In 1970 the party introduced proposals to make 
Tamil, rather than English, the language of instruction at secondary and 
tertiary levels but withdrew the proposals after protests from students (Ross 
Barnett 1976; 248-9). 
Although the DMK’s association with Tamil language and popular culture 
along with its advocacy of Tamil economic interests, particularly those of the 
intermediate social groups, were important in its electoral rise, these factors 
did not serve to radically distinguish the Dravidian parties from Congress. On 
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the promotion of a specifically Tamil political and cultural interest, on welfare 
measures and promotion of OBC interests and on promoting the economic 
development of the Tamil speaking areas, Congress’ record was comparable to 
that of the Dravidian parties. While the Dravidian movement was closely 
associated with the anti Hindi protests, Congress leaders and Congress linked 
activists played an active role in the move to create a Tamil speaking linguistic 
state. In the years following independence there was growing momentum 
across India for the immediate linguistic re-organisation of state boundaries. 
One of the most developed was the Andhra movement (1920’s-1952) which 
sought to create a Telugu speaking state out of the polylot Madras presidency. 
The Andra movement’s insistence that Madras city be incorporated into a new 
Telugu speaking state was actively resisted by Tamil activists, including 
prominent Tamil speaking Congressmen (Mitchell 1999; King, R.D 1999). 
Along with the tussle over the status of Madras city, the movement towards 
linguistic re-organisation also led to disputes over other ‘border’ areas that 
were linguistically divided between Tamil and Telugu or Tamil and Malayalam 
speakers (Rengaswamy 2006). 
Nehru reluctantly agreed to linguistic re-organisation in December 1952, 
following the death of an Andhra activist who had undertaken a protest fast 
insisting both on the creation of a Telugu speaking state and the incorporation 
of Madras city as the capital of the new state (King, R.D 1999:114). The wider 
process of linguistic re-organisation opened up a series of disputes not just on 
the Tamil / Telugu border but also on the Tamil / Malayalam border. The DMK 
and the DK were absent from these protests and campaigns as they continued 
to work within a pan–south Indian Dravidian framework. In the absence of 
the DMK, an important role was played by Congress figures as well as 
organisations and activists with close affiliations to the Tamil Nadu Congress. 
The linguistic boundaries of the southern states was finally agreed in 
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September 1955 but until that point there were constant protest marches and 
meetings on the political status of the ‘border areas’. These campaigns were led 
by the Tamil Arasu Kazhagam (TAK), an organisation that had close 
affiliations with Congress (Rengaswamy 2006; INT 01; INT 02). 
In January 1946, when the TAK organised a public celebration of the Tamil 
harvest or Pongal Festival in Madras to reinforce the Tamil claim on Madras 
city,185 both Kamraj Nadar and Chakravarti Rajagopalachariar attended, despite 
their then factional differences.186 Soon after independence, the TAK launched 
a campaign to retain the northern districts that bordered the Telugu speaking 
areas within a Tamil speaking state The TAK also worked with the Travencore 
Tamil Congress, when the latter initiated protests in 1954 demanding the 
merger of the Tamil speaking areas of that state with Tamil Nadu. The status of 
Madras city was finally decided by Rajagopalachariar, the then Congress Chief 
Minister, and the DMK was largely absent from the Tamil campaign, although 
the city later became a DMK electoral stronghold. As both Tamil and Telugu 
Congressmen were equally insistent in their respective claims, a commission 
was formed to adjudicate. Before the Commission could formally announce its 
results, however, Rajagopalachariar forced Nehru’s hand by threatening to 
resign unless Madras city was retained as the sole capital of the Tamil speaking 
Madras state. Nehru relented, and in October 1953 announced the formation 
of Andhra Pradesh, excluding Madras city. 187  
The Tamil Nadu Congress party and affiliated figures were also closely 
associated with campaigns and protests to promote and cultivate the Tamil 
language in the public sphere. Following the process of linguistic re-
organisation, the Tamil Nadu Congress adopted Tamil as the official language 
of the state (Ramaswamy 1997:161). Tamil Nadu Congress leaders also 
consistently demanded the continuation of English alongside Hindi as the 
official language at the Union level (Ross-Barnett 1976:134)(Subramanian, N 
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1999:193), and Rajagopalachariar, after leaving the Congress party in 1958, 
played a prominent role in the anti-Hindi protests of 1965 and 1967 
(Subramanian, N 1999:198-9). Moreover, the initiative and planning for the 
1968 World Tamil Studies Conference hosted with great pomp by the DMK 
government actually began under the previous Congress administration. The 
public promotion of Tamil literary heritage even extended to the 
ADMK/AIADMK, which was more explicit in its acceptance of a pan-Indian 
identity. In 1984 the then AIADMK government again hosted the World 
Tamil Studies Conference amidst great fanfare with party founder and Chief 
Minister MG Ramachandran playing a visible and prominent role (1999:301). 
Arguably, during the 1950’s, Congress had a much stronger record of 
promoting and protecting Tamil cultural and political interests than the DMK 
and DK which were still closely linked to the protection and promotion of 
Dravidian interests in radical social reform. 
Congress could also plausibly present itself as promoting and protecting Tamil 
economic interests. Contrary to the DMK’s criticisms of northern prosperity 
and southern neglect, during the period of Congress dominance Tamil Nadu 
experienced higher than average rates of economic growth and industrial 
development. The state became one of the most urbanised in India, had high 
levels of literacy and started to bring down population growth to replacement 
levels. Tamil Nadu’s high levels of economic growth and investment during 
this period reflected the state level Congress leadership’s success in bargaining 
for resources from the central government and party hierarchy (Spratt 
1969:51-60; Kumaradoss 2004). The regime of planned economic development 
implemented through the five year plans that started from 1951 was meant to 
direct economic and industrial investment through nationally orientated 
priorities. In reality, however, the process of national planning became a 
national framework of bargaining through which powerful state level Congress 
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leaders fought over economic resources that could be used to maintain support 
bases and patronage networks within their respective states. Tamil Nadu’s 
success in securing resources was related to the power of Kamraj Nadar, the 
Tamil Nadu Congress President from 1946 to 1952 and Chief Minister between 
1954 and 1964, in the national level Congress organisation. Kamraj was known 
to be close to Nehru and was an important figure in the group of state Congress 
leaders, known as the syndicate, who controlled the Congress organisational 
machine at the regional level (Kumaradoss 2004). Tamil Nadu’s economic 
performance during this period reflected therefore a relatively powerful 
position within the national Congress structure, rather than a position of 
marginality as claimed by the DMK.  
Finally, Congress could also make credible claims to be challenging caste 
hierarchy and exclusion whilst promoting the welfare of under-privileged 
groups. Kamraj Nadar came from a relatively humble background and had 
worked his way up through the Tamil Nadu Congress structure. Although 
Kamraj’s immediate family had been small traders, the Nadars traditionally 
were engaged in the relatively low status occupation of toddy tapping and 
were included within the BC category (Hardgrave 1969). During his tenure as 
Chief Minister, Kamraj launched a midday meal scheme as a welfare measure 
and also built over 12,000 schools in rural areas; school attendance between 
the ages of 6 and 11 increased from 45 to 75 percent in the seven years after he 
became Chief Minister in 1954 (Kumaradoss 2004). Both Kamraj, and his 
predecessor as Congress Chief Minister, CN Rajagopalachariar, included in 
their Cabinets ministers from both Backward and Scheduled caste groups 
(Subramanian, N 1999:219). Kamraj explicitly committed the Tamil Nadu 
government to promoting the interests of the SC’s and in 1951 Madras became 
one of the first state governments in post-independence India to introduce 
reservations for BCs in education and public sector employment. Congress 
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introduced a quota of 25 percent for BC groups - later expanded by a DMK 
government to 31 per cent and then by a ADMK government to 50 per cent 
(150, 290-1). 
Electoral competition between Congress and the DMK was not, therefore, a 
conflict between two competing visions of Tamil identity and interest; rather 
it took place within a shared political culture in which the promotion of Tamil 
political, cultural and economic interests were unquestioned norms. The DMK 
quietly abandoned the link between Tamil identity and the rejection of 
Hinduism once central to DK ideology, and, like the Congress party, linked 
Tamil identity to language and literature. Congress and the Dravidian parties 
also defined Tamil economic interests via similar types of policies: 
infrastructure and industrial investment in the Tamil speaking areas, as well as 
the provision of special economic benefits to SC and BC groups. While 
Congress sought political legitimacy from the large scale infrastructure and 
industrial projects that were implemented in the Nehruvian period, the DMK 
also associated itself with Tamil interests in progress and development. While 
in opposition the DMK criticized Congress policies for the apparent industrial 
underdevelopment of the south in relation to areas such as Bombay and 
Allahabad - the central government’s failure to provide investment for a steel 
plant in Salem was an important part of the DMK’s 1967 electoral campaign. 
When the DMK came to power, it adopted a high profile policy of slum 
clearance and urban housing provision that was promoted as an indicator of 
development. Finally, successive Congress and Dravidian governments 
mandated the provision of educational and employment quotas as special 
measures to overcome the effects of caste hierarchy and exclusion on SC and 
BC groups. 
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7.5 Ideology and Congress decline in Tamil Nadu 
The electoral demise of the Congress party in Tamil Nadu was not therefore 
the result of a radical ideological conflict and is better explained as the 
outcome of contingent factors working alongside the more effective strategies 
of mobilisation deployed by the Dravidian parties. Congress’ electoral 
hegemony between 1937 and 1967 rested on the co-option of powerful groups 
and the distribution of patronage through networks that brought together 
landlords, industrialists, business people, bureaucrats and their dependents into 
a relatively stable coalition (Corbridge and Harriss 2000:50). During the 1960’s 
this system of electoral dominance was undermined by a series of economic 
problems and a split within the Congress party. As a result of these manifold 
crises, Congress’ 1967 defeat in Tamil Nadu was mirrored in electoral reversals 
across India; the party’s vote at the national level fell by 5 percent (Chatterjee 
1997:15) and it failed to gain a majority in eight other states in which a variety 
of coalition non-Congress governments came to power.188 
The electoral success of the Dravidian parties was also associated with 
expanding political participation in Tamil Nadu, particularly amongst the 
backward or intermediate classes, a development that prefigured similar 
changes across northern India during the 1980’s (Yadav 1997). The entry of 
these groups into politics was signalled by the growing use of the vernacular 
media, popular mobilisation around linguistic identities and demands for 
positive discrimination policies tailored to BC groups in employment and 
education. This new political culture was described by Selig Harrison as the 
‘pulp culture of popular writers who will address themselves to the swelling 
millions of new literates in the regional languages’ (quoted in Corbridge and 
Harriss 2000:53) The relative success and failure of Congress and Dravidian 
parties in the context of these pan Indian contingent and structural factors can 
best be explained in relation to the three facets of  successful political 
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mobilisation; ideological articulation; co-option of powerful groups and 
individuals and direct political evangelization. 
As discussed above, there was an enormous amount of ideological overlap 
between Congress and the Dravidian parties. This was evident not only in the 
remarkably similar policies they pursued when in power and advocated when 
in opposition, it could also be seen in the political alliances that brought 
together actors across the Congress / Dravidian organisational divide.189 There 
was, for example, a longstanding personal friendship between Ramaswamy and 
Rajagopalachariar that from 1959 also produced a political alliance on 
opposition to Hindi as the official language. Meanwhile, between 1954 and 
1963, Ramaswamy and the DK officially supported Kamraj and the Congress 
party with DK activists actively canvassing for Congress party candidates. The 
differences between Congress and the Dravidian parties can best be explained 
therefore in relation to their relative effectiveness in co-opting individuals and 
groups and mobilising support through direct political evangelization. An 
analysis of Tamil Nadu electoral dynamics in terms of these two factors 
suggests that Congress decline and Dravidian ascendance was the result of 
successful Dravidian mobilisation compounded by contingent factors that 
fatally hampered Congress’ revival in the Tamil areas.  
The DMK’s electoral rise in the post independence decades was associated with 
a steady expansion in electoral participation, particularly amongst intermediate 
or backward caste groups that were largely outside the Congress’ networks of 
support. The expanding political participation of this intermediate class / 
backward caste cluster significantly changed the electoral dynamics of the 
Tamil speaking areas. There was a substantial expansion of voter participation 
from 49.3 per cent in 1957 to 76.6 per cent in 1967 and simultaneously the 
proportion of votes gained by independent candidates, who invariably relied 
on networks of personal loyalty and deference, declined (from 24.7 to 6.6 per 
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cent) in the same period. In the context of these changing dynamics, while 
Congress’ electoral support remained steady, from 45.3 per cent of the popular 
vote in 1957 to 41.4 per cent in 1967, the DMK’s support expanded from 12.8 
to 40.6 per cent in the same period (Ross-Barnett 1976:141). In effect, the 
DMK expanded its vote in part by attracting Congress supporters but also by 
increasing voter turnout (1976:140). The Congress network, excessively 
dependent on aggregating the support and dependent networks of notables and 
magnates, did not accommodate these newly emergent groups. In contrast, the 
DMK built support amongst those of ‘less wealth and status,’ (Subramanian, N 
1999:147, 172-4) engaged in voter registration drives (1999:171) and pursued 
an electoral strategy that had a strong element of direct political mobilisation:  
‘The DMK attempted to win support by aiming appeals at 
castes and classes not already politicized by Congress; by 
trying direct rather than indirect methods of mobilization in 
order to erode that portion of the Congress vote based on 
social deference; and by penetrating new regions and rural 
areas that the Dravidian movement had not as yet thoroughly 
organised’ (Ross-Barnett 1976:138). 
The DMK communicated directly with this newly enfranchised group through 
a variety of media and cultural forms. The party had close associations with the 
film industry; C.N Annaduria and M. Karunanidhhi190 were script writers for 
plays and films and many of the major figures of the 1950’s cinema were 
associated with the DMK. M.G Ramachandran, who went onto become ‘the 
most popular film star and public figure of modern Tamil Nadu’, joined the 
DMK in 1953 and starred in a number of films scripted by Karunanidhi that 
contained several allusions to the DMK and the Dravidian movement 
(Subramanian, N 1999:164). Along with cinema, in its early years of expansion, 
the DMK also used street performances to reach the illiterate and semi literate 
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majority with even the major leaders ‘wearing the players’ makeup’ 
(1999:145).DMK leaders also popularised their messages through numerous 
magazines and newspapers that were not just intended for private reading but 
were also discussed and circulated at street corner meetings and the ‘talk shops’ 
that were central to the DMK’s early growth. The social base of the DMK’s 
expansion facilitated this type of mobilisation:  
‘The shops of some early activists served as the party’s primary 
recruiting grounds, where Dravidianist journals were 
available, people congregated to gossip and discuss social 
issues, and the latest statements and directives of party leaders 
were made known’ (Subramanian N 1999:162).  
Although the Congress movement used a variety of popular and high cultural 
forms to communicate its message from the 1930’s, by the 1950’s the party had 
lost most of its links with the film industry and the print media. This was 
partly due to the death S. Satyamurthy in 1943, the key figure who forged the 
links between the Congress movement and the Tamil popular theatre and 
early cinema industry during the early part of the twentieth century (Baskaran 
1981). His successor, K. Kamraj, was less enamoured of actors and musicians 
(INT 01), and as a consequence Congress also failed to cultivate its association 
with Sivaji Ganeshan, a popular actor of the 1950’s and 1960’s, to the extent 
that the DMK cultivated the film image of MGR (Subramanian, N 1999:165).  
However, the DMK’s electoral growth and dominance was not entirely built 
on a strategy of direct mobilisation. As the party expanded, not only did it seek 
alliances with sources of existing power, it also became a route to power and 
influence. As Narendra Sumbramanian suggests, as the DMK grew it attracted 
more substantial merchants and landlords to augment its base of small property 
holders, and all those who joined the party ‘gained greater social eminence 
246 
 
through their role in the DMK’s social networks’ (1999:174). Once the party 
was in power, like the previous Congress administration, it used its control 
over public resources to build support by co-opting local notables, magnates 
and their dependents (1999:209). The continuing importance of strategies of 
co-option in the DMK’s, and also the ADMK’s, success suggests that the 
expansion of political participation and the more widespread use of direct 
political communication associated with the Dravidian movement did not 
produce a wholesale transformation in the political economy of electoral 
competition. As with the previous Congress system, the distribution of 
patronage through local notables remained an important element of party 
building during the period of Dravidian dominance. Finally, the DMK’s 
adeptness at forming electoral coalitions with other political parties was also 
consequential. The DMK first adopted this tactic in a systematic way in 1962 
but it has subsequently become an entrenched feature of the Tamil Nadu, and 
now national, electoral campaigns. The electoral coalitions take the form of 
seat sharing alliances which, given India’s simple majority electoral system, 
works to minimise electoral competition and therefore the fragmentation of 
votes within a particular constituency. From the late 1970’s the electoral 
dominance of the two Dravidian parties has reduced Congress - and the 
Communists - to the role of minor alliance partners in DMK or ADMK led 
electoral coalitions. 
Although Congress’ relative ineffectiveness in direct political mobilization was 
an important element in the Dravidian parties’ electoral dominance, Congress’ 
electoral demise was far from inevitable, and cannot be predicted from the 
sheer force of Dravidian ideology for the newly politicised intermediate classes. 
Not only was Congress’ share of the vote in 1967 (41.4 per cent) slightly higher 
than that of the DMK led coalition (40.6 per cent), Congress’ support also 
remained steady at about 30 per cent during the 1970’s. Congress’ electoral 
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demise must therefore be seen against contingent and structural pan Indian 
factors that hampered the party’s electoral revival during the 1970’s. This 
included a series of poor harvests that led to nationwide food shortages and 
prompted an unpopular system of grain requisitioning. The general malaise 
caused by food shortages was compounded by a wider economic crisis that 
produced a breakdown of the system of five year plans inaugurated in 1951 
and forced a devaluation of the rupee in 1969 (Corbridge and Harriss 2000:67-
8). In Tamil Nadu this led to a down turn in industrial output that preceded a 
similar downturn across India. Although the DMK led coalition successfully 
capitalised on the manifold discontents produced by the economic and food 
crisis, Congress might have recovered power in Tamil Nadu had it not been for 
the national split in 1969 and a series of factors that hampered Congress’ 
ability to mobilise growing opposition to DMK rule in the early 1970’s. 
The Congress party split in 1969 following a series of disagreements between 
Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister, and a powerful group of regional Congress 
leaders, including Kamraj, the aforementioned syndicate (1999:72-3).  The 
Congress (R) faction led by Indira Gandhi retained the support of most 
Congress parliamentarians, but the Congress (O), or Organisation faction, led 
by the state level party bosses, including Kamraj, retained the most of the 
organisational assets (Subramanian, N 1999:237-243). In particular, while some 
Tamil Nadu Congress parliamentarians joined Congress (R), the bulk of the 
Tamil Nadu Congress party remained within the Congress (O) structure. Thus, 
the split in the national Congress organisation in 1969 for the first time created 
a division between the national and state level Congress organisations. In 1971 
Congress (R), which had little organisational presence in the Tamil areas, 
formed a seat sharing alliance with the DMK for the state and parliamentary 
assembly elections. Under the agreement the Congress (R) refrained from 
competing in the state assembly elections in exchange for a proportion of 
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Tamil Nadu seats in the national elections. Meanwhile, the Congress (O) 
formed an alliance with other smaller Tamil Nadu parties and competed in 
both state and parliamentary elections against the DMK alliance, which 
included the Congress (R). These strategies arguably worked to divide the 
Congress vote in the parliamentary elections and prevented Congress from 
capitalising on Indira Gandhi’s growing popularity in the state assembly 
elections. From the early 1970’s, until his death in 1974, Kamraj attempted to 
bring about a reconciliation of the two factions but was opposed by other 
Congress (O) leaders at the national level. In 1977, following the end of the 
emergency, the Congress (O) joined the national Janata Coalition and from 
that point Congress in Tamil Nadu more or less disintegrated into a set of 
factions that competed for the national leadership’s attention and favour.  
Another factor that compounded Congress’ ability to recover was the 
emergence of the ADMK in 1972. The ADMK’s popularity was assured by the 
star appeal of its leader, MG Ramachandran, whose films communicated a 
message of benevolent paternalism to groups such as the scheduled castes, 
women and the rural and urban poor who were largely excluded from the 
DMK’s base of small property holders and white collar workers. The ADMK 
proved its appeal in a series of spectacular electoral victories following its 
formation, in some places forcing the DMK into third place behind Congress 
(Ross-Barnett 1976; 298). Congress’ strong electoral showing in elections after 
1972 suggests the party’s fate in Tamil Nadu was finally sealed as a 
consequence of national political alignments, rather than an ideological sea 
change in Tamil Nadu politics. The importance of contingent rather than 
structural factors is further underlined by suggestions that following the split 
with the DMK, MGR had initially thought of joining the Congress (O) – he 
was dissuaded by Kamraj’s well known aversion to film stars and the presence 
of the rival actor, Sivaji Ganeshan, within the Congress organisation (INT 01; 
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INT 06). Thus, it is possible that if MGR had joined the Congress (O), electoral 
politics in Tamil Nadu might have taken an entirely different course.  
7.6 Tamil Nadu politics and the Pan-Indian framework 
The shared framework of Tamil cultural nationalism that structured electoral 
competition in Tamil Nadu was compatible with the Indian constitution. The 
peaceable accommodation of the Dravidian parties was therefore not a matter 
of the moderate choices of its leaders, or the moderate preferences of its 
followers, but rather the DMK’s decision to switch from an agenda of 
Dravidian social reform to one of Tamil cultural nationalism. The Dravidian 
agenda of radical social reform jarred with the constitutional understanding of 
Indian society and interest in two key areas. Firstly, its insistence on a 
thoroughgoing purge of Hindu symbol and ritual from Tamil society sat 
uncomfortably alongside constitutional protections of religious practice in 
social life. Secondly, its demand for a separate Dravida Nadu transgressed the 
demand for unity that was central to the constitutional construction of Indian 
national interest. In moving away from the DK’s radical social reform agenda, 
the DMK adopted a position on Hindu social reform closer to the 
constitutional position that sought to balance the interests of progress and 
development with the protection of religious rights in the private sphere. 
However, the DMK’s decision to abandon Dravida Nadu was not an act of 
political moderation, but coeval with its decision to shift away from radical 
social reform as the key marker of Tamil collective identity and interest. In the 
DK’s ideology, the demand for Dravida Nadu was always tied to the imperative 
of social reform: the Indian state dominated by north Indian Hindu interests 
would be an obstacle to radical social reform which could only be achieved in 
a separate state. Conversely, the DK’s insistence on social reform led to its 
ambivalence on the creation of a Tamil linguistic federal state; a state that 
would not address the fundamental issue of Hindu / Brahmin dominance.  
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The call for a separate Dravida Nadu was central to the DMK’s 1957 election 
manifesto, but by the early 1960’s DMK leaders had privately decided to 
abandon the separatist demand (Ross-Barnett 1976:109-110); a decision made 
public in 1963 following India’s border war with China and the promulgation 
of central government regulations that penalised parties suspected of separatist 
tendencies (1976:127). Since abandoning Dravida Nadu the DMK has sought 
greater state autonomy for Tamil Nadu within the Indian union; a demand that 
brought the DMK into ideological alliance with organisations like the TAK 
that explicitly combined the demand for a Tamil state with a commitment to 
preserving Indian unity and territorial integrity (Rengaswamy 2006).  
An examination of the TAK’s position on Dravidian ideology demonstrates the 
important ideological differences underlying the demand for Tamil Nadu as 
opposed to Dravida Nadu, and also helps explain the significance of the DMK’s 
shift from Dravida Nadu to Tamil Nadu. The TAK sought a Tamil Arasu, or 
Tamil state, within the Indian union in order to better promote ‘Tamil 
language and literature in every field of human activity’ and encourage the 
‘development of the art and culture of the Tamils.’ In this vision, Tamil society 
was identified through language and culture, rather than caste and the reform 
of caste, and the TAK disavowed the Brahmin / Non Brahmin conflict as 
‘communal’ declaring that ‘all those who spoke Tamil as their mother tongue 
and considered Tamil Nadu as their mother land would be treated as Tamils’ 
(Rengaswamy:64-7). The TAK, whilst insisting on Tamil Nadu, opposed the 
demand for Dravida Nadu and participated in the anti-Dravida Nadu 
movement in collaboration with Congress and the Communists. In shifting 
from Dravida Nadu to Tamil Nadu, the DMK was therefore adopting an 
acceptable and therefore non-communal form of cultural nationalism over its 
previous radical, unconstitutional and therefore ‘communal’ commitment to 
social reform. The DMK has intermittently reiterated its commitment to 
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greater state autonomy; however autonomy is now sought for a Tamil speaking 
state and justified as necessary to facilitate better governance and greater 
fostering of Tamil in the public / political realm rather than to expedite social 
reform. 
The Dravidian movement’s drift towards a purely cultural understanding of 
Tamil identity and explicit identification with the Indian union can be said to 
have reached an apotheosis when in 1976 the ADMK officially changed its 
name to the All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in an effort to signal an 
explicit acceptance of the Indian constitutional framework. The ideological 
inconsistency between the all India framework and the Dravidian ideology, as 
articulated by EVR and the DK, is less important than the fact that one of the 
two largest parties in Tamil Nadu, at the moment of its ascending popularity, 
explicitly identified its commitment to the all India framework. The ADMK 
also disavowed the search for greater state autonomy (Subramanian, N 
1999:301), but this has not signalled a departure from the norm of promoting 
Tamil language / literature in the public political sphere; not only did MGR 
visibly identify himself with specifically Tamil causes and issues such as the 
1984 World Tamil Conference, the AIDMK has also joined other Tamil 
nationalist parties and associations in opposing moves to enforce greater use of 
Hindi in place of English at the national level. As N. Subramanian notes, the 
‘ADMK joined the Tamil nationalist chorus on such occasions, even pre-
empting it at times’ (1999:300). 
The ideological accommodation of Tamil identity within the Indian 
constitutional framework has also produced the political integration of the 
Tamil areas within pan-Indian networks and alliances. Kamraj and 
Rajagopalachariar, powerful figures in the Tamil Nadu Congress, were also 
prominent figures in national Congress structures. Rajagopalachariar had been 
one of Gandhi’s close allies and held the post of Governor General of India 
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between 1948 and 1952. In 1958 he left the Congress party to become an 
important leader in the Swatantra, an all-India party representing landed and 
commercial interests. Meanwhile Kamraj was an important figure in the 
‘syndicate’ of powerful Chief Ministers who controlled the Congress 
organisation and was known to be close to Nehru. Indeed in 1962 Nehru 
unveiled a statue of Kamraj in Madras city (Spratt 1970:77). Following 
Congress’ disappointing performance in the 1962 national and state assembly 
elections, Kamraj negotiated an agreement through which a number of 
Congress chief ministers would resign and work to revitalise the party 
machine, the so called Kamraj plan. As part of the plan, Kamraj himself 
resigned as Chief Minister of Madras and was elected Congress Party president. 
Following Nehru’s death in 1964, Kamraj played an important role in the 
negotiations that led to the choice of Lal Bhahadur Shastri as Prime Minister. 
Kamraj’s support was again influential in the choice of Indira Gandhi as Prime 
Minister following Prime Minister Shastri’s unexpected death in 1966 
(Chatterjee 1997). 
The 1969 split in Congress and the division between the Indira Gandhi led 
Congress (R) faction and the Kamraj led Congress (O) faction did not disrupt 
the integration of Tamil Nadu and national level politics. The Dravidian parties 
sought alliances with the Congress (R) in an effort to displace the Congress (O), 
as well as each other, at the state level. The DMK entered into a seat sharing 
alliance with Congress (R) for the 1971 national and state assembly elections 
but in 1974 Indira Gandhi dismissed the DMK government because of 
lobbying by the ADMK (Forrester 1976). The ADMK and the Congress (R) 
then entered into an alliance for the 1977 elections. Despite their regionally 
focussed ideology and organisational structures, the Dravidian parties have 
since become key actors in pan-Indian coalition politics and have thereby 
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retained the linkages between Tamil and pan-Indian politics that were present 
during the period of Congress dominance in Tamil Nadu. 
7.7 Conclusion 
In 1976, just as the ADMK was embracing the All India prefix, the main Sri 
Lankan Tamil party, the Federal Party, was abandoning its then almost three 
decade old demand for federalism in favour of outright independence or 
secession. This chapter has argued that the ADMK’s decision, and the wider 
incorporation of the Dravidian movement into the all-India framework, 
cannot be understood in terms of the relative moderation of its leaders or 
followers. Rather the peaceable accommodation of the separatist Dravidian 
movement is a consequence of the overlaps between Dravidian and Indian 
nationalist conceptions of Tamil identity and interest which meant that the 
Dravidian parties and Congress could engage in agonistic rather than 
antagonistic political competition. The Dravidian parties and the Congress in 
Tamil Nadu competed within a political culture in which promoting the Tamil 
language and culture, as well as securing Tamil interests in economic 
development, social reform and welfare provision, were accepted as norms. 
Furthermore, these shared norms were compatible with the constitutional 
definition of Indian national identity and national interest that had evolved 
through Congress’ political struggle to establish a pan ethnic platform 
beginning in the late nineteenth century.  
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8. National Politics and Ethnic Conflict in Post 
Independence Sri Lanka 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter Seven argued that the political contestation between the Dravidian 
movement and the Congress in Tamil Nadu was framed by large overlaps in 
their competing understandings of Tamil identity and Tamil interest. In 
contrast, in Sri Lanka, political contestation from independence to 1977 
consolidated two mutually incompatible Tamil and Sinhala conceptions of 
national identity and national interest, leading to a violently escalating ethnic 
conflict. The results of the 1977 general elections crystallised this opposition. 
The UNP won a landslide victory (140 out of 168 seats) but its conception of 
the 'national' had by this stage become explicitly Sinhala and Buddhist. 191 In 
the North-eastern Tamil speaking areas, the Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF) - a coalition of Tamil parties that stood on a platform of seeking an 
independent state (Tamil Eelam) - won 17 out of the 19 seats 192  with Sri 
Lankan Tamil majorities,193 and, as a consequence of the fragmentation of the 
opposition Sinhala parties, became the official opposition party. The UNP – 
along with the other major Sinhala parties - worked within an ethnically 
hierarchical conception of national identity and national interest in which the 
state was seen as rightfully an instrument of and for the preservation of Sinhala 
Buddhist identity and interests.194 In the post independence period, Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalist mobilisation and political action was increasingly directed 
in opposition to the Tamils, seen to pose a social, economic, political and even 
demographic threat to the Sinhalese (Smith 1979; Bose 1994; Krishna 2000). 
The result of these processes was that by the late 1970’s Sri Lanka had 
‘regressed into an illiberal, ethnocentric regime bent on Sinhalese super-
ordination and Tamil subjugation’ (De Votta 2004:6).  
255 
 
Quite apart from producing a stable ethnic hierarchy, the steady consolidation 
of this Sinhala first order produced an enduring orientation of Tamil politics 
around the demand for Tamil-Sinhala collective political equality. Tamil 
political actors sought a variety of means to give form to this this political 
equality – initially balanced representation, then federal autonomy and, by the 
mid 1970’s, political secession. Sri Lanka’s post-independence constitution was 
unitary and centralised, with all effective power concentrated in the 
parliamentary government in Colombo. This was effectively the same 
structure created by the 1833 Colebrooke-Cameron reforms (see Chapter 2). In 
the colonial period, leading Sinhala politicians had often advocated alternatives 
to this, including federalism, greater devolution to local government (SWRD 
Bandaranaike) and even federation with India (JR Jayawardene). However, as 
Tamil politics consolidated around the demand for territorial autonomy, 
initially through federal reform, Sinhala Buddhist opposition to Tamil 
demands converged on the need to maintain the unitary and centralised 
structure of the state. Tamil political autonomy was framed as an existential 
threat to Sinhala national identity and interest, whilst entrenching centralised 
administrative and, increasingly, military control over the Tamil speaking 
areas became a central concern of Sinhala Buddhist politics.  
This chapter traces the emergence of sustained conflict between these two 
antagonistic and mutually incompatible conceptions of national identity and 
national interest. It argues that there are two crucial factors in explaining this. 
The first is the clear incompatibility between the two conceptions of national 
identity and national interest. Unlike the Dravidian and Indian nationalist 
conceptions of Tamil identity and interest, in Sri Lanka there are no points of 
overlap between the Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil conceptions of Tamil identity 
and interest. Secondly, these two conceptions of national identity and interest 
were not just ideas or even subjectively experienced identities but concrete 
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political projects that were embodied in cohesive and robust organisations. The 
Sinhala Buddhist conception was embodied in the major Sinhala parties and 
soon in the Sri Lankan state itself, such that the state became a vehicle and 
agent of Sinhala Buddhist transformation. At the same time, the Tamil 
conception became consolidated through oppositional mobilisation to the state, 
led from 1956 by the Federal Party (FP). The ideological antagonism between 
the Tamil and Sinhala conceptions of national identity was expressed and 
made visible in concrete instances of confrontation –over specific issues - 
mobilised by Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil organisations and actors.  
The following two sections trace – in turn - the organisational consolidation of 
Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil conceptions of national identity and national 
interest. This shows that the consolidation of these projects was a matter of 
process that brought together a diversity of interests and motivations. 
Furthermore, once consolidated the Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil national 
identities became the dominant frameworks within which actors could pursue 
unrelated interests. These projects also cannot be understood as the simplistic 
articulation of Sinhala or Tamil ethnic identity respectively as both 
acknowledged and sought to accommodate – more or less successfully – 
internal divisions of caste, region and religion. Furthermore, once consolidated, 
as dominant frameworks, the competing Tamil and Sinhala conceptions of 
national identity and national interest came to shape the conditions of 
plausible public action for their adherents and opponents alike. The third 
section analyses the escalating confrontation between these two projects; one 
that increasingly involved the use of overt force. The argument is that 
escalation cannot really be understood in terms of the relative moderation or 
extremism of the protagonists. Rather, the escalation of confrontation into the 
regularised use of violence is the inevitable outcome of the conceptual 
incompatibility of the two conceptions of national identity and interest, the 
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significant support that both projects could mobilise amongst their target 
populations and fortuitous international circumstances that supported the use 
of force by the Sri Lankan state and Tamil militants alike.  
8.2 Consolidation of Sinhala Buddhism 
The consolidation of the Sinhala Buddhist framework was coeval with the 
consolidation of fairly stable system of party competition amongst the Sinhala 
speaking electorates. The rising importance of political parties can be seen in 
the declining share of the vote won by independent candidates.195 In the 1947 
elections independent candidates won just over 29 per cent of the vote, but by 
1970 this had fallen to a low of just 4.56 percent. At the same time, the share of 
vote won by the major two largest political parties – the UNP and the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) – averaged at about 67 per cent (+/- 7 per cent) 
between 1952 and 1977. The third major force in Sinhala party politics during 
this period were the two Marxist parties, the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja 
Party (LSSP) and the pro Moscow Community Party (CP). The Marxist parties 
had their best performance in the 1947 elections with 23.4 per cent of the vote, 
but this subsequently declined and from 1960 averaged about 11 per cent 
reaching a low of just 5 per cent in the 1977 elections. Since 1965 the Marxist 
parties have generally been in coalition with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP), formed by a split from the UNP in 1951. This steadily consolidating 
system of competition primarily between the UNP and SLFP was framed 
throughout by a shared commitment to a Sinhala Buddhist framework; in 
Michael Billig’s terminology, Sinhala Buddhism became the ‘banal’ and taken 
for granted framework of political contestation (1995). That is, the differences 
between and within parties on specific policies were framed by a shared 
commitment to a conception of Sri Lanka as a Sinhala Buddhist country and an 
ethnically Sinhala Buddhist framing of national identity and national interest. 
Sinhala Buddhism was thus not ‘a particular political strategy’ but ‘the 
258 
 
condition for conventional strategies, whatever their particular politics’ 
(1995:99). 
The consolidation of the Sinhala Buddhist framework can be usefully broken 
into two phases; the first is that of the UNP dominated government of 1947 to 
1956, and the second the period of alternating UNP led and SLFP dominated 
governments from 1956 to 1977. In the first phase, a Sinhala Buddhist 
conception of national identity and interest sat uneasily alongside a more 
multi-ethnic framework. In the second, after the escalation of Tamil demands 
for federal autonomy, and the success of the Federal Party in 1956, there was a 
more determined commitment to a Sinhala Buddhist transformation of the 
state and polity. The two phases were also marked by two distinct political 
economies of political contestation; the first predominantly revolved around 
patronage and the dispensation of welfare, while the second saw the 
emergence of a ‘state controlled economy’ regulated through a system of 
‘licenses, quotas and permits’ (Gunasinghe 2004:100). The second phase was 
also marked by escalating conflict along the Tamil – Sinhala axis. Although 
intra-Sinhala and intra-Tamil conflict along caste, region and religious 
cleavages continued during this period, these were more or less successfully 
contained within the wider Tamil and Sinhala categories. In contrast, conflict 
along the Tamil – Sinhala axis escalated and opposing Tamil political demands 
became an increasingly central focus of Sinhala Buddhist mobilisation; this was 
captured by Srimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister from 1960-4 and again 
from 1970-7, who declared in 1967, ‘The Tamil people must accept the fact 
that the Sinhala majority will no longer permit themselves to be cheated of 
their rights’ (quoted in Kearney 1975:163).  
259 
 
8.2.1 1948 to 1956 
The consolidation of Sinhala Buddhism during these two phases of electoral 
contestation was the outcome of the activities of political contestation in a 
context where the Sinhala Buddhist framework had been established as the 
unavoidable marker of national identity and interest in Sinhala public culture. 
From independence up to 1956, electoral politics continued along a pattern 
that was established with the introduction in 1931 of universal franchise. 
During the 1930’s party structures were absent and electoral mobilisation 
relied primarily on candidates’ established ties of patronage and dependence 
within their locality. The politics of vote banks and dependent networks was 
however, quickly augmented by an expanding range of welfare provisions 
(Manor 1979). Elected politicians then used the powers newly available to 
them within the Donoughmore constitution (1931-1947) to establish a range of 
welfare services such as free medical and educational facilities, milk for infants 
and expectant mothers and, most importantly, subsidies and rations for rice 
and wheat flour (Moore 1985:226). By 1947, the scale of welfare services was 
such that expenditure on social services accounted for 56.1 per cent of total 
government revenue (1985:226). Welfare provision thus came to occupy a 
crucial place in representative politics as politicians used their control over the 
distribution of public goods as a key asset in their electoral campaigns. As Mick 
Moore explains, not only did this establish individuals’ and groups’ access to 
welfare goods as crucial issues in party politics, it also introduced a strong 
‘welfarist’ element to political language and legitimacy such that:  
‘... government support for any activity, locality or population 
is commonly couched in terms of the granting of “relief” or of 
“due privileges”, while allegations of past failures to provide 
support are termed “Cinderella” or “stepmotherly” treatment” 
(1985:226-7).  
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The Sinhala Buddhist framework was also, however, an important element in 
the combination of welfare provision and patronage networks that drove 
representative politics. It sat uneasily alongside a more pan-ethnic conception 
of national identity and national interest. Sinhala Buddhist rhetoric and 
metonyms played an important role in electoral campaigns and in the public 
activities of Sinhala politicians. Electoral candidates invoked their Buddhist 
credentials, sought support from the Buddhist clergy and,, in the case of 
SWRD Bandaranaike, the future Prime Minister, converted from Christianity 
(Anglican) to Buddhism (Manor 1989:110-5) whilst making shrill statements 
about his commitment to defending the Sinhala ‘race’ (Russell 1982:157). This 
is despite the fact that Bandaranaike was regularly elected from a constituency 
that straddled his family estate and subsequently became a safe area for the 
SLFP (Jupp 1978:194, 198), the party he founded in September 1951 (Wilson 
77:285). The Sinhala Buddhist framework was also important in forging a 
political alliance between the Low Country Sinhalese and the Kandyans that 
included not just a commitment to a common set of symbols – notably the 
Kandyan lion flag as the national flag – but also a commitment to excluding 
Indian Tamil labourers from the franchise. Sinhalese political leaders were 
notably careful to invoke pan-ethnic conceptions of national identity and 
interest, particularly during the colonial period when the establishment of a 
pan-Ceylonese nationalism was the stated objective of British officials in 
decisions on constitutional reform. However, unlike the Sinhala Buddhist 
conception, pan-Ceylonese nationalism was invoked only in discussions on 
constitutional reform and in dealing with Tamil politics (voters and politicians 
alike) and not as a means of mobilising mass electoral support or indeed 
legitimising government policy in the Sinhala areas.  
The post independence governments headed by the UNP from 1947 to 1956 
produced a mixture of policies that were inspired by the Sinhala Buddhist 
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framework as well as a more pan-ethnic conception of national identity and 
interest. In keeping with the Sinhala Buddhist conception, the government 
passed legislation in late 1948 and 1949 that stripped Indian Tamil labourers of 
citizenship rights and the franchise. In 1951 it passed legislation sanctioning 
the use of the Kandyan lion flag as the country’s national flag. Finally, the 
UNP also continued with land colonization in the Dry Zone as the mainstay of 
its economic development policy (Wilson 1979:101). Although the policy was 
justified in terms of easing landlessness and improving agricultural 
productivity, 196  there was a clear purpose of settling Sinhalese peasants in 
Tamil and Muslim areas (Moore 1985:46; Manogaran 1987: Chapter 3). 
However, at the same time, the UNP led governments refused to acquiesce to a 
number of demands made by leading Buddhist associations and activists. These 
were principally for Sinhala alone – rather than Tamil and Sinhala –to 
immediately be awarded the status of official language, for the Christian 
denominational schools to be brought under state control, for preferential 
treatment to be given to Buddhist students in access to higher education and 
for senior posts in the civil administration and military hierarchy to be 
reserved for Buddhists. The UNP government therefore only partially 
accommodated the Sinhala Buddhist programme. However, it also expanded 
welfare provision and this led to an improvement in its electoral performance: 
in the 1947 elections the UNP polled just under 40 percent of the vote but at 
the 1952 elections this increased to just over 44 percent. There was also a rapid 
increase in voter turnout between the two elections (from 61 per cent in 1947 
to 74 per cent in 1952) and Mick More explains this as a reaction to welfare 
provision: ‘the rapid spread of state welfare activities, especially the rice 
ration.... and fears that the government was contemplating cutting or 
abolishing the rice ration for financial reasons’ (1985:219).  
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8.2.2 1956 and beyond 
The 1956 elections abruptly established Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the 
dominant framework of electoral competition and indeed government policy, 
and by the general elections of July 1960 a new pattern of politics was evident. 
This pattern was one of two party competition between coalitions led by the 
UNP and the SLFP with both parties committed to policies that sought to 
establish the social and political dominance of the Sinhala Buddhists, coeval 
with expanding state control over economic activity, including a determined 
push to expand Sinhala peasant colonization in the Tamil and Muslim areas of 
the island. The trigger for the rapid switch was over the issue of the official 
language in which the opposing sides provided two distinct visions of national 
identity and interest. The policy of having two official languages – one 
supported by all the major political parties at the 1952 general elections – 
contained an understanding of national identity in which the Tamil and 
Sinhala ethnic groups were equals. This was opposed by a variety of Sinhala 
Buddhist associational actors who sought a policy of Sinhala Only – in keeping 
with the ethnically hierarchical Sinhala Buddhist conception of national 
identity and interest. Eventually, in the run up to the 1956 elections both the 
UNP and the opposition led by the SLFP advocated the policy of having 
Sinhala only, rather than both languages, as the national language (Manor 
1989:227-253; De Votta 2004: Chapter 3). The rapid switch was followed by an 
equally rapid adoption of policies that were within the Sinhala Buddhist 
framework and within a few years Sinhala Buddhism went from being a 
widespread and sometimes oppositional social movement to being the 
dominant and background framework of political contestation. Discussing the 
functions of ‘banal’ or background nationalism in relation to political 
contestation, Michael Billig notes that in ‘order for political argument to take 
place within the nation, there must be elements that are beyond argument’ 
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(1995:96). The Sinhala Buddhist conception of national identity, interest, 
territory and history were key elements that were placed beyond argument in 
disputes over specific policies or the distribution of resources.  
SWRD Bandaranaike, Prime Minister from 1956 to 1959, played a crucial role 
in this radical change. In mid 1951 Bankaranaike resigned from the UNP 
government, largely from a sense that his ambitions to be Prime Minister 
would be frustrated within the UNP (Manor 1989), and formed the SLFP, 
which he positioned as taking an economic middle course between the right 
wing UNP and the Marxist parties of the left (Wilson 1979:125). The party’s 
founding manifesto, issued in September 1951, committed the party to a policy 
of Tamil and Sinhala as official languages stating that such a policy was 
necessary to ensure that that ‘the people of this country may cease to be aliens 
in their own lands’ (quoted in Ponnambalam 1983:84). This policy remained in 
place until late 1953 and Bandaranaike himself sometimes expressed an 
ambivalent attitude towards the Sinhala language (Wilson 1994:52). However, 
in the run up to the 1956 general elections, the force of Sinhala Buddhist 
opposition to the two language policy strengthened in the atmosphere of the 
Buddha Jayantha celebrations, marking 2500 years since the enlightenment of 
the Buddha (Tambiah 1992: Chapters 5-7). The Sinhala Buddhist challenge was 
also strengthened by the UNP government’s growing unpopularity, not just 
over its hugely unpopular and soon reversed decisions to cut subsidies in 1953, 
but also because of the extremely high profile and decidedly non-Buddhist 
lifestyle of the Prime Minister Sir John Kottelawala (Manor 1989:229-230). In 
this charged atmosphere, that included high profile defections from the UNP, 
Kottelawala made a speech in Jaffna in late 1954 committing the UNP 
government to ensuring parity of status between Tamil and Sinhala (Wilson 
1994:52). This was seized upon by major English and Sinhala language 
newspapers as suggesting that the Sinhalese would be forced to learn Tamil 
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(Ponnambalam 1983:94). By late 1955 the SLFP had switched its position to 
that of 'Sinhala Only', with Bandaranaike explaining his decision in terms of 
the Sinhala Buddhist trope of the perpetual Tamil threat and warning that 
parity of status would 'mean disaster to the Sinhalese race' because the Tamils 
'with their language and their culture and the will and strength characteristic 
to their race … would come to exert their dominant power over us' (Wilson 
1994:59). By early 1956 the UNP had also switched its position to ‘Sinhala 
Only’ (Jupp 1978:60) but it was too late and the advantage was with the 
opposition. An SLFP led coalition of parties, called the People's United Front 
(known by its acronym in the Sinhala language as the MEP), won the election, 
gaining just over 40 per cent of the vote and a thumping majority of 51 seats in 
a legislature of 95. The UNP's share of the vote fell from 44 per cent in 1952 to 
just 27.3 per cent and it was able to retain only 8 seats. 
At every election between 1956 and 1977 there was a change in government 
between left leaning governments headed by the  SLFP and right leaning 
governments headed by the UNP. Having come to power in April 1956, the 
new SLFP-led government promptly passed legislation in June to make Sinhala 
the only official language. The bill passed with the support of the UNP and was 
opposed by the Tamil MPs, predictably, but also by MPs from the two Marxist 
parties (the LSSP and the CP) who had campaigned on a policy of equal status 
for Tamil and Sinhala, and between them won just over 15 per cent of the vote. 
By the early 1960’s, however, both the LSSP and the CP had also switched 
their positions to ‘Sinhala Only’, and in the following years their ‘attitude 
towards the Tamil minorities could scarcely be differentiated from the strident 
bigotry of the SLFP’ (Bose 1994:67). 
In 1972 the SLFP-led government introduced a new constitution that changed 
the name of the country from the colonial Ceylon to the new Republican Sri 
Lanka whilst unequivocally affirming the Sinhala Buddhist character of the 
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state. The constitution enshrined the status of Sinhala as the sole official 
language and declared that the ‘Republic of Sri Lanka’ shall ‘grant to Buddhism 
the foremost place, and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect 
and foster Buddhism' (quoted in Ponnambalam 1983:164) It also explicitly 
described Sri Lanka as a ‘unitary’ state (1983:164), thereby constitutionally 
excluding the Tamil demands for territorial autonomy. In 1978 the newly 
elected UNP government again changed the constitution, importantly 
replacing the system of parliamentary government with a powerful and 
directly elected executive presidency. The 1978 constitution nevertheless 
retained the articles enshrining the status of Buddhism, the Sinhala language 
and the unitary, therefore Sinhala dominated, nature of the state (1983:197-8).  
8.2.3 Votes and voters 
This rapid rise of the Sinhala Buddhist framework cannot, however, be linearly 
correlated with voting behaviour. The 1956 elections saw the widespread 
mobilisation by Buddhist monks and Sinhala public sector workers on behalf 
of the MEP and yet, as Mick Moore notes, the overall voter turnout actually 
dropped slightly to 71 percent from a high of 74 per cent in 1952, suggesting 
that the language campaign did not draw any new voters into politics 
(1985:219). [A more significant increase in voter turnout took place between 
1947 (56 per cent)  and 1952 (71 per cent) and Moore explains this as a result 
of ‘the rapid spread of state welfare activities, especially the rice ration, in the 
war and post-war periods and fears that the government was contemplating 
cutting the rice ration for financial reasons (1985).] Furthermore, the 
relationship between MPs and their constituents continued to be dominated 
by questions of access to resources. Janice Jiggins states that from 1956, for the 
next twenty years, MPs characterised their role ‘as largely, if not wholly, 
relating to the satisfaction of their supporters’ demands, the solution of their 
problems ....by personal intervention and the securing of tangible benefits for 
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their constituents’ (1979:150). In other words, politics at the local level was 
‘about who will be employed by the Ceylon Transport Board as bus 
conductors’ (Moore 1985:224).  
However, this localised and transactional politics did not entail the exclusion 
of wider political categories or the national context. As Jiggins goes onto 
explain, ‘neither the voter nor the MP is typically seen in isolation, as an 
independent entity capable of staking a claim on resources or winning votes 
solely in his own right’ (1979:154). Political parties thus became increasingly 
important to electoral contestation197 and, along with a decline in independent 
candidates, party allegiance also become increasingly important to individual 
candidates’ electoral success (Kearney 1973:103; Jupp 1978:91-7). The 
entrenched localism of political bargaining has therefore coexisted alongside 
the consolidation of party labels and a stable pattern of two party politics. It is 
at this wider national level of party politics that Sinhala Buddhism became 
established as the unavoidable and profoundly consequential framework of 
political contestation. In other words, the Sinhala Buddhist framework thus set 
the context within which local struggles over public goods and services could 
be linked to wider national frameworks. 
8.2.4 Erasing intra ethnic cleavages 
As the overarching framework of political contestation, Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism was also able to contain cleavages of caste, region, religion and 
socio-economic strata within the Sinhala category, whilst also accommodating 
the representation of Muslim and Indian Tamil, but not Sri Lankan Tamil, 
votes. The UNP and SLFP drew electoral support from distinct regional and 
socio – economic strata; the UNP was concentrated in the low country and 
urban areas, and drew support from the slightly better off sections of rural 
society, whilst the SLFP was dominant geographically in the largely ‘dry zone’ 
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areas and was identified with the less well off sections of society. Caste 
cleavages were also important in political allegiance and determining political 
behaviour; political leadership in the UNP and SLFP has been exclusively with 
the dominant landowning or Goyigama castes, while the Karava, Durava and 
Salagama (KSD) castes found mainly in the low country regions are generally 
identified with the Marxist parties. Furthermore, both major parties combined 
their commitment to Sinhala Buddhist nationalism with the recognition that 
caste continued to be a tangible category of political mobilisation and 
representation. From 1958 both parties have used the constitutional provision 
that allows for the appointment of MPs to represent minority groups to 
appoint members from low caste Sinhalese groups who would normally 
struggle to be elected from the largely Goyigama dominated Sinhala districts 
(Kearney 1973:185). The UNP’s striking electoral victory in 1977 (when it 
gained a striking 50.92 per cent of the total popular vote) included an explicit 
attempt to divest itself of the image of being the party of the Goyigamas and 
build support amongst the KSD caste groups (Wilson 1979:139). Relatedly, the 
Janaka Vimukthi Perumana’s (JVP) failed armed insurrection against the state 
in April 1971 – which combined revolutionary Marxism with strident Sinhala 
Buddhism (149) – had its support base mainly amongst the non-Goyigama 
youth of the low country and some Kandyan districts (38). Sinhala Buddhism 
was therefore a political category, rather than an expression of ethnic 
sentiment, as it sought to include – more or less successfully – a plurality of 
Sinhala Buddhist caste groups.  
While caste and regional cleavages within the Sinhala category were relatively 
easily reconciled within the Sinhala Buddhist framework, the shifts produced 
by the 1956 electoral victory were associated with a series of confrontations 
that threatened sustained and ongoing conflict along the Tamil-Sinhala axis - 
and, separately, along the Catholic – Buddhist axis which was contained 
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primarily within the Sinhala category. Between 1956 and 1961 two successive 
SLFP led governments passed legislation and effected the administrative 
changes to make Sinhala the only official language, including the language of 
the law courts in the predominantly Tamil speaking areas. To protest against 
these changes the Federal Party, the largest Tamil party following the 1956 
general elections, launched mass participation civil disobedience 
demonstrations in 1956, 1958 and 1961 (Navaratnam 1991). The 1956 and 1958 
demonstrations led to anti-Tamil violence across many areas of the island that 
were framed – whatever the actual motivations of individual rioters 
themselves -  by participants, victims and political actors as expressing Sinhala 
antipathy to Tamil political demands. The 1961 protests by the Federal Party, 
which involved occupations of government offices across the north-east that 
brought the civil administration to a standstill, were ended with repressive use 
of the military, the declaration of a state of emergency in the North-east and 
the imprisonment of FP leaders, including the ageing leader SJV 
Chelvanayagam (Wilson 1994).  
In the same period, there was also escalating conflict along the Catholic – 
Buddhist axis. The flashpoint of this conflict was the nationalisation of 
denominational schools undertaken by the SLFP government of Srimavo 
Bandaranaike in late 1961. The move led to protests by Sinhala Catholics who 
occupied the schools, refusing to hand them over to educational authorities. 
Eventually a confrontation was avoided by the intervention of the Catholic 
hierarchy, namely Cardinal Valerian Gracias from India (reportedly sent by 
Nehru), who persuaded Catholics on the island to relent (Wilson 1977:302). 
Since the flashpoint of Catholic – Buddhist confrontation in the 1959-62 
period however, conflict along this axis has been largely accommodated within 
the Sinhala Buddhist framework. In contrast, conflict along the Tamil – 
Sinhala axis has simply escalated. To begin with, the Catholic Church through 
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the 1960’s continued the process of ‘nationalising’ itself with masses conducted 
in Tamil and Sinhalese (Jupp 1978:37) and this trend was reflected in voter 
allegiance. From the 1947 elections onwards, there was a trend of Catholic 
support for the UNP, partly as a result of the Catholic hierarchy’s antipathy to 
Marxist parties - heightened in the context of the Cold War (1978:149-51). 
The conflict over denominational schools also appeared to strengthen Catholic 
support for the UNP (1978:148-9). However, by the time of the 1970 elections, 
there were swings against the UNP led government in the majority Christian 
districts of the Sinhala areas, reflecting patterns across the Sinhala districts 
more generally (1978:149-151). Following the landslide victory of the SLFP led 
United Front in 1970, the Roman Catholic Bishops of Ceylon called on the 
faithful to give ‘loyal and enlightened support to the new government’, and 
similarly supported the UNP government that came to power in 1977 (Wilson 
1979:46).  
The narrowing of the Catholic – Buddhist divide can be seen in the shifting 
categories used to define educational entitlement. In the early 1950’s leading 
Buddhist educationalists had demanded special quotas for Buddhist students in 
higher education to compensate for the disadvantages they suffered under 
British rule, allegedly because they ‘have stuck to the religion which binds 
them to their native soil’ (Kearney 1973:172). However, in the early 1970’s, 
when the United Front government adopted policies to correct Tamil 
overrepresentation in the coveted Medical and Engineering faculties, the 
measures were framed to benefit not the Buddhists but the Sinhalese. For 
example, the schemes worked by lowering the entrance marks for students 
studying in the Sinhala language stream and those from rural districts. As a 
consequence, the ethnic composition of the Medical and Engineering faculties 
was substantially altered, but along a Tamil-Sinhala rather than a Catholic – 
Buddhist axis.198  
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Finally, these rapid changes provoked an attempted coup, the first of two since 
independence, in late 1961 by a group of officers in the military and policy 
forces who were motivated primarily to stem the ascendance of Sinhala 
Buddhism and the conflict it was causing, as well as the ethnic transformations 
it was effecting on the civil service (Horowitz 1980). The coup was discovered 
in early 1962 – and hence referred to by that year - and arrests were made 
throughout February. Despite the mixed ethnic backgrounds of the coup 
plotters, it was framed in terms of the over-representation of Catholics and 
Tamils in the military. Successive governments have since then followed a 
policy of creating an ‘ethnically pure’ Sinhala Buddhist military (Blodgget 
2004:54). As a consequence, the proportion of Tamils employed in the Police 
and Armed services dropped from 40 per cent in 1956 to 4 per cent in 1980 
(Manogaran 1987:129).  
The political ascendance of Sinhala Buddhism cannot be linearly related to 
ethnic demography. The fact that the majority of electorates on the island 
contained a Sinhala majority facilitated, but did not cause, the ascendance of 
Sinhala Buddhism. To begin with, mediating access to public goods was a vital 
part of representative politics at the local level, and increases in voter turnout 
were more associated with the expanding scope of public goods provision than 
with the stridency of Sinhala Buddhist rhetoric. Furthermore, adopting a 
strident Sinhala Buddhist stance did not produce direct electoral results: for 
example between 1956 and 1960, the UNP’s share of the vote increased by just 
over 2 per cent (from 27.44 per cent to 29.62 per cent) despite the party having 
visibly and vociferously adopted Sinhala Buddhist rhetoric. Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism did not function as a means to mobilise voter sentiment, but 
worked instead as the underlying framework within which political 
contestation occurred. Following the elections of 1956, all political parties that 
aspired to power at the national level worked within this framework and, as 
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Moore notes, soon afterwards ‘differences in the degree of Sinhalese 
chauvinism were greater within parties than between them’ (1985:218).  
8.2.5 Political process and the Sinhala Buddhist transformation of 
state and society 
The explanation for the dominance of Sinhala Buddhism, firmly established by 
the mid 1960’s, must be sought in the processes of political organisation and 
mobilisation, rather than in the static variables of ethnic demography. The 
Sinhala Buddhist ethnically hierarchical conception of national identity and 
national interest were well established in Sinhala public culture through 
ongoing associational activities that began with the late nineteenth century 
Buddhist revival. Nevertheless, these activities were not organised into a single 
organisation with a well established political framework that could mobilise 
support across the Sinhala districts. The organisational weakness of the Sinhala 
Buddhist movement was however matched by the weakness of its principal 
oppositional target, the pan-ethnic conception of national identity and interest 
then associated with the UNP. As discussed in Chapter Six, the attempts by Sri 
Lankan politicians to form pan-ethnic nationalist associations in the late 
nineteenth century did not generate the temporally continuous activities that 
in India were associated with the establishment of Congress as a dominant and 
unavoidable presence – for Indian politicians and British officials alike – in 
colonial Indian politics. As a consequence, a pan-ethnic conception of national 
identity and interest had a very weak organisational presence in Sri Lankan 
politics. The UNP, hastily formed through between June and September 1946 
out of existing organisations, including the overtly Sinhala nationalist Sinhala 
Maha Sabha, used the pan-ethnic conception primarily as a rhetorical device to 
co-ordinate the activities of its Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil members. The party 
did not develop or deploy a pan-ethnic conception of the island’s history 
(comparable to that invoked by Nehru) to compete with the Sinhala Buddhist 
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narrative and nor did it have a developed framework that accommodated the 
island’s ethnic pluralism within a shared set of interests and values. Instead, its 
senior Sinhala leaders regularly invoked the Sinhala Buddhist framework and 
closely associated with Sinhala Buddhist associations. Furthermore, UNP 
candidates in the Sinhala districts explicitly invoked their Buddhist credentials 
during electoral campaigns. A pan ethnic-conception of national identity was 
therefore absent in Sinhala popular culture. It is in this historically produced, 
rather than demographically determined, context that when the SLFP 
demonstrated electoral success by adopting the Sinhala Buddhist framework 
and then introduced legislation to give it effect (such as the 1956 Sinhala only 
act), the other political parties rapidly followed suit, making explicit at the 
level of formal policy its already widespread use as a means of direct political 
mobilisation and social reform.  
Once established as the dominant framework of political contestation, Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism became a powerful and constraining presence in the 
island’s social, political and economic life. Political contestation among the 
Sinhala parties was bounded by the commitment to preserving the Sinhala 
Buddhist character of the island, particularly against the threat poses by Tamil 
demands for political autonomy. There were important differences between 
the parties, for example on economic policy, with the SLFP and the Marxist 
parties favouring greater state control, while the UNP was willing to allow 
space for private enterprise. However, any compromise with Tamil political 
demands could not be accommodated in this framework. An attempt in 1957 
by the SLFP Prime Minister, SWRD Bandaranaike to negotiate an agreement 
with SJV Chelvanayagam, the Federal Party leader, was abandoned after 
sustained Sinhala nationalist opposition, spearheaded by the UNP. A similar 
agreement in 1966 between the UNP Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake and 
SJV Chelvanayagam was also abandoned, but this time as a result of sustained 
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mobilisation by the SLFP and its Marxist partners, the CP and LSSP.199 The 
Sinhala-Buddhist framework thus came to dominate, even actors who may 
have sought to use it tactically, without real conviction. SWRD Bandaranaike, 
for example, played a crucial role in initiating the switch to the Sinhala 
Buddhist framework but then found that his efforts to come to an agreement 
with the FP were thwarted by Sinhala Buddhist mobilisation. J. R Jayawardene, 
the UNP politician who led a high profile and symbolic march to mobilise 
popular Sinhala opposition to the agreement between Bandaranaike and the FP, 
subsequently played an important role in the abortive 1966 negotiations 
between the UNP and the FP. The actual intentions and the motivations of the 
politicians themselves are therefore less important in explaining outcomes 
than the constraining conceptual boundaries within which they must operate.  
Although the electoral dominance of Sinhala Buddhism was driven through a 
system of representative politics dominated by local arenas and serving often 
parochial interests for public goods and services, the consequences were 
nevertheless systemic. The changes triggered by the 1956 elections produced 
an expanded state. However, this state was one that was in personnel and ethos 
increasingly Sinhala. While membership of public sector trade unions 
expanded from 52,000 in 1952 to over 257,000 in 1968, the proportion of 
Tamils employed in the various sectors of the public sectors fell.200 By the early 
1980’s public sector trade unions played a crucial role in organising anti Tamil 
collective violence. Public rituals and spaces were marked by Buddhist 
symbols and rituals, while the nationalisation of schools introduced the 
Mahavamsa narrative of Sinhala civilization and Tamil invasion to all students 
in the Sinhala stream. The 1956 elections also triggered the rapid creation of a 
‘state controlled’ economy regulated through ‘licenses, permits and quotas’ that 
were needed for all forms of commercial and manufacturing activity. Although 
these economic rewards were distributed through patronage networks – which 
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were determined more by factional and kinship considerations than ethnicity 
– Tamils found it difficult to access the necessary resources and, as a 
consequence, were largely squeezed out of private sector activity as well 
(Gunasinghe 2004). The sum effect of these changes could be seen in average 
income figures; in the decade between 1963 and 1973, average Sri Lankan 
Tamil income fell from 327 rupees per month to 309, that of the Low Country 
Sinhalese increased from 292 to 343 and that of the Kandyan Sinhalese 
increased from 219 to 277 (Wilson 1979:11).  
Following the 1962 coup attempt and the subsequent policy of establishing an 
‘ethnically pure’ military and police, these institutions also came to operate 
within the Sinhala Buddhist framework and were at the leading edge of the 
state’s confrontation with Tamil opposition, both political and later armed. 
Emblematic of this change is a shift in the stated motivations of the two 
attempted coups of Sri Lanka’s post independence history. The 1962 coup was 
led by officers - multiethnic and cosmopolitan in outlook – who sought to 
check the rising dominance of the Sinhala Buddhist framework. One of their 
complaints was the escalation of ethnic tension; they blamed the 1958 anti 
Tamil violence on ‘Bandaranaike’s yielding to crude communal feelings’ 
(Horowitz 1980:112). The officers involved in the coup were also critical of the 
decision to send in the military to break the FP led civil disobedience protests 
(known as Satyagraha after Gandhi) across the north-east. As the Satyagraha 
was peaceful, the officers believed the ‘government was using unnecessary 
force in handling it’ and ‘some officers felt the government was even 
attempting to provoke violence’ (1980:113). In a further incident, the two 
Tamil commanding officers in the regiment sent to quell the protests in Jaffna 
were ordered not to accompany their troops; a move that ‘impressed the 
officers more deeply than the regime’s needless use of troops or its excessive 
repression of peaceful protest’ (1980:113). The 1966 coup, by contrast, was 
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launched by ‘extreme Buddhist elements’ who were opposed to the UNP’s 
negotiations with the FP over its demands for regional autonomy and official 
status for the Tamil language (Jupp 1978:24). The overwhelmingly Sinhala 
military and police were subsequently deployed in increasing numbers in the 
Tamil speaking areas from the early 1970’s to confront the then incipient 
insurgency. 
The ascendance of Sinhala Buddhism involved therefore the wholesale 
transformation of the state, society and the economy. This affected a variety of 
ethnic categories – including Sinhalese Catholics, Muslims and Indian Tamils, 
as well as Sri Lankan Tamils. However, Catholic, Muslim and Indian Tamil 
political actors in practice acquiesced to the dominant Sinhala Buddhist 
framework. In contrast, amongst the Sri Lankan Tamils the ascendance of 
Sinhala Buddhism was associated with countervailing mobilisation by the 
Federal Party, which sought to establish political equality between the Tamils 
and the Sinhalese in opposition to the Sinhala first ethnic hierarchy of the 
Sinhala Buddhist framework. The FP’s growth was in part a result of the 
impact of post-independence state policies on a diversity of interests within 
Tamil society; bringing together for example Jaffna students denied access to 
higher education, Colombo based civil servants working within an 
increasingly Sinhala Buddhist hierarchy and eastern province farmers living 
alongside growing state aided colonization schemes. However, discriminatory 
policies alone are insufficient to mobilise opposition. For example, the category 
that arguably suffered the most at first from Sinhala-Buddhist policies were 
Indian Tamil labourers. They were also the easiest to mobilise; the large 
majority living and working in identical conditions and in a concentrated 
geographical area. Yet Indian Tamil political leaders, many of them plantation 
owners, collectively sought to co-operate with the Sinhala leadership rather 
than mobilising opposition from their constituents’ disenfranchisement and 
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ongoing conditions of relative economic servitude (Wilson 1979:22-31, 155-
160).The consolidation of Sri Lankan Tamil opposition must therefore be 
understood as the outcome of step-wise and temporally continuous processes 
of organisation and mobilization that established the idea of a Tamil national 
identity as a dominant and unavoidable presence in Tamil political life.  
8.3 Federal Party and Tamil nationalism 
The electoral and political consolidation of Sinhala Buddhism occurred 
through contestation to gain control of the state, and then through the 
agencies of the state itself. It was not associated with a single organisation or 
party. In contrast, the consolidation of the Tamil nationalist framework during 
the same period was associated with the electoral growth and expansion of the 
Federal Party. The party’s main efforts were in seeking election to Sri Lanka’s 
parliament. It did this primarily as means of negotiating with the government 
on its core demands for territorial autonomy and gaining official recognition 
for the Tamil language. To this end, the FP from its foundation stated that it 
would not accept cabinet posts until its demands had been met; M. 
Thiruchelvam, an FP MP, served briefly as a minister in the UNP led 
government of 1965-9, but resigned because of failure to progress on the issue 
of territorial autonomy and the government’s refusal to categorise a Hindu 
temple in Trincomalee as a site of cultural importance (Wilson 1994:107-111). 
The FP also initiated mass protests against the Sinhala only policy - in 1956, 
1958 and again in 1961 – and used the support it was able to demonstrate 
through these, as well as through its electoral campaigns, as a means of 
expressing Tamil sentiment to the government but also to the larger world 
(1994:96).  
The period of the FP’s electoral rise and dominance (1952-1977) was certainly 
coeval with the rising material impact of the policies of Sinhala Buddhist 
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majoritarian dominance. As discussed above, following the adoption of the 
1956 Sinhala Only Act, Tamils were rapidly excluded from the public sector 
(Wilson 1979:11), their access to the private sector was restricted (Gunasinghe 
2004), the military and police were transformed into overwhelmingly Sinhala 
‘ethnically pure’ structures (Blodgett 2001, 62) and Tamils’ access to higher 
education was also curtailed (Manogaran 1987:129). Meanwhile, Sri Lankan 
governments funded and subsidized ethnically Sinhala colonies in the Tamil 
speaking regions (Manogram 1987:88-114). These programs produced – as they 
were intended to (Moore 1985:46) –significant changes in the ethnic 
demography of the Tamil regions. These changes were punctuated by bouts of 
collective anti-Tamil violence (1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, 1983), in which the 
ethnically transformed police and military were increasingly complicit (1977, 
1981, 1983) (Bose 1994; Krishna 1999).  
While the impact of escalating Sinhala majoritarianism certainly provided the 
conditions for the rising dominance of the Federal Party, this cannot be seen as 
a natural consequence. The Sri Lankan Muslims for example, who are equally 
outside the Sinhala Buddhsit framework, have adopted an ‘almost entirely 
instrumentalist approach to politics’ evident in ‘repeated party changing, 
support for independents and refusal, in the main, to be the captive of either of 
the major parties’ (Jupp 1978:152). A distinct Muslim political party, the Sri 
Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC), was only formed in 1981 and until that 
point Muslim politicians joined either the UNP, the SLFP or stood as 
independents (1978:153). This approach has had tangible material benefits and 
there have been Muslims in every cabinet from independence (1978:152). 
However, Muslim political participation has been on the basis of, publicly at 
least, accepting the Sinhala Buddhist framework.201  
Sinhala political leaders have sought to convince Tamil politicians and voters 
of the virtues of accommodation and acquiescence, rather than the FP path of 
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opposition. Governments led by the both the UNP and SLFP sought to co-opt 
Tamil politicians and engineer defections from the FP and ACTC 
(Ponnambalam 1983:154-5). Meanwhile, the Marxist parties and the SLFP 
often nominated candidates in the northern constituencies who campaigned 
on the platform that the FP’s ‘methods had worked against the interests of the 
Tamil majority who still persisted in voting for them’ (Jupp 1978:140). These 
efforts met with limited success; defections were rare. 202 Meanwhile in the 
constituencies of the north-east the vote share of candidates and parties not 
adopting a platform of Tamil-Sinhala political equality remained low: it fell 
from high 25 per cent in 1952 and then remained between 14-17 per cent 
(1978:138). There are two factors that explain the relative failure of efforts to 
establish Sinhala Buddhist dominance as a principle of Tamil politics, and the 
simultaneous electoral and political consolidation of the Tamil demand for 
territorial autonomy. The first is that the principle of Tamil – Sinhala equality 
was already well established in Tamil politics, particularly in the Jaffna 
peninsula, from the early decades of the twentieth century. This principle 
would have been available to any actor seeking to capitalise on the diverse 
discontents created by the escalating Sinhala majoritarianism. However, as 
noted earlier, the experience of exclusion does not necessarily provoke 
sustained opposition. Instead, the activities of the FP were decisive in 
translating diverse Sri Lankan Tamil experiences of Sinhala Buddhist 
majoritarianism into a sustained demand for territorial autonomy as a means of 
ensuring collective equality between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. From its 
formation in 1949 until it merged with smaller Tamil parties to form the TULF 
coalition in 1976, the FP brought together the three processes of successful 
political mobilisation in a temporally sustained way. The temporally 
continuous as well as spatially and socially extensive character of the FP’s 
activities established the principle of Tamil nationhood and territorial 
autonomy as both an enabling resource and constraining framework for all 
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political actors – whatever their actual intentions or motivations – who sought 
to mobilise political support in the Tamil speaking regions. 
8.3.1 FP agenda and strategy 
The central plank of the FP’s agenda was the demand for territorial autonomy 
through a federal re-ordering of the Sri Lankan state. In justifying this demand, 
the FP explicitly used the language of nationhood and self determination and 
invoked a narrative of historical continuity to assert a Tamil ‘homeland’ in the 
north-eastern Tamil speaking areas of the island. At its first convention in 
1951 the FP adopted a resolution claiming that the Tamil speaking people had 
an ‘unchallengeable title to nationhood’ to be realised within a ‘federal union 
with the Sinhalese’ that included a ‘separate historical past ... at least as ancient 
and as glorious as that of the Sinhalese’ and ‘territorial habitation of definite 
areas’ (quoted in Wilson 1994:74). The FP’s explicit adoption of the legal and 
political language of nationhood was both a development of, and departure 
from, Tamil politics in the colonial period. As discussed in Chapter Six, Tamil 
politics before independence turned on a conception of the Tamils as equally 
indigenous to the island as the Sinhalese. There were disagreements between 
politicians and organisations (such as the JYC) that sought to advance Tamil 
interests by building a pan-ethnic form of Ceylonese nationalism and those 
who (like G. G Ponnambalam and the ACTC) sought specific political 
guarantees of Tamil rights within an all island political framework. These 
conceptions cannot easily be categorized as Tamil nationalist as the Tamils do 
not appear within them as the subject of national rights but rather as a 
component – albeit on equal terms with the Sinhalese – of a broader Ceylonese 
national unity. The notion of territorial autonomy had been occasionally raised 
during the colonial period - most notably by P. Arunachalem203 – but it had 
not become the basis of a sustained campaign of political organisation and 
mobilisation. For the FP, however, territorial autonomy was its core demand, 
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as well as a crucial aspect of its organisational strategy. The rationale for 
territorial autonomy nevertheless retained the logic of Tamil / Sinhala political 
equality developed during the colonial period, but sought a different means of 
securing this end. As C. Vanniasingham, an FP leader, argued, the federal 
principle was necessary to preserve the mutual non-domination of the Tamils 
and the Sinhalese; a federal union would be ‘fair by the Sinhalese, as they 
Tamils did not want to dominate them even as they, the Tamils, did not want 
to be dominated by them... federalism would enable them to live as equal 
partners of a new union’ (quoted in Wilson 1994:54). 
The demand for territorial autonomy, while continuous with previous politics, 
was not automatically resonant: the FP did very poorly in the 1952elections,204 
and during the campaigning the ACTC derided its claims, arguing that if 
Tamils achieved an autonomous state, the trains from Colombo would not pass 
through the narrow isthmus of the Jaffna peninsula (Wilson 1994:32). 
However, in the run up to the 1956 elections, the ACTC’s strategy of securing 
Tamil rights by working with UNP had visibly failed and it was in this context 
that the FP’s alternative demand for territorial autonomy gained ground. In 
August 1948 G. G Ponnambalam agreed to join the UNP government in return 
for a cabinet portfolio, namely industry and fisheries. Chelvanayagam, then an 
ACTC MP, reluctantly supported this decision having already made public 
statements on the need for territorial autonomy, and even secession, as a 
means of ensuring Tamil rights (1994:25). Chelvanayagam split with 
Ponnambalam in December 1949 and formed the FP following the UNP 
government’s decision to strip the Indian Tamil plantation labourers of their 
citizenship and franchise rights. Ponnambalam stayed on in the cabinet 
pointing to the material benefits of co-operation, namely a number of publicly 
funded projects across the north-east (1994:72). However, by October 1953 
Ponnambalam had been expelled from the cabinet by the new Prime Minister 
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John Kotelawalla,205 and in February 1956 the UNP abandoned its commitment 
to Tamil – Sinhala linguistic equality prompting the resignation of Tamil party 
members (1994:59). The FP’s rise to political dominance occurred therefore in 
the context of the failure of the ACTC’s strategy of ‘responsive co-operation’, 
while the mainstream Sinhala parties could offer only limited material benefits 
in exchange for acceptance of the Sinhala Buddhist framework.  
Unlike the ACTC, the FP made direct political mobilisation a crucial 
component of its strategy, and at its inaugural meeting, its leader 
Chelvanayagam, stated that the FP was not an ordinary political party but a 
‘movement’ and its ultimate purpose was the mobilisation of the Tamil 
speaking people. Even if the FP did not realise its key demand, namely Tamil 
autonomy, it should nevertheless ‘at the very least mobilise and marshal our 
younger generation to carry the banner forward and fulfil our mission’ (quoted 
in Wilson 1994:70). To this end, the FP held public meetings to set out its 
views, published a weekly newspaper, the Suthanthiran (advocate of freedom), 
held yearly conventions in different locations across the north-east and also 
mobilised mass protests in 1956, 1958 and in 1961. At the same time, it also 
sought to win parliamentary seats as a means of creating a disciplined 
parliamentary block that could be used to extract concessions from Sinhala 
leaders. Agreements, albeit abortive, were reached on three occasions between 
the FP and Sinhala political leaders (with the SLFP in 1957 and 1960 and then 
with the UNP in 1965). 
By the early 1970’s it was evident that the FP’s project had singularly failed to 
realise any of its stated objectives. The FP’s three mass protests ended with 
violence directed primarily at Tamils, the imprisonment of FP leaders (1958 
and 1961) and with the imposition of emergency rule in the Tamil areas (1961). 
At the same time, the three pacts it negotiated ended in abrogation and two 
(1957 and 1965) were abandoned amidst vociferous opposition framed in 
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Sinhala Buddhist terms. The 1970 constitution also entrenched the unitary and 
Sinhala Buddhist character of the state, thus apparently closing off the 
possibility of constitutional change through the parliamentary process. The 
FP’s failure to realise its stated objectives turned out, however, to be an 
integral component of the consolidation of a territorial Tamil national identity. 
Indeed, FP political mobilisation, and the responses it generated from Sinhala 
political actors, were linked in an escalating dialectic of protest and violent 
response, negotiation and abrogation that consolidated the Tamil and Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalist projects and their mutually incompatible conceptions of 
the ‘right’ ethnic ordering of the island.  
By 1976 the ACTC, which had once derided the idea of federalism, had joined 
the FP in demanding an independent Tamil state. The growth of a Tamil 
militant movement that sought independence through armed struggle also 
showed that the territorial conception of Tamil identity had escaped the 
bounds of the FP’s politics. Importantly, this process was also important in 
consolidating Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Until the late 1970’s opposing and 
resisting the FP’s demands was a crucial element of the Sinhala Buddhist 
platform. From the early 1980’s onwards, confronting and containing the 
growing Tamil insurgency, and later the LTTE’s armed state building project 
(early 1990’s-2009), along with Tamil demands for independent statehood, 
became a central component of the Sinhala Buddhist domestic, as well as 
international, agenda.  
The FP’s first protest was held in June 1956 as the ‘Sinhala Only’ act was being 
enacted into legislation. Three hundred FP volunteers who staged a sit down 
protest in front of the parliament in Colombo were attacked by an assembled 
crowd and thrown into a nearby lake. There followed several days of rioting, 
principally attacks against Tamils and Tamil property in Colombo but also 
notably in the areas of the eastern province that contained Sinhala colonies 
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(Ponnambalam 1983:105-6). In August of that year the FP held its convention 
in the eastern port city of Trincomalee and set out its core demands: a federal 
re-ordering of the constitution, parity of status for Tamil and Sinhalese, an end 
to Sinhala colonization in the Tamil speaking areas and the restoration of 
citizenship and franchise rights for Indian Tamil plantation workers. It also 
threatened to launch a mass civil disobedience campaign unless these demands 
were met. In order to recruit volunteers for the campaign Chelvanayagam and 
C. Vanniasingham, two key leaders, toured the towns and villages of the 
north-east establishing branches and setting out the FP’s programme and 
strategy (Wilson 1994:85).  
The FP’s demands and Prime Minister Bandaranaike’s own personal 
inclination to compromise led to an agreement in July 1957 (the Bandaranaike 
– Chelvanayagam, or ‘BC’, pact). There was immediate resistance: in October 
1957 J. R Jayawardene led a march from Colombo to the Temple of the Tooth 
in Kandy (which contains a relic believed to be the Buddha’s tooth). The 
march was loaded with symbolic meaning and was staged as a ‘pilgrimage to 
worship and to protest at that shrine, where the relic that served as the 
palladium of earlier Sinhalese kingdoms, and by extension, of the modern 
polity rested’ (Tambiah 1992:49). As Bandaranaike hesitated, the FP took the 
initiative and in January 1958 launched civil disobedience protests across the 
north-east, with volunteers courting arrest by publicly tarring Sinhala 
characters on vehicle license plates in the Tamil speaking areas. 
Chelvanayagam participated in such a protest in Batticaloa, was arrested and 
imprisoned for a week (Wilson 1994:87-88). By April that year, and following 
a protest by a group of Buddhist monks in front of his private residence, 
Bandaranaike agreed to abrogate the pact. There followed a second, more 
intense, as well as spatially widespread, episode of ethnic violence, primarily 
Sinhala violence against Tamils.206 The violence has been explained in a variety 
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of ways; Manor has for example argued that economic interests that had 
‘suffered during Bandaranaike’s two years in power contributed to the rioting 
in order to destabilise the government’ (1989:293). However, the violence also 
has to be read against the framework of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and its 
project of establishing a Sinhala first hierarchy of ethnic relations on the island. 
As Sankaran Krishna suggests,  
‘Viewed against this hierarchy, the periodic pogroms and 
explosions of collective violence against the Tamils (1956, 
1958, 1977, 1981, 1983) in Sri Lanka represent efforts to put 
them back in their place on grounds that they need to be 
taught a lesson, according to an oft-used phrase. It is hardly 
coincidental that the bouts of collective violence in recent 
times have all occurred immediately after of during efforts 
to open a dialogue on redressing minority grievances in Sri 
Lanka’ (1999:54). 
The final FP mass protest lasted from February to April 1961 and was again in 
response to government policy on the language issue. An SLFP led government 
elected in July 1960 announced that it would bring the Sinhala Only act into 
full effect by January the following year and included provisions to make 
Sinhala the language of the law courts in the north-east. In response, the FP 
led mass demonstrations across the north-east. Protestors sat in front of 
government offices in Jaffna, Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa, the largest 
population centres in the north-east, blocking all government functions until 
late April.207 The protests were eventually ended by the use of military force; 
all of the FP MP’s were arrested and detained for two months and a state of 
emergency existed in the Tamil speaking areas for two years (Ponnambalam 
1983:131).  
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Although the protests ended without any substantial gains in terms of securing 
the FP’s objectives, they were nevertheless important in demonstrating – to 
opponents and allies– the party’s capacity to mobilise support. As 
Chelvanayagam stated, the purpose of the Satyagraha had been ‘to demonstrate 
to the world that the Tamil speaking people were united in the defence of 
their language rights and in their opposition to the government’s 
discriminatory policies’ (quoted in Wilson 1994:96). The protests consistently 
drew large crowds and the increasing political centrality of a Tamil political 
identity based on national demands for territorial autonomy were also evident 
in the FP’s improving electoral performance. In 1952 the party secured only 2 
out of the 11 seats with Tamil majorities, by 1956 it secured 6 out of 11 and in 
July 1960 it secured 12 out of an available 16 (a fresh delimitation of 
constituencies in 1960 added the extra seats). At the same time, its share of the 
vote in Tamil majority constituencies expanded from 15.79 per cent in 1952, to 
43.03 in 1956, reaching a high of 59 per cent in July 1960.208  
The FP was about to launch a second civil disobedience campaign in 1964 
when the SLFP government fell as a result of defections (Wilson 1994:102). 
The FP then entered into negotiations with the UNP leader Dudley 
Senanayake (son of the former leader D. S Senanayake), ironically at the home 
of Dr. MVP Pieris, who had served as the medical advisor on Jayawardene’s 
1957 protest march to Kandy (1994:104). The negotiations led to a second 
agreement, labelled the Senanayake – Chelvanayagam (SC), pact that 
contained provisions on limited self government for the northeast and some 
limitations on Sinhala colonisation in these areas. The FP subsequently became 
a partner in the UNP-led coalition government of 1956-1969, and M. 
Thiruchelvam took the local government portfolio as a means of implementing 
the SC pact. However, by 1968 it was evident that Senanayake was backsliding, 
again in the face of growing Sinhala Buddhist hostility, and the provisions of 
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the SC pact remained unimplemented (Ponnambalam 1983:146). The FP 
finally left the government in late 1968 when the Prime Minister overrode 
Thiruchelvam’s decision to designate the area around a Hindu temple in 
Trincomalee a Hindu religious site – thereby preserving it from commercial 
development and colonization. Senanayake acquiesced to Sinhala Buddhist 
opposition to the designation, led by a Buddhist monk from Trincomalee, who 
argued that if the land was designated as a Hindu religious site it would ‘get 
into the hands of those who were neither Sinhalese nor Buddhist’ (quoted in 
Wilson 1994:110 see also Pfaffenberger 1990:92).  
The SLFP led coalition’s landslide victory in 1970209 and the adoption of the 
new constitution in 1972 was coeval with a radicalisation of Tamil politics as 
the FP itself abandoned federalism for secession. In 1972 Chelvanayagam 
resigned his seat to protest at the new constitution and stated that he would 
fight the by-election on the platform of independence. When the by-election 
was finally held in 1975 he won with 72 per cent of the vote, his opponent, a 
candidate for the Communist Party (an SLFP ally), got 26 per cent of the vote 
(De Silva 1979:196). In the 1977 general elections, an FP-led coalition, the 
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), stood on a platform of independence 
citing a history of violence, discrimination, economic exclusion and 
colonisation along with the failure of political compromise (Ponnambalam 
1983:185). The TULF won 17 out of the 19 constituencies with Tamil 
majorities with 59 per cent of the vote (Appendix Two).  
At the same time there was growing militancy amongst Tamil youth seeking 
independence through armed struggle. This included, amongst numerous 
others, the Tamil New Tigers (formed in 1972), the organisation that 
subsequently became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which 
became the dominant Tamil armed movement from the mid-1980’s 
(Balasingham 2004:21-6; O’Duffy 2007). The militancy was first expressed in 
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widespread student protests against government ministers and other officials 
visiting the Northeast, particularly Jaffna. There was also a spate of bank 
robberies, assassinations of police officers and Tamil politicians seen to be 
collaborating with the Sri Lankan state (INT 18; INT 19). The state responded 
with intensified police and military repression (Ponnambalam 1983:184) in an 
escalating cycle of violence. A notable incident was the police firing into the 
crowd attending the fourth World Tamil Conference, hosted in Jaffna in 1974 
(the first was held in Malaysia in 1966, the second in Tamil Nadu in 1968 and a 
third in Paris in 1970). The police firing left nine dead and hundreds injured 
(1983:182-3) and signalled the growing importance of violence in relations 
between the Sri Lankan state and Tamil political as well as cultural activity.  
8.3.2 Votes and voters 
The consolidation of a territorial conception of nationhood in Tamil politics 
cannot be seen as the unmediated expansion of nationalist sentiment. In a 
pattern that reflected trends in the Sinhala speaking areas, voter turnout in the 
Tamil speaking areas appeared to correlate more closely to expanding welfare 
provision, than FP mobilisation. The largest expansion in turnout was between 
1947 (55 per cent) and 1952 (71.12) a period which saw the expansion of 
welfare provision, particularly rice subsidies, along with fears this may be 
withdrawn. The FP was formed in 1949 and while it engaged in campaigns to 
mobilise political opinion – through public meetings, for example - in 1952 it 
won only 2 of the 18 Tamil majority constituencies and gained 18.6 per cent of 
the vote. The increase in voter turnout was not therefore the outcome of FP 
mobilisation. The 1956 elections were however, an important landmark in the 
FP’s trajectory; it expanded its vote share to 40 per cent of the vote in the 
Tamil majority constituencies. But average voter turnout at the 1956 elections 
across in the Tamil constituencies (as in the Sinhalese ones) was actually 
slightly less in 1956 (69 per cent) than in 1952 (71 per cent). This is despite the 
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FP’s successful mobilisation of mass protests in 1956 and 1958 and the anti 
Tamil violence this provoked. Welfare provision was therefore likely to be an 
important factor in mobilising Tamil votes. Meanwhile FP MPs, when they 
were not leading protests, behaved much like other parliamentarians and 
worked to mediate their constituents’ access to publicly provided goods and 
services; some also used their parliamentary positions as a means of advancing 
personal interests (Pfaffenberger 1990).  
Like Indian and other Sri Lankan political parties, the FP did not rely on direct 
political mobilisation alone to mobilise support. Instead, it often co-opted 
locally powerful individuals as a means of building and expanding its support 
base. Although many FP candidates were individuals of local standing who 
often financed their campaigns with personal resources, the party label and the 
Tamil nationalist framework did make an important difference. For example, 
in the Eastern Province, from 1956 onwards, as the FP entered electoral 
contests and gained significant vote shares, three candidates who had 
previously stood as independents hastily adopted party labels advocating a 
specifically Tamil political interest.210 Similarly, in the Jaffna constituency, the 
independent candidate Alfred Durayappah, who was elected in the 1960 
elections for the Jaffna town constituency, nevertheless felt constrained to 
identify himself with the FP led Satyagraha in 1961 and made high profile 
visits to the protests on several occasions (INT 20). [Durayappah later joined 
the SLFP, and as mayor of Jaffna, ordered the police raid on the World Tamil 
Conference, which is said to have led to his assassination in 1975 by militants]. 
C Arulapalam, the successful candidate for the ACTC in the Nallur 
constituency (Jaffna) during the 1970 elections polled 46.6 per cent of the vote 
(de Silva 1979:241). However, he subsequently crossed over to the SLFP and in 
1977 stood as the SLFP candidate, but this time polled just over 3 per cent of 
the vote. Similarly, in the Jaffna constituency, C. X Martyn who stood in the 
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1970 elections as the successful FP candidate gained 35 per cent of the vote. 
However, in the 1977 elections, standing as independent he also gained just 
over 3 per cent of the vote (1979:186). The FP’s failure to mobilise new voters 
does not, however, diminish its political significance. Instead, its activities 
worked to establish the Tamil nationalist framework as the ‘banal’ and taken 
for granted framework of political contestation (Billig 1995). In other words, 
the FP’s activities were decisive in establishing the principle of territorial 
autonomy as core to Tamil politics, a principle that has since to be invoked by 
all actors seeking Tamil support, whatever the actual political motivations.  
8.3.3 Erasing intra-ethnic cleavages 
The Tamil nationalist platform, like Sinhala Buddhism, was also not a mere 
assertion of organic ethnic solidarity, but a complex political project that 
involved a recognition of, and effort to mediate, the pluralism within. While 
seeking equality with the Sinhalese, the FP also sought to regulate the 
differences of caste, region and religion within the Tamil category through the 
principle of equality, expressed through the notion of ‘non-domination’; that is, 
no one section (however defined) would dominate the other. In terms of 
religion, for example, the party made explicit commitments to secularism 
(Wilson 1994:75). As discussed in Chapter Six, the differences between 
Christians and Hindus had largely been overcome by the late colonial period 
through a shared understanding of Tamil identity and interest as political and 
cultural; Chelvanayagam, the pre -eminent Tamil leader of this period, was 
Anglican (1994:50), whilst one of his principal lieutenants, C. Vanniasingham, 
was an orthodox Hindu (1994:64). The principle of secularism was therefore 
enshrined this historically created framework – and was intended as a means 
of also including the Tamil speaking Muslim population. However, although 
the FP had some success in mobilising Muslim support, it was not able to 
successfully incorporate Muslim voters stably into its electoral base. This is 
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primarily because Muslim associational activity from the late nineteenth 
century had primarily identified Muslim cultural and political interests in 
terms of religion (Samaraweera 1997) and as therefore distinct from Tamil 
public culture organised around language and culture, as well as the explicit 
demand for Tamil – Sinhala political equality.  
The principle of non – domination was also intended to cover the issue of caste 
(Wilson 1994:74). Caste hierarchy continued to exist in much of Tamil social 
and cultural life, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula and was to some extent 
reflected in voting behaviour; for example, the CP and LSSP had a base 
amongst caste groups subject to the practices of untouchability in two Jaffna 
constituencies - Udipudy and Nallur (Jupp 1979:143; De Silva 1979:241, 277). 
The issue rose to prominence in the late 1960's as a number of associations 
amongst caste groups treated as untouchable began to organise protests 
demanding entry into temples; often being met by organised violence from 
upper caste temple patrons (Pfaffenberger 1990). By the early 1970's, partly as 
a result of these protests, caste began to figure more prominently in the FP's 
activities. Caste figured in the six point programme adopted by an FP led 
coalition of Tamil parties in 1972 (Ponnambalam 1983:178) and a number of 
FP leaders began to suggest positive discrimination measures such as those 
adopted in India to alleviate the effects of caste hierarchy and exclusion (INT 
20).  
The attitudes of FP politicians towards caste were mixed; most, including SJV 
Chelvanayagam, were members of the dominant landowning caste and some 
were known to be rigidly observant of caste hierarchy in their own lives. 
Others such as Navaratnam, the FP MP for Chavakachcheri, engaged publicly 
in activities – such as intercaste dining and the cleaning of latrines in lower 
caste houses - that were intended to symbolically overturn caste hierarchy 
(INT 20). These activities copied Gandhi's approach to caste; by publicly 
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engaging in activities that broke caste taboos, such as cleaning latrines (a task 
normally reserved for castes treated as untouchable) Gandhi sought to 
undermine upper caste prejudice whilst retaining other aspects of Hindu 
practice and belief. The FP's approach to caste was therefore very much in 
keeping with the dominance of the Indianist rather than Dravidian strand of 
Tamil revivalism; the DK's wholesale rejection of Hindu belief and practice 
remained absent as a substantial or visible part of Tamil associational activity 
in Sri Lanka in the post-independence period. Caste also became a category of 
political representation; in the 1977 elections T. Rajalingam, the successful 
TULF candidate for Udupiddy (Jaffna), was from a formerly untouchable or 
Dalit caste. His campaign involved extensive canvassing by members of the FPs 
youth wing who were deployed to win support for the candidate amongst the 
predominantly upper caste voters (INT 20; INT 21).  
Caste remains an important aspect of Tamil society – influencing, for example, 
marriage patterns amongst both Christians and Hindus. However, successive 
Tamil nationalist actors – the FP and the LTTE – have explicitly sought to 
address the question of caste. The LTTE, for example, adopted positive 
discrimination measures within its own – by the mid 1990’s well developed - 
military and political structures (INT 23; INT 24; Bose 1994:105). Caste issues 
have therefore been contained, rather than erased, by Tamil nationalist actors’ 
efforts to create a pan-Tamil (inclusive of caste) national movement. This is of 
course exactly what happened in India where caste has not disappeared but 
instead caste based demands have been contained within the Indian 
constitutional framework.  
The attempt to create a unified Tamil national platform also had to address the 
differences of region. From the mid 1920's onwards, the Jaffna peninsula had 
become an important centre of Tamil associational activity, mirroring its 
economic and cultural dominance over the rest of the north-east (Moore 
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1985:133-4). The activities of the JYC and the ACTC were concentrated 
mainly in the Northern Province and specifically the Jaffna peninsula. In 
contrast, the FP sought explicitly to build a support and organisational base 
that incorporated the northeast as a whole. Its electoral campaigns as well as its 
mass protests were organised on this regional scale. The eastern port town of 
Trincomalee was declared as the putative capital of a federal Tamil state 
(Wilson 1994:73) and N. R Rajavarothiam, the FP MP for Trincomalee, was 
named the party's vice president at its inauguration in 1949 (1994:32). The FP's 
first convention in 1951 was held in Trincomalee and was staged as something 
of a spectacle as party members organised processions from Jaffna and 
Batticaloa to converge at the convention site; their route physically tracing the 
geography of Tamil national claims (Navaratnam 1991). The 1956 sit down 
protest in front of parliament organised by the FP included volunteers from 
the North as well as the East (1991). Similarly, the 1961 protests brought civil 
administration to a standstill across the North and the East. Although the FP’s 
electoral base was more far more consolidated in the Northern Province, 
through a combination of direct mobilisation and the co-option of existing 
important politicians, the FP was able to mobilise significant electoral support 
in the East, where it regularly polled an average of 40 per cent of the vote in 
constituencies with Sri Lankan Tamil majorities.211  
The escalation of the Tamil-Sinhala conflict was therefore a matter of ideology 
and political process. The Tamil and Sinhala conceptions of national identity, 
national interest and the ideal orderings of the island’s ethnic pluralism are 
mutually incompatible. This is in contrast to the Dravidian and Indian 
nationalist conceptions (discussed in Chapters Five and Seven). This 
ideological antagonism is also not a simple case of identity always being 
formed in opposition to an oppositional other. Tamil nationalism and Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism can both be traced to the late nineteenth century Tamil / 
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Saivite and Buddhist revivals respectively. As discussed in Chapter Six, these 
movements did not develop in opposition to each other but rather in response 
to the same conceptual framework. In the post-independence period, however, 
the rapid Sinhala Buddhist transformation of the Sri Lankan state, economy 
and social life was associated with a countervailing Tamil nationalist project. 
The escalating conflict is an expression of the ideological contradictions 
between the two projects rather than an outcome of their mere existence as 
separate bases for identities. Muslim political leaders have for example 
accepted and worked within the ideological framework of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism.  
8.3.4 Tamil nationalism and secession 
The consolidation of the Tamil nationalist framework also cannot be explained 
as an outcome of its utility as an instrumental vehicle for a variety of unrelated 
ends and purposes. For example, at times of intra-Tamil caste conflict, FP 
leaders may well have mobilised Tamil nationalist rhetoric more or less 
consciously as a means of subordinating these tensions against the broader 
Sinhala-Tamil axis of conflict (Pfaffenberger 1990). Some hopeful candidates 
may have used Tamil nationalist rhetoric as a means of getting elected, still 
others as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the government. 
However, the argument that Tamil nationalist rhetoric could be used to 
conceal intra-Tamil caste conflict fails to explain why it was meaningful and 
successful in doing so. The argument that Tamil nationalism was 
instrumentally used by Tamil politicians to mobilise electoral support similarly 
fails to explain why they did so in specifically Tamil nationalist terms, rather 
than for example following Muslim politicians and working within a Sinhala 
Buddhist framework. Finally, some Tamil politicians may well have been 
seeking individual political power, rather than a fundamental restructuring of 
the unitary, centralised Sinhala Buddhist state. However, this also fails to 
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explain why such a course of action was deemed meaningful; after all Muslim 
and Sinhala Catholic politicians were able to gain access to public resources 
and ministerial portfolios by working within the Sinhala Buddhist paradigm. 
In short, the dominance of Tamil nationalism as an organising principle of 
politics had an existence outside of the interests that might have been served 
by it and so cannot be explained as an consequence of these interests.  
The escalation of Tamil demands from federalism to independence must also 
be seen within this ideological framework. The FP’s decision to adopt 
independence can be seen as a response to pressure from the growing armed 
insurgency (INT 18; INT 19). Amita Shastri has suggested that Tamil 
politicians made the switch to independence when they saw the possibilities 
for the economic development of the Tamil speaking regions being realised by 
state sponsored colonisation schemes and the public investment that followed 
the nationalisation of the Trincomalee port (1994). The proximate causes that 
triggered the switch are however, less important than the fact that the demand 
for secession was logically contained within the framework of stressing Tamil 
and Sinhala collective political equality. The demand for self determination 
had been made, perhaps rhetorically but nevertheless meaningfully, by Tamil 
politicians from as early as 1947 (Wilson 1994:30). Furthermore, the economic 
potential and viability of the Tamil speaking areas had long been discussed by 
the FP as a means of promoting its demands for territorial autonomy (1994:69); 
indeed territorial autonomy had been demanded primarily as a means of 
realising this potential for the benefit of the Tamils (Navaratnam 1991). The 
motivations and proximate causes driving the switch were less important than 
the fact that it was meaningful within the logic of the Tamil conception of 
national identity and national interest. The difference in 1975 was that the 
demand for secession was backed not just by a political coalition that could 
mobilise electoral support but also by a nascent armed insurgency. The armed 
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movements’ objective, independent statehood, clearly had its ideological roots 
in recent Tamil politics. However, the factors that created an escalation of 
armed conflict are to be found in the shifts of regional and international 
politics, rather than in Sri Lanka’s political dynamics.  
8.4 The regional and international politics of Sri Lanka’s ethnic 
war 
The appearance of sustained Tamil nationalist armed militancy in the early 
1970’s is situated within a context of local, regional and international factors. 
The adoption of the 1972 constitution was interpreted by many Tamil political 
actors, particularly youth and student activists, as the door finally closing on 
the possibility of peaceful constitutional change (O’ Duffy 2007:260). On the 
day the constitution was adopted most of the Jaffna schools were empty as 
students staged impromptu strikes and held demonstrations burning the Sri 
Lankan flag (INT 19). Secondly, Tamil public opinion had closely followed the 
insurgency in East Pakistan, Indian intervention and the formation of 
Bangladesh in 1972 (Krishna 1999). Tamil students, inspired by the 
Bangladeshi example, sought to organise material and political support for the 
Mukthi Bani (the Bangladeshi insurgents); they were unsuccessful and arrested 
(INT 19; INT 20). Finally, the international context is also important. The late 
1960's and early 1970's was the era of armed national liberation struggles, most 
prominently in Vietnam and in several African locales, and the idea of armed 
resistance to the state – whether national or from within a Marxist framework 
– was prevalent. It was in this context that armed opposition to the state 
emerged on a Tamil nationalist basis in Jaffna, whilst in the Sinhala south the 
JVP uprising of 1971 was inspired by Marxist and Sinhala nationalist themes 
(Kearney 1973:202-207). By the mid 1970s, Tamil militants had carried out a 
small number of attacks on banks and police posts as well as assassinating 
Tamil politicians seen to be colluding with the Sri Lankan state. However, the 
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scale of the Tamil militancy at this stage cannot be said to presage the 
escalation into full-scale civil war during the 1980’s. In 1983, the LTTE that 
had been in existence since 1972 and eventually became the dominant militant 
group had only carried out a handful of attacks and had only a few dozen 
members (Balasingham 2004; INT 22). In comparison, armed anti colonial 
activity in India during World War One and in the immediate post war period 
was much greater; with at least 51 political assassinations in the 1914-16 period 
and several thousand arrests, including those of the Ghadr movement (Sarkar 
1989:147-8).  
The switch from small scale insurgency to full scale civil war turned on a 
number of other factors. Locally important factors were the escalation of anti 
Tamil violence from 1977, rising Tamil militancy and a growing militarisation 
of the Tamil speaking areas, particularly Jaffna. The 1977 elections, and the 
TULF’s spectacular victory on a mandate of secession, were followed by island 
wide anti Tamil violence. In response, the newly elected President J. R 
Jaywardene explicitly adopted the language of terrorism in dealing with the 
growing Tamil insurgency. A Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed in 1979 
and the military, now almost completely Sinhalese, was despatched to the 
north with orders to ‘wipe out the terrorists’ (Ponnambalam 1983:203). Along 
with a rising arrests, indefinite detention and extra-judicial executions targeted 
at individuals suspected of militants links, the growing Sinhala police and 
military presence in Jaffna also produced an escalation of more general 
violence. In June 1981, on the eve of local council elections, Sri Lankan police 
committed widespread arson attacks in Jaffna town, attacking shops, business 
and the FP offices. They also torched the Jaffna public library along with its 
90,000 volumes, including some rare Tamil manuscripts. The simmering 
insurgency finally tipped into civil war following perhaps the worst episode of 
anti Tamil violence in July 1983. Jaywardene responded to the violence by 
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adopting a constitutional amendment that explicitly prohibited secessionist 
advocacy, prompting the resignation of most TULF parliamentarians who were 
unwilling to publicly renounce the possibility of secession (Wilson 1988; Bose 
1994).  
With the possibility of parliamentary protest effectively closed, international 
factors and wider geo-political concerns were also important in the escalation 
of conflict (Bose 1994; Krishna 1999). J. R Jayawardene’s programme of 
economic liberalisation and pro-west ‘tilt’ produced substantial western 
military and diplomatic support for military efforts against the Tamil 
insurgents, understood as ‘communist terrorists’. Conversely, Indira Gandhi’s 
government, wary of growing US influence on the island, began to arm and 
train Tamil militants as a means of gaining leverage over Colombo. Sri Lanka’s 
escalation to a full blown civil war was therefore not the inevitable outcome of 
small scale armed militancy, but the product of a confluence of factors – 
including the impossibility of finding an accommodation between the rival 
Tamil and Sinhala Buddhist conceptions of national identity and interest.  
8.5 Conclusion 
By 1977 two mutually incompatible conceptions of national identity and 
national interest had become firmly established as organising principles of the 
island’s political life; the Sinhala Buddhist conception was reproduced by 
political parties and the activities of the state whilst the Tamil conception was 
reproduced through political parties and later armed movements opposed to 
the state’s project. The rise to political dominance of these two contrasting 
conceptions cannot be explained through temporally static variables – such as 
ethnic demography - or indeed the proximate interests and motivations that 
might have been served through their ascendance. Rather, the dominance of 
these two conceptions is a matter of political process that can be traced to the 
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absence of engaged and temporally sustained work to establish a pan-ethnic 
conception of the nation from the late nineteenth century. As a consequence, 
mass electoral contestation on the island began in the absence of a shared 
understanding of how the island’s ethnic pluralism could be reconciled with 
the need for a unified sense of national identity and national interest. Electoral 
contestation instead established two competing conceptions of reconciling 
ethnic pluralism and national identity; the hierarchical conception of Sinhala 
Buddhism and the ‘two equal collectives’ conception of Tamil nationalism.  
Furthermore, this escalation of conflict is not just a matter of the relative 
extremism or moderation of political leaders, but rather of the logic and 
political success of the respective national frameworks within which they 
operated. S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, having led his SLFP to power on a Sinhala 
nationalist platform, sought to reach an accommodation with the Tamil parties, 
but was prevented from doing so by growing opposition – including from the 
UNP - framed in Sinhala Buddhist terms. Then in 1965 when UNP leaders 
sought to accommodate FP demands for territorial autonomy and language 
rights, they met stiff resistance both from their own backbenchers and from 
opposition parties, led by the SLFP. Similarly, the Tamil FP, on two occasions – 
in 1956 and again in 1965 – agreed to proposals that clearly fell short of its 
demands for federal autonomy but nevertheless failed to prevent the 
inexorable centralisation and Sinhala nationalisation of the Sri Lankan state.212  
Finally, the TULF, despite the strident rhetoric of its of 1977 election 
manifesto demanding an independent Tamil state, came to an agreement with 
J. R Jayawardene, the UNP president, on proposals to establish District 
Development Councils with limited autonomy in the Tamil speaking areas 
(Wilson 1988). These efforts were thwarted by a number of factors; notably 
resistance from the cabinet, his own ambivalence, steadily escalating clashes 
between Tamil insurgents and the military and finally growing collective 
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violence against Tamils and other minorities that culminated in the 1983 anti-
Tamil violence. All of these factors are, however, subordinate to the larger 
political problem - notably that between the Sinhala Buddhist hierarchical and 
centralised conception of order on the one hand, and the Tamil conception of 
equal nations, on the other, there is very little overlapping space in which 
agreement can be found. Violently clashing political projects, rather than 
violence per se, has subsequently come to define Sri Lanka’s Tamil – Sinhala 
politics and the still unresolved national question. 
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9. Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the fatefully divergent trajectories of ethnic and 
national politics in Tamil speaking regions of India and Sri Lanka from the late 
nineteenth century to 1977. It has argued that this divergence can only be 
explained as the contingent outcome of competitive and temporally situated 
processes of political contestation and mobilisation through which the 
conceptually unavoidable tension between ethnic pluralism, on the one hand, 
and the need for a unified conception of national identity on the other, was 
resolved in more or less ethnically inclusive ways. In doing so, it has departed 
from the extant literature on ethnicity and nationalism and extant 
explanations for the outcomes in both places. Rather than treating ethnic and 
national politics as self-evident expressions of ethnic and national identities – 
themselves explained in a variety of ways - the approach here has been to treat 
ethnic and national claims as meaningful, conceptually unavoidable and 
therefore consequential acts of political contestation in the modern era of 
nation-states and popular sovereignty. 
While the study of ethnicity, nationalism and ethnic conflict contains an 
irreducible plurality of theoretical and methodological approaches, it is 
nevertheless characterised by a common concern; notably the effort to identify 
the factors that produce and sustain ethnic and national identities, interests, 
motivations and affiliations. Some approaches have suggested that ethnicity 
and nationalism are relatively permanent characteristics of the human 
condition, linked to basic structures of cognition, social interaction or features 
of stable social and political structures. Others have suggested that ethnic and 
national identities, far from being stable factors of the human social condition, 
are in fact the relatively fleeting and more or less consciously instrumental 
creations of social and political struggle. The attempt to identify the 
underlying sources of ethnic and national politics in India and Sri Lanka points 
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to a bewildering array of factors and processes that could explain the divergent 
outcomes; notably the more or less consciously instrumental tactics of self 
seeking politicians, patterns of ethnic demography, the more or less 
enlightened decisions of political leaders, the integrity of party structures and 
finally the discursive practices of the colonial state and / or revivalist actors.  
What all of these potential causal explanations cannot adequately capture, 
however, are the striking similarities across the two cases, the Tamil-speaking 
areas of South India and Sri Lanka, in the range of interests pursued by self 
seeking politicians, the patterns of ethnic demography, the array of ethnic and 
national discourses adopted by colonial and revivalist actors, as well as the 
levels of political moderation and or excess exercised by leaders and or their 
followers. Instead of attempting to identify the sources of ethnic or national 
identities, and thereby the causes of their potential conflict or accommodation, 
this dissertation has sought to explain the similarities and divergences in the 
two case studies by treating ethnic and national claims primarily as meaningful 
and therefore consequential statements of political contestation.  
The nation and ethnicity are thus understood as central and unavoidable 
concepts of political contestation, rather than as vehicles to express or invoke 
underlying interests or identities. As political concepts, the nation and 
ethnicity – along with related terms – act as the frames that shape the 
experiences, expression and description of identities and interests as well as the 
struggles to secure them. This analysis of the conceptual characteristics of the 
nation and ethnicity draws on the work of Koselleck and the techniques of 
conceptual history with which he is closely associated. In this way, the nation 
and ethnicity, along with their close cognates and synonyms, are understood as 
terms imbued with a forward reaching temporality that reach out to establish 
future possible social and political worlds, rather than to capture existing 
reality.  
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The political meanings of the nation and ethnicity are defined by their close 
relationship to the principle of popular sovereignty. The nation functions in 
political language as a metonym for the notion of the general will – the 
operative principle of popular sovereignty – and in doing so conveys both 
political and ethnic meanings. The nation as general will requires an 
accommodation of the plethora of partial interests or wills competing in 
society while the nation as pre-political community requires a harmonisation 
of the pre-political ethnic diversity of the population into a culturally and 
historically unified national whole. The nation, ethnicity and linked terms 
such as communal are thus situated in a semantic field in which terms and 
issues define the boundaries of political community and the legitimate uses of 
public authority. Popular sovereignty demands that the power of the state, or 
public authority, should only be moved in the national interest and competing 
protagonists in political struggle put forward alternative conceptions of the 
national interest and, relatedly, national identity. Yet, the nation is also a pre-
political entity and in order to contest the definition of the national interests 
political protagonists must have a shared understanding of the terms through 
which plural ethnic categories are accommodated within a culturally and 
historically unified conception of the nation. The nation is thus not more or 
less civic or ethnic, but more or less inclusive of the ethnic pluralism found 
within the boundaries of all states.  
The analysis presented in this dissertation shows that the difference between 
ethnic accommodation and ethnic conflict is a matter of contingent, in that 
they could have been otherwise, processes of political organisation and 
mobilisation in which more or less ethnically exclusive national identities are 
asserted, contested and more or less successfully established as dominant 
frameworks of political contestation. In essence, central to the explanation of 
Sri Lanka’s descent into ethnic conflict and India’s peaceable accommodation 
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of Tamil politics are the contingent and temporally situated processes through 
which dominant conceptions of Indian and Sri Lankan national identity came 
to framed in ways that accommodated or excluded politically dominant 
conceptions of Tamil identity and interest.  
There are two distinctive features of these divergent trajectories that make the 
Indian and Sri Lankan cases uniquely comparable. Firstly, a shared and 
connected historical experience of British colonial rule, subsequent 
competitive democratic politics and comparable social and economic 
conditions have been associated with a striking synchronicity in political 
developments marked by a similar range of politically significant ethnic 
categories. In both India and Sri Lanka, from the late nineteenth century, 
there have been significant political movements that have invoked, in 
overlapping ways, differences of religion, language, race, caste and region. 
Secondly, Sri Lanka’s post independence history of violently escalating ethnic 
conflict framed in Tamil – Sinhala terms and the peaceable accommodation of 
Tamil politics within the Indian national framework, could not easily have 
been predicted from the range of political movements apparent in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. Politics in colonial Sri Lanka was marked by 
intra-Sinhala and intra-Tamil caste and religious conflict, intra-regional 
Sinhala conflict (between low country and Kandyan Sinhalese) while the most 
notable incident of pre-independence collective violence was directed by 
Sinhala Buddhists against Muslims. Meanwhile, in colonial India, the south 
Indian Dravidian movement’s opposition to the Congress movement was 
comparable to Muslim nationalism in the types of claims it made and in its 
initial sources of support. Finally, the south Indian Tamil protests (1965-7) 
against Congress led attempts to introduce Hindi as the ‘official’ language 
arguably expressed a much greater level of violent antipathy towards the 
Indian government than the largely peaceable demonstrations by Sri Lankan 
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Tamils (1958-62) against the adoption of Sinhala as the only official language 
in Sri Lanka.  
The dissertation explains the emergence of escalating ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka and peaceable ethnic accommodation in India, despite the apparently 
unpromising beginnings of both, as a consequence of the contingent outcomes 
of competitive political mobilisation in which the nation and related ethnic 
categories functioned as meaningful and unavoidable categories of political 
contestation. In Sri Lanka, the Sinhala Buddhist conception of national 
identity was politically more successful than a pan-ethnic conception, while in 
India the pan-ethnic conception was politically more successful than the 
Hindu nationalist conception. These differences in the relative success and 
failure of differing conceptions of national identity and interest were 
furthermore not due to pre-given structural differences but rather, the success 
of ethnic and national movements depended on their ability to mobilise a 
diverse array of existing interests and motivations – in a temporally continuous 
way - in support of their specific claims and demands. Although the interests 
and motivations mobilised by ethnic and national movements are often only 
incidentally related to the movement’s claims and assertions, the social and 
political consequences of successful and politically dominant movements are 
nevertheless closely linked to their core ideological frameworks. Successful 
ethnic and national movements have transformative social and political 
consequences that are in keeping with their core ideological claims, but these 
effects are often quite separate from the often unrelated ends and interests 
pursued by self regarding actors who are invariably associated with any 
successful movement. In short, the consequences of ethnic and national 
movements cannot be explained by the various ends pursued and/ or satisfied 
through such movements.  
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There are a number of implications from the arguments presented here both 
for the study of ethnicity and nationalism, and also for ongoing debates about 
the means of resolving ethnically framed conflict. In terms of the still 
unresolved question of whether nationalism is an inherently modern 
phenomenon, the argument presented here would suggest that the present 
meanings and consequences of national and ethnic politics are tied to a 
modern conceptual framework and could not have had the same meanings 
prior to the conceptual shifts associated with the processes of modernisation 
and in particular the principle of popular sovereignty linked to the modern 
territorial state. Secondly, and as a consequence of the close conceptual 
connection between the nation and popular sovereignty, national conceptions 
of political community are never either exclusively civic or ethnic but rather 
more or less inclusive of the ethnic pluralism contained within the boundaries 
of almost all states. Departing from the extant approaches to ethnicity and 
nationalism, this thesis has also suggested that the outcomes of ethnic conflict 
and ethnic accommodation cannot be explained in terms of the factors that 
reproduce ethnic identities or the activities of self-seeking politicians; ethnic 
pluralism and self seeking political actors can be found in situations of ethnic 
conflict and ethnic accommodation. Rather, the outcomes of ethnic conflict or 
ethnic accommodation can only be explained as outcomes of temporally 
situated effects of nationalist mobilisation and the more or less ethnically 
inclusive conceptions of identity and interest that successful movements are 
able to establish as dominant and organising principles of political contestation.  
Finally, the arguments presented here have important implications for ongoing 
debates about how best to manage ethnic pluralism and ethnically framed 
conflict. There are broadly two mutually antagonistic approaches; the first that 
can be labelled ‘accomodationist’ favours a political framework that explicitly 
recognises ethnic diversity while a second, labelled ‘integrationist’, advocates a 
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framework that would marginalise ethnic groups in favour of a unified 
national identity. Those who advocate ‘integrative’ approaches suggest that 
accommodating ethnic identities will simply entrench and exacerbate ethnic 
divisions while those who advocate accommodative policies reply that 
integrative approaches simply entrench the political dominance of the largest 
ethnic group whilst perpetuating the marginalisation of ethnic minority groups. 
These debates continue to be vital in relation to Sri Lanka’s ongoing and 
seemingly intractable ethnic conflict. The analysis presented here suggests, 
however, that ethnically inclusive politics is not a matter of institutional 
reform but is rather an outcome of political mobilisation, particularly 
oppositional mobilisation.  
The example of India suggests that accommodative politics produce 
accommodative institutions, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, 
and contrary to the claim that ethnic politics undermines national unity, the 
Indian example suggests that national unity is created by the recognition and 
accommodation of ethnic pluralism through temporally situated processes of 
political mobilisation, rather than by the transcending of ethnic difference. 
Opinion poll surveys in Tamil Nadu attest to this accommodation rather than 
transcendence of ethnic identity. The proportion of people in Tamil Nadu 
expressing a regional only identity (34 per cent) is higher than the average for 
the other Indian states (12 per cent), while at the same time, the proportion of 
people in Tamil Nadu expressing trust in central Indian institutions – such as 
the central government (58 per cent) and the army (82 per cent) - is higher 
than the average for the Indian states:30 per cent and 64 per cent respectively 
(Stepan et all 2001:136-7). This outcome, the dissertation argues, is the result 
of the trajectory of national politics in India and its relationship to the 
emergence of a conceptually modern Tamil cultural identity. Indian nationalist 
mobilisation in the Tamil speaking areas did not override the emergence of a 
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distinct Tamil public culture, but rather incorporated it as both a vehicle and 
object of the Indian identity and interest; Indian nationalism in effect became 
Tamil in the Tamil speaking regions.  
The implications for ethnic conflict resolution are clear; it is not a matter of 
institutions but of politics and more particularly the types of ethnic and 
national identity that have become politically dominant. In Sri Lanka this 
means that the prospects of peaceable ethnic accommodation will depend on 
the ongoing political salience of the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist conception of 
ethnic hierarchy, on the one hand, and the Tamil nationalist conception of 
ethnic equality, on the other. If these identities remain politically salient, then 
the alternatives of either integrative or accommodative institutions will simply 
behave in ways predicted by their critics: integrative institutions will 
perpetuate Sinhala Buddhist dominance while accommodative institutions will 
entrench the separate spheres of Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil politics. The 
latter may however, be the least worst outcome and more in line with extant 
political realities.  
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10. Appendices 
Appendix One: Population Statistics 
Table One 
India 1891  
Total Population 287, 223, 431 
Madras Population 35, 630, 440 
Tamil Speakers 15, 229, 759 
Hindu 187, 937, 450 
Muslim 50, 121, 585 
Christian 1, 862, 634 
• Figures taken from the Census of India 1891 (Government of India 1892) 
Table Two 
India 1921 
Total Population 318, 942, 480 
Madras 42, 794, 155 
Tamil Speakers 18, 780, 000 
Hindu 216, 735, 000 
Muslim 68, 735, 000 
Christian 4, 754, 000 
309 
 
Indo European Language Speakers 
(Hindi, Hindustani, Bengali, Gujarati, 
Marathi, Urdu, Maithili) 
232, 846, 549 
Dravidian Language Speakers 
(Tamil, Telugu, Kandadam, 
Malayalam) 
64, 128, 052 
• Figures taken from the Census of India 1921 (Government of India 1922) 
Table Three 
Distribution of Indian Muslim Population in 1921 
Province Muslim 
Population 
Muslim 
Population as per 
cent of total 
provincial 
population 
Muslim 
Population as per 
cent of total 
Indian Muslim 
population  
Bengal 25, 210, 810 54 43 
United Provinces 6, 481, 032 14.25 11 
Punjab 11, 444, 321 55.33 20 
• Figures taken from Hasan (1991:10) 
• While these three provinces contained 84 per cent of the population, 
the remaining 16 per cent were distributed across Madras, Bombay, 
Central Provinces and the Princely States.  
Table Four 
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Sri Lanka 1891 
Total Population 3, 007, 789 
Sinhalese 2, 041, 158 
Tamil 723, 853 
Muslims 197, 166 
Malays 10, 133 
• Figures taken from Census of Ceylon 1891 (Government of Ceylon 
1892) 
Table Five 
Sri Lanka 1921 
Total Population 4, 498, 605 
Sinhalese 
• Low Country 
• Kandyan 
3, 016, 154 
1, 927, 057 
1, 089, 097 
Sri Lankan Tamils 517, 623 
Indian Tamils 602, 735 
Others (mainly other Indians, Burghers 
& Europeans) 
77, 426 
Muslims 284, 964 
Buddhists 2,743,702 
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Hindus 964,927 
Christians 443, 043 
• The religious composition of the Low Country Sinhalese was majority 
Buddhist (86.26 per cent) and minority Christian (13.69 per cent) 
• The religious composition of the Kandyan Sinhalese was 
overwhelmingly Buddhist (99.26 per cent) 
• The religious composition of the Sri Lankan Tamils was majority Hindu 
(83.01 per cent) and minority Christian (15.79 per cent) 
• The religious composition of the Indian Tamils was majority Hindu 
(89.01 per cent) and minority Christian (8.21 per cent).  
• The ethnic composition of the Christian population was as follows: Low 
Country Sinhalese (59.49 per cent), Sri Lankan Tamil (18.42 per cent), 
Indian Tamils (11.16 per cent) and others – mainly Burghers and 
Europeans (14.93 percent).  
• Figures taken from Census of Ceylon 1921 (Government of 
Ceylon:1923) 
 
Appendix Two: Sri Lanka Electoral Statistics 
 
Northern & Eastern Province / FP (TULF in 1977) per cent share of the votes polled 
  1952 1956 Mar 1960 Jul 1960 1965 1970 1977 
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Batticaloa 0 51.22 46.86 51.81 42.76 32.66 24.33 
Batticaloa 2   0 4.3 0 0 20.49 
Kalkudah 0 0 47.83 58.39 34.93 37.77 42.70 
Padiruppu 0 49.14 61.82 66.05 51.14 48.52 48.80 
Trincomalee 45.32 56.62 70.70 64.32 59.87 47.83 45.65 
  1952 1956 Mar 1960 Jul 1960 1965 1970 1977 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 P
ro
v
in
ce
 
Chavakacheri 27.45 64.23 64.73 85.33 68.77 54.33 63.08 
Jaffna Town 39.36 32.34 29.19 31.26 30.71 35.48 56.43 
Kankesanthurai 42.44 53.75 66.79 87.98 57.62 44.09 84.90 
Kayts 6.42 70.61 56.07 81.11 69.37 53.14 63.83 
Kilinochchi   41.21 71.78 44.31 46.39 73.22 
Kopay 44.29 53.15 47.84 66.94 51.15 55.50 76.86 
Manipay       83.48 
Mannar 0 52.69 46.93 55.49 39.25 48.70 51.44 
Mullaitivu       52.16 
Nallur   48.95 64.92 44.88 44.47 89.05 
Point Pedro 0 20.47 39.91 66.75 45.98 48.28 55.59 
Udupiddy   18.02 37.91 32.67 46.24 63.18 
  1952 1956 Mar 1960 Jul 1960 1965 1970 1977 
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Uduvil   43.62 62.45 48.04 49.07  
Vavuniya 0 0 0 42.08 24.87 42.80 58.82 
Vaddukodai 18.96 57.12 52.81 71.05 60.09 50.17 71.21 
 FP seats won out 
of Total 
Available 
2 out 
of 13 
8 out 
of 13 
14 out of 
18 
14 out of 
18 
12 out 
of 18 
12 out 
of 18 
17 out 
of 19 
 Average FP vote 15.79 43.03 43.52 59.44 44.89 43.63 59.22 
 
• Figures collated from De Silva (1979) 
• New constituencies were created through fresh boundary delimitations 
in 1960 and 1977. The 1977 changes eliminated the Uduvil 
Constituency. In the 1960 changes Batticaloa was made into a two 
member constituencies, each registered voter was given two votes and 
the two highest scoring candidates were elected.  
• In 1977 the FP led a coalition of Tamil parties (that included the ACTC) 
– called the TULF. 
• In the Northern Province Constituencies the bulk of the non FP vote 
went to the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC). In the Eastern 
Province it was won mainly by UNP candidates or independents. The 
percentage share of ‘non Tamil parties’ (ie other than the FP or ACTC) 
was a high of 25.1 per cent in 1952 and reached a low of 14 per cent in 
1960. In the Northern Province the non Tamil vote went to Marxist 
parties while in the Eastern Province it went to the UNP or 
independents (Jupp 1978:139). 
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• Where a zero is shown the FP did not contest.  
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Appendix Three: List of Interviews 
Indian Politicians, Journalists, Activists and Officials 
Mr. Ramachandran Congress party member. Father was Congress 
party member. Tinnellvelly District party 
Secretary from 1957 to 1964 
Mr. Nallakannu  Communist Party India (CPI) member from 1949. 
Previously member of Tamil Nadu Secretariat, 
currently secretary of the CPI Agricultural 
Workers Union 
Mr. Thiagarajan CPI member from 1962 member of the State 
Secretariat (Tamil Nadu) and National Council 
Mr. K. Thirunavukarasu  Dravidian movement activist and writer, founder 
of the Nam Nadu Achagam (press) that now 
publishes amongst other things Nakeran, a Tamil 
Language weekly satirical magazine 
Mr. Nedumaran Tamil activist. Student member of theDMK 
during the early 1950’s. Left to join Congress 
during the 1960’s and became a frontline leader. 
Currently leader of the Tamil National Movement, 
a non party political organisation. 
Mr. Era Sezhian Founder member of the DMK. Member of Lok 
Sabha from 1962 – 1977 and member of Rajya 
Sabha from 1978 – 1984.  
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Mr. K. Subbu Politician. Initially member member of CPI, 
crossed over to DMK and served as DMK State 
Assembly Member from 1971- 1975.   
Dr. Malaiswamy Retired IAS officer, currently serving as AIADMK 
member of Rajya Sabha.  
Mr. K. Anandan Sri Lankan Tamil poet and political activist. 
Political activist with the Federal Party during the 
1960‘s. Author of nationalist songs and poems that 
were popular during the Federal Party period. 
Continues to write about the civil war in Sri 
Lanka. Currently living in exile in Chennai. 
Mr. Aasan Editor Viduthalai, a daily Tamil language 
newspaper produced by the DK 
Mr. Poongondran  Organising Secretary, Dravida Kazhagam  
Mr. Arivukarasu  Organising Secretary, DK  
Mr. R Khan DMK member and Labour minister in DMK 
Government between 1996 - 2001. 
Mr. Kamaraj   Associate editor, Nakeran  
Mr. Vaiko   Leader MDMK  
Ms Arul Mozhli  Propaganda Secretary, DK   
Ms. K. Vijayakumar  Women’s Wing Secretary, MDMK  
Sri Lankan Tamil Politicians   
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Mr. G. Ponnambalam  Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP for Jaffna 
electorate, (2001-10) leader of All Ceylon Tamil 
Congress, grandson of G. G Ponnambalam 
Mr. S. Premachandran  Presently TNA MP for Jaffna electorate, leader of 
former Tamil militant group Eelam People’s 
Revolutionary Liberation Front 
Mr. M Senathirajah Presently TNA MP for Jaffna electorate, former 
member of FP youth wing 
Mr. R Sampanthan Presently TNA MP for Trincomalee, first elected 
to parliament from Trincomalee constituency in 
1977 on TULF ticket 
LTTE Officials  
Mr. Anton Balasingham  Chief Negotiator and Political Strategist 
Mr. S.P Tamilselvan   Negotiator, Head of Political Wing 
Mr. B. Nadesan   Negotiator and head of Tamileelam Police 
Services 
Mr. S. Puleedevan   Secretary General of Peace Secretariat 
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11. Endnotes 
                                                           
1 Until 1972 Sri Lanka was known as Ceylon. For convenience the dissertation will use 
Sri Lanka throughout. 
2 The proximate ‘trigger’ for the anti-Tamil rioting of July 1983 is often attributed to 
the ambush by LTTE guerrillas on an army patrol that killed 13 soldiers – then the 
most serious attack by Tamil militants. This account, one routinely cited in media 
reports, holds that anger amongst the Sinhala majority erupted into communal rioting 
as emotions ran high during the state funerals held for the troopers. However, several 
scholarly accounts of the pogrom detail the organised targeting of Tamils and their 
homes and businesses, with the rioters going street by street using electoral lists. For 
example, Kenneth Bush details the role played by government actors in his discussion 
of the pogrom (2003: 128–34). Newton Gunasinghe, in his seminal discussion of the 
economic and social impact of the rapid liberalisation after 1977 under the 
government of President J.R. Jayawardene traces how this had resulted in a 
strengthening of trade-oriented activities (advantaging Tamil businesses) and 
weakening local manufacturing (dominated by Sinhala ownership) adding an ethnic 
logic to simmering economic resentments. Other scholars place the pogrom within a 
longer history of anti-Tamil violence in an increasingly Sinhala nationalist state. As 
Sankaran Krishna (1999:67) notes, the period since independence has been 
“punctuated by bouts of annihilatory violence, often called pogroms, directed against 
the Tamils in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983.” In his view, these “periodic 
explosions of violence against Tamils represent efforts to put them back in their places 
on grounds they have become too assertive and need to be taught a lesson” (1999:54). 
This “physical discrimination” against the Tamils, as Nithiyanandam puts it, stemmed 
not only from the use of state (military) violence against Tamils, but also that when 
anti-Tamil rioting took place, “governments in power, by and large, condoned these” 
(2000:300). For a detailed account of the July 1983 pogrom, see Thornton and 
Niththyananthan (1984). 
3 For a critical discussion of this idea, see Yack (1996).  
4
 For a discussion of the lack of correlation between success in terms of robust political 
mobilisation and success in terms of realising political objectives see Chapter Four.  
5 For a discussion of the historical sources of this distinction, as well as a critical 
reformulation, see Zimmer (2003). 
6 See, for example, Kohn (1967) Greenfeld (1992) and Ignattieff (1993). 
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7 For criticisms of this approach, see Brubaker (2004), Calhoun (2007) and also Yack 
(1996). 
8 For example, by the late 1970’s the central pole of Sri Lankan Tamil politics had 
shifted from the demand for federal autonomy, first articulated shortly after 
independence, to the demand for independent statehood – Tamil Eelam – articulated 
most resoundingly by newly formed Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) sweeping 
the Northeast in 1977 elections, having campaigned on this single issue a platform. 
Meanwhile in India the ADMK, having recently adopted the All India prefix, 
resoundingly won the 1977 Tamil Nadu state assembly elections to become the 
governing party, reflecting the comprehensive integration of the state into the Indian 
union. 
The rapid developments in Sri Lanka after 1977 also make the historic period since 
qualitatively different from preceding decades. Its dominant themes were the overt 
militarization of state response to Tamil demands, armed militancy replacing the 
ineffectual parliamentary politics as the dominant mode of Tamil mobilisation, and 
also the establishment of important and complex connections between south Indian 
and Sri Lankan Tamil politics, as well as covert, and later overt, involvement of the 
Indian central government in the armed conflict. As Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis 
intensified in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the Indian government began to fund 
and train Sri Lankan Tamil militants (O’ Duffy 2007; Balasingham 2004; Bose 1994), 
primarily as a means of checking the increasingly pro-west orientation of the 
Colombo government (Krishna 1999). At the same time the anti-Tamil violence 
including the 1983 pogrom led to mass demonstrations of sympathy in Tamil Nadu for 
both the Sri Lankan Tamils’ political grievances and for Tamil militant movements, 
many of whom established bases in Tamil Nadu and close links with the central 
government in Delhi. Widespread support for the militants in Tamil Nadu, including 
from the charismatic AIADMK Chief Minister Maruthur Gopalan Ramachandran 
(known by the initials MGR), who provided public endorsement and financial support 
for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in particular (Balasingham 2004:62). 
Indian involvement in Sri Lanka’s armed conflict reached a zenith with the 
deployment from 1987 to 1991 of tens of thousands of Indian troops – the Indian 
Peace Keeping Force (IPKP) – to disarm Tamil militants and enforce an agreement – 
the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 – to effect a solution to the island’s ethnic conflict. 
These developments have established a set of complex and contentious four way 
interactions between Sinhala dominated Colombo governments, Sri Lankan Tamil 
political actors (now including the west-based Diaspora), Tamil Nadu parties and the 
government in Delhi that remain central to the Tamil question in Sri Lanka today. 
However, this complex set of interactions have taken place against a backdrop of 
contrasting relations of peaceable accommodation between Tamil Nadu and Delhi on 
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the one hand, and ongoing violent confrontation between the Sri Lankan Tamil 
population and Colombo on the other, relations that had become crystallised by the 
late 1970’s through the political processes that had began in the late nineteenth 
century, and which are the focus of this dissertation. 
9 For a discussion of the transformations associated with British rule in India, see 
Goswami (2004) and Washbrook (1988, 2004). For Sri Lanka see chapters 18-23 in De 
Silva (2005), Snodgrass (1966) and Mills (1964).  
10 The discussion of the eighteenth century British transition from trade to empire in 
India draws on Bayly (1988) and Marshall (2005). 
11 In the last years of the eighteenth century at least 2 million men circulated in 
India’s military market place looking for employment in the armies of competing 
regional states (Kolff 1990:110-16) quoted in (Washbrook 1999:4050].  
12 This account is taken from Mills (1964), Jeffries (1962) and de Silva (2005). 
13 This reflected parliament’s growing insistence on controlling distance territorial 
possessions (Marshall 2005).  
14 For a history of the rise of low country Sinhalese commercial groups see Roberts 
(1982). 
15 The 1891 census did not distinguish between the two. Indian Tamil labour 
migration at this time was to a substantial extent cyclical and also unregulated. As tea 
plantations replaced coffee plantations the demand for labour became less seasonal 
and the labourers became more settled on the island. The 1921 Census did distinguish 
between the two populations. It shows that the total Tamil population of 1, 120, 358 – 
consisted of 602, 735 Indian Tamils (54 per cent) and 517, 623 Sri Lankan Tamils (46 
per cent). See Appendix Two, Table Five.  
16In this sense liberal imperialism is in Koselleck’s sense an ideology, one of a series of 
“isms” that ‘projected historical movement into the “future perspective” and thereby 
sought their vindication (2004:248). 
17 For British official attitudes towards India from the mid nineteenth century see 
Gopal (1965) and Metcalfe (1965), for Sri Lanka see Mills (1964) and also 
Wickramasinghe (1995). 
18 The failure of pan-ethnic national politics in Sri Lanka is discussed further in 
Chapter Six.  
19 This account is taken from Gopal (1965), Sarkar (1989) and Metcalfe (1965).  
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20 From the mid nineteenth century Indians were also nominated to participate in 
local government bodies. The elective principle, on a restricted franchise, was first 
introduced to local bodies in 1882 by the liberal Viceroy Lord Ripon who promoted 
elected Indian majorities on local bodies as a means of promoting ‘self confidence 
among the educated masses of India and to train them for participation in 
government’ (Gopal 1965:164).  
21 As in India there was greater change at the level of local government, during the 
1860’s Municipal Councils were established for Galle, Colombo and Kandy with an 
electorate based on a restricted franchise that included Sri Lankans (Mills 1964) 
22 See Chapter Five for further details.  
23 This account is taken from de Silva (2005), Wickramasinghe (2006) and Russell 
(1982) 
24 In India the franchise was extended to 6.5million people out of a total population of 
306 million (Sarkar 1989:36, 337). In Sri Lanka the franchise was extended in 1921 to 
just over 53, 000 (de Silva 1979:79-82) out of a total population of just under 
4.5million.  
25 For India see Washbrook (1976) and Baker (1976) and for Sri Lanka see Russell 
(1982). 
26 There is a large literature on the social classifications of colonial rule – particularly 
in relation to India. Examples include Cohn (1987, 1996), Dirks (2001), King, R (1999) 
and Pandey (1990). For Sri Lanka see Wickramasinghe (2006), Rogers (2004) and Scott 
(1999).  
27 For contrasting accounts of the impact of British colonialism on the caste system see 
Dirks (2001) and Bayly (1999). Similarly for contrasting accounts of British 
colonialism on religiously motivated collective violence see Bayly (1985) and Pandey 
(1990). 
28 For details see (Trautmann 2004: Chapter 5, 6). 
29 For accounts of the Aryan narrative of Indian history see Goswami (2004), Van der 
Veer (2001) and Trautmann (2004) 
30 This account of caste is taken from (Bayly 1999, 1-24) 
31 For discussions of these competing approaches to caste see Dirks (2001), Bayly (1999) 
and Pandian (2007) 
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32 As Baker notes the ‘1891 Census in Madras set out to catalogue subcastes defined by 
interdining and intermarriage: it counted up to 25, 000 before giving up and admitting 
that the list was far from complete’ (1976:4).  
33 For contrasting views on this issue see articles by Harriss (2002) and Rajadurai and 
Geetha (2002).  
34 For the commercial rise of the Karava see Roberts (1982), see also de Silva (2005:428) 
35 Tamil Saivism is a set of religious practices and beliefs that evolved in the Tamil 
speaking regions from the 10th Century. It is organised around the principle of 
Bhakthi – namely the idea that devotional love for the figure of Sivan can bring 
salvation. The tradition is expounded through a set of Sanskrit and Tamil texts that set 
out the Savite philosophy or Saiva Siddhanta (Hudson 1992, 1995).  
36 For a broad history of the Congress see Sarkar (1989), for a survey of anti colonial 
politics in Sri Lanka see de Silva (1997) and Roberts (1997b). 
37 For Congress revivalism in south India see Arnold (1977), Baskaran (1981), 
Ramaswamy (1997) and Subramanian, L (1999) 
38 For a useful overview see Ozkirimli (2000).  
39 See for example Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
40 For example Brubaker (1996) 
41 Varshney (2003) 
42 This is the approach of the modernist accounts of nationalism – Gellner (1983), 
Anderson (1991) and Brueilly (1993). 
43 Smith (1986), Hutchinson (2005). 
44 See (Horowitz:143-5) for a summarised version of this. Interestingly the argument is 
set out using a Sinhalese folk story about the relative characteristics and merits of the 
Tamils and Sinhalese from Sri Lanka.   
45 ‘The cutting edge of comparison and conflict is the juxtaposition of backward and 
advanced groups. For certain groups, the discovery that ethnic strangers had mastered 
skills associated with the colonial rulers more completely than they themselves had, 
compounded and perpetuated the humiliation of the colonial experience.’ (166) 
46 See chapter five 
323 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
47 For an analysis of Congress attempts to incorporate Tamil cultural revivalism and 
Muslim politics see chapter five. For an extended discussion of the relationship 
between Congress and Muslim nationalism see Hasan (1988:1991). 
The careers of the anti-caste leaders EV Ramaswamy Naicker (1879-1973) and B.R 
Ambedkar (1891-1956) provides an insight into the complex relationship between 
caste, anti caste mobilisation and Congress’ attempt to form a pan Indian nation. Both 
Ambedkar and Naicker were at times fierce critics of Congress, viewing at as a vehicle 
for continued upper caste social and political domination. Naicker had been a member 
of the Congress party, but left in 1925 over a dispute over caste exclusive dining 
arrangements at a Congress run educational facility. Upon leaving Naicker famously 
declared that his creed was: ‘no god; no religion; no Gandhi; no Congress; and no 
brahmins’ [(Kudi Arasu, 1925) quoted in Dirks (2001:259)]. Similarly Ambedkar 
famously wrote a polemic entitled ‘What Congress and Gandhi have done to the 
Untouchables’ (1945) and had a high profile dispute with Gandhi on the question of 
separate electoral representation for Dalits. However, the two figures later also co-
operated with Congress politicians. During the 1950’s Naicker supported the Tamil 
Nad Congress government, led by K. Kamraj, a politician from low caste origins 
(Kumaradoss:2004). Similarly Ambedkar worked with Nehru and other leading 
Congress figures and played a critical role in the drafting of the Indian constitution 
(Corbridge and Harriss 2000:21)(Austin 1972:19). See also Dirks for an analysis of 
ways in which the anti caste politics of Naicker and Ambedkar, differently, 
challenged Gandhi’s own attempts to reform caste practice (2001:255-275).  
48 See Chapter Seven 
49 See Chapter Five 
50 See Chapter Six 
51 See Goswami (2004), Gould (2004) and Gordon (1974) for a discussion of the 
complex overlapping and competitive relations between Congress and Hindu 
nationalisms. For Hindu nationalists attempt to incorporate and co-opt lower caste 
groups in the post independence period see Hansen and Jaffrelot (2001).  
52 For Hindu nationalists attempt to incorporate and co-opt lower caste groups in the 
post independence period see Hansen and Jaffrelot (2001).  
It is also important to note that Hindu nationalist themes were apparent in the Tamil 
speaking areas of south India during the nineteenth century (Pandian 2007) 
(Suntharalingam 1974). However Hindu nationalist parties have had very little 
electoral success in Tamil Nadu. There are divergent views on whether Hindu 
nationalist mobilisation is beginning to undermine the previous predominance of 
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south Indian Tamil cultural nationalism and its anti Hindu basis; for contrasting views 
on these issues see articles by Harriss (2000) and Rajadurai and Geetha (2000). 
The absence of a clear Hindu-Muslim divide, including in the Tamil speaking areas, is 
therefore a contingent matter, determined by political process rather than the pre-
given structure of ethnic demography.   
53 See Chapter Six 
54 James Jupp describes the internal pluralism of the Sinhala category in the following 
way: ‘Thus a Low Country Sinhala Karawa Christian University educated, professional, 
Colombo dwelling politician may be totally Westernised in all significant respects, yet 
be willing to accept astrology, Buddhist dominance, Sinhala communalism and the 
intervention of the devales in order to appeal to his electorate’ (50).  
55 He states:  
‘This, then, is the irony of the dialectical relationship of the Sinhalese-Buddhist state 
and Tamil civil society: the state elite’s strenuous efforts to homogenise the population 
within its domains led, ultimately, only to division, discord and confrontation. The 
process of “nation building”, as attempted by those at the apex of the Sri Lankan state, 
actually facilitated the emergence of a Tamil national consciousness, and eventually 
precipitated a crisis of the state defined in terms of solidary, exclusivist Sinhalese-
Buddhist interest and identity.’ (80) 
56 Manu Goswami quotes the following address by a Congress politician, M. V Bhinde, 
in 1890 to demonstrate Congress’ attempts to demonstrate unity out of diversity:  
‘I know that there are among our critics ... who proclaim with an air of superior 
wisdom that India is but a geographical expression and that there is no Indian nation 
as such, but only a congerie of races and creeds, who have no cohesion in them... here 
in this gathering we have representatives from the most distant provinces, Bengal, 
Assam, Punjab, North Western Provinces, Rajaputana, Sind, Gujarat, Maharashtra .. 
but the watchword of these congressman is India, Indians first, Hindus, 
Muhummadans, Parsees, Christian, Punjabee, Bengali ... afterwards .. the aggregate of 
those that are resident of one territory...urged by the like impulses to secure like 
rights and to be relieved of burdens’ (quoted in 2004:234). 
57 For a discussion of the relations between officials and the Congress see Gopal (1965), 
McLane (1977) and Seal (1968). See also the discussion in Chapter Five.  
58 During the 1890’s in particular Indian nationalist efforts were focussed on Britain, 
and two leading Congressmen (Dadabhai Naroji and W. C Bonnerjea) were elected to 
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Parliament in 1892. In this period the activities of the British Committee of the 
Congress – lecture tours, pamphlets and breakfast meetings – cost more than the 
annual sessions of the Congress in India. However, enthusiasm began to wane after 
Bonnerjea and Naroji both lost their seats in the 1895 elections and subsequently 
parliament passed legislation imposing excise taxes on Indian cotton – to the benefit 
of the Lancashire mills and the expense of the nascent Indian textile industry. From 
1905 the annual Congress sessions simply voted thanks rather than money to the 
British committee. (McLane 1977:132-140) 
59 Particularly important were the views of the Muslim political leader and prominent 
educationalist Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) who stated of the Congress in 1888:  
‘I do not understand what the words ‘National Congress’ mean. Is it supposed to mean 
that the different castes and creeds living in India belong to one nation, or can 
become (one) nation, and their aims and aspirations be one and the same? I think it is 
quite impossible... You regard the doings of the misnamed National Congress as 
beneficial to India, but I am sorry to say that I regard them as not only injurious to 
our own community but also to India at large.’ (quoted in Gopal 1965:159) See also 
McLane (1977:105-7).  
60 Compare James Jupp’s description of Sri Lankan Tamil politics (136-151) in the post 
independence phase with that of the Sri Lankan Muslims (151-157). For the FP’s early 
difficulties and subsequent sustained efforts to expand its base see Chapter Eight.  
61 As Jupp notes:  
‘While the Tamils have naturally taken up a militant role in defence of their position... 
[what] distinguishes the Muslims is their almost entirely instrumentalist approach to 
politics, their repeated party changing, support for independents and refusal, in the 
main, to be the captive of either of the major parties’ (1978:151-2).  
He also notes that one of the two main Sinhala parties the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) and its Marxist allies had different types of relationship with the Tamils and 
the Muslims: 
‘The tactic of the SLFP and its Marxist allies was to isolate the Federalists and to show 
that their methods had worked against the interests of the Tamil majority who still 
persisted in voting for them. At the same time the SLFP began to make inroads among 
the Muslims, who also spoke Tamil but were very uncertain allies of the Federal 
Party’ (1978:140).  
62 For specific details of the 1956 and 1965 agreements see Wilson (1994) and 
Navaratnam (1991), for details of the 1981 negotiations see Wilson (1988). 
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63 For details see Tamil Nation (2007) 
[http://tamilnation.co/conferences/cnfMA66/index.htm] and Tamil Nation (2007a) 
[http://tamilnation.co/conferences/cnfTN68/index.htm] 
64 Washbrook (1976) and Baker (1975) provide instrumentalist accounts of south 
Indian ethnic politics, Brass does the same for north Indian Hindu- Muslim politics 
(1974).  
65 Ramaswamy provides a constructivist account of the creation of south Indian Tamil 
linguistic nationalism (1997) and Wickramasinghe draws on post structuralist 
approaches to discuss ethnic identities in Sri Lanka (2006).  
66 Tambiah for example suggests that an important aspect of resolving Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic conflict will involve resolving misperceptions of the island’s history (1986:6) 
67 For example Brass (1974), Stokke (1998) and Bush (2003)  
68 For example Washbrook (1976) and Baker (1975) 
69 See note 20 above 
70 For the politics of caste in colonial Sri Lanka see Russell (1982) and Rogers (2004). 
For the ongoing role of caste and caste conflict in post independence Sri Lanka see 
Jupp (1978), Kearney (1973) and Wilson (1979).  
71 For example Romila Tharpar (1989) and Robert Frykenberg (1989) have argued that 
the notion of a unified Hindu religion emerged during the nineteenth century 
through the efforts of British officials, missionaries and Hindu revivalists – 
furthermore that this idea was radically discontinuous with previous theologies. This 
argument has also informed the view that the notion of a Hindu – Muslim divide is an 
entirely colonial creation (Pandey 1990). This view of the disjuncture between 
modern notions of Hinduism and previous has been challenged by amongst others 
Van der Veer (2001) and Trautmann (1997:64-80) as well as the notion that Hindu- 
Muslim conflict is a purely nineteenth century phenomenon (Bayly:1985). Likewise 
while Dirks (2001) emphasises the role of colonial rule in establishing India as a caste 
society, Bayly (1999) points to the role of caste norms in the pre colonial dynamics of 
state building as well as the agency of the colonial subjects themselves. There is a 
similar disjuncture in the literature on Sri Lanka. For example Seneviratne (1999) 
discusses the role of nineteenth century scholars, officials and religious revivalists in 
establishing Buddhism as a confessional category. In contrast Malagoda (1976) points 
to continuities.  
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72 For the imprecise and shifting use of categories in Sri Lanka see Wicramasinghe 
(1995: Chapter One). For the use of the term nation by Utilitarians and Orientalists in 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century India see Trautmann (2004:123, 154-5).  
73 This led to British officials claiming that India could not be a nation, i.e. it was not 
able to exercise self government Sarkar (1989:2). Likewise for Indian nationalists the 
claim to be a nation was coeval with the demand for self government: see for example 
Mehrotra (1971:575-60) and discussion in Chapter Five.  
74 In Sri Lanka the term communal to describe pre political affiliations until the mid 
1980’s: see for example Colonial Office (1928, 1945), Kearney (1973), Jupp (1978) and 
Russell (1982). However, from the mid 1980’s the term ethnic has become dominant – 
as for example in Tambiah ‘Sri Lanka – ethnic fratricide and the dismantling of 
democracy’ (1985), Wickramasinghe ‘Ethnic politics in colonial Sri Lanka’ (1995) and 
Bush ‘The intra-group dimensions of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka’ (2003). 
In India however, the term communal continues to be used alongside the term ethnic. 
So for example a study by Ornit Shani (2007) on the recent anti Muslim violence in 
Gujarat is titled ‘Communalism, caste and Hindu nationalism: the violence in Gujarat’. 
However, the term ethnic is used in studies that are more self consciously situated in 
the political science literature, as in for example Chandra’s equation of caste with 
ethnicity in ‘Why ethnic parties succeed’ (2004), Varshney (2003) ‘Ethnic conflict and 
civic life’ and Wilkinsion (2004) ‘Votes and violence: electoral competition and ethnic 
riots in India’.  
75 Mill states for example that:  
‘We have recognised in representative government the ideal type of the most 
perfect polity, for which, in consequence, any portion of mankind are better 
adapted in proportion to their degree of general improvement. As they range 
lower and lower in development, that form of government will be generally 
speaking, less suitable to them;’ (1991:257).  
For those ‘lower in development’ the only hope of betterment, was a government of 
despotism and one that was potentially foreign.  
‘Accordingly the civilization of such tribes, when not the result of 
juxtaposition with others already civilized, is almost always the work of an 
absolute ruler’ (232).  
However, the purpose of such despotic government was always that of improvement 
or progress:  
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‘We must not, however, forget the reservation necessary in all things which 
have for their object improvement, or Progress: namely, that in seeking the 
good which is needed, no damage, or as little as possible, be done to that 
already possessed. A people of savages should be taught obedience, but not in 
such a manner as to convert them to a people of slaves. And (to give the 
observation a higher generality) the form of government which is most 
effectual for carrying a people through the next stage of progress, will still be 
very improper for them if it does this in such a manner as to obstruct, or 
positively unfit them for, the step beyond.’ (234).  
76 As discussed previously, for a discussion of the sources of national differences and 
nationhood in Rousseau’s work see Marc F. Plattner, Rousseau and the Origins of 
Nationalism  in Orwin and Tarcov 1997. 
77 A clear statement of this distinction between good ‘civic’ nationalism and bad 
‘ethno-nationalism’ can be found in Ignatief (1993).  
78 As Conolly explains, ‘People do, after all, draw subtle distinctions between concepts 
of guilt and shame, conflict and competition, manipulation and persuasion, 
inadvertent and negligent acts, without being able to formulate upon request the 
complex rules governing these distinctions’ (1993:37).  
79 For example the Indian Census used the category Hindu whilst noting that the label 
itself might not be meaningful to many of the individuals categorised as Hindu 
(Government of India 1891). 
80 Magnates in Madras were rural notables with substantial landholdings or wealthy 
urban merchants with income from trade, finance and property who entered politics 
to protect their economic interests and could also mobilise their networks of 
economic clients and dependents for political activity. (Washbrook 1976) As a 
consequence electoral allegiance was a matter of personal connection, than conviction. 
C. R Reddy a Madras politician noted in 1929 that the ‘general politics of press and 
platform hardly affect the voting. The landlord, the merchant, and the lawyer have 
their clientele, and every man his tribe, clan or creed behind him who follow him 
with sheepish fidelity. In this medievalism, political conviction counts for little.’ 
(Baker 1976:35) For the importance of patronage networks and local, factional 
calculations in Muslim politics see Jalal (1994:138-173).  
81 See Appendix One, Table Three 
82 For the Hindu nationalist orientation of the Bengal Congress see Joya Chatterjii 
(1994), for the Congress in Punjab see Norman G. Barrier (1967) and for UP see 
Gordon (1975) 
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83 Baker suggests that about two thirds of the newly elected Congress candidates in the 
1937 Madras provincial legislature were local power holders who had no previous 
affiliation to the Congress (1976:313). Some established magnates withdrew from the 
electoral contest when confronted by the prospect of a well organised electoral 
campaign (267, 303) whilst others simply switched their allegiance to the Congress 
(268, 313). In UP Jalal argues Congress ‘rural activism’ during the Civil Disobedience 
movement persuaded Hindu landlords to accept the Congress ticket. (1994:31)  
84 In the 1937 elections the league secured only 4.4 per cent of the total Muslim votes 
cast (7, 319, 445). (Jalal 1994 32, 171) In the 1946 elections, however, it won 75 per 
cent of the total Muslim votes cast (6, 099, 573). (171). In the 1937 elections most 
Muslim votes went to large landlords or other candidates able to command the 
allegiance of significant vote banks. In Punjab independents subsequently joined the 
Unionist Party – a coalition of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim landlords. Similarly in UP 
Muslim votes mainly went to landlords. Bengal’s Muslim politics was split between 
east and west. Whereas in the east Muslims were in a majority (and were mostly 
tenants of Hindu landlords) in the west Muslims were in a minority and included 
landlords as well as business groups. There were thus two Muslim parties – the Praja 
Party (or Peasant party) representing Muslim interests in the east and the United 
Muslim Party formed mainly by Muslim landlord and business interests in the west. 
Jinnah eventually agreed to the United Muslim Party taking on the name of the 
Muslim League in Bengal. However, the parties were not cohesive organisations, 
easily fragmented by factional disputes and defections prompted by the lure of 
ministerial office. By 1943 Jinnah wanted to distance the League from the deeply 
unpopular Bengal Ministry which was then presiding over famine conditions. He 
therefore ordered that League members could not be in government; most of the 
Bengali Muslim ministers resigned their League membership and stayed in 
government (Jalal 1994: Chapter One).  
85 The Landholders Society formed in Calcutta in 1838 asserted an ambition of 
establishing branches across the British Indian Empire. (Mehrotra 1971:12) In 1851 
the Calcutta based British Indian Association communicated with political 
associations in Madras and Bombay in an effort to present a unified petition to the 
British parliament as it debated the renewal of the East India Company’s charter. (Seal 
1968:245) 
86 See Seal (1968: Chapter 4), Gopal (1965: Chapter 2, 3) and Mehrotra (1971: Chapter 
5 and 6).  
87 The drain of wealth argument was in circulation in upper Indian cities between 
1806 and 1818. (Bayly 1988:196) 
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88 See for examples Sarkar (1989:22), Seal (1968:165), Gopal (1965:36–38) and 
Mehrotra (1971:494 -7).  
89 See Chapter Seven 
90 See Chapter Seven for discussion 
91 Chapter Two and Trautmann (1997)  
92 Trautmann (1997:67) and Metcalf (1994:6-15) 
93 Peter Van Der Veer characterises Theosophy, and the broader Spiritualist 
movement of which it was a part, as oppositional movements that contested the late 
nineteenth century hegemonic alliance of Evangelical Christianity and Imperialism 
(2001:58-66). He situates Annie Besant’s biography within the sociological dynamics 
and intellectual currents of this movement (63).  
94 See Pandian (2007:22) for the extent of the Tamil texts in circulation. 
95 There were multiple and often conflicting uses of the Dravidian idea. While some 
used it to revive and reform Saivism, the south Indian tradition of worship and 
theology (Ramaswamy 1997:24-34), others used it to attack religion as a whole and 
sought to reform south Indian society by appealing to universally applicable humanist 
principles (Pandian 1999). 
96 E. V Ramaswamy, the founder of the Self Respect Movement, described his political 
creed as ‘no god, no religion, no Gandhi, no Congress, and no Brahmins.’ (Pandian 
1999:289)  
97 Not all Tamil Congress activists were committed to social reform see Pandian 
(2007:93). 
98 For example the poet C. Subramania Bharathi (1882-1921) condemned the practise 
of untouchability but worked very much within a Hindu or Saivite devotional idiom 
to promote Indian nationalism (Nambi Aroonan 1980:60-62). In the late nineteenth 
century debates on the issue of child marriage and widow remarriage, both south 
Indian conservatives and social reformers appealed to the authority of the Sanskrit 
texts; in other words reform was justified as a return to textual orthodoxy rather than 
a departure from it (Suntharalingam 1974:83, 311-337) For discussions of the 
sociological assumptions driving social reform efforts within the Indian nationalist 
movement see Bayly (1999: Chapter 5, 6) and Dirks (2001: Chapter 11).  
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99 By 1902 only 40 of the 1067 officers of the elite Indian Civil Service were Indians. 
(McLane 1977:24) A 1924 Royal Commission envisaged a 50 per cent Indianization of 
the civil service after 15 years. (Sarkar 1989:237) 
100 Direct elections to the provincial legislatures were only introduced with the 1919 
Montague Chelmsford Reforms and for the Central Legislature only with the 1935 
reforms.  
101 In 1896 the Indian Government, under pressure from London, imposed excise taxes 
on Indian textiles that were beginning to compete with Lancashire cotton. (McLane 
1977:134) Indian business interests continued to express frustration at government 
policy and alleged discrimination in favour of European firms in the 1920’s (Sarkar 
1989:238) and up to the 1940’s (23).  
102 See Chapter Four.  
103 For a list of the different cities see: http://www.congress.org.in/new/congress-
sessions.php 
104 The number of Muslim delegates at the Congress sessions grew during its early 
years; 2 in 1885, 33 in 1886, 79 in 1887 and 222 in 1888. (Seal 1968:329). 
105 See above for dates 
106 In April 1919, police firing into an unarmed peaceful crowd at Jallainwallahbagh 
(Punjab), under the orders of General Dyer, killed 379 people, according to official 
estimates but unofficial figures were higher. (Sarkar 1989:191) The incident produced 
outrage across India and the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore resigned his 
knighthood in protest (194). The report of the official commission appointed to 
investigate the incident was published in May 1920 and condemned by Gandhi as a 
‘whitewash’ (196). In the same month as the report the terms of the peace treaty with 
Turkey were also published and condemned by Indian pan-Islamists (1989). 
107 For a discussion of the diverse and autonomous (of Congress) movements that 
propelled these campaigns – often exceeding the limits of Congress’ official 
programme – see Sarkar (1989)  
108 ‘The Non – co-operation campaign was initiated by Gandhi and by politicians who 
had been disappointed by the reforms; the agitations which contributed to the 
campaign in the southern province, however, were scattered and sporadic and had 
little to do with the politicians’ stated aim of driving the British into the Indian Ocean. 
Many of them displayed an angry reaction to the recent changes in administration – 
in particular to new taxes and administrative incursions. Liquor manufacturers 
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registered a protest against the new excise rules and taxes and helped to give weight to 
the temperance campaign. Cattle graziers and forest tribesmen, objecting to new 
regulation of the forests and to new taxes on forest produce, raised an agitation which 
temporarily undercut the tenuous hold of law and order in the forest tracts.’ (Baker 
1976:21) 
109 By giving concrete expression to the discontents created by the Depression, the 
Congress claimed for itself the role of representing popular grievance against 
government policy and repression. In 1934 Tamil Nadu Congressmen argued that 
other parties should withdraw from the elections so that ‘Congress could demonstrate 
the strength of public opposition to Government repression’ (Arnold 2004:278). 
110 The initial phase of the Civil Disobedience movement led to the famous face to face 
talks between Gandhi and the Viceroy Lord Irwin between in early 1931. Although 
the talks were largely unproductive in moving the Congress agenda forward (Arnold 
2001:152), they were nevertheless symbolically important. ‘Gandhi met the Viceroy, 
face-to-face, as the sole representative of the Congress, and carried on discussions as if 
they were the commanders of two opposing but unbeaten armies’ (152). 
111 For south India see Baker (1976:37, 72)  
112 It was disbanded in early 1920, once the final forms of the Montague Chelmsford 
reforms had been settled - its members either joined Justice or the Congress (Irschick 
1969:166).  
113 For details of the Non Cooperation movement in the Tamil speaking areas see 
Baker (1976:21), Arnold (1977:46 – 77) and Irschick (1969:193 – 201). 
114 For details of Civil Disobedience in the Tamil speaking areas see Arnold (1977:118 
– 140), Arnold (2004), and Baker (1976:211-224).  
115 Although the Dravidian category in theory applied to all four south Indian 
languages (Tamil, Telugu, Kannadam and Malayalam) the Self Respect Movement’s 
activities were confined to the Tamil speaking districts as its founder E. V Ramaswami 
worked in Tamil and English. (Irschick 1969:334)  
116 For E. V Ramaswami Naicker’s (1879 – 1973) political biography see Irschick 
(1969:330-350) and Nambi Aroonan (1980:152 -185) and Pandian (1999) 
117 In many ways Ramaswami shared his indifference to political power with Gandhi. 
As Nick Dirks notes:  
‘Except for a brief moment in his early career, his interest was far less in the 
representation of non – Brahmins in numerical terms than in the representation of 
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non Brahmins in symbolic terms; non Brahmins were to be seen both as the majority 
and as the principal modality of social value. Indeed E.V.R shared a great deal with 
Gandhi – in his reliance, for example, on the symbolic character of politics, on the 
necessity of social reform, and in his overriding interest in ideology rather than 
political process’ (2001:263-4).  
Ramaswami’s hostility to the political process, including his refusal to participate in 
electoral contestation, eventually led to a split with his principal lieutenant C. N 
Annadurai, who subsequently went onto form the Dravida Munnetra Kalzaham, the 
party that displaced the Congress from power in Tamil Nadu in 1969. (Ross –Barnett 
1976; Chapter 7).  
118 For a description of the Congress campaign tactics see Arnold (1977:160 – 174) and 
Baker (1976:263, 278, 279, 283, 299, 302). 
119 ‘The conditions for being accepted as a Congress candidate were simple: one had to 
sign the Congress pledge, a formula in which the signatory promised allegiance to the 
Congress programme and goals. There was rarely any close scrutiny of the political 
antecedents of candidates. It was evident that the Congress was primarily interested 
in winning and the door to the organisation had been opened as wide as possible to 
ensure victory.’ (Baker 1976:276) See also (297, 301). 
120 For the calculations in Punjab see Jalal (1994:143, 144) and for Bengal (151-163).  
121 Ayesha Jalal argues that while Jinnah took a public position on maximum 
provincial autonomy he always intended to use this as a bargaining chip. The 
provincial autonomy position was moreover important to Muslims in the Muslim 
majority provinces, particularly Punjab. What Jinnah actually hoped to secure was 
adequate Muslim representation at a strong centre for which he would concede 
provincial autonomy. Jinnah himself had no base in provincial politics and always 
operated at the national level (1994:10, 57-60).  
122 In 1933 the Hindu Mahasabha called for the defence of Hindus as well as the 
capitalists and landlords as a class (Sarkar 1989:332). Similarly inter ethnic parties 
representing landlord interests dominated electoral politics in the Punjab till the 
elections of 1945 (Jalal 1994:21, 22) and in the United Provinces until 1937 (29, 30). 
See also Hasan (1988:210). Finally there was also from the late 1920’s onwards an 
emergent Communist movement which from the late 1930’s was contained (covertly) 
as the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) (Sarkar 1989:247-251).  
The impact of the 1930’s depression led to widespread peasant or Kisan movements in 
Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Bengal. These movements cut across the Hindu – Muslim 
barrier. The Kisan movements also led often violent demonstrations and protests 
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against Congress led ministries. However, neither the Congress nor the League, 
including Congress Socialists like Nehru and Bose, were willing to make peasant 
mobilisation a core component of their programme or structure. This is primarily 
because in the late 1930’s the Congress in particular was building a base amongst 
richer or dominant peasant groups, whose interests were very different from marginal 
peasants and landless labourers (Sarkar 1989:363-365).  
123 While Muslims constituted almost 22 per cent of the total Indian population in 
1921, Tamil speakers constituted just under 6 per cent. See Appendix One, Table Two 
124 (Government of India 1924:109) 
125 See Chapters Six and Eight 
126According to Nira Wickramasinghe Senanayake was the ‘prime initiator’ of moves 
which led to the formation of a United National Party in April 1946. The party was 
nicknamed the ‘Until New Parliament’ party (1995:223).  
127 For Senanayake’s increasingly prominent role from 1942 onwards see Russell 
(1982:302-4) and De Silva (2005:554). For Senanayake’s close links to Sinhala Buddhist 
revivalism see De Silva (2005:464) and also Dharmadasa (1992:230, 332-3). In 1931 
Senanayake became Minister for Agriculture and was crucial to the adoption of the 
policy of state subsidised peasant colonisation in the sparsely populated dry zones of 
the island (Farmer 1957:143-144). Within the Sinhala Buddhist framework the policy 
of peasant colonisation was seen as a means of re-capturing the ‘lost’ and ‘glorious’ 
Sinhala kingdoms destroyed by south Indian invasions of the dry zone areas – see 
(Dharmadasa 1992:13, 47, 55, 78) and for Senanayake’s role (1992:332-3; 
Wickramasinghe 1995 124). The distribution of crown lands to peasant proprietors 
was regulated through the 1935 Land Development Ordinance which explicitly 
excluded Indians settled on the island from the benefits of the scheme and peasant 
colonisation effectively became the preserve of the Sinhalese peasant (De Silva 
2005:578).  
128 V. Nalliah, a Tamil representative from the Eastern Province stated during a debate 
on constitutional reform in November 1945: ‘I am not going to differ from the 
majority of the Sinhalese. I am prepared to accept what today seems to be the majority 
decision of the majority community, because on them rests the responsibility for 
taking a correct decision.’ (State Council Debates, 8 November 1945; Col 6995)  
The following day, Mr. A R A Razik a Muslim representative, referred to the 
forthcoming constitutional reforms as an ‘hour of triumph’ for ‘the Sinhalese 
Community’ (State Council Debates, 9 November 1945: Col 7064)  
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As early as 1928, T. B Jayah, a Muslim politician stated: ‘I am not afraid of domination 
by the Sinhalese people. We have no objection to the majority community ruling this 
country. Let them govern. We will help them.’ (Russell 1982:244).  
129 For the social and intellectual context in which the term ‘religion’ was used to 
categorise, administer and then reform south Asian systems of practices and beliefs see 
Chapter Four. For a discussion of this process in relationship to Buddhism in Sri Lanka 
see Seneviratne (1999). For a discussion of the role of Tamils in Buddhist revivalist 
narratives see Dharmadasa (1992:7-14, 120, 138) 
130 For a brief discussion of colonial archaeology see Dharmadasa (1992:112), for a 
discussion of British and Sinhala Buddhist approaches to the sites see Rogers (1990:100) 
and for examples of official patronage and support for Sinhala Buddhist revival 
activities, specifically in relation to historical sites and relics in the late nineteenth 
century see De Silva (2005:432) and in the early twentieth century see 
Wickramasinghe (1995:120).  
131 Peter van der Veer suggests that the Theosophists had a much more important role 
in the Buddhist revival than the Hindu movement in India. ‘The role of Olcott and 
the Theosophical society in the creation of a particular anti-colonial Hindu 
nationalism was minor compared to their role in creating Buddhist nationalism.’ (Van 
der Veer 2001:75) 
132 The central Kandyan kingdom located in the hilly interior of the island was largely 
outside of European influence until 1815. In contrast the coastal regions, including 
the Tamil speaking northern regions, had been under Portuguese and then Dutch 
control from 1505 and also had a far more commercialised society as a consequence of 
involvement in regional and global trade networks (see Chapter Two). This different 
historical trajectory produced economic and social differences between the low 
country and Kandyan Sinhalese. From 1901 the two groups were differently 
enumerated in the census returns. Sinhalese speakers from the Central, Uva, 
Sabaragamuwa and North Central Provinces were counted as Kandyans. The low 
country Sinhalese were those within the Western, Southern and North-western 
province (Wickramasinghe 1995:41). The Kandyans ‘were less literate and having 
held out for two centuries longer against Western penetration than the Low Country 
Sinhalese, led lives based mainly on the village and ownership of land largely 
untouched by the commercial developments which had followed the exploitation of 
tea and rubber estates’ (1995). The 1921 Census showed that the Low Country and 
Kandyan Sinhalese constituted 64 per cent and 36 per cent respectively of the total 
Sinhalese population.  
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133 Dagmar Hellmann – Rajanayagam suggests that amongst the recurring themes of 
Tamil uses of history is the ‘assumed linguistic, cultural, religious and ‘racial’ 
difference between the Sinhala and the Tamils’ that is always made the ‘basis of the 
argument, whether for an autonomous Jaffna or for a united, multi-ethnic Sri Lanka’ 
(1990:118).  
134 The Dravidian idea was often invoked, particularly during the 1930’s (Russell 
1982:148-9). However, it did not have the same anti-Hindi anti Indian meanings 
associated with the Dravidian idea in south India. Instead in Sri Lankan Tamil politics 
the Dravidian idea was often invoked alongside the idea of India as the Tamils’ 
spiritual and cultural home. The Tamil politician R. Sri Pathmanathan stated for 
example that all ‘of us Tamils owe allegiance to India and are thankful to her for her 
spiritual gifts and privileges which she gave us.’ He went onto identify the Tamils as 
Dravidians stating ‘we, Dravidians, have a pre-Aryan culture extending to the time of 
Mohenjodaro.’ (1982:149) Similarly the 1926 history ‘Ancient Tamils’ written by C. 
Rasanayagam describes the history of the island as a whole as linked to ‘Tamil – 
Hindu or Dravidian history’ (Hellman – Rajanayagam 1990:111). As discussed in 
Chapter Five, in south Indian Tamil politics, history was a narrative of perpetual 
conflict between Dravidians and Hindus – of Aryan invasion and Dravidian 
destruction. The Dravidian idea in Sri Lankan Tamil politics was also not tied to the 
need for radical social reform – including the rejection of Hinduism – as it was with 
the Self Respect movement in south India. Instead social reform in Sri Lankan Tamil 
politics was closer to the Gandhian and Congress conception of reform that worked 
within rather than against the framework of Hindu norms. Finally the Dravidian idea 
in Ceylon Tamil politics did not become associated with sustained social or political 
activity.  
135 Discussions of Navalar’s religious and educational activities as well as contributions 
to Tamil literary developments can be found in Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1989), 
Hudson (1992), Bate (2005) and Gunasingham (1999:113-158).  
136 Peter van der Veer argues that a modern public sphere or public culture emerged in 
early nineteenth century south India through the three tiered contests between 
missionaries, the East India Company and the south Indian associations that emerged 
to meet the missionary challenge to existing beliefs and practices (2001:20-1). See also 
Pandian (2007:22-3). For the expansion of education and print culture in the Tamil 
speaking areas of Sri Lanka see Gunasingham (1999:103-8, 121, 124-136).  
137 Navalar promoted Saivism primarily as a means of salvation: ‘Human birth is rare 
to obtain, even more so birth in this meritorious land of Bharatha (South Asia) where 
the Vedas and Agamas, the true books are esteemed. Birth among those who perform 
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asceticism is even rarer. And most rare of all is birth amongst the lineage of Shaivas’ 
(quoted in Hudson 1992:42). In Navalar’s thinking, it is not that Tamils ‘owned’ 
Saivism or had a special ‘national’ obligation to protect Saivism, rather for those born 
as Tamils, Saivism was the ideal means of salvation.  
Similarly one of Navalar’s disciplies Kopay Sapapathy Navalar (1844-1903) 
differentiated religious ‘consciousness’ from other types of affiliation: ‘... there are 
several types of consciousness such as caste consciousness and patriotism that are 
valued by human beings... Caste consciousness, patriotism and language consciousness 
are aspects of knowledge that one displays in relation to the world outside oneself. 
(But religious consciousness is not like this).  Therefore, human beings should show 
the greatest regard for religious consciousness above all other types of consciousness.’ 
(quoted in Gunasingham 1999:130-1) 
138 The study of Tamil literary and religious texts and the production of reliable 
printed editions of these works became an important locus of concern for Christians 
and Saivites (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1989:243-5; Hudson 1992, 1995; Gunasingham 
1999:103, 143). This eventually led to the promotion and cultivation of Tamil 
language and literature being a shared concern between Hindus and Christians – for 
examples (Russell 1982:122; Saveri 1993:152, 331; Gunasingham 1999:152). Christians 
and Hindus were also jointly involved in the promotion of Carnatic music and 
Bharathanatyam (Russell 1982:69, 121). However, theological disputes between 
Christians and Hindus continued and there was ongoing, often violent, conflict 
between the two over funding for schools and the social status and rights of low caste 
Christians (Kadirgamar 1980:14, 35-8, 43, 62-3; Saveri 1993). For the ongoing 
importance of religious and caste affiliations in Tamil politics see Russell (1982:41, 76, 
81, 101) 
139 The total size of the electorate for the ‘educated’ Ceylonese seat and the conditions 
for the franchise are given in de Silva (1979:3, 4, 79). The population figure for 1912 is 
given in Colonial Office (1928, 13). 
140 See de Silva (1979:5) for franchise conditions and Colonial Office (1928:82) for 
electorate and voting figures. 
141 See Appendix One. 
142 P. Ramanthan also had a career in the public service and served as Solicitor General 
(1892-4; 1894-6) and once as Acting Attorney General (1896-1907) (Wilson 2000:45).  
143 Don Spater Senanayake (1848-1907) was father of Don Stephen Senanayake (1884-
1951) and grandfather of Dudley Shelton Senanayake (1911-1973). Don Stephen 
Senanayake entered the legislative council in 1924 and became the first Prime 
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minister of independent Sri Lanka. Dudley Shelton entered the State Council (as it 
was known in the period of the Donoughmore Constitution) in 1936 and was 
appointed Prime Minister after his father’s death in 1953. He resigned in 1953 
following food riots and served again as Prime Minister between 1965 and 1970. 
144 The CNA submitted a memorandum, drafted by Ramanathan, calling for very 
moderate constitutional reforms in 1890 (Vythilingam 1971:586) and was briefly 
active again in 1915 following the ethnic violence between Sinhalese and Muslims 
(Gunasingham 1999:211).  
145 The brother of P. Ramanathan, P. Arunachalam entered the civil service in 1875 
and retired in 1913 as Registrar General. He like his brother had wanted to become a 
Supreme Court judge. (Wilson 2000:49) 
146 The 1921 Census shows that the majority (88 per cent) of the total population of Sri 
Lankan Tamils (just over half a million) lived in the Tamil speaking northern and 
eastern provinces. Of the population that lived outside of these provinces just under 
40 per cent lived in the Western Province: figures taken from Colonial Office 
(1928:63, 122, 165). Many of the Sri Lankan Tamils living outside the north-east had 
white collar employment either in the administrative services or in the private sector 
(Roberts 1997a:229-230). 
147 Wickramasinghe notes that although ‘Tamils were the largest non – Sinhala 
community living in Anuradhapura, the campaign led by Buddhist leaders in the early 
twentieth century against the modern town that had emerged next to the ruins was 
not directed against them. The targets were the colonial administration, the Christians 
and later the moors.’ (2006:118). 
148 The Tamil Mahajana Sabhai (founded 1921) and the All Ceylon Tamil League 
(founded 1923) (Gunasingham 1999:216-7) did not establish themselves as important 
political associations – which is why new organisations were formed in the 1920’s and 
1930’s. Also see Russell (1982:219-221) for the fissiparous and fleeting nature of many 
associations.  
149 The report notes that hopes for ‘political programmes that would turn attention 
from communal to party politics.... have not yet been realised’ (33).  
150 See Colonial Office (1945:7-32) for a summary of constitutional developments from 
the onset of British rule to 1945.  
151 For a discussion of the influence of the Indian National Congress on Ceylon politics 
see Russell (1982:42-3, 157) and Roberts (1997b:284-5). The organisation with the 
strongest links was the Jaffna Youth Congress. It was at the initiative of the JYC that 
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Gandhi visited the island in 1927 (Kadirgamar 1980:27) and the JYC’s sessions were 
attending by a host of leading Indian politicians including Nehru (19); the meeting 
addressed by Nehru was attended by over 10, 000 people (Russell 1982:28).  
152 In 1927 a Special Commission was appointed by the Secretary of State to make 
recommendations for further constitutional reform on the island. The Commission’s 
report – known after its chair Lord Donoughmore – recommended universal 
manhood suffrage and the replacement of communal with territorial constituencies. 
The legislative council would also be transformed into a State Council that would 
function both as a legislature and executive – members of the State Council would 
form themselves through election into executive committees with real power and 
responsibility (De Silva 2005:521). The Commission’s recommendation for universal 
franchise was not supported by most of the associations and politicians it met – even 
those who advocated self government (Colonial Office 1928:82-3). For a discussion of 
the wide array of demands and proposals put before the Commission see 
Wicramasinghe (1995:60-77).  
153 ‘D. S Senanayake emerged as the self – proclaimed representative of a moderate 
strand of Ceylonese nationalism and it was not long before he was eagerly appointed 
as a privileged compagnon de route by the Governor and the Colonial Office on the 
road leading to independence. .... The complex nature of the Ceylonese polity seems 
to have been deliberately overlooked by the colonial rulers and faith was placed in the 
vision of unity and reason projected by a man who, after all, was hardly 
representative of anyone besides himself’ (Wicramasinghe 1995:184).  
154 From the late nineteenth century British officials’ increasingly saw the island as 
essentially Sinhala Buddhist in history and character (Rogers 1990), (Wicramasinghe 
2006:103-109) (Jeffries 1962:3). Furthermore the Donoughmore report reproduced the 
modern ‘Mahavamsa’ narrative of Sinhalese Buddhist colonisation, flourishing and 
Tamil invasion precipitating decline in the introductory pages of its report (1928:5-6). 
While the Donoughmore commissioners derided the ‘communalism’ they found 
rampant in the island’s politics (31, 41), they nevertheless implicitly adopted the 
notion of ethnic balances noting for example that the Ceylon Tamils for ‘various 
reasons, wholly admirable’ have ‘obtained political influence somewhat 
disproportionate to their numerical strength.’ (92). The Commissioners also noted that 
the advocates for full self government were always from ‘the larger communities’ who 
if freed ‘from external control would be able to impose their will on all who dissented 
from them’ (31). Meanwhile the minorities ‘though united in no other respect, are 
solid in their opposition to the proposal’ (31). The Commissioners set as their 
objective the development of a ‘free, united and democratic nation’ (91) and argued 
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that only the abolition of communal representation would foster the ‘various 
communities to develop together to a true national identity’ (99).  
Similarly the Soulbury Commission report, spoke of the majority as being ‘entitled’ to 
a ‘proportionate share in all aspects of Government activity’ (1945:53). The 
Commission characterised ethnic harmony as one of good behaviour by the majority. 
One the one hand it warned sternly that it ‘will behove the Sinhalese majority to take 
the utmost care to avoid giving cause for any suspicion of unfairness or partiality’ (50). 
On the other hand the Commission also expressed confident that ‘the Government of 
Ceylon (presumably a Sinhalese government) is fully aware that the contentment of 
the minorities is essential not only to their own well being but to the well being of 
the Island as a whole’ (50; comments added). 
155 The debate on the Donoughmore constitution revealed a divide between the 
Sinhalese members and the minorities on this issue. A representative sample of the 
Sinhalese politicians include the following:  
A. C. G. Wijeyekoon: ‘Now the question with which we are very much concerned 
about is the extension of the franchise to the immigrant labourer. ... What we fear is – 
to put it plainly - ..... their numbers will increase beyond all proportion and swamp 
the country.’ (Legislative Council Debates: Nov 1, 1928, Col 1694).  
P. B. Rambukwelle: ‘We who fought to preserve the independence of this country for 
the last two thousand years ... we sincerely feel that if the proposed recommendations 
are carried into effect, the result will be not only the transference of the 
administration of the country from British and Ceylonese hands to the Indians, but 
Ceylon becoming eventually a part and parcel of India, which we certainly do not 
want it to be.’ (1928; Col 1669) 
156 G. G Ponnambalam was a barrister who entered the State Council in 1934. By the 
late 1930s he had established a position as the unofficial spokesperson of the Northern 
Province Sri Lankan Tamils (Russell 1982:297), although his position was heavily 
criticised by the Jaffna press (1982:291-3). In 1944 he, along with others, founded the 
All Ceylon Tamil Congress that was the largest Tamil political party until it was 
eclipsed by the Federal Party in 1956.  
157 The Jaffna newspaper the Morning Star summed up the differences between the 
two groups as a question of ‘whether the Tamil community is to assume an attitude of 
defence towards the majority community in the Island, and preventing it encroaching 
on our rights or misappropriating any share in the number of places we are entitled to 
in government service, or whether the attitude of the Tamil community should be 
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one of unsuspicious and trustful co-operation’ [July 6, 1934 quoted in Russell 
(1982:74)]. The two groups came to blows throughout 1933 (1982:39).  
158 Many well known Sinhala politicians attended the JYC’s annual sessions in Jaffna 
(Kadirgamar 1980:20, 39, 47; Russell 1982:292). However, some of the politicians who 
attended the sessions, such as A. E Goonesinha often later adopted openly anti Sri 
Lankan Tamil and anti Indian Tamil stands (Russell 1982:31; Wickramasinghe 
1995:135).  
159 R. Sri Pathmanathan (son in law of P. Ramanathan) sought an alliance with the 
Kandyans, but this was undermined by the issue of the Indian franchise and the quite 
deliberate manipulation by low country politicians, including D. S Senanayake, of 
conflict between the Kandyans and Sri Lankan Tamils (Russell 1982:235-242). By the 
early 1940’s G. G Ponnambalam had forged an alliance with the Indian Tamils 
(1982:243-248) 
160 Jane Russell says of the JYC’s 1933 conference, the last large gathering of its kind; 
‘Leading south Indian politicians came to speak at the conference and several portraits 
of Indian National Congress leaders were unveiled. Except for a homage to the Bo 
Tree, and a plea for colonisation of the Wanni by Ceylon Tamils, the conference 
might just as well have been conducted in South India, as there were almost no 
references at all to the current political situation in Ceylon’ (1982:50).  
161 The JYC was clearly rooted in Jaffna society and politics, although it forged links 
with Sinhalese and Indian politicians. All of the sessions, for example, were held in 
Jaffna.  
162 The JYC gained this influence partly because links with Indian politicians, who 
were popular and well known on the island, particularly the Jaffna peninsula. In 
particular the JYC was central to organising Gandhi’s 1927 visit to the island, 
including his highly popular visit to Jaffna (Kadirgamar 1980:27-38). The JYC also 
engaged successfully in direct political mobilization, giving the impression that it 
could mobilise popular opinion – as the Indian Congress did during the 1920’s. As 
Jane Russell notes, ‘The Jaffna Congress held its meetings in the villages, in the 
vernacular. The leaders who dressed in the verti and banian, talked freely with all, 
regardless of cast or social status, and were willing to enrol any person who wished to 
join’ (1982:28).  
163 H. A .P Sandarasagara, a Sinhalese politician interpreted the move as a form of 
Ulster Unionism, rather than pan Island nationalism stating ‘I’ll make Jaffna an Ulster 
and I’ll be its Lord Carson’ (De Silva 2005:528), the Governor also misinterpreted the 
boycott as stemming from the fact that the Tamils were unhappy with the level of 
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representation they would obtain in the State Council (528). However, other 
Sinhalese politicians sent messages of support (Kadirgamar 1980:80-81). The Soulbury 
Commission report similarly explained the boycott as a ‘protest against the abolition 
of communal representation’ (Colonial Office 1945:14).  
164 The demand for balanced representation began to be consolidated from 1933 
(Russell 1982:67, 187, 250-2) 
165 Ponnambalam gained over 70 per cent of the votes polled (de Silva 1979:186). 
Mahadeva had won in that constituency in the previous elections held in 1934 and 
1936 (1979:98).   
166 D. S Senanayake retained this post from 1931 until 1947 when he became Prime 
Minister. Following this his son, Dudley Senanayake took over the post of Agriculture 
and Lands Minister until he in turn became Prime Minister in 1953 (Farmer 
1957:144-4). 
167 The Dry Zone comprises around 70 per cent of the land area of the island (Farmer 
1957:3) and is relatively under populated; at the census of 1921 the four provinces 
(Northern, Eastern, North Central, North Western) that lie completely within the Dry 
Zone contained only 25 per cent of the population (Colonial Office 1928:165). Land 
development policy until the 1920’s had primarily relied on private enterprise 
(Farmer 1957:103-115), although between 1870 and 1890 there had been a vigorous 
policy of the government sponsored restoration of irrigation tanks, including man in 
the Eastern Province (1957:106). During the 1920s there was a noticeable shift in the 
emphasis of land policy from improving food production and generating government 
revenue to preserving the peasantry as an institution and relieving congestion in the 
over- crowded Wet Zone areas of the island (1957:116-123). This was laid out 
explicitly report of the Land Commission that was published in 1929 (1957:126) 
which called for government support for colonists; the Commission included a 
number of Sinhalese as well as Tamil politicians (1957:121). The Commission’s 
recommendations were finally incorporated into a Land Development Ordinance that 
was passed by the State Council in 1935 (1957:127).  
168 In the Land Development Ordinance the definition of Ceylonese was framed in 
such a way as to exclude Indian Tamils (Wickramasinghe 1995:191-192). Whereas the 
Indian Tamils were excluded by definition, Sri Lankan Tamils complained that they 
were discriminated against through executive and administrative acts (Russell 
1982:168). From 1900 – 1931, the Northern and Eastern provinces received almost 50 
per cent of total expenditure on irrigation, but after 1931 the share fell to 19 per cent 
(1982:170).  
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For example A. Canagaratnam, a Tamil representative from the Northern Province 
complained of discrimination in relation to colonization schemes during a debate on 
Donoughmore Report in 1928:  
‘It was a small administrative problem, the Nachchadua Colonization Scheme. There 
was a Committee sitting on this question – a Committee on which the Tamils were a 
in ... a very small minority. ..... but the members of that Committee thought that the 
scheme could not be worked except by a ‘homogenous’ community and in that 
scheme they would not include members of any community other than one – the 
majority community’ (Council Debates; Nov 20, 1928).  
Similarly in 1939 G. G Ponnambalam complained of:  
‘the scant attention paid to colonization and to the production of paddy and to food 
production both in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the recent rejection of the 
scheme of the Director of Irrigation to spend Rs. 3, 000, 000 for food production in 
Kalmunai in the South of Batticaloa, the finest paddy – production district in Ceylon – 
these things alone, if any proof is needed will justify the demands of the minorities’ 
(Ponnambalam 2001:187).  
Meanwhile as a result of the expenditure on irrigation works in Batticaloa during the 
nineteenth century, this province was able to export rice to Jaffna and other parts of 
the island (De Silva 2005:385). Similarly the system of agriculture on the overcrowded 
Jaffna peninsula was – compared to other regions on the island – intensive and 
efficient (2005:387)(Farmer 1957:50). 
169 G. G Ponnambalam asked for a colonisation scheme for the Jaffna peninsula in 
1939 because of the rising levels of unemployment (Russell 1982:24). The percentage 
of landless families in Jaffna (31.7 per cent) and Batticaloa (57.8 per cent) (Farmer 
1957:66) was also comparable to the range of landlessness in the districts of the Wet 
Zone (from a low of 14.2 per cent in Colombo to a high of 41.8 per cent in Nuwara 
Eliya) (1957:89). (NB much of the landless population in Nuwara Eliya may well have 
been the Tamil labourers in the plantation districts).  
 
170 ‘After the Commission had finished its work in Ceylon, D.S Senanayake was 
invitied to England by the Secretary of State for discussions .... Interestingly, 
Senanayake had made it plain to the Governor that he was not prepared to sit around 
a table with G. G Ponnambalam. Colonel Stanley decided not to provide 
representatives of any particular group with passage facilities and all delegations were 
received separately. ... G.G Ponnambalam saw the Secretary of State .... for half an 
hour..’ (Wickramasinghe 1995:202-3). 
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171 For the centrality of economic development to Congress conceptions of national 
interest see Austin (1972: Chapter 2), Goswami (2004: Chapter 7) and Chatterjee 
(1986, Chapter 5.) and Corbridge and Harriss (2000, Chapter 2). 
172 The Congress’ retained its dominance from independence to 1967. During this 
period it won majorities in all of the elections to the national (or Union) legislature 
and all – but one (Kerala in 1957) of the elections in the sub-national (or state) level 
legislatures. This period was described as the ‘dominant party system’ in which 
competitive party politics existed without a change in government at the Union level 
and in most states (Kothari 1970). 
173 In fact the DK leader E V Ramaswamy had declared the day of Indian 
independence (August 15 1947) a day of national mourning. C N Annaduria, 
Ramaswamy’s principal lieutenant publicly disagreed with the DK leader on this point 
and went onto form the DMK (Ross-Barnett 1976). 
174 The Constituent Assembly was elected indirectly in July 1946 from the legislatures 
of the provincial councils (fresh provincial council elections had been held in the 
winter of 1945). Following independence and partition the Constituent Assembly also 
functioned as the Union parliament; Congress held 82 per cent of the seats in the 
assembly (Austin 1972:10-11).  
175 For brief biographies of these figures see Austin (1972:337-346) 
176 For a discussion of the differences between Vallabhhai Patel and the others on land 
reform and the inviolability of private property see Austin (1972:87-101) and 
Corbridge and Harriss (2000:45-49) 
177 This was particularly so as the debates took place in the context of independence 
and partition, and the large scale ethnic violence that ensued (Austin 1972:43-4). For 
further examples see 1972 (29, 140, 150, 189, 239, 273, 283) and King (1999:63).  
178 For a discussion of the politics of language and the historical relations between 
Urdu (linked to Persian and Arabic), Hindi (linked to Sanskrit) and Hindustani (the 
lingua franca across much of north India) see King (1999:74-81). For the Hindu 
nationalist promotion of Sanskritised Hindi see Kumar (1990) and Singh (2005).  
179 For a discussion of the battles between Hindu nationalists and ‘unity in diversity’ 
advocates on the national language and linguistic provinces issue see Austin 
(1972:236-243, Chapter 12) and King (1999: Chapter 3). 
180 For a discussion of the Telugu movement and its importance in triggering the 
process of linguistic reorganisation see Mitchell (2009). 
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181 As Ayesha Jalal notes the Congress was eventually happy to cede Pakistan in 
exchange for a strong centre and an early transition of power, something that Jinnah 
did not expect (1994).  
182 For a discussion of the ideological content of the DMK see Hardgrave (1965) as well 
as Ross Barnett (1976: Chapter 5, 9 & 10).  
183 For a discussion of Congress government’s responses to Sikh and Kashmiri 
movements see Brass (1994).  
184 For a discussion of the differences between the DK and the DMK and the events 
leading to the eventual split see Hardgrave (1965), Spratt (1970), Ross-Barnett (1976) 
and Subramanian (1999). 
185 Disputes between Tamils and Telugus over the status of Madras city became 
significant in the months leading up to independence. Congress had included the 
linguistic reorganisation of provinces in its manifesto for the elections in late 1945/6 
and most Tamil and Telugu Congress politicians expected that a new Congress 
government would work quickly to implement this promise (Mitchell 
2009)(Rengaswamy 2006).  
186 The TAK’s eventual ejection from Congress is due to the factional differences 
between Rajagopalachariar and Kamraj (Rengaswamy 2006).  
187 ‘Nehru ... knew, however, that the Tamils and Rajagopalachari would themselves 
fast to death rather than relinquish Madras City as their capital, now would they ever 
agree to a shared capital. That part of Sriramulu’s demands Nehru could never have 
granted; it would have cost him far too dearly in Tamil support and made of 
Rajagopalachari an implacable enemy instead of an occasional headache’ (King, R.D 
1999:114). 
188 Non Congress coalition governments – often fractious and unstable – were formed 
in Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and 
Kerala (Chatterjee 1997:15). 
189 These included for example the alliances that were formed by Ramaswamy with 
Kamraj and then Rajagopalachariar against the DMK. The DMK then formed an 
alliance with Indira Gandhi’s Congress (R) against the Tamil Nadu Congress led by 
Kamraj.  
190 Karunanidhi assumed the leadership of the DMK after CN Annadurai’s death in 
1969, he continues to retain that post.  
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191 By February 1956 the UNP had adopted the policy that Sinhala ‘Only’ should be 
the official language (Wilson 1994:59). The 1965-1970 UNP led national government 
replaced Sundays as public holidays with Poya days (that coincided with the waxing 
and waning of the moon) that were of significance to Buddhists (Wilson 1979:18). 
Following its 1977 landslide electoral victory (see table below) the UNP introduced a 
new constitution that gave to Buddhism the ‘foremost place’ and entrusted the state 
with the duty to ‘protect and foster the Buddha Sasana’ whilst also affirming that the 
‘Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala’ (Ponnambalam 1983:197-8).  
192 Figures collected from de Silva (1979). See also Appendix Two 
193 Tamil nationalism as a political movement had its base mainly amongst the Sri 
Lankan Tamils concentrated in the Northern and Eastern provinces (see map). There 
were also other Tamil speaking minorities –the Muslims and the Indian Tamils, 
primarily plantation workers who were mainly in the Central Province. However, 
these populations have not become part of the Tamil nationalist project.  The Muslims 
speak Tamil but in politics tend to ‘identify themselves with the Sinhalese leadership 
in national politics’ (Wilson 1979:48) and have not made demands for territorial 
autonomy or equality in terms of official recognition of Tamil. The Indian Tamils 
meanwhile have tended to be represented Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) and the 
Democratic Workers Congress (DWC). These parties have generally worked with 
which-ever party is in government (155-6). Tamil nationalism as a political project 
has therefore been a Sri Lankan Tamil phenomenon. The term Tamil is used here 
therefore to refer to the Sri Lankan Tamils.   
194 As Mick Moore states, the ‘use of state power for the benefit of the ordinary 
Sinhalese has been, and remains, the primary legitimation, implicit or explicit, of all 
governments elected since 1956 at least, and arguably, since 1931’ (1985:29).  
195 The following figures are taken from Wilson (1979:156-9). 
196 The schemes did not increase overall food production or returns on the capital 
investment – and mainly functioned to establish beneficiaries with the status of 
‘landowners’ (Farmer 1957). 
197 From the July 1960 elections, the ‘proportion of votes won by each of the two 
major contenders has remained remarkably stable. The UNP proportion has held 
between 37 and 40 per cent, while the SLFP proportion has varied by only a slightly 
wider margin, from 30 to 37 per cent’ (Kearney 1973:95). Furthermore from 1956, the 
pattern of electoral support in most constituencies in the Sinhala electorates was 
aligned with nationwide swings rather than dependent upon local peculiarities (Jupp 
1978:210-5). Political parties have thus come to dominate electoral politics and in the 
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1970 general election, ‘all but two of the 151 parlaimentary seats and 94 per cent of 
the popular votes were captured by parties that had been in existence for at least 19 
years’ (Kearney 1973:100).  
198 In 1970, before these measures were introduced, 48 per cent of students in the 
Engineering and the Medicine and Dental faculties were Tamil. By 1983 this had 
fallen to 28 per cent for the Engineering faculty and 22 per cent for the Medicine and 
Dental faculty (Manogaran 1987:125).  
199 For details see Bose (1994) or Wilson (1979).  
200 Between 1956 and 1970, the proportion of Tamils employed in the elite 
Administrative Services fell from 30 per cent to 5 per cent, in the Professional and 
Technical services from 60 per cent to 10 per cent and in the Clerical Services from 50 
per cent to 5 percent.  
201 See for example note 136 above and also Wilson (1979:48).  
202 One FP MP defected in 1960 (Ponnambalam 1983:155) and two in 1977 (Jupp 
1978:139).  
203 See Hellman-Rajanayagam (1990).  
204 It contested 7 seats and won only 2 – See Appendix 3. 
205 Following D. S Senanayake’s death in March 1952, his son Dudley Senanayake had 
succeeded him as Prime Minister. The younger Senanayake resigned in October 1953 
due to illness, brought on by the stress of dealing with a budgetary crisis, that 
prompted the government to cut rice subsidies, a hugely unpopular measure. He was 
succeeded by his first cousin Sir John Kotelawala (Manor 1989:209-223).  
206 For accounts of the violence see Manor (1989:287-294), Tambiah (1992:51-57) and 
Vittachi (1958).  
207 For details see (Wilson 1994:94-96) and also Navaratnam (1991).  
208 Figures collated from De Silva (1979). See also Appendix Two 
209 The SLFP won 90 out of the 150 seats and 60 per cent of the vote (Wilson 
1979:159).  
210 In Batticaloa R.B Kadramer stood as an independent in 1952 but then in 1956 
(when the FP competed successfully for the first time in the constituency) adopted 
the label of the Batticaloa Tamil Speakers Front (De Silva 1979:133-4). In Kalkudah, V. 
Nalliah, the successful candidate for the UNP in 1952, competed unsuccessfully 
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against the FP in March 1960 under the banner of the Tamil Speakers Front 
(TSF)(1979:191). Finally in Padiruppu, the candidate U.S Ethirmanasingham, who 
stood unsuccessfully as an independent in 1952, stood successfully in 1956 under the 
Batticaloa Tamil Speakers Front (when the FP entered the contest for the first time) 
and polled 49.1 per cent of the vote (1979:250) 
211 Appendix Two 
212 For details of the agreements see Navaratnam (1991). 
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